

HISTORIA

Provinciae

THE JOURNAL OF REGIONAL HISTORY

A PERSON IN HIS TIME

Online scientific journal

2017 • Vol. 1 • No. 2



Cherepovets
2017

Publication: 2017 • Vol. 1 • No. 2 • JULY. Issued four times a year.

FOUNDER: Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education ‘Cherepovets State University’

The mass media registration certificate is issued by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). Эл №ФС77-70013 dated 31.05.2017

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Address of the publisher, editorial office, printing-office:

162600 Russia, Vologda region, Cherepovets, Prospekt Linacharskogo, 5.

OPEN PRICE

ISSN 2587-8352

Online media

10 standard published sheets

Publication: 27.07.2017

Format 60 × 84 ¹/₈.

Font style Times.

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Dear readers,



You have the opportunity to get acquainted with the second issue of the journal ‘Historia provinciae – the journal of regional history’. In this issue, we widened the space-time coordinates, although it was devoted mainly to the contemporary European history. In the centre of the publications is the person: an ordinary citizen, a politician, a government leader, a prisoner of war..., being engaged in their activities necessary both for themselves and the country, or even those who were in forced labour for the new masters, as in the article of the historian from Germany Elena von Klitzing.

History cannot remain unchanged. It flows following the time or is interpreted in accordance with the new demands, approaches and assessments of the past. Helmut Kohl was called a ‘provincial’ behind his back, meaning his origin, ‘rural’ habits and personality traits. However, this ‘provincial’ man in due time became the ‘chancellor of German unity’ and is now amongst the German state leaders along with Bismarck and Adenauer. Paul Hirsch also lived ‘in time of trial’, about which the Belorussian historian Mikhail Strelets narrates. However, despite his ethnic origin he succeeded as well, as the outstanding Prussian politician in the key region of Germany of the time.

In the article of the famous historian from Kemerovo Oleg Terekhov, another German is referred to – Oswald Spengler, whose ideas, were they implemented, would change the course of time for Germany. Professor of Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences Tatyana Labutina is writing practically about the same, reconstructing the political history of England of the new time. “Influence of the parties, behind which were standing the classes-proprietors who won in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, – as she maintains, – became so perceivable in the life of the society that it was practically impossible to imagine the ruling of the country without their participation”. And are we not witnessing now that these parties, although in a different time, decide the fate of Great Britain by exercising Brexit whilst leaving the European Union? The material published in ‘Historia provinciae’ are complemented by the reviews of E. Dobrovolsky and O. Smirnova on the relevant published monographs. In the section ‘Chronicle of scientific life’, there is some information relating to the scientific conference held in 2017 in Lipetsk, devoted to the honour of the well-known Russian historian A.I. Boroznyak, where B.V. Petelin, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of History and Philosophy at Cherepovets State University was one of the participants.

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DOI 10.23859/2587-8352-2017-1-2-1
UDC 329 (410)

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The political parties of England in the assessments of early enlighteners

Abstract. In the article, the author pays attention to the debatable character of the formation of political parties and the establishment of a bipartite system in England in the 17th – early 18th centuries, both in foreign and domestic historiography. Based on the analysis of the contemporaries' works of the era, the figures of the Enlightenment, H. Bolingbroke, J. Swift, D. Defoe, R. Steele, J. Addison, Marquess of Halifax, the conclusion is made regarding the first parties – the Whigs and the Tories – their existence at that moment and their struggle for power.

Keywords: England, 17th–18th centuries, political parties, the Whigs and the Tories, two-party system, enlighteners

Introduction

The problem of the formation of political parties and that of a bipartisan system in England during the last two centuries remained one of the debatable issues in British historiography. Prior to the 20th century, virtually no scientist questioned the existence of any parties in the late 17th – early 18th centuries. The term ‘parties’ was used by the English educators of the 18th century G. Bolingbroke, J. Defoe, J. Swift, F. Chesterfield. D. Hume singled out “the principles that make up the very nature of our constitution” as the main criterion that was underlying the division of parliamentary factions into parties¹. Apparently, the educator set the ideology at the forefront of the party division.

In the 19th – early 20th centuries, the historians spoke unanimously about the existence of the political parties in the preceding century. Moreover, the representatives

¹ Hume D. Of the Parties of Great Britain. *Hume D. Essays*. London, 1923, p. 90.

of the ‘Whig’ trend in the British historiography (T.B. Macaulay, S. Kent, K. Feiling, J. Trevelyan)² asserted that the contemporary parties of liberals and the conservatives were direct ‘descendants’ of the Whigs and the Tories of the 18th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, several scientists (I. Balmer-Thomas, J. Western, J. Jones, B. Coward)³ agreed with the concept of their predecessors. At the same time, some historians (L. Namier, R. Walcott) began to challenge such a claim. In Namier's view, by 1760 there were no proper party organizations, although the names of the parties existed⁴. Per the American scientist, R. Walcott, at the early stage of its development, Britain's political system was a multi-party one⁵. At the beginning of the 21st century, there were several innovative works (J. Clarke, B. Hilton, J. Hoppit)⁶, whose authors entered polemics with the supporters of liberal and Marxist interpretations of British history of the 17th–18th centuries. As an example, Clarke proposed to consider the period of 1660–1832 as ‘a long 18th century’, emphasizing the continuity in the development of the British society within the specified chronological framework. The emergence of opposition political forces that manifested themselves at the time, he linked with the influence of the religious dissenters who, claiming the demands of religious freedom, switched to political struggle. The modern historian J. Black, reflecting on the early parties of the 17th century, argued that the Whig party was most likely “a group associated with informal ties, ambitions and ideology, rather than party discipline and centralized management”⁷. It should be noted that the analysis of the discussion that unfolded in the English-language historiography with regards to the problem of early political parties and formation of a bipartisan system was covered in detail by contemporary Russian scientists V.N. Erokhin and A.A. Kiselev⁸.

² Macaulay T.B. *History of England from the accession to the throne of James II.* T.B. Macaulay T.B. *Full composition of writings.* V. XI. St Petersburg, 1864; Kent C.B. *Early History of the Tories, 1660–1702.* London, 1908; Feiling K. *History of the Tory Party. 1640–1714.* Oxford, 1924; Trevelyan G.M. *England under the Stuarts.* London, 1937.

³ Bulmer-Thomas I. *The Growth of the British Party System.* L., 1967; Western J.R. *Monarchy and Revolution. The English State in 1680's.* L., 1972; Jones J.R. *Country and Court. England, 1659–1714.* Cambridge, 1978; Coward B. *The Stuart Age. A History of England. 1603–1714.* London, NY., 1980.

⁴ Namier L. *The Structure of Politics in the Accession of George III.* Vol. I. London, 1929, p. VII.

⁵ Walcott R. *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth-Century.* Cambridge, 1956.

⁶ Clark J.C.D. *English Society 1688–1832. Religion, Ideology and Politics during the Ancient Regime.* Cambridge, 2000; Hilton B. *Bad, Mad and Dangerous People? England 1688–1727.* Oxford, 2006; Hoppit J. *A Land of Liberty? England, 1689–1727.* Oxford, 2000.

⁷ Black J. *The History of the British Isles.* St Petersburg, 2008, p. 228.

⁸ Erokhin V.N. Political parties and society in the UK in the late 17th – early 19th centuries: a historiographical sketch. *Political Parties of England. Historical Essays.* St Petersburg, 2017, pp. 16–30; Kiselev A.A. The problem of the formation of the English bipartisan system in historiography. *Political Parties of England. Historical Essays. Decree. Op,* pp. 31–42.

Soviet historians studied the problem of originating of the parties in the context of British political history, without paying special attention to it. And only in the last decades, the scientists began to actively engage in the history of the parties of conservatives, liberals and laborites of the 19th–21st centuries. (M.V. Zholudov, M.P. Aizenshtat, T.N. Gella, E.O. Naumenkova, A.Y. Prokopov, E.G. Blossfeld and others)⁹, when a two-party system already existed in England. Few scientists have addressed the history of the early political parties. The problem of the formation of early Tories and Whigs was first raised by us in a few works¹⁰. S.B. Semenov and M.A. Kovalev wrote about the parties of the middle – second half of the 18th century¹¹. Whilst the above-mentioned historians defend the possibility of existence of early parties in England in the late 17th – early 18th centuries, Sokolov, following in the wake of several foreign historians (primarily J. Clarke), questioned it¹². If the discussion in the historiography regarding the emergence of parties continues, the sources of that era contain irrefutable facts confirming their existence. This applies primarily to the writings of the Enlightenment figures, who not only acted as party ideologists, but also openly declared their involvement in the Tories or the Whigs. As an example, a well-known journalist and educator, Richard Steele, speaking in the House of Commons, directly stated: “I am a Whig and have been sent here (to the parliament – T.L.) by

⁹ See: Political Parties of England. Historical Essays. Decree. Op. 136–333.

¹⁰ Labutina T.L. *Political struggle in England during the Restoration of the Stuarts (1660–1681)*. Moscow, 1982, pp. 80–192; Ibid. The formation of a two-party system in England in covering bourgeois historiography. *Questions of history*. Moscow, 1984, no. 4; Ibid. Ideology of political parties in England in the period of formation of a bipartisan system (Review of foreign literature). *England of the 17th Century: Ideology, Politics, Culture*. St Petersburg, 1992; Ibid. The concept of political parties and party opposition in the ideology of the early English Enlightenment. *Fight Ideas in a Changing World: Actual problems of Politics and Ideology of the 19th–20th centuries*. Ufa, 1993; Ibid. The predecessors of the English liberals. The strategy and tactics of the Whigs in the early period of their activity. *European Liberalism in Modern Times. Theory and Practice*. Moscow, 1995; Ibid. Political parties in England in the era of the early Enlightenment. *Questions of General History*. Ryazan, 1997; Ibid. At the origins of British conservatism: the ideology and politics of the first Tories. *Conservatism in Russia and Western Europe*. Voronezh, 2005; Ibid. *The formation of political parties in England and their struggle in the Restoration Parliaments (1660–1681)*. Vladimir, 2010.

¹¹ Semenov S.B. *Political Views of British Radicals of the 18th Century*. Samara, 1995; Ibid. *Radical Movement and Struggle for Parliamentary Reform in England in the Second Half of the 18th Century*. Samara, 2008; Ibid. National Association and the movement for parliamentary reform in England in the 18th century. *Political Parties in England. Historical Essays. Decree. Op*, pp. 120–135; Kovalev M.A. The Tory party in the age of the Whig oligarchy in the domestic historiography. *The British World. History of Britain: Modern Research*. Moscow, 2015, pp. 195–201; Ibid. Parliamentary parties in the mid-18th century in the views of conservative opposition theorists (G. Bolingbroke, D. Hume). *British Parliament Yesterday and Today*. Moscow, 2016, pp. 169–177; Ibid. The Tory party in opposition: The ideology of intellectuals of the mid-18th century. *Political Parties of England. Historical Essays. Decree. Op*, pp. 101–119.

¹² *Questions of history*, 2006, no. 7, p. 167.

this party”¹³. We will try to find out to what extent such claims are justified, by referring to the creative legacy of the early enlighteners who personified themselves with representatives of political parties. It should be noted that these being the first attempts to address this issue, we undertook it in the context of studying the ideology of the enlightenment movement¹⁴.

Main text

In the reign of the last Stuarts, King William of Orange and Queen Anne (1689–1714), the Tory and the Whig parties began to play a significant role in the political life of the country. The influence of the parties, behind which there stood the classes-owners as the victors in the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, became so tangible in the life of the society that it was practically impossible to imagine the government of the country without their participation. In the arsenal of bourgeois ideologists, theories began to appear that justified the need to govern the country by alternating party ministries, which in fact legitimized the existence of political parties in the state structure of the government. Enlighteners, who had made their choice of political orientation based on the socio-economic status and joined one of the parties, became defenders and guides of Tories’ or Whigs’ ideas. Strange as it may seem, but none of the works of the educators represented positive assessments of the division in the society that had arisen in the society. On the contrary, the Enlightenment often spoke with condemning speeches about the party strife. As an example, the journalist R. Steele expressed fears that the ‘frantic party zeal’, when it reaches its full strength, can lead to a civil war and bloodshed in the country. Party conflicts, in his opinion, not only destroy the virtue and reasoning of people because of the ‘barbaric’ relationship of one party to another, but also instill hostility in the English, “rip their souls, transmitting these feelings and prejudices to their descendants”¹⁵.

Offensive political epithets were given to the political parties by the Marquess of Halifax, who himself for several years headed the Whigs. In the pamphlet ‘Thoughts and Reflections about Politics’, he argued that the “party enmity divided the world into two camps”. Halifax emphasized that many people hasten to join one of the parties ‘hurriedly’, without going into the goals and tasks that the Tories and the Whigs were setting themselves. Some fell into the ranks of the party through ignorance, “just not to stay out of work”, and only ‘a sense of shame’ keep them from leaving the party. In the party, as a rule, no one can express their own opinion, everyone should be content with the generally accepted provisions. And although the opposition party

¹³ A speech supposed to be spoken by R. Steele, Esq. at the opening this Parliament. London, 1714, p. 7.

¹⁴ Labutina T.L. *At the Roots of Modern Democracy. The Political Thought of English*. Moscow, 1994; Ibid. *The Culture and Power in the Era of the Enlightenment*. Moscow, 2005.

¹⁵ Steele R. *Sir Roger De Coverley. Essays from the Spectator*. Boston, 1882, p. 115, 119.

criticizes the administration consisting of representatives of the ruling party, it is however concerned not with the eradication of mistakes and abuse committed by it, but only by its self-interests¹⁶. Halifax stressed that the opposition party did not think at all that it could commit even more serious sins when it comes to power. Overestimating one's capabilities without trying to look at oneself critically, the parties, as a rule, were not able to succeed, especially if the question was about the resignation of the government. Most of all, Halifax resented the fact that the parties spoke on behalf of the people. "The parties in the state are like pirates who masquerade into false clothes", he wrote in the treatise 'State Principles'. "They put forward demands for the people's good, but in reality, they pursue their real benefits". Based on the foregoing, Halifax concluded: the parties "disgrace the whole of England"¹⁷.

The well-known writer J. Swift spoke out with the condemnation of the party struggle; for many years, he worked closely with both parties. "Unfortunately," he wrote in 'The Examiner', "we split into two parties, each claiming a dominant position in the state and the church government and differing from each other only by means of struggle". The writer considered the names of the 'Tory' and the 'Whig' parties 'stupid nicknames'. Swift devoted a lot of articles to the issue of the parties in the journal 'The Examiner'. He recalled that for the first time, the parties emerged in the reign of King Charles II of Stuart (1660–85), then existed until the Glorious Revolution and have since been preserved, although their names now reflect other principles. Swift noted that the Whigs are those who approve the Glorious Revolution, as opposed to the Applicant (son of King James II Stuart – T.L.), and who consider it necessary to limit the monarchy by the law that the executive branch has no right to abolish and accept tolerance. With regards to the Tory party, the pamphleteer included people who supported the hereditary right of monarchs and considered their personality sacred and inviolable.

Swift expressed his unflattering position on the Whigs. He believed that this party was headed by "a few upstarts or ruined people who sought first and foremost to fix their own financial situation and therefore their first task was to get rich at the expense of the state treasury". Swift paid attention to the variegated social composition of the Whigs, explaining it by the fact that those forced to seek support from the various sectors of the Whig society attracted even those whose views on religion and state government were not orthodox at all. On the pages of 'The Examiner', he noted with a twist of irony: the Whigs "treat the monarchy and the church with due respect,

¹⁶ *The Complete Works of George Savile First Marquess of Halifax*. Oxford, 1912 (hereinafter referred to as – The Complete Works of Halifax), pp. 225–227.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 182, 226–227.

even when they take serious steps to undermine both”¹⁸. But he described the Tory party as the most suitable for the state administration.

The famous journalist J. Addison raised the question of the sources for the party enmity to appear in the country. The Enlightener drew attention to the fact that in England, during the reign of Queen Anne, the interest in politics in various strata of the society was noticeably more active. With humor, the journalist wrote in one of the numbers of ‘the Freeholder’: “Our island, which was formerly called the nation of saints, can now rightly be called the nation of state men. Almost every representative of it, regardless of age, profession or gender, has its own view on ministers and their government”. Addison showed how various issues of state policy aroused close interest among representatives of all walks of life. The English nobility is a ‘politician from birth’ and teaches communities how to entrust their power to those representatives who can be controlled through jurisdiction or privileges, and in this way, restrict the legislative power. University students, rural yeomen, squires, world judges – everyone was interested in politics. The fair sex equaled men: hardly any woman would be found in the kingdom, who had not heard of the contradictions in the church or the state. In a word, concluded Addison, “every member of the society is aware of the changes in the constitution and is well versed in state affairs”¹⁹. And in this society, well-orientated in politics, the discord begins; open hostility to each other is sparked by party disagreements, and sometimes just belonging to this or that party. “Our children join the factions before they even know where the right hand is and where is their left,” Addison wrote in ‘The Freeholder’. “They barely learned to speak, but the words ‘Whigs’ and ‘Tories’ become their first in life. Even in infancy they are trained to hate one half of the nation and take control of all the malice and fury of the party before they get the mind”²⁰. With the condemnation of the party feud, Addison appeared on the pages of ‘The Spectator’. The parties make honest gentlemen hate each other, he wrote. “It cannot fall on a country a more terrible punishment than this terrible spirit of discord, which divides the state into two different people and makes its people hostile and alien to each other”. The Enlightener emphasized that the party strife was harmful to the society. The party spirit influenced the morals and sound judgments of members of the society, revealed pre-assets for external enemies. Finally, when “a fierce party spirit flares up in full force, it causes civil war and bloodshed ... it fills the nation with vengeful hatred and destroys all the germs of good, compassion and humanity”²¹.

¹⁸ The Examiner. London, 1712, p. 13, 104, 111, 163, 166.

¹⁹ Addison J. *The Freeholder or Political Essay*. London, 1751, p. 302–303, 305.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 302.

²¹ /Addison J./ *Selections from Addison’s Papers Contributed to the Spectator*. Oxford, 1894, p. 40–41.

Addison noted that during the period of political crises, the party struggle caused ‘the strongest ferment’ even in the minds of the weaker sex. “In all the city, there is hardly a person who does not consider herself capable of judging the most complicated disputes, church and state,” the journalist testified in one of the issues of the journal ‘The Freeholder’. “Oyster sellers are convinced of the illegality of our bishops, and the maidens affirm the inviolability of their rights”. The Enlightener believed that the ‘party zeal’ would only give “incited hatred and party strife among men and to a large extent deprive women of that natural charm with which they are endowed with birth”²².

In one of the issues of the journal ‘The Spectator’, Addison ironically portrayed a fictitious sketch of a visit to the theatre, where he drew attention to two groups of women who were lodged in the opposites and were ready to fight each other. He noticed that the ‘flies’ adorned the faces of women were attached differently: some on the right side of the face, others – on the left. It was also noteworthy that the ladies exchanged ‘extremely hostile glances’ with each other. In the middle boxes, there were a lot of ladies whose ‘flies’ were glued on both sides of the face, and at first glance it seemed that those ladies had come to the theatre for the sole purpose: to listen to the opera. Meanwhile, to the outside observer, it became clear that the ladies sitting in the middle, kept neutrality. However, day by day the number of the latter noticeably reduced, which could be determined by how their flies moved to the ‘Tory’ or the ‘Whig’ side, depending on which party they joined. Evil tongues argued that in those ‘movements’ a big role was played by men, the locations of whom the ladies sought, and that the flies were attached to the right or left in accordance with the principles of the man, whom these ladies favored. And only a few of them acted based on their own principles or in the interests of the fatherland, Addison concluded²³. He condemned such ‘party’ activity of women, believing that the ladies should rather promote the unity than the strife of the parties.

In disapproval of the party divisions, Addison proposed to unite the efforts of all people, regardless of their party affiliation, against a common enemy. “As for me,” he wrote, “I sincerely would like all honest people to unite in the society for the mutual support, whatever party they belong to ... We should not continue to treat our compatriots as Whigs or Tories, but consider deserved people as our friends, and in scoundrels to see our enemies”²⁴.

²² Addison J. Essay from the magazine ‘The Freeholder’. *England in a Pamphlet. English Publicist Prose of the Early 18th Century*. Moscow, 1987, pp. 92–93; Addison J. Selections from Addison’s Papers Contributed to the Spectator. Op. cit, p. 258.

²³ Ibid, pp. 256–258.

²⁴ The Freeholder...Op. cit, pp. 302–305; Addison J. *Selections from Addison’s Papers Contributed to the Spectator*. Op. cit, pp. 40–43.

Condemning the division of the society into parties and emphasizing its disastrous consequences for the country, almost all educators preferred to declare their ‘nonparty’ status. Mr. Bolingbroke argued that his views “differed from the arguments, both Tories and Whigs”²⁵. The famous writer D. Defoe stated that he was writing his pamphlets not for the sake of remuneration or serving the party, but exclusively “for the sake of the society”. Swift preferred to act as a peacemaker for the disputing parties, and Addison declared his neutrality. What explains the desire of the Enlightenment to dissociate themselves from the parties and declare their ‘nonparty’ status? There were many reasons for this. First, these were fears for personal safety, which were experienced by the most famous pamphleteers and journalists who stood guard over the interests of one or another party and supported them on the pages of the opposition press. As an example, Defoe, who was in the service of the Tory Ministry, but who continued to sympathize with the Whig ideas, eventually lost the confidence of both parties. “Two days ago,” Defoe wrote in the ‘Review’, “I simultaneously received two letters: one from an angry Whig, and the other from an angry Jacobite (a supporter of James II Stewart – T.L.). The first threatens to hang me when his party comes back to power, and the other threatens to kill immediately”²⁶. Serious fears for his safety were voiced by Swift as well. When in 1710 there was a threat of changing the Tory cabinet, to strengthen the position of which the enlightener had done a lot, Swift had to turn to the Secretary of State St. John (Lord Bolingbroke) for help. “After dinner, I took him aside,” Swift later recalled, “and recalling all the services that I (the Tory ministers – T.L.) provided to them (for the Tory ministers) and for which they did not ask for any compensation, believing that at least, I can count on security, “and asked to be sent abroad” before the onset of change”²⁷.

Not the least role among the reasons forcing pamphleteers and journalists to declare their ‘non-partisanship’ was played by their mercantile considerations. In one of the numbers of ‘The Spectator’, Addison said that he received many letters reproaching him for violating the ancient Greek law, which forbade any person to remain neutral when the entire population of the country was split into parties. Nevertheless, the educator considered it necessary to take a neutral position, believing that “he will lose all his influence if he sinks to insults of any party”. It is not improbable that the journalist was afraid to lose not only his readers' confidence, but also the revenues that his publication brought.

The statements about ‘non-partisanship’ were made deliberately, in our opinion, also so that the enlighteners could appear in the eyes of public opinion as independent

²⁵ Bolingbroke. The idea of the King-Patriot. *Bolingbroke. Letters on the Study and Use of History*. Moscow, 1978, p. 208.

²⁶ /Defoe D./ *A Review*. Vol. 8. London, 1711, p. 339.

²⁷ Swift J. *A Diary for Stella*. Moscow, 1981, p. 252.

journalists or pamphleteers who were able to express not someone else's opinion but their own. Thus, the Enlightenment hoped to attract as many supporters as possible to the party's side.

In reality, the attitude of the Enlightenment to the parties depended on whose interests they defended themselves. As a rule, those who supported 'money interests' (Defoe, Steele, Addison), spoke with the most flattering appraisals of the Whig party and its policies. Those who were closer to the interests of the 'land people' (Swift, Bolingbroke), with obvious antipathy spoke about the Whigs and their principles, often distorted the goals of this party to compromise it in the eyes of the public opinion, but at the same time praising the Tory party in every way. It is noteworthy that Addison pointed out this feature when he asked himself what had brought the English into the ranks of this or that party. In his opinion, most fellow citizens when choosing a party, were guided by their education and personal gain. Addison rightly argued that the disputes between the parties were devoid of any adherence to principles and were conducted primarily "because of the highest positions in state government", and therefore most the ruling party "in reality, agrees with the opinion of those who are in opposition". Addison also managed to notice the fact that 'land' and 'monetary interests' rested at the heart of party divisions²⁸.

It should be noted that many educators pointed to the common interests of both parties. In the words of Defoe and Addison, the idea of identity of the goals of both parties was expressed, first, as satisfaction of their own mercantile interests, as well as unwillingness to accept any changes in the public administration. Bolingbroke spoke about the same thing, stressing that the Tories who came to power pursued the same "material benefits in personal and party interests as the Whigs". He noted that the Tories had come to the palace in the reign of Queen Anne, "to take the government into their own hands, to attenuate the Whigs so that the Queen turned her favor to the Tories, entrusting them with important positions in the kingdom"²⁹.

Perhaps another thing united the Tories and the Whigs. This was the use by both parties of the people masses as a kind of pressure lever in their struggle. In the reign of the last Stuarts, the political activity of not only the upper and middle strata of England, but also of the lower classes, had sharply increased. Defoe on the pages of the magazine 'The Review' wrote: "Our plowmen talk about poor management of the court, while the mob sings ballads and writes lampoons against the government, seeing in taxes, war and the behavior of ministers of abuse"³⁰. Such an activity of people's lower classes was often used for their purposes by both parties. "We (the

²⁸ /Addison J./ Selections ... Op. cit, p. 45.

²⁹ Bolingbroke H. St. *A Letter to Sir William Windham*. London, 1787, p. 13.

³⁰ Wilson W. *Memoirs of the Life and Times of Daniel Defoe, containing a Review of his Writings and his Opinions upon a Variety of Important Matters Civil and Ecclesiastical*. London, 1830, vol. 2, p. 394.

Whigs) used the crowd for various reasons, directing its efforts to eliminate any abuses. But when the work was finished, the mob did not have anything bad in mind”, Defoe acknowledged with cynicism³¹.

Meanwhile, the elements of the crowd evoked fears of the propertied strata. Defoe also wrote the following: “People are made disobedient, furious, and sometimes just unreasonable” during the street protests. At the same time, “property ceases to be protected”, which may lead subsequently to a ‘general revolution’³². Considering the foregoing, Defoe urged the parties with special caution to attract the lower classes to their side and rely on them ‘up to a certain limit’, since the direction of their spontaneous movement is unpredictable. “The so-called people, the crowd, the mob, like a large raft in a river flowing out of the sea, gathers speed and rushes down the river, sweeping everything in its path, and nothing can stop it, but it's worth the strength of the current to weaken, or change the direction of the river; it immediately turns back with the same force as before, moving in the opposite direction. Thus, there is no benefit of this crowd to either party,” the enlightener concluded³³. Fears that people's lower ranks used by the political parties as a lever of pressure can oppose the powers that be, forced the bourgeois enlightener to demand the publication of more severe laws aimed at subordinating the people to the authorities”. From all this, it becomes clear to me that the degree of subordination to the government should be properly controlled by the laws,” and the goal of any government is primarily to “prevent riots and confusion among the people, that is, in short, protect us from the crowd, from the mob”, Defoe concluded³⁴. Apparently, in the masses of the people, the educator saw a more danger for his party than in the political opponents. And although he tactically allowed the use of the lower classes to defeat the Tory party, he simultaneously confirmed that it was easy to reach a compromise with the last Whigs if it was necessary to ‘curb’ the elements of the masses.

It became obvious from the statements of the enlighteners that in the party struggle they were defending interests of the propertied classes. And indeed, although the party representatives claimed that they defended the national interests, but in practice it became obvious that this was not true. This fact was recognized even by some of the enlighteners. For example, Halifax argued that the parties “put forward demands for the people's good, but pursue their real benefits”³⁵. Meanwhile, most educators continued to advocate the idea that the Tories or the Whigs (depending on which party the ideologist was attached to) expressed the interests of all sectors of society and

³¹ Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 103–104.

³² /Defoe D. / *A True Collection of the Writings of the Author of the True-Born Englishman*. Vol. I. London, 1703, p. 451.

³³ Defoe D. *The Shortest Way to Peace and Union. Famous Pamphlets*. London, 1890, p. 452.

³⁴ Defoe D. *A Hymn to the Mob*. London, 1715, p. 1.

³⁵ *The Complete Works of Halifax*, p. 182.

fight for their own good. At the same time, they shyly concealed the fact that the “blessing of the people” meant exclusively some benefit for the bourgeois and the ‘new’ nobles. The class orientation in the ideology of the Enlightenment became more and more obvious. As for most ordinary Englishmen, who were far from politics, the preferred choice of the party was of no fundamental importance to them.

Since in the reign of the last Stuarts in England there was a process of formation of a bipartisan system, the enlighteners could not ignore the problem of the party opposition. Most detailed issues were covered by Bolingbroke. To reflect on the need to create a party opposition in the government of the country, the educator appealed when he found himself in emigration in France after accession to the English throne of George I of Hanover. Out of work, the prominent British civil servant could not hide his disappointment with the changes that had taken place in the country, because of which he hated that the Whig party won. Contemporary parties seemed to Bolingbroke ‘wretched worms of the earth’, which were capable of ‘poisoning everything around’. The favorite topics of the discussions for these parties, in his opinion, were ‘bribery and dependence’. The parties “stand up for the first as a means of government, worthy of praise, and for the second – I mean the corrupt, hidden entanglement – as an integral part of our constitution,” he wrote in ‘A Dissertation upon Parties’. To contradict such negative phenomena in the political life of the society, the educator offered to create an opposition party. In detail, this issue was considered by him in the work ‘Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism’. “Anyone who aspires to destroy the constitution, who pursues only ambition and self-interest, thirsts for power and personal enrichment, ... should be resisted if this is possible and they are not completely mired in vices,” Bolingbroke wrote. For this purpose, it is necessary to create an opposition. Meanwhile, many political figures of the country believe, the educator continued, that the creation of an opposition to a dishonest government is voluntary, and therefore every person has the right to enter it and leave it when they please. Bolingbroke regarded this opinion as a delusion. He considered creating opposition to bad management the duty of every honest person. Bolingbroke was sure that the party that “is oppositional and acts systematically, giving preference to the wise before the stupid, honest before the dishonest in government, will enjoy great respect, authority and will easily achieve the goal”³⁶.

It remained unclear from the arguments of Bolingbroke, which ultimate goal the opposition pursued. Did it suggest a change in the form of a government or removal of officials, or, confining themselves to their formal admission, allowed only a few critical remarks about the government officials of all ranks? The enlightener did not

³⁶ Bolingbroke. Discourse on the parties Bolingbroke. *Letters on the Study and Use of History. Decree*. Op, p. 182; Bolingbroke. Lord Viscount H. St. John. *Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism*. London, 1757, p. 22, 62.

give any answer to these questions. In the Bolingbroke's theory, attention is drawn to the fact that he made distinctions between the opposition of the king and ministers. Bolingbroke regarded criticism of the king as an 'unconstitutional' act, considering at the same time, that the actions of ministers should be criticized by the opposition. Apparently, in the 'opposition' theory, Bolingbroke believed the king could not 'act badly', and the highest officials of the state-ministers were responsible for governing the country. Important in the theory of 'opposition' was Bolingbroke's conclusion that with the help of the party opposition it was possible to achieve simultaneously two goals: 'tie' the actions of the supreme ruler and put up a screen to protect against the elements of the masses that can lead to a civil war. Thus, the party opposition was a kind of a detonator, preventing the establishment of the tyranny of the ruler, on the one hand, and the onset of chaos and anarchy, on the other.

Conclusion

The appeal of the enlighteners to the problem of parties and the party opposition confirmed that in that historical period, the classes that had formed these parties gained considerable weight in the state and public life of the country. The bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie nobility no longer had to fight for power with the king, since the legislation of the Glorious Revolution strictly outlined the boundaries of the executive power. At the new stage in the political struggle, other forces appeared in England, which entered the battle: the 'land' and 'money' interests. Their representatives equally needed support and assistance from the parties, therefore the ideologists of the Tories and the Whigs equally defended the goals and tasks of the respective classes. The existence of a bipartisan system greatly facilitated the rule of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie nobility, opening access to government alternately to representatives of 'land' and 'monetary' interests. It goes without saying, there was no question of any principled nature of the party's opposition at that time, since both the Tories and the Whigs defended only the interests of the propertied strata. The popular lower classes remained outside the political structures created by the bourgeois ideologists, and they were remembered only in exceptional situations when it was required to 'press' their political opponents from the arena of struggle or to remind the supreme ruler about the past events of the civil war when they became unnecessarily obstinate and intractable in relations with the legislative power. Thus, the political parties at the beginning of the 18th century took a solid place in the structure of the state government, having become an integral part of the constitutional order of England. A significant role in this process was played by educators who substantiated and then popularized the idea of the need for the parties and party opposition in the state structure of England. The reasoning of the enlighteners regarding the parties was not the result of their 'cabinet' reflections; they did not have speculative or abstract cha-

racter. On the contrary, all the Enlightenment representatives, despite the declarations of their ‘non-partisanship’, in word and deed confirmed their commitment to the Tories or the Whigs. The party orientation, which was primarily social affiliation, was the determining factor in the ideology of the Enlightenment. And since the differences in the ideology of the parties, to which the enlighteners adjoined, were not of fundamental nature, it is not surprising that the Tories of the Enlightenment and the Whig educators adhered to the same views on the origin of the state power, the constitutional structure of the country, the parliamentary privileges and the royal prerogative.

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DOI 10.23859/2587-8352-2017-1-2-2
UDC 99(47).084.8

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German regional politician Paul Hirsch in history reversals

Abstract. Paul Hirsch was born when Bismarck sought to unite Germany by all means – by ‘iron and blood’. In the era of Kaiser's Germany, he could receive a university degree, with a solid profile in the field of journalism, to participate actively in the activity of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and to have a successful career as a city councilor in Charlottenburg and Berlin. The glory hour for Hirsch as a politician and a statesman came after the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany. Being head of the highest body of executive power in Prussia in the crucial period for his fatherland, he tried to solve the equation with many unknowns. However, on 30 January 1933 there came a day of ‘political Chernobyl’ in Germany. The National Socialists who came on that day to power did everything to alienate the German Jews from the society. The Jew Paul Hirsch fully experienced that fate. He lived in the racist ‘Third Reich’ for seven years and passed away in huge financial struggles. The article shows in detail how each of these four eras in the German history is reflected in Paul Hirsch’s fate.

Keywords: burgomaster, Germany, city councilor, deputy, Jew, journalism, Landtag, Paul Hirsch, prime minister, Prussia, the Social Democratic Party of Germany

Introduction

In historical Germanic studies, there is clearly a lack of research on the life and work of representatives of the Jewish segment of the German regional political elite. In this article, for the first time, a scientifically based attempt has been made to systematically reconstruct the political biography of one of their representatives, Paul Hirsch. His political career embraced four eras of the German history and was connected with the key German region – Prussia. Hirsch was also head of the supreme executive body there and a parliamentarian on a land level, as well as the city councilor and vice-burgomaster, then burgomaster and an active figure of the SPD Land organization. In the Soviet and post-Soviet historiography, the political biography of Paul Hirsch was not specifically investigated. What do we have in this respect today?

The Belarusian scientist O.G. Subbotin mentions P. Hirsch several times, whilst analyzing the Prussian-German dualism in the period when the first German republic existed¹. There are references to P. Hirsch in the dissertation of the famous Russian historian and specialist in Germanic studies T.V. Evdokimova, who mentioned him twice². The first instance refers to covering the attitude of the German and Prussian authorities to the Kapp Putsch. The second one is expressed in the following original statement: “The Prussian government of the Social Democrat P. Hirsch made further existence of Prussia dependent on another Lands”³. The article about Hirsch in Russian Cyclopedia turns out to be superficial and in fact purely informational. Besides, it contains some expressions that might raise questions. As an example, how correctly it is to call Hirsch ‘Mayor of Dortmund’⁴. He was the burgomaster of Dortmund. In German historiography, there is more information about Hirsch. Let us refer to the article written by Renate Karnowsky. The use of the city archive of Dortmund enabled her to cover in detail Hirsch’s activity as the burgomaster of this city⁵. Next comes the article by Klaus Malettke, which is also worth mentioning. Its scientific value is the coverage of Hirsch’s activities in the Landtag of Prussia⁶. There is an article about Hirsch in German Wikipedia. It is also informative; however, it turns out to be better than the one in Russian Cyclopedia⁷. And this is perhaps all that can be found in the historiography.

The author of this article offers his own version of Paul Hirsch’s political biography with full understanding that it is unlikely that he will be able to dot the i’s and cross the t’s. Some facts from his biography still need to be thoroughly investigated by contemporary researchers.

For today, in the western historical science there is low interest in politicians who are under ‘the first level’ in rank. The genre of biography, when a personality was placed in the center of the historical process, seems to be experiencing hard times. Multifaceted research projects with vague worldview trends dominate, which can be

¹ Subbotin O.G. *Transformation of the Weimar Model of Federalism in Germany (November 1918 – February 1934)*: Doc. Dis. in Historical Sciences. Minsk, 2015, pp. 70–76.

² Evdokimova T.V. *Transformation of the Ruling Political Elite of Weimar Germany (based on the example of the Reich chancellors and composition of their cabinets.)*: Doc. Dis. in Historical Sciences. Volgograd, 2012.

³ Evdokimova T.V. Op. cit. P. 116.

⁴ Paul Hirsch. *Cyclopedia*. URL: cyclowiki.org/wiki/Пауль_Хирш. Date of access: 31.01.2017.

⁵ Karnowsky R. *Paul Hirsch in Biographien bedeutender Dortmunder, Menschen in, aus und für Dortmund, herausgegeben von Hans Bohrmann, Verlag des Historischen Vereins Dortmund*, 1994, s. 41–43.

⁶ Malettke K. Hirsch Paul. *Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB)*. Band 9, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1972, s. 76–78.

⁷ Paul Hirsch. *Wikipedia*. 2017. Available at: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Hirsch. Date of access: 08.02.2017.

explained by the legacy of ‘postmodernism’. The author, being aware of the complexity of the research, used both general scientific and special historical methods. Approved theoretical and methodological tools have helped in a thorough study of a wide range of sources, with the publications of Paul Hirsch in the center⁸. They contain his conceptual approaches to the most important problems as well as his contributions at various levels. Verbatim records of the Prussian Landtag meetings were actively used⁹. Reference books were also involved¹⁰. They can be grouped into chronicles, biographical information and statistical collections.

⁸ Hirsch P. *Aufgaben der deutschen Gemeindepolitik nach dem Kriege*. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Berlin 1917. 172 s.; Hirsch P. *Das kommunale Wahlrecht (mit Hugo Lindemann)*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts. Berlin, 1905. 117 s.; Hirsch P. *Das Kommunalprogramm der Sozialdemokratie Preußens*. Buchhandlung Vorwärts. Berlin, 1911. 111 s.; Hirsch P. *Der preußische Landtag. Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Landtagswähler*. Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin 1913. 112 s.; Hirsch P. *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie zur Macht in Preußen*. Stolberg Verlag, Berlin, 1929. 276 s.; Hirsch P. *Die Knebelung der Arbeiterklasse durch die preußische Junkerpartei*. Berlin, 1899. 141 s.; Hirsch P. *Die Sozialdemokratie im Wahlkreise Teltow-Beskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg*, 5. Aufl., Berlin, 1913. 111 s.; Hirsch P. *Die soziale Gesetzgebung im 19. Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1902. 104 s.; Hirsch P. *Die Verfassung des Freistaates Preußen vom 30.11.1920*. Berlin, 1921. 109 s.; Hirsch P. *Gemeindepolitik. Erläuterungen zum Görlitzer Programm*. Dietz Nachf., Berlin, 1922. 100 s.; Hirsch P. *Gemeindesozialismus. Eine Kursusdisposition*. Berlin, 1924. 111 s.; Hirsch P. *Gesetz über die Bildung einer neuen Stadtgemeinde Berlin*. Vom 27. April 1920. Mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen. Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1920. 127 s.; Hirsch P. *Groß-Dortmund. Die Heimat. Monatsschrift für Land, Kunst und Volk in Westfalen und am Niederrhein, Zeitschrift des Westfälischen Heimatbundes*. 10. Jg, Juni 1928, s. 162 ff. 13; Hirsch P. *Jastrow als Politiker. Sozial-politische Studien, Festgabe für Ignaz Jastrow zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Carl Clodius*, Berlin, 1929, s. 65–76; Hirsch P. *Kampf gegen die Arbeiterkoalitionen*. Berlin, 1899. 141 s.; Hirsch P. *Kommentar zu den kommunalpolitischen Richtlinien der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*. Berlin, 1929. 145 s.; Hirsch P. *Kommunale Kriegsfürsorge*. Berlin, 1916. 154 s.; Hirsch P. *Kommunale Wohnungspolitik*. Berlin, 1906. 124 s.; Hirsch P. *Sozialdemokratische Gemeindepolitik*. Berlin, 1905. 232 s.; Hirsch P. *Sozialismus ist Arbeit. An die deutschen Arbeiter. Ein Aufruf der Regierung (mit Otto Braun und Emil Barth)*. Berlin, 1919. 184 s.; Hirsch P. *Unter dem elendsten aller Wahlsysteme*. Berlin, 1906. 129 s.; Hirsch P. *Verbrechen und Prostitution als soziale Krankheitserscheinungen*. Berlin 1897. 200 s.; Hirsch P. *Was bedeutet der Weg zum Sozialismus?* Berlin, 1919. 123 s.; Hirsch P. *25 Jahre sozialdemokratischer Arbeit in der Gemeinde*. Berlin, 1908. 212 s.

⁹ Stenographische Berichte des Preußischen Hauses der Abgeordneten, 21. Legislaturperiode. 1908/9, Berlin, 1909. Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Preußischen Hauses der Abgeordneten ab 21. Legislaturperiode, 1908/9. Berlin, 1909. S. 89 ff.

¹⁰ Anger Werner T. *Juden im politischen Leben der Revolutionszeit*. Werner E. Mosse (Hg.), *Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution 1916–1923*. Tübingen 1971, s. 196–239. Braun Lilly *Memoiren einer Sozialistin*. Berlin, 1956, Bd. III. 128 s.; Brockhaus *Handbuch des Wissens in vier Banden*. Leipzig, 1921, s. 87. ff. 2.; Erdmann Karl Dietrich. *Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft. Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. 3, 1955, s. 1–19. *Hamburger Ernest. Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmitglieder Ernest, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchistischen Zeit 1848–1918*. Tübingen, 1968. 435 s. *Lexikon deutsch-jüdischer Autoren. Band 11*. Saur, München, 2002, s. 393–397. Osterroth F. *Biographisches Lexikon des Sozialismus*, Bd. I: Verstorbene Persönlichkeiten, Hannover, 1960, s. 11 f. Osterroth F.

Hirsch's biography is considered against the background of the social and political processes in Germany in the first third of the 20th century¹¹. Such an approach, as it seems to us, is required to illustrate and understand the specific features of Paul Hirsch's state and political activities.

Main text

Paul Hirsch was born on 17 November 1868 in Prenzlau in the family of the trader Nathan Hirsch. He was born when Bismarck sought to unite Germany by 'iron and blood' (*Eisen und Blut*). Although the family moved to Berlin, when Paul was only a child, there were varied links to Prenzlau – family ties in the first place, so that later Paul Hirsch's daughters felt like natives there and after many years could remember "the incredibly beautiful city with magnificent surroundings". The wife of Paul Hirsch, Lucia Jacobi, came from Pasewalk; her sister Selma was married to a physician highly respected in Prenzlau, a health councilor Dr. Waldemar Ehrlich. The brother of the Jacobi sisters, Ludwig, also lived there; and Paul's uncle and cousin were intendants of Julius Jacobi's expedition firm.

Thus, it is also not surprising that Paul Hirsch, being prime minister of Prussia, showed a keen interest in the local political relations, with regards to the fact that Prenzlau – his hometown and his native district – influenced this appointment as head of the district administration.

In Berlin, Paul Hirsch first attended a private school, and then in 1879-88 – moved to Gymnasium zum Grauen Kloster, the famous old school of knowledge, where such figures as Schadow, Schinkel, Jahn and Bismarck studied.

His mother, a widow with many children, did not want her son to remain there until he received his secondary education, but the headmaster persuaded her. His main argument was as follows: the boy has bright intellect, he will be useful¹².

Schuster Dieter; Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Bd. I, Hannover, 1963, s. 112; Schröder Wilhelm Heinz: *Sozialdemokratische Parlamentarier in den deutschen Reichs- und Landtagen 1867–1933*. Biographien, Chronik und Wahldokumentation. Ein Handbuch. Düsseldorf, 1995. 458 s.

¹¹ Erger J. *Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20*. Hrsg. von der Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Düsseldorf, 1967. 454 s.; Fischart J. (d.i. Erich Dombrowski) *Das alte und das neue System. Neue Folge: Die Männer der Übergangszeit*. Berlin, 1920. 346 s.; Hannover Heinrich und Elisabeth *Politische Justiz 1918–1955*. Hamburg, 1966, s. 243. Herlemann B. *Kommunalpolitik der KPD im Ruhrgebiet 1924–1933*. Wuppertal, 1977. 134 s.; Luntowski Gustav, *Kleine Geschichte des Rates der Stadt Dortmund*, Dortmund, 1970, 165 s.; Wittmayer L. *Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung*. Neudr. der Ausgabe Tübingen 1922. Aalen: Scientia, 1974. 478 s.; Zaska E. *Der föderative Gedanke in der Weimarer Reichsverfassung und deren Revision nach föderalistischen Gesichtspunkten*. Jena, 1925. 78 s.; Zorn Ph. *Die deutsche Reichsverfassung*. 2. Aufl. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1913. 128 s.

¹² Hirsch P. *Was bedeutet der Weg zum Sozialismus?* Berlin, 1919, s. 13–43.

After completion of his secondary education in 1888, Paul Hirsch studied at the University of Berlin. He studied medicine for several terms. But afterwards he switched to political economy, and his diploma was devoted exactly to this subject. Since he did not receive any money from his mother, he had to earn his living. The work as a stenographer in the Landtag and his writing activity helped greatly. He wrote textbooks on stenography and articles in specialized stenographic journals, and since 1896-97 he had been presenting works on criminological issues. In his first book, ‘Crime and Prostitution as Manifestations of Social Diseases’, he argued with the concept of ‘innate criminals’ and proved the importance of economic, family and school relations with regards to the origins and progression of criminal behavior or prostitution, with the help of statistical and scientific materials and practical examples that he observed in the courtroom. This very first extensive work of Paul Hirsch traced a great deal of human and social sensitivity and strongly advocated standing up for justice, which were caused by the extreme poverty of wide segments of the population. To clarify the scale of the need for Berlin alone, the following statistics might be useful: 8,622 of male population were doomed in 1894 due to their poverty and 2,711 men due to homelessness. 9,251 beggars and 8,072 homeless people were subjected to police arrest. The number of prostitutes was difficult to calculate; it was many thousands¹³. Wretchedness of the housing was horrifying, which was mentioned by Hirsch in several works and was convincingly shown in the paintings of the artist Heinrich Zille¹⁴.

He disputed these problems not only theoretically in books, but also in practice. “The willingness of social assistance was his constant credo, and he also engaged his family to help”,¹⁵ his daughter recalled. Not only Hirsch himself contributed to charity for many years, but that was also true of his wife and his daughters. They worked in youth-care either on a voluntary basis or as their main job. Perhaps, it is possible to reasonably assume that one of the motives for joining the SPD, which Hirsch did in the 1890s, was a strong sensitivity to ‘social sores’. His activities as a stenographer of the Landtag played a role as well. He could directly and intensively observe the Prussian politics and ‘sharpen’ his political consciousness, which perhaps led him to the decision to be active in the SPD himself¹⁶.

It should also be mentioned that Hirsch played a prominent role in the students’ movement in the 1890s, being influenced by Christoph Moritz von Egidy and Georg

¹³ Hirsch P. *Verbrechen und Prostitution als soziale Krankheitserscheinungen*. Berlin, 1897, s. 65, 69, 76, 98.

¹⁴ Hirsch P. *Das Kommunalprogramm der Sozialdemokratie Preußens*. Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1911, s. 56–98.

¹⁵ Hamburger E. *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmitglieder Ernest, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchistischen Zeit 1848–1918*. Tübingen, 1968, s. 123.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

von Pitziki, who defined the cultural and critical trends. These became ingrained in Hirsch's worldview. Unfortunately, both thinkers are completely forgotten today, though Egidy's works were widely distributed in the first place at the time. Thanks to journalistic creations and organizations such as the German Society for Ethical Culture, they sought to renew religious and moral values and influenced the peace movement¹⁷.

Hirsch himself attested to the fact that in the 1890s he belonged to Leo Arons's circle, where workers, traders, and students of higher educational institutions gathered for informal discussions on political issues. Leo Arons was a prominent physicist, also known for his own inventions. The scientist got into serious trouble for his sympathy for the SPD. Based on the law that was passed on this occasion, the Prussian government in 1900 deprived him of the qualification of a privat-docent. And this happened even though the university offered to appoint him as a professor, considering his undeniable scientific contributions. In Aron's circle, Hirsch also got acquainted with the social politician and privat-docent in political economy Ignaz Jastrow. Politically, Jastrow stood closer to the liberals. His program, which above all included struggle for universal suffrage and social reforms, was described by him as 'social liberal'. Hirsch later wrote that in Aron's circle, he took many initiatives specifically from Jastrow; these were important to him in his work in the Prussian parliament and in the following activity as prime minister. In fact, the main lines of Hirsch's policy were also those of Jastrow's policy: the struggle for an electoral and social reform¹⁸.

But what could also be Hirsch's motive for joining the SPD was too much of his personal courage, since the legalization of the SPD in 1890 meant by no means that it was politically and socially accepted at the time. It was seriously defeated and slandered. Those who recognized it were expelled from the bourgeois society immediately.

Paul Hirsch as a journalist and writer was, at least to a lesser extent, dependent on the external pressure. Though he later left his work as a writer, unlike his political activity he was still in theory developing and describing the problems of practical politics in his numerous articles and books. Currently, only seven independent titles of the books in question are known, which Hirsch either wrote or published.

The most important milestone in Hirsch's political career happened to be in 1900, when he became city councilor in Charlottenburg. At that time, it was an independent city and was much larger than the current urban district of Berlin, Charlottenburg.

¹⁷ Wegscheider H. *Weite Welt im engen Spiegel. Erinnerungen. Geleitwort und Anmerkungen von Susanne Suhr*. Berlin, 1953, s. 345–367.

¹⁸ Hirsch P. *Jastrow als Politiker*, in: *Sozial-politische Studien, Festgabe für Ignaz Jastrow zum 70. Geburtstag*. Berlin, 1929, s. 65–76.

Along with a highly effective activity as a member of the Landtag of Prussia in 1908–32, Hirsch manifested himself as an outstanding specialist in the field of communal politics. For a quarter of a century (in 1900–21 as city councilor and in 1921–25 as deputy burgomaster of Charlottenburg), he devoted himself to communal politics in Berlin and was initiating the communal reorganization and creation of Greater Berlin. Later, he ended his political career in 1925–32 as burgomaster of Dortmund, and at that point he put forward an administrative-territorial reform again. At the same time, he wrote and published his fundamental works about social-democratic work in the community and constantly collaborated with several communal and political journals¹⁹. By the time when Paul Hirsch joined the SPD, its position in the Land and communities was determined primarily by the discriminatory provisions of the electoral law that prevented the poor from participation and expressing their political will. Yet as Bismarck put it: “Prussia has the most miserable electoral system of all”²⁰. There were three classes exercising electoral rights. The weight of votes was directly dependent on tax revenues. What did it lead to? As an example, in the elections to the Landtag in 1903, the Social Democrats won 311,000 votes but did not receive a single mandate. And this was at the time when the Conservatives, having received only 13,000 more votes, that is 324,000 in total, warranted 143 mandates for the party. It is not surprising that under such an electoral system, less than a quarter of eligible voters went to the elections. With regards to this situation, the SPD decided at its Cologne Congress not to participate in the elections to the Landtag of Prussia; whereby all party members had to restrain from the elections²¹.

This decision caused heated discussions in Arons’s circle. Arons supported participation in the elections. Hirsch shared his opinion. Later, he argued in favor of his position in the ‘Guidelines for the Participation of Social Democrats in the Elections to the Landtag’: “Prussia has become a foreign land for the Social Democrats, and no one welcomed proletarian non-participation like the dominant reaction did”²². At the parliamentary rostrum, he stated that the social democracy had underestimated the possibilities of the Landtag of Prussia, and that there was no better way to wake the masses to overcome Prussia’s political backwardness than participating in the elections. With such views, Hirsch was completely isolated in the Berlin party organization. It continued until the SPD congress decided in favor of obligatory participation in elections to all *Landtage* in Mainz in 1900. However, Hirsch’s hopes for ‘unforeseen opportunities’ of the three-class voting rights at the high turnout were implemented only partially in the long run.

¹⁹ Hirsch P. *Gemeindesozialismus. Eine Kursus Disposition*. Berlin, 1924. 111 s.

²⁰ Hirsch P. *Unter den elendesten alten Wahlsystemen*. Berlin, 1906, s. 78.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Hirsch P. *Der preußische Landtag. Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Landtagswähler. Buchhandlung Vorwärts*. Berlin, 1913, s. 78.

The results of the elections to the Landtag in terms of the mandates received for the SPD were as follows: in 1908 there were seven mandates, whereas in 1913 there were ten mandates. It goes without saying that this was a positive fact. On the other hand, the limits of Hirsch's strategy could be clearly traced in this respect, as the SPD received only these few mandates, though it became the strongest party of Prussia with 23.87 % of votes. On the contrary, the Centre Party received 104 mandates with 19.91 % of votes, whereas the conservatives received as many as 152 mandates with only 14.15 % of votes. Also, it should be noted that due to the parliamentary struggle, it was impossible to liquidate the three-class electoral system. It remained in force – which might seem surprising by the modern standards – until October 1918 and disappeared only as the result of Germany's military defeat; whereby the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Landtag of Prussia resisted any reform until the very last moment²³.

The faction of the social democrats demonstrated tremendous activity. It reacted to all the issues discussed in the Landtag. The members of the faction had to act under the conditions of open hostility on part of the absolute majority of deputies, who were trying to create big obstacles for them. The faction of the social democrats took rough with the smooth.

Since 1911, Paul Hirsch was chairman of the faction, as he was 'the most intelligent and the quietest', 'the most prudent and the most cool-blooded' and therefore became the 'recognized leader' of the group. It goes without saying that one might say that Hirsch knew the basics of parliamentary work due to his professional activities, and that is why no one else could be considered for the post. One should add his brilliant abilities to integrate things, which had to be constantly shown to maintain the equilibrium and for a prompt resolution of disputes between the right-wing and left-wing trends in the faction. Paul Hirsch tried to prevent the split of the group especially in the first years of the war, where the threat of such a split arose due to the issue of German military intentions. Hirsch's achievement of bitter compromises was interpreted by some comrades as his manifestation of weakness and indecisiveness. Finally, it became no longer possible to build bridges between the divergent positions, for example, between such political figures as Karl Liebknecht and Otto Braun. There were unbridgeable political gaps between these two figures. Paul Hirsch finally admitted his belonging to the right wing of the faction after he was convinced that it was this wing that held the right views on the issues related to the assessment of Germany's military intentions and its readiness for peace. Nevertheless, the split occurred. The left-wing social democrats formed their own faction, with most of them

²³ Hirsch P. *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie zur Macht in Preußen*. Stolberg Verlag. Berlin, 1929, s. 167–168.

changing the party spirit over time, joining the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (the USPD).

The leading role in Prussian politics was inevitably assigned to Hirsch as the leader of the majority group in the SPD, when the latter came to power due to the revolution of November 1918. He was, of course, extremely modest and did not strive to be in the foreground and occupy senior posts. In Hirsch's memoirs about these events, his political worldview is quite distinct: "The social democrats assumed the governmental responsibility on 12 November 1918 at 11 am. We – apart from me there were Heinrich Stroebel, Eugen Ernst, Adolph Hoffmann and Otto Braun – told the vice-president of the Cabinet of Germany on behalf of the executive committee of the Council of Workers and Soldiers that we were authorized to assume public administration of Prussia, however met no resistance. Herr Dr. Friedberg admitted that the actual power was in the hands of the Executive Committee of the Council, and he had to come to terms with the fact. He considered he completed his activity in that post and left the civil service"²⁴. In Hirsch's memoirs, nothing is said about the stress and anxiety of those days in November; rather, certain satisfaction was felt that the 'transfer of political power' took place in peace and order. Hirsch was already authorized on 9 November by Ebert and the Interior Minister of Prussia to maintain 'peace and order' in Greater Berlin – an unusual 'revolutionary' mission. Based on the model of the Council of the People's Deputies, the Prussian revolutionary government was led by three representatives from the USPD and three representatives from the SPD. Paul Hirsch kept his leadership until 25 March 1919, together with his functions in the state ministry (as prime minister) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It should be also mentioned that the internal contradictions between the two political trends in the labor movement were too great for the government to remain in its place for a long time. Per Hirsch, the main difference was as follows. The SPD of the majority representatives believed that the political reorganization of Prussia was to be specified mainly during the work of the legislative assembly. 'Independents' were aiming towards immediate political and economic transformation, without waiting for any convocation of the legislative assembly²⁵.

How can the main lines of Hirsch's policy whilst being prime minister of Prussia be described now? First, he had the aspiration to lay the constitutional foundation as soon as possible with regards to qualitatively new realities, to create prerequisites for convocation of the legislative land assembly, the task of which would be "to create new people's Prussia from the wreckage of the old Junker Prussia" and "give this

²⁴ Werner Angress T. *Juden im politischen Leben der Revolutionszeit. Werner E. Mosse (Hg.), Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution 1916–1923*. Tübingen, 1971, s. 196–197.

²⁵ Osterroth F. *Biographisches Lexikon des Sozialismus*. Bd. I: Verstorbene Persönlichkeiten, Hannover, 1960, s. 11 f.

Prussia a solid state reform”. Thus, strictly speaking, Hirsch was thinking using fundamental state and legal categories and explicitly linked his political behavior with the principles of self-determination and freedom.

He fought for democratic suffrage for many years in the previous years of his life. At the point when it had been achieved, he was ready with certainty to defend free expression of people’s will through elections, but also to resist the attacks of radical groups in his own or close-standing parties. After the representatives of the party were finally elected in Reich in 1912 and in Prussia in 1913, the leadership of the SPD of the majority representatives did not want to make any fundamental changes without their prior legitimization due to the will of the voters. For this purpose – to contribute to free expression of the will of voters as much as possible – the SPD was even ready to refuse the advantage of the moment that it possessed due to the revolutionary movement whilst carrying out such events. The social democratic leadership felt more like a ‘bankruptcy supervisor’ of the old system, who would leave their political ideas regarding their goals aside until their mandate was legitimately represented by the people.

In accordance with these principles, first, the measures were taken that made possible such an expression of political will with overcoming vestiges of the past. By the end of December 1918, an order was issued to carry out elections to the Legislative Assembly of Prussia. It was elected on 26 January 1919, that is a week after the elections to the National Constituent Assembly. In the same way, the communal and district bodies that had not been formed based on free elections were dissolved. Their new elections per the democratic suffrage became possible. Orders for confiscation of family possessions, abolition of disciplinary sanctions imposed before 9 November 1918 and the possibility of suspending politically influenced civil servants supplemented the work of the government.

The head of the government welcomed the deputies of the Prussian Legislative Assembly with the following enthusiastic words: “The old Prussia is now gone forever. There will be new Prussia... and no power in the world will be able to destroy the great achievements of the revolution... You will face the monumental challenge of creating this new Prussia... The tasks of Prussia are not yet solved... In the old days, the Reich was constrained by force... It should serve as the spirit of freedom, order and work of the German nation and its future peaceful greatness. Old Prussia is dead; all hail the new Prussia!”²⁶

What were the social transformations that the social democracy constantly proclaimed and that its supporters expected from it?

²⁶ Hirsch P. *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie zur Macht in Preußen*. Stolberg Verlag. Berlin, 1929, s. 214.

Let us refer to the appeal of the Prussian government on 13 November 1919 as a specific example. One cannot find the word ‘revolution’ there. The word ‘socialism’ occurs only once, and in connection that has nothing to do with property relations. However, there was a demand for “socialization of the large industrial and agricultural enterprises suitable for it”, but it was formulated vaguely and had no real relevance.

This program can hardly be considered socialistic. The requirements were mainly directed towards creation of political democracy, educational reforms and similar activities but were not aimed at transforming the economy. Surprisingly, the ‘independents’ officially shared this program, in which the position of the SPD of the majority representatives dominated.

Soon in 1921, the new work of Paul Hirsch regarding the political goals of his party was published. In it, the politician and the statesman makes distinctions between the daily struggle for improving the position of the working class through legislation and its ultimate goal: overcoming class contradictions by eliminating classes as such.

Of course, while he saw no other option rather than to meet the burning demands, Hirsch, in his political speeches and statements, still pointed out the catastrophic situation with food supplies, the needs of the masses, especially in the cities and the urgent necessity to restore the economy. Guided by his deep sense of social responsibility, he wanted to save people from the ongoing sufferings, and this desire determined politics above all, as well as treatment of monarchically-minded employees.

But on the other hand, the rejection of any activities on socialization in the highly-industrial centers in the west of Prussia or with regards to the land reform in several parts of East Prussia heavily saturated with large landed estates, did not necessarily improve the economic prerequisites. At least in the industrial region of North Rhine-Westphalia, the frustration of the working class with the lack of socialization in the mines, as well as by further political development in general, led to strikes or passive denial; whereby part of the working class became alienated from the social democracy and the republic.

Another solution to this question was out of question for Hirsch not only because of his understanding of the constitution and legitimation. Trade unions, the imperial congress of councils, the Council of the People's Deputies had so far refused socialization which could only be applied uniformly for the whole Reich. Finally, it was hardly possible to carry on in terms of foreign policy, primarily due to the powerful French resistance. Another fact that came to light upon the outcome of the elections to the National Assembly and to the Landtag of Prussia should be added here. The proper conclusion would look as follows: the demands for socialization did not find

support of the majority, since the SPD and the USPD in Prussia remained in the minority with 36.3 and 7.4 % of the votes respectively; i.e. the opponents of socialization had an unambiguous minority. As it can be seen, the politically motivated refusal of socialization seemed to be correct also on authoritative and political grounds, since it was impossible to perform such an activity of fundamental significance without the support of the majority²⁷.

Hirsch's policy can be evaluated in the sense of the above-mentioned Jastrow's definition as a social liberal policy. It was liberal because of the indispensable respect for constitutionality and legal statehood, whereas it was social because of its strong emphasis on the components of state charity, as they were manifested in the plan to introduce the ministry of public aid into the regional government structure; in passing laws on labor protection, in improving the housing and settlement spheres, the school sector and many others, where owing to small steps, the position of people's segment that felt defectiveness of their interests should improve. This policy was formed on a broad consensus and – which was necessary due to the weakness of the left-winged – on a compromise with the bourgeois parties. This was the way for the social democracy of the West to follow World War II.

The aim pursued by Hirsch – “raising the living standards of the classes in financial need and not just of the working class” – was achieved partially under the conditions when ‘order and safety’ prevailed in the region. That is why Hirsch saw the greatest of danger coming from the extreme left-winged, who wanted to “continue to engage in the revolution”. For him, these forces were “criminal minority, violently operating and fully incapable in the real political sense”, which plunged the nation into chaos with its conception of the general political strike. Hirsch saw the ‘historical mission’ of his party in prevention of this. The constitution passed owing to the revolution had to be strictly observed. To ensure this, Hirsch relied on the solid authority of his government and was ready to take risks into account. When president of the Berlin police, a member of the USPD Emil Eichhorn no longer recognized the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Prussia as a legally effective body after members of the USPD left the Prussian government, Hirsch ordered to dismiss Eichhorn and provoked street fighting in Berlin in January 1919²⁸.

Finally, was it possible to avoid the civil war, and what principal alternatives to German and Prussian politics existed at that time? This is a question that has been discussed by the German scientists to the present day. For a long time, the following statement dominated in the historiography, that in the revolution of 1918-19, there was a clear alternative: a social revolution in alliance with the forces striving for pro-

²⁷ Osterroth F. *Biographisches Lexikon des Sozialismus*. Bd. I: Verstorbene Persönlichkeiten, Hannover, 1960, s. 11.

²⁸ Rosenberg A. *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik*. Frankfurt, 1961. 16. Aufl. 1974, s. 9.

letarian dictatorship or a parliamentary republic in alliance with conservative forces such as the old officer corpus. Over time, this statement was substantially modified, but it corresponded to the point of view held at that time by Hirsch and the entire leadership of the SPD in the Reich and Prussia. Hirsch saw the social democracy as a performer of tough but inevitable historical necessity. He attested to the fact that it was difficult for the Prussian government to have to reject the workers' demands for better wages "considering the entire state"²⁹. The politician and statesman admitted: "We realized that the fury of masses, who were deceived in their hopes, was directed against their brothers in class with double or even triple strength. But neither threats nor reproaches could or should prevent us from fulfilling our duty. We did not have any love to favor the masses"³⁰. The last sentence does not contain 'contempt' for the masses but implies idealistic and strictly objective understanding of his own political role by Paul Hirsch.

Gustav Noske later 'with satisfaction' recalled that Hirsch was his associate who did not yield to the hysterical kindheartedness of some people and courageously participated in the process of restoring order to the extent possible in Prussia and the Reich. And the facts that are in the possession of the author of this article, suggest the following: Hirsch, perhaps, evaluated the events of that time somewhat differently than Noske. He saw a 'tragedy' in the military support of the government by Kaiser's officers, and a 'catastrophe' – in the case of Eichhorn and the January fights. He maintained that the social democracy should have been responsible for ensuring that Germany remained as united Reich. To raise the German economy and the well-being of the German people, the reaction would unite against the social democracy and defeat it.

Here, a pessimistic and critical note in Hirsch's reflections clearly appears to be the main one. He also gives a proper evaluation of the politically right-winged forces in Germany. A conclusion can be drawn from this that the revolutionary governments in German Reich and in Prussia strived as quickly as possible to ensure the democratic achievements and to limit the power of the monarchical forces. The main flaw of both the Council of the People's Deputies and the government of Hirsch was repeatedly criticized. The meaning of this overlook was that it was not possible to lay a solid basis for parliamentary democracy through any political control or consistent personnel policy in the Reichswehr, justice, management, socialization of heavy industry and agrarian reform in the German East. Of course, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Hirsch overestimated the sense of duty and loyalty on part of old civil servants.

²⁹ Erdmann K.D. Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft. *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. 3. 1955, s. 4.

³⁰ Erdmann K.D. Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft. *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 3. 1955, s. 6.

In addition, the complex state machine had to continue its work. This could not be achieved by getting rid of the old pool of civil servants immediately, whereby both experience and competence were on their side. In fact, the absolute majority of these people thought in terms of a bygone era³¹.

We should also mention some important problems that Hirsch had to resolve being prime minister of Prussia. First, the Treaty of Versailles, in which no concessions were made for Hirsch and other members of his government. After all, per this treaty Prussia was the most disadvantaged of all Germanic states. It seemed impossible to Hirsch; the prime minister also felt severely disadvantaged in his perception of justice and national feelings. Hirsch believed that the peace was made not from the perspective of consent and justice but that the enemy imposed that peace from the position of strength forced the German people to sign death-warrant. He predicted that due to such a treaty there would be no calm, and rivers of blood and tears will pour. Thus, Hirsch thought unambiguously nationally but not nationalistically. He also did not find any understanding with the supporters signing the Treaty of Versailles. But at the same time, he had 'Prussian' mental model in mind, not in the sense of 'Prussia of the past', but in the sense of a 'free state' of Prussia. The politician and statesman stood solid against the attempts to split Prussia or to divide it into parts as suggested by the 'father of the Weimar Constitution' Hugo Preuss. Preuss's plans corresponded to the traditional demand of the social democracy to eliminate the individual German states and create a united republic. In the first days of the revolution, the following influential bodies – the Executive Council of the imperial government and the Council of the People's Deputies – clearly hesitated to give an unambiguous answer to the following question: Should we establish sovereignty and supremacy of the Prussian leadership and thereby prejudge the existence of Prussia as an independent state? Therefore, Hirsch's government was formed three days later than the new imperial government, that is on 12 November 1918³².

Hirsch's reaction to the intention to reorganize the Reich was tactically skilful: according to the social-democratic tradition, he immediately announced readiness in principle to transform Prussia into a fully democratic part of the united people's republic. On the other hand, he insistently warned against the negative consequences of fragmentation of Prussia into incompetent and lifeless tiny formations. It is difficult to evaluate to what extent the transfer to the united people's republic was generally conceived as a real alternative, since Hirsch was able to make this concession safe. The fact was that he linked it with the condition that the Southern Germany states would be equally ready for this; which, as is known, was out of a

³¹ Rosenberg A. *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik*. Frankfurt, 1961, 16. Aufl, 1974, s. 57.

³² Rosenberg A. *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik*. Frankfurt, 1961, 16. Aufl, 1974, s. 202–203.

place. “While Prussia, which embarked on a path of uncompromising struggle against the monarchical legacy of the Hohenzollerns, identified itself with a stronghold of democracy and national unity, the Bavarian political elite openly sympathized with the monarchist ideas and vigorously defended its regional interests”³³.

In the struggle for the unity of the Prussian state, the government stood against any separatist movements. They were radical on the borders of the states in the Rhineland, the Northern March and Upper Silesia. “Moderate forms of separatism developed in the province of East Prussia, which at the suggestion of the chairman A. Winnig (the SPD), sought financial, economic and trade preferences, ‘exclusive’ administrative autonomy and legalization of self-defense units”³⁴. The government pursued the aim to ensure territorial integrity of the Prussian state and to prevent its fragmentation. The fact that this had not been achieved in certain areas was not their fault but rather a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, against which the government fought so hard.

As the federal ministry of the interior, just a couple of days after holding the appointment, the head of the government initiated Berlin unification together with all surrounding towns and communities to create Greater Berlin. The goal was achieved, and Hirsch went down in history as ‘the father of Greater Berlin’.

The putsch of monarchist forces led by Kapp and Lüttwitz in March 1920 cost Hirsch and many other members of the Prussian government their posts, e.g. the minister of interior and minister of finance Südekum. The basis of the Social Democratic Party reproached them for taking too many reciprocal steps towards the putschists. Hirsch was reproached that his government was negotiating with the putschists. Hirsch strongly rejected this. It goes without saying, there were contacts but not negotiations between the putschists and vice-chancellor Schiffer, who represented the German Democratic Party. Hirsch’s government also stayed in touch with these contacts. The motives of Hirsch’s government were as follows: to avoid completely unnecessary bloodshed, dangerous consequences of either spread or continuation of the general strike, and namely: the colossal economic damage and, above all, radicalization of the workers. Hirsch tried to obtain the resignation of Kapp, and in the question of amnesty for the participants he was ready for some reciprocal moves, but no more than that. Finally, remaining faithful to historical truth, we should not keep silent about the fact that it was Hirsch who urgently advised the government of Bauer and Reich president Ebert to stay in Berlin and not flee before the putsch³⁵.

³³Subbotin O.G. Op. cit, p. 70.

³⁴Subbotin O.G. Op. cit, p. 71.

³⁵Erger J. *Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20*. Hrsg. von der Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Düsseldorf, 1967, s. 347–349.

After resigning as prime minister, Hirsch worked for almost a year as state secretary in the ministry of charity and then returned to communal politics as deputy burgomaster of Charlottenburg. Also, it is worthwhile mentioning that the retired government members refused their pension.

Hirsch's successor as prime minister was Otto Braun, who had been minister of agriculture prior to his new post. He adopted his predecessor's program in his government manifesto and assured that he would carry it out with all his power. This proved that the problems of Hirsch's government did not follow from their own conceptual weakness but were objectively substantiated in the situation.

The final stage of Paul Hirsch's political career saw a seven-year activity as the burgomaster of Dortmund, being the content side of his politics. With no intense competition, he was invited to this post as a well-known specialist in the communal politics and of course considering his experience of creating Greater Berlin. It can be stated unambiguously that it was a difficult step for him to go to an unfamiliar city, which, first due to the occupation of Ruhr, had to fight the most serious social problems. As an example, the unemployment rate had come close to 90%. Hirsch was elected as burgomaster on 22 July 1925. The SPD, the NPD, the KPD and the NSKOV voted for him. While the KPD only agreed to an extending compromise, as it – per its own statement – had to prove to the workers that a social democrat could not be workers' representative. The NSKOV voted in principle, eagerly supporting the relevant candidate, because Hirsch as vice-burgomaster of Charlottenburg constantly showed a great concern for disabled veterans of war. The united right-wing parties and the Centre Party, on the other hand, raised objections to Hirsch's election, because in their opinion, the tense financial situation of the city did not allow to have another member of the magistrate who would receive a salary; and Hirsch, as a member of the Landtag, would spend too much time in Berlin.

The communal territorial reform, which Hirsch considered the priority, was carried out by him in close connection with chief burgomaster Dr. Ernst Eichhoff. Why was it necessary to hurry with the reform? The territory, which economically formed a unity, could not be split politically into different regions. A city-planning perspective should be added to this, since due to the inclusion of rural communities into that of the city, many promising developments became possible. In 1928, the urban community of Dortmund included 22 rural communities, resulting in the growth of the city population from 325,000 to more than 500,000; and in area it became the second largest in Germany³⁶.

As a deputy of the Landtag and former prime minister of Prussia, he used his extensive ties with the Prussian government to solve the tasks, which the city leadership

³⁶ Hirsch P. Groß-Dortmund. *Die Heimat. Monatsschrift für Land, Kunst und Volk in Westfalen und am Niederrhein, Zeitschrift des Westfälischen Heimatbundes*. 10. Jg, Juni 1928, s. 162 ff. 13.

faced. The residents of Dortmund knew it and evaluated the policy positively. Owing to Hirsch, the Pedagogy Academy, the Institute of Industrial Physiology and a low vision clinic appeared in Dortmund. He could help in extremely difficult situations, when during the world economic crisis it was very difficult to collect money for charity, or when there was a threat of closing a theater. As the second burgomaster, he was responsible for all arts and science institutions, libraries, theaters, transport department, press department, statistical office and automatic telephone exchange. The employees admired his efficiency, calmness and modesty in communication.

Hirsch's activity in Dortmund was to end in November 1933, when he reached the age of 65. But a year earlier, on 1 November 1932, he claimed his state pension. Severe health problems were the main reason for this. It is quite possible that the growing national socialism and wide-spreading anti-Semitic public sentiments also affected this decision³⁷.

On 30 January 1933, 'political Chernobyl' broke out in Germany. 'Zoological' anti-Semites led by Hitler came to power. The Jew Hirsch fully experienced the same drama that his compatriots had experienced under the domination of the national socialists. The Jews were the lowest race for them, whose place would be on the outskirts of the society. On 1 August 1940, Hirsch passed away in a truly catastrophic financial situation³⁸.

Conclusion

The name of Paul Hirsch occupies an extremely important place in the history of the German regional political elite. He built a solid profile in history reversals. His amazing political flair, powerful intellect, outstanding oratorical gift, phenomenal efficiency and constant desire to abate to moral standards in politics through thick and thin put him among the regional politicians and statesmen demanded most in the German society.

As the first prime minister of Prussia after the November Revolution of 1918, he actively participated in the creation of new Prussia. Though the ambitious goal set by the revolutionaries "to transform Prussia from the most politically backward state into the freest and most progressive state in the world" during his period in power was implemented only partially, and after 1933 he had to experience how the "great democratic achievements of the Revolution" that he considered unshakeable, were easily eliminated; it must nevertheless be recognized that his idea of new 'people's Prussia' was the only real project feasible for the future of this state. If those notions and goals were fully implemented at that time, the historical catastrophe would not have broken

³⁷ Luntowski G. *Kleine Geschichte des Rates der Stadt Dortmund*. Dortmund, 1970, s. 55.

³⁸ Braun L. *Memoiren einer Sozialistin*. Berlin, 1956. Bd. III, s. 89.

out, the consequence of which among other things was the demise of the Prussian state.

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DOI 10.23859/2587-8352-2017-1-2-3
УДК 94 (430)

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The everyday experience of forced labor among ‘Eastern workers’ in the agriculture of National Socialist Germany

Abstract. The article examines the situation where the Soviet citizens were taken away by force during World War II and whose labour was used in the agriculture of National Socialist Germany. In the context of legalized discrimination, under the strict system of control and punishment, as well as due to the inevitable close contact with the German peasants, the ‘Eastern workers’ developed different survival strategies that varied between adaptation and resistance.

Keywords: World War II, the Soviet Union, Germany, national socialism, forced labour, ‘Eastern workers’ (Ostarbeiter), agriculture

Introduction

The forced labour of ‘Eastern workers’ – or ‘Ostarbeiter’¹ – in the economy of the Third Reich is one of the darkest pages in the history of World War II. With the failure of the German Blitzkrieg at the end of 1941, extreme labour shortage led to the shift from the policy of extermination of the USSR human resources to the policy of their employment on the territory of Germany. The working and living conditions for the ‘Eastern workers’ reflected the concept of the Nazi legislation based on the Nazi doctrine of ‘racial’ superiority that was also strictly regulating all aspects of foreigners’ life and their staying in the Reich. This also referred to those industries where the traditions of arrangement of the processes to use seasonal labour processes conflicted with the treatment of the workers, such as it was in the agriculture of the Nazi Germany.

¹ Ostarbeiters – a Nazi German designation for ‘Eastern workers’ apprehended from the occupied Central and Eastern Europe to perform forced labor in Germany during World War II.

Main text

Amid existence of significant amount of scientific literature on the history of World War II and fascism², the problem of forced labour of the Soviet citizens in the Nazi Germany and on the occupied territories received only fragmentary coverage in the national historiography. The study by P.M. Polian stand out as a unique attempt to make synthesizing research into the problem on forced labour of the Soviet prisoners of war and ‘Eastern workers’ as an independent historical phenomenon. In the extensive foreign historiography, the works of J. Lehmann³, A. Zühl (Frank)⁴ and G. Freitag⁵ were devoted to various aspects of forced labour in agriculture but did not use the everyday experience of ‘Eastern workers’ as the subject of their research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the everyday experience of forced labour among the ‘Eastern workers’ in the agriculture of National Socialist Germany. The method of ‘oral history’ used in this work allows to present the point of view of the victims and to study the phenomenon of forced labour more deeply.

The pragmatic position of peasants in relation to labour prevented the practical implementation of the Nazi regulations regarding treatment of the workers arriving from the Soviet Union⁶. Due to remoteness of repressive apparatus and a peculiar position of the peasants, the ‘Eastern workers’ had little opportunity to improve their own situation by building relationships with the German peasants. The behaviour of ‘Eastern workers’ at peasant farms depended on many factors and often varied between adaption to the circumstances and resistance to them. As an example, Ustina S.⁷, who worked at the estate near the town of Sulz, described numerous cases of individual resistance of the ‘Eastern workers’. During her deportation, she tried to

² See, for example, Bessonov B.I. *Fashizm: ideologiya, politika* [Fascism: Ideology, Politics]. Moscow, 1985; Blank A.S. *Iz istorii rannego fashizma v Germanii. Organizatsiia. Ideologiya. Metody* [From the History of Early Fascism in Germany. Organization. Ideology. Methods]. Moscow, 1978; Rozanov G.L. *Konets «tret'ego reikha»* [The End of the ‘Third Reich’]. Moscow, 1990. For more information about the national historiography of German fascism, see: Galaktionova Yu.V. *Germanskiy fashizm kak fenomen pervoy poloviny XX veka: otechestvennaya istoriografiya 1945–90s godov* [German Fascism as a Phenomenon of the First Half of the 20th Century: The National Historiography of 1945–1990s]. Kemerovo, 1999.

³ Lehmann J. *Zwangsarbeiter in der deutschen Landwirtschaft 1939 bis 1945. Europa und der Reichseinsatz: ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutschland 1938–1945*; Hrsg. U. Herbert. Essen, 1991, s. 127–139.

⁴ Zühl A. *Zum Verhältnis der deutschen Landbevölkerung gegenüber Zwangsarbeitern und Kriegsgefangenen. Faschismus und Rassismus*; Hrsg. W. Röhr. Berlin, 1992, s. 342–352.

⁵ Freitag G. *Zwangsarbeiter im Lipper Land: Der Einsatz von Arbeitskräften aus Osteuropa in der Landwirtschaft Lippes, 1939–1945*. Bochum, 1996.

⁶ Lehmann J. *Zwangsarbeiter in der deutschen Landwirtschaft 1939 bis 1945. Europa und der Reichseinsatz: ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutschland 1938–1945*; Hrsg. U. Herbert. Essen, 1991, s. 135.

⁷ Interview mit Ustina S. *IGB/ISFLDP*. Interview mit Ustina. S. 37.

escape twice and told about her disobedience and obstinate behaviour in the German household. In a quarrel with the estate manager, Ustina S., in a rage, threw a fork at him, “And I think, “I do not care!” I was not afraid of death. I was not afraid, you see? I was simply not afraid. I thought, to suffer that much... Being hungry, cold and nevertheless working and sweating like that, and he would still beat me ... scoff me⁸?”

The passive resistance common for the ‘Eastern workers’ was much safer than open protests and manifested itself in the slow or careless performance of the assigned work. The passive resistance was also risky, since the German peasants had a few opportunities for compulsory increase of labour productivity of the ‘Eastern workers’ in their own economy. As an example, the manager of the estate where Ustina S. worked once frightened the ‘Eastern workers’ by shooting, getting the gun and putting all the workers against the wall⁹. Sometimes former forced labor workers in their memoirs pointed out another form of protests of the ‘Eastern workers’ under the conditions of working in the agriculture, and namely, changing or complete leveling the power relations in the dichotomy ‘forced labor worker – master’. This is typical for the memories of those workers who, based on their knowledge and experience, saw themselves equal or superior to their masters¹⁰.

The example of the interview with Ustina S. shows that the ‘Eastern workers’ found their main support for resistance among the groups of forced labour workers. In the estates, where the owners fully complied with the Nazi regulations regarding columns and camp maintenance, the ‘Eastern workers’ experienced the same regarding their working and living conditions in many respects as it would be in the industrial sector. There, it was much easier to comply with the ban of the so-called ‘shared tables’. The tables in such estates stood separately not only for the owners and for the foreign workers, but also separately for each group of foreign workers¹¹. The owners of the estates could assign additional workers to themselves, therefore the value of an individual worker for the economic viability of any estate was very small.

It should be noted that the ‘Eastern workers’ who were used as a group had relatively little access to or any relations with the German population. Intercultural communication, exchange of experience, assimilation of values and perception of the image of the German peasants were rather insignificant there.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Grinchenko G. Erste Auswertung eines Oral-History-Projektes aus der Ostukraine. *Hitlers Sklaven. Lebensgeschichtliche Analysen zur Zwangsarbeit im internationalen Vergleich*; Hrsg. Plato A.v. u.a. Wien: Böhlau, 2008, s. 237.

¹¹ Winter J. Lorberg, der Gendarm und der Polen-Franz. Nazi-Jahre auf dem Hofgut Wickstadt – Szenen aus der Zwangsarbeit. *Fern der Heimat unter Zwang - Der Einsatz ‘fremdländischer Arbeitskräfte’ während des Zweiten Weltkrieges in der Wetterau*; Hrsg. K.D. Rack, M. Kingreen, D. Richhardt. Butzbach, 2004, s. 442.

The ‘Eastern workers’ that were exploited individually, describe their relationship with the German population differently, more often indicating the possibilities of adaptation. An interview with Vera W., who fled from her factory during a bombardment and found refuge amid the agricultural estate in a small peasant farm near Stolberg, would be a typical example for considering the experience of adaptation for the ‘Eastern workers’. Having changed her place of work by means of escape, Vera W. got into substantially better working and living conditions. In general, Vera W. positively evaluated her living conditions and the attitude of the German family to her. Having experience in the industry, she immediately understood the main difference of her new position, “Well, they did not beat me. I do not want to say that; they did not beat me. The mistress told me to write a letter to find out if there was still anyone at home. “If there was no one alive there, so be it, but if there was anyone alive, I will give you away in marriage”, she said. She was possible joking with me, or something like that, but I cried. So, she told me, “Do not cry. You are good for us. We do not offend you. Look at how difficult it is for the others. And you eat well. This is war. The war will be over, and you will go home¹².”

Vera W. perfectly understood that staying on the farm became her chance to survive and to spend the last months of the war in a quiet and relatively safe place. However, despite the humane treatment by the German family, the initial experience of being in industry did not allow her to establish truly trusting relationship with the farm owners. By the time of the escape, she had a clear idea of ‘her racial inferiority’ and the cruelty with which the German employers could treat her compatriots, “They live well. Not worth talking about it. They see themselves as they are above us all, their nation is above all. [...] We are the third-class people. They consider themselves so worthwhile”¹³.

The idea that the workforce had to be reliable and efficient was a norm for Vera V. in relations with the Germans. Having already experienced the much crueller treatment in the industry, she could not even think of refusing to work in any form on a peasant farm. The need for obedience seemed legitimate to her also during the interview¹⁴. Based on this understanding, she did not criticize the restrictions on free movement and free choice to which she was subjected. Semjen V, a former forced labour worker, said in his letter, “We were helpless, and we had nobody to complain to. I did not resist; I did what I was ordered¹⁵.”

¹² Interview mit Vera W. *IGB/ISFLDP*. Interview mit Vera W, s. 66.

¹³ *Ibid*, s. 67.

¹⁴ Several of the Soviet citizens, who survived the hunger and persecution in the Soviet Union, do not consider the period of their stay and work in the agriculture of Germany the worst part of their life. See: Interview mit Vera W. *IGB/ISFLDP*. *Interview mit Vera W.*; *Interview mit Semen W.*// *IGB/ISFLDP*. *Interview mit Semen W.*

¹⁵ Brief von Hr. Semjen V., 25. August 2000. *Stadtarchiv Meinerzhagen*.

Adaptation became one of the most widespread strategies for survival amongst ‘Eastern workers’ in the agriculture of National Socialist Germany and meant adaptation to the conditions of the microsocium of an individual peasant household. It seemed that the National Socialist Party took all measures to avoid the integration of ‘Eastern workers’ into the environment of the German peasantry. Any contacts with the Russian workers, not relating to the labour process, especially any conversations on political topics, were strictly prohibited¹⁶. The ‘Eastern workers’ were not allowed to eat with the German people, to stay in the village at the end of the working day or take part in the church services¹⁷. However, the integration of ‘Eastern workers’ was natural and irreversible, especially in small agricultural households.

Another way of adaptation of ‘Eastern workers’ was to demonstrate a religious community with the German peasants. German researcher A. Zühl explains some cases of humane attitude of the peasant population in the Nazi Germany towards foreign workers by a strong role of the church and religion and the associated Christian ethics in the rural areas¹⁸. The Security Service of the SS, or the SD (German: Sicherheitsdienst), stressed in its reports of July 1943 that certain groups of workers from the Soviet Union had a pronounced sense of religiosity, among them the Ukrainians taken from rural areas, elderly people and a large majority of women¹⁹. The SD members saw this as a peculiar threat to the rural population, “The fact that the big part of the Russians turned out to be Catholics threatens to mix German and foreign blood. Thus, the Catholics of Regensburg thought that the Russians should be unusually devout people, because they constantly wear a crucifix around their necks”²⁰. Having discovered the religiosity among many ‘Eastern workers’ and even Catholicism among the Ukrainians, the German peasant population sometimes admitted ‘Eastern workers’ into their community. In the Münster region in May 1943, the local police station noted with concern that many ‘Eastern workers’ with a sign ‘Ost’ attended Sunday services in a church²¹. The local gendarmerie was mainly dissatisfied with the behavior of the population that was quite comfortable with the presence of foreigners in the church. As A. Zühl points out, this kind of attitude towards the workforce from Eastern Europe was one of the hidden forms of rejection by the pea-

¹⁶ Merkblatt zum Einsatz der Zivilarbeiter und –Arbeiterinnen aus dem sowjetischen Gebiet in der Landwirtschaft, 21. Juli 1942. *STAMS. Politische Polizei. Nr. 366.*

¹⁷ Zühl A. Zum Verhältnis der deutschen Landbevölkerung gegenüber Zwangsarbeitern und Kriegsgefangenen. *Faschismus und Rassismus*; Hrsg. W. Röhr. Berlin, 1992, s. 344.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 349.

¹⁹ *Meldungen aus dem Reich*. Band 14. [31. Mai 1943 – 7. Juni 1943], s. 5485.

²⁰ Aus Bericht des SD-Abschnitts Bayereuth (Gau Bayerische Ostmark), 20. Juli 1942. *Bayern in der NS-Zeit: soziale Lage und politisches Verhalten der Bevölkerung im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte*; Hrsg. M. Broszat. München, Wien, 1997, s. 62.

²¹ Schreiben an den Kreisleiter von Gestapo-Rauxel, 17. Mai 1943. *STAMS. NSDAP - Kreis- und Ortsgruppenleitungen.*

sant population of the restrictive religious policy of the Nazi Germany. The confession of the foreigners was far more important than their ethnic identity or race, especially for the Catholic population of Germany²². Under the conditions of forced labor, many 'Eastern workers' emphasized their belonging to a religion, using this fact not only to improve their situation but also simply to find moral support under the conditions of forced stay on the territory of Germany. As an example, the former forced labour worker Nona T. recalled how she taught another female worker to cross herself in the same way as the Germans did, "We had a Roman and an Eastern-Rite church, so I knew how to cross myself, both Polish and Russian-Orthodox style. So, I crossed myself, and she was a girl from Smolensk. There, in Smolensk, they did not have it the way we did in the West. So, the German woman who took workers to the church said, "Oh, you are good, you are good, you know how to cross yourself." And she, this Polina, she did not know, "I do not know." [...] "Teach me," she asked me later. I answered, "Well, look at me." So, when we came next time, "Let's go to the (catholic) church," she said. "Let's go." Well, we went into the church and she (that German woman) said, "Oh, this is good. Because this is not so good to stand alone, do it like other people do"²³.

During their stay in Germany, almost all 'Eastern workers' got an idea of better working and living conditions of foreign workers of other nationalities. Therefore, the natural tendency of many 'Eastern workers' would be an attempt to hide their national identity. Thus, the former forced labour worker Nona T. hid the fact of her Belarussian origin during her stay in a German village, because she was afraid to be suspected of sympathy for the partisan movement²⁴. Many 'Eastern workers', having learned about better working conditions for the Ukrainians deported from the Galicia district, tried to prove their Ukrainian origin by requesting supporting documents from Ukraine or the Ukrainian Central Committee²⁵.

Conclusion

Despite all positive experiences of working in the German agriculture as mentioned above, the memories of former forced labour workers in Germany have a clear trail of mental trauma inflicted in the war years, during either deportation or work. In

²² Zühl A. Op. cit, p. 350; G. Freitag points out in his research on the forced labour of foreign workers on the territory of Lipper Land that the human attitude to the foreigners of a different confession was also observed among the protestant part of the peasantry. See: Freitag G. *Zwangsarbeiter im Lipper Land ...* S. 36.

²³ Interview mit Nona T. *IGB/ISFLDP. Interview mit Nona T.*, s. 22.

²⁴ *Ibid*, s. 12.

²⁵ The Ukrainian Central Committee [Український центральний комітет; Ukrainskyi tsen-tralnyi komitet, or UTsK] was established in Cracow in 1945. The main task of the committee was to protect the rights of the Ukrainians in Galicia and to help conscript them for forced labour in Germany.

each interview with the former forced labor workers, they admitted to a various extent belonging to a group of workers, which the national socialists viewed as allegedly ‘racially inferior’ with a limited right to life.

The consistent implementation of the postulates of the ‘racial’ national-socialist ideology encountered the insuperable barriers in the agriculture of the Nazi Germany due to the peculiarity of the process of production in the agricultural sector and the high dependence of the German peasants on their workers due to a shortage of local labour resources. Despite the isolation policy carried out by the national socialists towards the labor force, ‘Eastern workers’ inevitably became part of microsocium at the peasants’ farms. In a situation of close contact with the German peasants, ‘Eastern workers’ tried to influence their own situation, developing survival strategies that varied between adaptation to the circumstances and resistance to them.

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DOI 10.23859/2587-8352-2017-1-2-4
UDC 930:94(430),085

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Oswald Spengler: ‘The conservative revolutionary’ during the era of crisis in classical modernism

Abstract. In the article, political and philosophical-historical views of Oswald Spengler as an ideologist of the German ‘conservative revolution’ in the Weimar Republic are considered. It is claimed that the crisis of world outlook and the ideological bases of the German conservatism after 1918 led to emergence of ‘reactionary modernism’, the feature of which was the use of the modernist manner for the statement of irreconcilable anti-modernism. The analysis of Spengler’s main works shows the theoretic-methodological and heuristic potential of the concept ‘reactionary modernism’ in relation to the ideology of ‘conservative revolution’ and ideological phenomena close to it.

Key words: Oswald Spengler, ‘conservative revolution’, modernism, the Weimar republic

Introduction

The German historian Detlev Peukert provided the following title to his famous work on the history of Weimar Germany – ‘The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity’¹. In this title, Peukert quite accurately expressed the essence of spiritual, political, socio-economic and socio-cultural processes, which took place in Europe during the interwar period. A liberal image of endless and incremental historical progress was “buried in the trenches” by the First World War. The European civilization faced a tough identity crisis. The project of modernity and the program of modernity, which at one time allowed Europe to make a giant leap in its development, began to be questioned and criticized. Modernity became a problem in itself and required rethinking its basic foundations. There comes the situation of crisis in classical modernity, which was noted by D. Peukert.

¹ Peukert D. *Die Weimarer Republik. Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987. 313 s.

The ‘current spiritual situation’ – as it was denoted by the great contemporary of that era, Karl Jaspers – led to exceptional boost of spiritual and intellectual quest in the European society in the 1920s and 1930s, which had fostered a diverse array of views, concepts, approaches, etc. to reality, often seemingly incompatible with each other for their worldview, political and other basics. In an intellectual field, the crisis of classical modernity was especially experienced by those countries, which due to historical specifics were compelled to pass through all stages of modernity at an accelerated pace.

In their range, Germany is perhaps the most illustrative example. The processes of the growing ‘modernization’ of German society were quite intense and covered all the key stages of its turbulent history of the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries: the Kaiser Reich, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. The unique feature of the ‘special German path’ (Sonderweg) was the fact that under the conditions of the so-called ‘catch-up modernization’ in the spiritual, socio-political and socio-economical terms, the German state and the society found themselves in different, but simultaneously existing sociocultural layers. Taking into consideration the peculiarity of Germany's political culture, with its clear predominance of ideological conservative attitudes and paradigms, the situation with the crisis of modernity caused particularly acute contradictions in various facets that provoked an unprecedented boost of spiritual and intellectual quest in the German society.

German conservatism found itself in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, the conservatives tried to ‘freeze’ the process of modernization or at least to channel it into the course which was right for them; and that was what the ruling elite of the German Empire did. On the other hand, the conservatives understood that it was not possible to preserve the traditions in their old condition. Per S. Breuer, despite the difficulties and contradictions of modernization, by the end of the 19th century, the Germans were generally a bourgeois nation, and the principles of bourgeois political consciousness were deeply rooted among the ruling elite, including in its conservative circles².

The tension between modernism and anti-modernism in the ‘consciousness’ of German conservatives reached its peak in the years of the Weimar Republic, which in specifically radical conservative groups has led to the formation of a peculiar phenomenon of the ‘reactionary modernism’ (the term is introduced into contemporary humanitarian thought by the American historian and political scientist J. Herf³), which distinctive feature was the use of the “modernist manner for the assertion of irrecon-

² Breuer S. *Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993, s. 23.

³ Herf J. *Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Cambridge: University Press, 2003. 251 p.

cilable anti-modernism”⁴. The phenomenon of the ‘conservative revolution’ ideology was at the peak of the similar mentality among the traditionalist right-wingers in Weimar Germany.

Under the conditions of collapse of the traditional German conservative ideology, the representatives of the younger generation of German conservatives opposed the return to the traditional form of conservative ideology and politics, which led to the emergence of the ideology of ‘conservative revolution’, the prerequisites of which had been formed even before the war. The paradox of the ‘revolutionary conservatism’ consisted in the desire of its leaders to unite seemingly incompatible things. Per Geoff Eley, “what the conservative revolution wanted to ‘save’ had been already ‘lost’ (if it existed at all, which could be doubted), and therefore should have been re-created”⁵.

On the one hand, the ideology of the German ‘conservative revolution’ absorbed the ideological clichés of German conservatism: nationalism, illiberalism, opposition of the German national spirit and the German culture to the values of Western civilization, search for a special path of Germany's historical development in the course of ‘German (Prussian) socialism’, the idea of a corporate state, as well as an uncompromising struggle against the Weimar Republic and radically strengthened them. On the other hand, it was an attempt to create a new radical German conservatism and nationalism.

The ideologists of the ‘conservative revolution’ moved beyond the class conservatism of the Kaiser Reich and proclaimed a return to the true values of the German history and German society: the cult of the leader, the corporate state, authoritarianism, the state's responsibility before a citizen and vice versa, the unity of the nation and so on. The problem of ‘reactionary (conservative, right-wing) modernism’ in the ‘conservative revolution’ was repeatedly considered in the humanitarian thought⁶.

Main text

Oswald Spengler (1880 – 1936) takes a special place among the ideologists of the ‘conservative revolution’. His scientific and journalistic heritage reflects all the stages of the intellectual evolution of German conservatism, experienced by the Kaiser

⁴ Zhenin I. *Mezhdru ideei i ideologii: politizatsiya akademicheskogo soobshchestva Germanii v pervoi polovine XX veka* [Between the idea and ideology: politization of academic community in Germany in the first half of the 20th century]. Logos, 2013, no. 1 (91), p. 142.

⁵ Eley G. *Teorii faschisma: problemy interpretatsii* [Where are we at present with the theories of fascism?]. Bereginya 777 Sova, 2014, no. 4 (23), p. 31.

⁶ Terekhov O.E. ‘Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya’ kak fenomen pravogo moderna v Veimarskoi respublike v germanskoi istoriografii [‘Conservative revolution’ as a phenomenon of right wing modernism in Weimar Republic in German historiography]. *Vestnik kemerovskogo universiteta* [Bulletin of Kemerovo University], 2013, no. 2 (54), vol. 3, pp. 146–150.

Reich, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich within a short period. His works reflect the tectonic shifts in the ideology of German conservatism at the turn of the epochs of the German history.

The author of one of the most famous and controversial cultural and historical concepts in the history of the 20th-century humanitarian thought reflected them in 'The Decline of the West'; Spengler as a conservative advocated the preservation of traditions, but his conservatism was of a different kind than the traditional German conservatism of the Kaiser era. He believed that the old traditions in his era had been already drastically lost. Tradition made way to individualism of classes, layers, and individuals.

Like the 19th-century conservatives, Spengler viewed the society as organic whole, but the essential difference between his ideas about the society and the traditional conservatism was due to the lack of reliance on religion. Spengler was a follower of Nietzsche, who proclaimed that "God is dead". Spengler denied the influence of the church on the state policy formation. In his opinion, the modern state is based on the principle of the 'will to power', and therefore it did not need any divine sanction.

In addition to 'The Decline of the West', among the significant political and journalistic writings of Spengler, which were written by him in the Weimar period and played a significant role in the formation and development of the ideology of 'conservative revolution', the following works can be named: 'Prussianism and Socialism' (1919), 'New building of the German Empire' (1924), and 'The Hour of Decision' (1933).

J. Herf notes that Spengler's political ideas were on the border between Prussian conservatives, who were relying on industry, Junkers, the army and bureaucracy and postwar conservative revolutionaries⁷. A. Mikhailovsky believes that "Spengler's views are characterized by the dissonance between the orientation toward traditional values and the understanding of impossibility of their real implementation. He introduced a new position in the criticism of the era, which cannot be reduced to either purely revolutionary or purely reactionary, or purely pragmatist mentality of preserving the liberal status quo"⁸.

In this regard, let us cite an extensive excerpt from the article by the contemporary German researcher C. Möckel, where the author attempts to formulate the essence of Spengler's philosophic-historical and political views: "In his criticism of culture and man, which in addition to the philosophy of life is also based on social Dar-

⁷ Herf J. *Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Cambridge: University Press, 2003, p. 11.

⁸ Mikhailovskiy A.V. *Filosofiya tehniki Hansa Frayera* [Philosophy of Hans Freyer's technique]. *Voprosy filosofii* [Questions of philosophy], 2011, no. 3, p. 64.

winian and illiberal positions, Spengler deeply penetrates into the essence of modern industrial society and mass production. Despite all his polemic with historical romanticism, Spengler nevertheless, in the depths of his soul is in sympathy with pre-industrial, peasant-soil civilization. He became the voice of conservative circles among the ruling elite, hostile to the Weimar Republic, although Spengler's cooperation with the national socialism, of course, did not proceed due to his elitist convictions"⁹.

After 1918, Spengler switched to the position of 'conservative revolution', which ultimately led him to the number of its leading ideologists. Already in the first volume of 'The Decline of the West' (1918) written during the First World War, from the position of a patriotic German conservative, he builds a grand philosophical and historical concept of human development.

At the heart of this concept, there was one of the central ideas of German humanitarian thought – the idea of the struggle between civilization and culture. Spengler followed the tradition of conservative criticism of civilization and asserted the fact that the transition to civilization in the political sense was the transition from class order to the modern mass society, parliamentary and party democracy. Parliamentary democracy has become a kind of collapse of class order¹⁰. The establishment of the parliamentary Weimar Republic meant for Spengler the collapse of specific Prussian state-political tradition. The world war showed which civilizational forces would dominate the world empire: the Anglo-Saxon capitalism or the Prussian-style organized socialism.

Spengler, as it seemed to him, found the ideological and theoretical basis for the renewal of German conservatism under the conditions of the collapse of European and German culture in the synthesis of Prussianism – the traditional ideological and political doctrine of German conservatism and socialism. Spengler was that conservative thinker, who not only used the Prussian-German values but transformed them by proceeding from the contemporary political situation and in the social and political realities of the Weimar Republic that allowed transforming the German conservatism from a protective to an offensive and dynamic political course. After 1918, Spengler was among those 'young' German conservatives who gave a new ideological value of legitimation to German conservatism.

The problem of defining and interpreting socialism was one of the most important in Spengler's works. In the first volume of 'The Decline of the West', he tried to substantiate his understanding of this spiritual and political phenomenon of the West-

⁹ Möckel C. Diagnostika krizisa: Gusserl' protiv Shpenglera [The diagnostics of crisis: Husserl vs. Spengler]. *Logos*, 2007, no. 6, pp. 159–160.

¹⁰ Siefertle R.P. *Die Konservative Revolution: fünf biographische Skizzen* (Paul Lensch, Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Hans Freyer). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1995, s. 114–116.

ern history of the 19th–20th centuries. “Socialism is an irreligious Faustian feeling of life,” Spengler wrote¹¹. Socialism in Spengler’s understanding was a kind of an ethical code of the Faustian Man in the civilization era, who had not lost his vital activity yet. He rejected the economic interpretation of socialism and filled the concept of socialism with ethical content. Spengler concludes that the principles of ethical socialism were close to the Prussian spirit, the main features of which were as follows: the right to work, duty and the will to power. Thus, even the first volume of ‘The Decline of the West’ contained the main components of Spengler’s understanding of socialism.

During the existence of the Weimar Republic, Spengler’s political philosophy and his concept of ‘Prussian socialism’ acquired their completed shape. Spengler was one of the first representatives of Germany’s conservative political camp who responded to the military defeat of Germany, the November Revolution and the establishment of the bourgeois-democratic Weimar Republic. His political essay ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ (1919) declared what the main ideas and motives of the emerging ‘conservative-revolutionary’ movement were, and Spengler found himself proud of what he had written¹².

In ‘Prussianism and Socialism’, Spengler acted “as the guardian of tradition and as the prophet of the German nation of the future at the same time”¹³. The socialistically revamped Prussian idea was understood not as the collapsed one, but as unfinished calling of the nation; and it acted as an ideological counterbalance to the new German ‘Weimar state’. The ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ like all the young conservative works of the time, pursued the dual purpose: a breakthrough to modernity and the destruction of democracy¹⁴. H. Lübke, while comparing two fundamental works of the German ‘conservative-revolutionary’ thought – ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ and the ‘Worker’ by E. Jünger emphasized the sincere intention of their authors to formulate a new image of socialism. In the books, the project of “post-Marxist socialism as a German political pattern of the future” is outlined¹⁵.

¹¹ Spengler O. Zakat Evropy [The decline of Europe]. *Ocherki morfologii mirovoi istorii. I. Geshtal't i deistvitel'nost'* [Outlines of World History Morphology. Vol. 1: Gestalt and Reality]. Moscow: Mysl, 1993, p. 546.

¹² Spengler O. *Politische Schriften*. München: Beck, 1932, s. VII.

¹³ Patrushev A.I. Miry i mify Osval'da Shpenglera (1880–1936) [Worlds and myths of Oswald Spengler (1880–1936)]. *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya* [New and Contemporary History], 1996, no. 3, p. 136.

¹⁴ Felken D. Oswald Spengler: *Konservativer Denker zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur*. München: Beck, 1988, s. 104.

¹⁵ Lübke H. *Oswald Spenglers ‘Preußentum und Sozialismus’ und Ernst Jüngers ‘Arbeiter’*. *Der Fall Spengler; Hrsg. von A. Demandt, J. Farrenkopf*. Köln Weimer, Wien: Böhlau, 1994, s. 137.

Spengler begins 'Prussianism and Socialism' with the assertion that it was necessary "to free the German socialism from Marx, so there is no other"¹⁶. Speaking of socialism as the initial stage of the civilization of the Faustian cultural-historical type, Spengler proceeded from the conceptual and theoretical constructions of the history philosophy in the 'The Decline of the West'¹⁷. The ideological and semantic message of 'Prussianism and Socialism' is Spengler's interpretation of the historical opposition of Prussia and England.

The English spirit, the historical and political experience were the embodiment of liberalism, whereas the Prussian was that of discipline, solidarity and a sense of duty. "Every man for himself is English-style; everyone for all – this would be the Prussian-style"¹⁸. In this connection, Spengler's evaluation of the possibility of democracy in England and Germany was indicative: "Democracy in England means the opportunity for everyone to become rich, and in Prussia it is an opportunity for everyone to reach the highest stage of the social ladder"¹⁹. While contrasting the Prussian (German) and the English spirit, Spengler introduces his famous imagery symbols of the Teuton (knight who serves the order) and the Viking (robber-getter).

Not only life values, but also the economic set-up of the Germans and the Englishmen were opposing each other. The type of a free trader originated from Vikings, and the type of an official-administrator originated from the knights. If a German would honor the economic authority of the state, Englishmen in their economic activity would hope only for their own strength, which determined the specifics of German and English capitalism. The economic set-up that was called capitalism achieved the highest degree of development in England, per Spengler. It was pointless to copy the economic and political forms of English capitalism in Germany. On the pages of 'Prussianism and Socialism', Spengler repeatedly suggested that German liberalism was a caricature of the English one.

Spengler's strong criticism of the traditions of English capitalist ethos was not accidental. He, like most 'conservative revolutionaries', was illiberal and anti-capitalist. The illiberal political views of the leading ideologists of the 'conservative revolution' led them to the idea of a deep crisis of capitalism and the bourgeois society. Spengler believed that in the system of 'Prussian socialism', the financial capitalism and Marxism were both to be overcome.

Spengler's interpretation of the concept of 'Prussian socialism' shows him as a supporter and an ideologist of the German state bureaucracy. Speaking for the liberation of politics from the economy, struggling with all manifestations of liberalism and

¹⁶ Spengler O. *Prussachestvo i sotsializm* [Prussianism and Socialism]. Moscow, 2002, p. 9.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 39.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 56.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 71.

democracy, Spengler remained committed to the fundamental theory of German conservatism – the theory of the role of ‘pure politics’ in history driven by the individual will of a great personality. But in this theory, he introduced new nuances about the independence of the state not only from the church, but also from the economy.

The influence of the ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ on the formation of a conservative and nationalist ideology in Weimar Germany was significant. Spengler managed to rethink the specifics of German political culture and history. The book outlined the possible prospects for the development of Germany from the point of view of anti-democratic and conservative-nationalist political forces. Spengler rejected the results of the bourgeois-democratic November revolution and called for the accomplishment of a ‘national revolution’ to establish ‘Prussian socialism’, which he understood as a kind of ‘people's community’ aimed at serving the state and the nation.

If the journalistic essay ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ was written by Spengler as a direct response to the current political events, then in the second volume of ‘The Decline of the West’ he turned to the philosophical and historical substantiation of his conservative political views²⁰. The main place in the second volume was occupied by political topics. Spengler, while analyzing political history, again returned to the opposition of civilization and culture through the evaluation of the role of social classes in history, which, in his opinion were the reflection of metaphysical moment in history.

The creators and bearers of culture in history, per Spengler, were the nobility and the clergy. It was these two classes where the meaning of the historical process was concentrated. The creative power of the nobility grew out of blood ties with the land. Therefore, the fate itself together with the history assigned the leadership of the state to the nobility. Spengler also positively evaluated the peasantry, which as a class were closely connected with the land and therefore were also culture-bearers.

Spengler referred to the evaluation of the place and role of the state in history. “The world history is the history of states”, he stated²¹. The peculiarity of the conservative understanding of the state, per Spengler, consisted in its morphological approach, in the urge to consider the state in historical dynamics. The state for Spengler is a natural form of historical existence of the peoples, such as a family for a genus. The peoples and the family act as ‘units’ of history for Spengler, and the genus is the smallest one, whereas the peoples are the largest unit in the flow of history.

The peculiarities of the state were determined by the peculiarities of the people and culture; in accordance with it, the state was understood by them as an organic in-

²⁰ Spengler O. *Zakat Evropy. Ocherki morfologii mirovoi istorii. 2. Vsemirno-istoricheskie perspektivy* [The decline of Europe. Outlines of morphology of world history. Vol. 2. Perspectives of world history]. Moscow, 1998. 606 p.

²¹ Ibid, p. 385.

dividual, in which the single will was subordinated to the common will. The problem of state stability is the question of its internal authority, which depended not on the constitution but on the work of the government and the authority of the leader²². The state-forming class, per Spengler, was the nobility which held the state 'in shape'. Thus, per Spengler, only the class state could be the true product of culture and, accordingly, the real state.

With the oncoming of civilization and the bourgeoisie coming to political power, the authority of the state began to decline. Instead of the traditional notion of the state, there came interests, material values and the power of money. There came the era of the hated by Spengler democracy with its parliamentarism and the dominance of party interests, corruption and manipulation of public consciousness. Democracy was a sure sign and the beginning of decline and destruction of culture. For Spengler, the state thought was closely connected with the personality of the leader. He understood the democratic forms of government organization as a manifestation of political degradation.

Parliamentarism became a direct product of democracy. Spengler considered the parliamentarism "a continuation of the bourgeois revolution by other means"²³. Parliamentarism has no depth and no past. The parliamentary form of government creates an illusion of popular representation, but as a matter of fact, the center of gravity of big politics is shifting towards corporative interests of the financial oligarchy.

With the collapse of parliamentarism, the state during the civilization era enters its own closing stage – the stage of Caesarism; domination of personality, which is charismatically strong but free from cultural and historical determination. "I call Caesarism a method of management, which despite all the state-legal formulations ... is formless in its internal essence", Spengler characterized the last stage of existence of the state in history²⁴. Caesar simultaneously acted as a gravedigger of democracy, parliamentarism and liberalism and the creator of the world empire.

In the second volume of 'The Decline of the West', Spengler also interpreted the problems of the economy. Proceeding from the principle of morphological understanding of life and history, Spengler wrote: "Economic thinking and activity is one side of life that receives incorrect coverage, it is only necessary to consider it as an independent kind of life"²⁵. Thus, he expressed doubt in the justification of the existence of political economy as a science, especially in its English version. In his approach to explaining the economic life, Spengler follows the traditions of the con-

²² Eckermann K E. *Oswald Spengler und moderne Kulturkritik*. Bonn, 1980, s. 40–41.

²³ Spengler O. *Zakat Evropy. T. 2* [The decline of Europe. Vol. 2], p. 441.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 459.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 496.

servative German school of national economy, which deduced the specifics of economic life from the national historical traditions of peoples. He deepens this approach, and in his virtuosic morphological elegance he brings it to its logical conclusion, formulating it in a precise thesis “the whole of economic life is an expression of spiritual life”²⁶, as the attitude of ‘conservative revolutionaries’ to the problems of the economy. Spengler made a claim that his views on the economy are on the other side of the capitalism and socialism. Politics and economics are two sides of the cosmic stream of history.

The second volume of ‘The Decline of the West’, ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ and several other journalistic works by Spengler (the most significant of them is the essay of 1924 ‘The New Building of the German Empire’) were among the classic texts of the ‘new’ German conservatism in the Weimar Republic, where his main mythologemes were reflected, and Spengler himself became the most influential figure in the circles of German conservatives of the Weimar Republic. Spengler’s ideological engagement contributed to his entry into the elite circle of politicians and industrialists who dreamed of eliminating Weimar democracy, such as the following Germany's leading industrialists, Hugo Stinnes, media mogul Alfred Hugenberg, commander-in-chief of the Reichswehr, general Hans von Seeckt.

However, Spengler himself avoided attributing himself to any direction of German conservatism in the Weimar Republic, preferring to take a position ‘above-the-fray’. He was developing plans for a possible state structure after the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. There is evidence of his participation in the preparation of a coup d’état in Bavaria, which was planned at the end of 1922²⁷. Despite his political commitment and active participation in the ideological and political polemics during the first years of the Weimar Republic, Spengler quickly became disappointed in his ability to influence the real politics. In the mid-1920s, he appealed to the ‘pure’ science again.

Spengler’s interest in politics awakened in early 1930s, when Germany found itself at the historic turning point again. The global economic crisis, the approaching fall of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations had shaken the foundations of the world politics once again. In the public consciousness of the Germans, the time came for the triumph of the ‘conservative revolution’ ideas. The term eventually put into usage in the political, cultural and everyday space of Germany by the famous poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal in 1927 and popularized by one of the leading ideologists of the modern conservatism E. Jung in early 1930s²⁸, started to be per-

²⁶ Ibid, p. 498.

²⁷ Koktanek A. M. *Oswald Spengler und seiner Zeit*. München, 1968, s. 287–290.

²⁸ Jung E. J. *Deutschland und der konservativen Revolution. Deutsche über Deutschland. Die Stimme des unbekanntten Politikers*. München, 1932, s. 369–383.

ceived as a call for the coming ‘national revolution’, which was to destroy the Weimar Republic and become the impetus for a new revival of the German Reich.

Spengler's last significant work, ‘The Hour of Decision’ published in the summer of 1933, several months after Hitler's rise to power, is filled with anxiety about the relative future of Western civilization and Germany²⁹. ‘The Hour of Decision’ became the result of the evolution of Spengler's historical and political thought. The main ideas of the book reflected Spengler's deep pessimism about the prospects for Germany and world politics. Perhaps D. Felken was right when he pointed out that ‘The Hour of Decision’ should be perceived as the most important ideological and political source of the gradual transformation of the right-wing German conservatism at the last stage of existence of the Weimar Republic before turning into a national-socialist worldview. The book shows how far the ‘conservative revolution’ has departed from its original ideological and spiritual sources³⁰. Although, as it seems to us, it is impossible to draw a direct parallel between the ideology of the ‘conservative revolution’ and national socialism.

The subject of ‘The Hour of Decision’ was once again the problem of the decline in Europe, but this time not in the form of abstract philosophical and historical reflections, but rather in the form of analysis of specific political situation developed in the world and in Germany within years after the end of the First World War. Spengler maintained: “We entered the era of world wars”³¹. And this is the natural state of history, as “the history of mankind is the history of world wars”³².

Spengler felt sad because of the destruction of old Europe – Europe of Metternich and Bismarck, Europe of dynastic national states. Two kinds of dangers threatened the West. There was “White Revolution”, under which Spengler understood the unrestrained domination of rationalism, parliamentarism, democracy in the public consciousness, state and political institutions of the West. “The old, memorable forms of the state lie in ruins. They were replaced by the shapeless parliamentarism...”³³. The second danger related to the rise of ‘colored’ people, to which Spengler referred Russia as well. He prophesied the coming ‘color’ revolution aimed at the destruction of the white race.

Spengler's hatred and disgust regarding socialism, liberalism, capitalism in the ‘The Hour of Decision’ is truly universal. Much of the book is devoted to the criticism of the ‘white revolution’, under which Spengler understood the triumph of the idea of class struggle – the main spiritual and political weapon of liberalism and socialism. Based on this vision of the Western history, he again, same as in 1919,

²⁹ Spengler O. *The Years of Decision*. Moscow, 2006. 240 p.

³⁰ Felken D. Op. cit, s. 195.

³¹ Spengler O. *Gody resheniy* [The Years of Decision] ..., p. 36.

³² Ibid, p. 23.

³³ Ibid, p. 127.

equates the working-socialism and liberalism. “There is no contradiction between the economic liberalism and socialism”, Spengler writes³⁴. In this context, capitalism, liberalism, Marxist socialism, Bolshevism are the manifestations of the same phenomenon for Spengler – the civilization decay of the culture. Civilization completely supplanted culture in the history of the West.

In ‘The Hour of Decision’, Spengler returned to the problem of ‘Prussian socialism’. Reasoning about ‘Prussian socialism’, he lamented that the original idea of the ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ was never understood by the Germans; that within years since the publication of the book, Marxist understanding of socialism continued to dominate the consciousness of the Germans³⁵. He reiterated that “the Prussian idea is directed both against financial liberalism and against working-class socialism”³⁶. Spengler repeatedly pointed out his understanding of socialism as a kind of moral life form, which has nothing to do with economic and social problems. Prussian style means, per Spengler, the priority of politics (primarily external) over the economy.

History provided Spengler with another opportunity to get involved in the real-life politics. This time his authority was claimed by the national socialists as one of the factors of legitimization of the Nazi regime³⁷. The problem of Spengler's relationship with the national socialism fits into the general context of the problem of attitude of ‘revolutionary conservatives’ to Nazism³⁸. The intellectual competition between the two trends of German radical conservatism continued throughout the existence of the Weimar Republic. Hitler's attempts to attract prominent figures of the ‘conservative revolution’, such as A. Möller van den Bruck, to cooperate with the Nazi Party, failed eventually.

The attitude of ‘conservative revolutionaries’ to the ideology of national socialism and later to the political practice of the Third Reich was initially contradictory. On the one hand, they, like the national socialists, were eager to eliminate the ‘Weimar system’, the Treaty of Versailles, the revival of the German nation in the form of a ‘people's community’. On the other hand, the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ had

³⁴ Ibid, p. 161.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 160.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 164.

³⁷ For more details see: Koktanek A. M. Spenglers Verhältnis zum Nationalsozialismus in geschichtlicher Entwicklung. *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1966, B. 13, s. 33–55; Vollnhals C. Oswald Spengler und Nationalsozialismus. Das Dilemma eines konservativen Revolutionärs. *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, Tel Aviv 13, 1984, s. 263–303; Gergilov R.E. O. Shpengler i Tretiy Reih [O. Spengler and the Third Reich]. *Klio*, 2007, no. 2, pp. 33–40, Artamoshin S.V. O. Shpengler i ‘konservativnaya revolyutsiya’ v Germanii [O. Spengler and ‘conservative revolution’ in Germany]. *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of History], 2009, no. 6, pp. 148–154.

³⁸ Terekhov O.E. Fenomen ‘konservativnoi revolyutsii v istoriografii FRG: osnovnye kontseptsii i problemy interpretatsii [Phenomenon of ‘conservative revolution’ in the West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany)]. *Historiography: main concepts and problems of interpretation*. *Kemerovskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet* [Kemerovo State University]. Kemerovo, 2011. 192 p.

been putting the Nazi movement on freeze since its beginning, noting its plebeian character. The claim of the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ aimed at spiritual and political elitism, at a kind of ‘spiritual aristocracy’ aroused irritation on part of the national socialists, who by no means were keen to admit that the ideological primacy of the ‘national revolution’ in Germany belonged to the ‘conservative revolutionaries’. In addition, the totalitarian practice of the Nazi regime played its negative role. The ‘conservative revolutionaries’ were supporters of the authoritarian model of the state.

During 1933, the prominent figures of the Third Reich repeatedly appealed to Spengler with a request to publicly support the Nazi regime (such as Goebbels). However, even though during the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1932 Spengler voted for the Nazi party, he refused to support the regime publicly. In this connection, a face-to-face meeting and a conversation between Spengler and Hitler at Wagner festival in Bayreuth was quite indicative. The interlocutors did not understand each other. He did not see the draft of Prussian socialism in the national socialism. Other important points that distinguish Spengler's political views from the ideology of national socialism can be singled out as follows: cultural pessimism, absence of ‘nationality’ principle, non-biological understanding of the race.

Moreover, embracing the massive and popular character of the Nazi movement with irritation, Spengler in ‘The Hour of Decision’ announced his cautious criticism of the Nazi political practices. Since autumn of 1933, a campaign against Spengler started in the Nazi press; and since 1934 Spengler's name ceased to be mentioned in the media. The events of 30 June 1934, the so-called ‘night of long knives’, when some of Spengler’s friends from the conservative camp were killed, clearly demonstrated that his further criticism of the Nazi regime could cost him life.

Conclusion

Spengler’s political views evolved as characteristic of German ideology of ‘revolutionary conservatism’ in the Weimar Republic, different from its more moderate-authoritarian forms, followed by the formation of right-wing radical tendencies closely matching the ideology of national socialism, which was quite typical for the representatives of ‘reactionary modernism’ in German conservatism in the years of crisis in classical modernity. Spengler started with building a new philosophical (in this case philosophical and historical) basis of ‘The Decline of the West’ right to the ideology of German conservatism after the disaster of 1918 but subsequently turned directly to the political journalism, relying on it to influence the public opinion.

R. von Bussche notes the duality of Spengler's influence on the conservative thought and conservative movement in the Weimar Republic. On the one hand, most of the conservatives refused to accept Spengler’s pessimistic cultural philosophy; on the other hand, Spengler had drawn his political conclusions from the statement that

the decline of Europe was perceived in the Weimar conservative circles extremely positively³⁹. Nor can we deny the fact that Spengler's concept of 'Prussian socialism' had a significant influence not only on the formation of the political ideas of 'conservative revolution' but also the German conservatism in the Weimar Republic in general.

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³⁹ Bussche R. von dem. *Konservatismus in der Weimarer Republik: die Politisierung des Unpolitischen*. Heidelberg, 1998, s. 148.

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DOI 10.23859/2587-8352-2017-1-2-5
UDC 94(327)

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Helmut Kohl: Facing the challenge of history

Abstract. In modern history, when reality is subject to rapid and radical change, the role of personality – whether a statesman or a politician – can be very significant in the process of making such changes and in achieving specific results. This is true of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in 1989-90, as described in this article, by his actions and policies led the Germans to unity after forty years of Germany's split.

Keywords: German policy, Chancellor Kohl, perestroika, Berlin Wall, GDR, united Europe, CDU / CSU

Introduction

At the meeting with the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990, the Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl quoted Otto Bismarck: “A person cannot achieve anything by himself, he can only wait until he notices the divine omen on the way to the accomplishment of events, then step forward and grab onto the red mantle of the Lord, that's all that is in his power”. The negotiations took place in Arkhyz, in the Stavropol Territory, in the homeland of Mikhail Gorbachev, who admitted that he had never heard this statement of Bismarck but immediately agreed with him,



adding the favorite expression “everything flows, everything changes”¹.

There followed a lot of changes. But if Mikhail Gorbachev could not grab “for the red mantle”, having lost everything soon, Helmut Kohl made it into history as the ‘Chancellor of German unity’, standing in line with Otto Bismarck and Konrad Adenauer².

To approach the evaluation of any historical personality objectively, it is not enough to analyze the external factors that guided their actions. It is worth paying attention to the person, their formation, to the life journey and experience that was passed and acquired by the time of making the most important choice – in response to the challenge of history³. There are not so many works specifically devoted to Helmut Kohl in domestic German studies⁴; often the judgments about him and his political activities are presented in the works on Germany devoted to broader topics by A. Y. Vatlin, A.I. Patrushev, N.V. Pavlov and others⁵.

Amongst the German publications, we would highlight the biographical research of Hanns-Peter Schwartz, the biography written by Klaus Dreyer, as well as other books by the biographer Werner Maser and the political scientist Guido Knopp⁶ published in Russia, and of course Helmut Kohl's own memoirs⁷. He referred to himself as a representative of the ‘post-Hitler generation’⁸, emphasizing that his views and persuasions had formed after the collapse of Nazism. The writers of Kohl called the former chancellor ‘the grandson of Adenauer’, as Spiegel's editor W. Bickerich did in

¹ *Mikhail Gorbachev and the German question. Coll. Documents. 1986–1991.* Moscow, 2006, p. 495.

² Petelin B.V. *German policy of chancellor Helmut Kohl 1982–1990.* Vologda, 2004, p. 17.

³ Dunaeva Yu.V. Historical biography: Decline or rebirth? *Historical biography: Modern approaches and methods of research. Coll. Reviews and reports; RAS INION.* Moscow, 2011, pp. 8–9.

⁴ See: Iistyagin L.G. *Political Portrait of Helmut Kohl.* Moscow, 1985; Markov V. N. Chancellor of Germany. *They are Talked About: (20 Political Portraits).* Moscow, 1989, pp. 321–342; Vyatkin S.K. Helmut Kohl. *Questions of History*, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 46–66; Petelin B.V. Helmut Kohl: Factors of political longevity. *Historical Thought in the Modern Era: Materials II Inter-University Readings in History Dedicated to the Memory of V. A. Kozyuchenko.* 2–4 April 1996. Volgograd, 1997, pp. 28–33; In 1990, Erlangen published an essay biography of Kohl written by the Russian historian A. Frenkin, in which, per the German biographer W. Maser, the chancellor appears in a rather ‘distorted image’ and “is not at all a good specialist in any field”. Maser W. *Helmut Kohl: Der deutsche Kanzler. Biographie.* Frankfurt am Main, 1990, s. 111–112.

⁵ Vatlin A.Yu. *Germany in the 20th Century.* Moscow, 2002; Patrushev A.I. *Germany in the 20th Century.* Moscow, 2004; Pavlov N.V. *Russia and Germany: The Failed Alliance (A Continuation Story).* Moscow, 2017.

⁶ Schwarz Hans-Peter. *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie.* München, 2012; Dreher K. *Helmut Kohl von Leben mit Macht.* Stuttgart, 1998; Maser V. *Helmut Kohl: Biographie.* Moscow, 1993; Knopp G. *History of Triumphs and Mistakes of the FRG Leaders.* Moscow, 2008.

⁷ Kohl H. *Erinnerungen 1982–1990.* München, 2005.

⁸ See: Maser W. Op. cit., p. 18.

his book⁹, or as O. Fehrenbach, for example, claimed that he was not “only aware of himself as the ‘grandson of Adenauer’, but was the one indeed”¹⁰. However, Kohl himself did not often correct the journalists (Adenauer was 54 years old on his birthday). To some extent, he could be considered his ‘grandson’.

Helmut Kohl was not only the Federal Chancellor, but also chairman of the Christian Democratic Union – the largest party in Germany, where he experienced all the ups and downs in his career. Knowing perfectly the intricacies of the party work and life, Kohl often foresaw and anticipated the wishes and aspirations of individual functionaries, trying to prevent weakening of his own positions, as evidenced by the involved documents directly related to the German policy of the CDU¹¹.

Main text

Helmut Kohl was born on 3 April 1930 in Ludwigshafen am Rhein. His full name was Helmut Josef Michael Kohl. His father Johann Caspar Kohl was a financial officer, a typical representative of this social stratum of the interwar period. He had a strong character, showed diligence in his work, an incorruptible sense of duty and loyalty to serving the state. The family was religious Catholic, but its members tolerated the Protestants. There was no big income, however, as Kohl himself recalled: “We did not know the worries about the daily bread. Nobody had to starve”¹².

The future chancellor separated himself from the National Socialists, among whom were his peers, but he certainly had certain views and persuasions at this age. The family did not pay tribute to the Nazis, although his father and brother Walter had to go off to war. The elder brother Walter died at the front. Helmut was called up for military service in Wehrmacht whilst being 15 years old. Hitlerjugend – the last reserve of the Fuhrer, was to stop the Red Army and the Western allies. The fanatically minded youth fought and died, but Kohl was not a fanatic at all. The war ended when the US troops arrived. His native city passed into the French zone of occupation. Hard post-war time came.

Kohl’s biographer Maser writes that in his childhood and youth, Helmut was distinguished by a clear desire to be a leader, a ‘small Fuhrer’, practicing “the art of

⁹ Bickerich W. *Der Enkel: Analyse der Ära Kohl*. Düsseldorf, 1995.

¹⁰ Fehrenbach O. *The Collapse and the Revival of Germany. A Glance at the European History of the 20th century*; Transl. from German. Moscow, 2001, p. 229.

¹¹ *Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989–90; Bearb. von Hanss Jürgen Küsters und Daniel Hofmann*. München: Oldenburg, 1998; Lexikon zur Geschichte der Christlichen Demokratie in Deutschland; Herausgegeben von W. Becker, G. Buchstab, A. Doering-Manteuffel, R. Morsey. Schöningh Verlag Paderborn, 2002; Bericht zur Lage 1989–1998. Der Kanzler und Parteivorsitzende im Bundesvorstand der CDU Deutschlands. Droste Verlag Düsseldorf, 2012.

¹² Cit. by: Maser W. *Helmut Kohl: Der deutsche Kanzler. Biographie*, p. 19.

guiding his peers”¹³. The matured Helmut seemed to many a very good-natured person, accommodating and inclined to compromise. In fact, it was different: he was characterized by a rare sense of purpose, inherent in people with a strong character. The straightness of his character was not the simplicity characteristic of the simpletons. In 1946, Kohl joined the CDU, and in 1947 he actively participated in the creation in Ludwigshafen of the local branch of the Young Union of Germany (the Junge Union Deutschland’s). The choice was conscious, although he did not hide his sympathy for the social democrat Schumacher, compared to which Adenauer seemed “a politician from the past”. In the summer of 1950, Helmut finished gymnasium, showing excellent profound knowledge in the final exams, especially in history, literature and language.

In the winter of 1950–51, Kohl became a student at the University of Frankfurt, but studied there only for two semesters. Then he moved to Heidelberg University, where he studied law and philosophy. In the process of studying, Kohl specialized in history and political science. It was then that the choice was made in favor of politics. Political activity attracted him, he felt that he had aptitude for this sphere. Helmut loved discussions, various kinds of debates and was active in student seminars. The fascination of history was a conscious choice. He was interested in its practical side. Such an approach remained for life. Even in his youth, Kohl realized that one should not abandon history, whatever it was; and for this reason one cannot “overcome the past”.

When and to what extent did the German question become part of his views? One of the first strong political impressions, which he admitted himself, was the speech of Kurt Schumacher, delivered in 1947, imbued with a passionate desire to see Germany as a united country. But many people, including those in the SPD, said those statements were untimely. Willy Brandt noted even ‘aggressiveness’ in such speeches by Schumacher about the reunification of Germany¹⁴. Maser writes that Kohl believed in this idea even in the upper class of gymnasium¹⁵. He carried this passionate desire to see his homeland united through his entire future life. Another fact was that many people in their childhood and adolescence dreamt of a career and of the heights that they could reach. Kohl was no exception there. The journalist B. Heimrich wrote that for the first-time Kohl expressed the desire to become chancellor while he was still at school; and then in 1959, when he became a member of the Landtag, where he was the youngest of his age¹⁶.

He continued to rise across the party and the state ladders quickly, becoming ‘the youngest’ in relation to his predecessors and the others. He became Chancellor at the

¹³ Maser W. Op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁴ Brandt W. Memories. Moscow, 1991, p. 38.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁶ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15. 1. 1983.

age of 52, which was not surpassed by anyone in the 20th century (his successor, G. Schroeder was elected chancellor at 54). Naturally, Kohl's career was somehow accompanied by luck, but most of the success came because of hard work, especially since almost always Kohl began to 'climb' whilst in the ranks of the opposition.

In Rhineland-Pfalz, Kohl received a good 'schooling'. Having successfully passed all the intermediate party-state posts, in 1966 he was elected chairman of the land organization of CDU, and in May 1969 he became Prime Minister of the land government. There was one more feature in Kohl's activity as the prime minister. He skillfully shaped the coterie, which would play a significant role in the subsequent development of the FRG – R. von Weizsacker, H. Gaisler, B. Fogel, N. Bluhm, H. Telchik and others, perhaps less important politicians, who eventually became the main people in the apparatus of the Federal Chancellor. In 1967, Kohl contributed to the appointment of B. Heck as Secretary General of the CDU and the election in the same year of K.-G. Kiesinger as chancellor of the FRG. Admittedly, Kohl's 'land government' had successfully addressed the socio-economic issues by undertaking several necessary reforms.

Moreover, Kohl did not forget the main idea, as evidenced by the following fact: in the government statement issued on 20 May 1969, he recalled the belonging of Rhineland-Pfalz to the united Germany. Unlike other politicians of the time, it was Kohl who consistently reasoned and judiciously defended the idea of the German unity. At the same time, his words were not perceived as a duty or a common reminder; they sounded like a hope for reunion. The CDU authority 'Zonda' wrote in 1972: "The CDU finally needs the chairman who will be engaged in the party work, and this post will cease to be only nominal. Thus, Adenauer had no interest in the party, Erhard wanted to stand above it, Kiesinger had no desire, and Barzel had no time for the party work"¹⁷. In June 1973 at the congress in Bonn, Helmut Kohl was elected chairman of the CDU and remained in office. The record time was 25 years. Under him, the party acquired its modern look, and its potential was comparable to the SPD. By 1982, the CDU had over 710,000 members, and the total number of members in the social committees and the youth union was more than one million. A year later, the party had 835 thousand members – the highest figure in its entire history. In 1983 in CSU there were 185 thousand members – the third result in the history of the union (in 1989 there were 185,853 members and in 1990 – 186,198 members)¹⁸.

After the failure of the CDU / CSU in the elections to the Bundestag in 1976, Kohl moved to Bonn and headed the parliamentary fraction. His flexible and skillful tactics played a role in the disintegration of the SPD-FDP coalition and the latter's transition to the CDU / CSU side. On 1 October 1982, after voting in the Bundestag

¹⁷ Grafe P.J. *Schwarze Visionen: Die Modernisierung der CDU*. Hamburg, 1986, s. 29–30.

¹⁸ Lexikon der Christlichen Demokratie in Deutschland, s. 708.

on the issuance of a vote of no confidence to chancellor H. Schmidt, Helmut Kohl was elected the new chancellor, who formed the government based on the CDU / CSU-FDP coalition.

With Kohl's election as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, they started talking about a 'new beginning' in the political circles. But in what way did it become 'new' indeed? Here is how Maser wrote about this: "With the advent of Kohl to power, both in the FRG and in the GDR, the discussion of the issue of the unified Germany resumed. The patriotic passion of the Chancellor, his sentimental attitude towards Berlin and the active statements on the German question helped awaken the sense of belonging to one nation among all Germans, not only in the FRG. The debate had revived on the very actual topic since the Tacitus, which had been however specifically burdened since 1945 and became the unprecedentedly protracted topic - what is Germany, what does it mean to be a German, what is the essence of the German nature, the German nation and nationality¹⁹?"

This initial period was not only important in the work of the new chancellor, but also extraordinarily difficult in the elaboration of his own political line. Collaborating with such an experienced, independent party politician and well-known international figure as Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Kohl could fall beyond the foreign policy sphere²⁰. At first, it seemed so. Per K. Hacke, the professor at the Hamburg University of Bundeswehr, the author of many works on the history and foreign policy of the CDU / CSU, Kohl "was not cosmopolitan, and foreign policy was not his passion ... Kohl showed very little intellectual disposition to foreign policy topics, but he owned a good, confident and sensitive scent for the fundamental interests of the FRG"²¹.

This played an important role in shaping the goals of the foreign policy for the 1980s. Kohl, as head of the Cabinet, defined his foreign policy in the traditions of Adenauer (it is not that Kohl intended to be a 'copy' of Adenauer in the German politics.) This was defined as the exact fault of the GDR leadership, as A. Filitov noted in his monograph²²). Thus, it was placed on the usual conservative foundation and limited the possibilities for proceeding with the foreign policy within the social-liberal framework, the supporter of which was Genscher himself. Hacke believes that it should be agreed that the return to Adenauer's foreign policy 'covenants' greatly facilitated the ties with the West, but with respect to the Eastern European states, where it

¹⁹ Maser W. Op. cit, p. 210.

²⁰ The first publications on the new chancellor noted that in the field of eastern and German politics Kohl "is not a theorist", he is inclined to act as a 'pragmatist' guided by the principle of 'utility'. KAS. ACDP: Abteilung Pressedokumentation 1/190 CDU. 21. Okt. 1983.

²¹ Hacke Chr. *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen?* Berlin, 1997, s. 281.

²² Filitov A.M. *The German question: from split to unification. New reading.* Moscow, 1993. 211 p.

was required to act within the policy of detente, the CDU / CSU had no traditions; they should have been created, and this was the main problem.

At first glance, it seemed insoluble, because as per Adenauer, “the German policy was to be the core of all foreign policy”²³, which was difficult to combine with the continuation and normalization of relations with the eastern neighbors and the GDR. However, Kohl at the very beginning of his chancellery, repeatedly advocated adherence of the new Cabinet to the concluded treaties and agreements and appealed to avoid any attempts to revise or reject them. In fact, this consisted of the so-called Realpolitik of Chancellor Kohl, with the amendment that the CDU / CSU declared the need to place the Eastern treaties in the legal framework of the FRG legislation.

“The German question is open in the legal sense” – this was the ruling statement in the 1980s. It did not become a cunning trick of conservatives. They had their own vision of ways to solve the German problem²⁴. And this immediately gave the German policy an opportunity to enter a new level of understanding and content, and most importantly it became offensive but not reactionary or revanchist at all. Even the fact that Rainer Bartzel became the first minister for inter-German relations in H. Kohl’s government, given his position during the debate over the eastern treaties, was generally perceived as positive²⁵.

Thus, since 1982 the German question became an actual topic. The main normative document was the Program and Principles adopted at the 26th congress of the CDU held on 23–25 October 1978 in Ludwigshafen, where the Secretary General of the CDU Heiner Geisler called the document “the decisive spiritual renewal of the CDU in opposition”²⁶. In Article 132 of the Program and Principles, the main task in the German policy of the CDU was defined as follows: “the achievement of freedom and unity for all German people”. At the same time, it was explained that “overcoming the division of Europe and, together with this, the division of our fatherland” was only possible only under the conditions of peace. Article 133 defined the approaches of the CDU to the German question, which “remained open”. The party assumed the responsibility to support the national feelings about the united fatherland in all parts of Germany. The party was ready to support the negotiations and agreements that would improve the living conditions and the situation with human rights in the di-

²³ Adenauer K. *Reden und Gespräche 1946–1967*. Köln, 1998, s. 29–30.

²⁴ The fact that the German CDU / CSU policy was formed on a legal basis is evident from the nature and content of the interpretation of the Eastern treaties, which per the West Germany side, did not “close the German question”. In this respect, even the ruling Social-Liberal coalition, on whose behalf these agreements were signed, left a ‘legal clue’ in the form of the famous ‘Letters on the Unity of the German Nation’ dated 12 August 1970. To learn more about this problem, see: *Deutschlandtheorien auf der Grundlage der Ostvertragspolitik*; Georg Teyssen. Frankfurt am Main, 1987.

²⁵ Hacke Chr. *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

²⁶ *Deutsches Monatsblatt*. Sonderbeilage, 1979, no. 3, s. 1.

vided Germany and with what should become the foundation for the future unity²⁷. Further it was stated that “all treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with other states and with the GDR were binding”. Article 134 read as follows: “Berlin is the capital of the whole Germany”²⁸.

As a long and substantial period was implied, the question of periodization with regards to the German policy was raised quite appropriately. Most researchers agree on adhering to a well-defined clear framework. K. Hacke, in the third edition of his book on the FRG foreign policy, proposed the following three ‘phases’. The first one ran through the autumn of 1982 – summer of 1985; this ‘phase’ was considered the formation of the German policy by the new governmental cabinet and the CDU / CSU coalition – the FDP. Its peculiarity was that the German policy was implemented in the context of aggravation of the relations between the West and the East, the policy of ‘re-armament’ of NATO and the reciprocal measures of the USSR. Despite the confrontation, the German policy turned out to be quite ‘constructive’²⁹. The second ‘phase’ covered the summer 1985-autumn 1987, including E. Honecker's visit to the FRG, which was the ‘highest point’ in Germano-German relations. The third ‘phase’ ran through 1987–89, when the German politics developed, mainly under the influence of the changes in the Soviet Union and the GDR. Hacke singled out the period 1989–90, that is directly implying the process of Germany reunification, which looked quite justified. In the consideration of the German policy of the CDU / CSU, its theoretical and practical content, we will adhere to this periodization with some adjustments, depending on the development of the events in 1982-90.

Helmut Kohl, in contrast to Konrad Adenauer, had ample opportunities in the formation and conduction of the German policy. First, it was connected with the functional activity of the German Chancellery, which was an institutional body of the executive power, that is, directly the head of the government. In domestic publications, there are only brief references to the existence of “Chancellor’s auxiliary apparatus”. In fact, there is no information on its structure, composition or work, which is not surprising. Among German researchers it is necessary to mention the dissertation work of Siegfried Schöne ‘From Reich Chancellery to Federal Chancellery’, published as a book in 1968³⁰. The most comprehensive description of the organizational structures of the Chancellery in the 1980s is presented in the very first volume of the ‘History of the German Unity’ under the authorship of K.-R. Korte. The “apparatus of the German policy” was represented in six main divisions (as of 15 June 15 1985):

²⁷ See: *Grundsatzprogramm der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands*. Freiheit; Solidarität. Gerechtigkeit. Beschlossen vom 26. Bundesparteitag Ludwigshafen 23–25. Oktober 1978. Bonn: Konrad-Adenauer-Haus, 1978.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Hacke Chr. Op. Cit, pp. 311–312.

³⁰ See: Schöne S. *Von der Reichskanzlei zum Bundeskanzleramt*. Berlin, 1968.

- Central management (Leitungsebene);
- The Second administration (Abteilung 2) – “external and intra-German relations” with “the working staff of German politics” (Arbeitsstab Deutschlandpolitik);
- The Fifth administration (Abteilung 5) – “social and political analysis, means of communication” and “service speechwriters” (Redenschreiberteam);
- Permanent representation in the GDR;
- Plenipotentiary representative of the federal government in Berlin;
- Personal authorized representative of the Chancellor³¹.

The researcher will find evaluations of business qualities of the Chancellery employees in immediate circles to Chancellor Kohl in the interesting and informative book by G. Langgut ‘The Internal Life of Power: The Crisis and the Future of the CDU’³².

Along with the Federal Chancellor, the head of the Federal Chancellery expressed the central leadership. In 1982–84, the Chancellery was headed by the State Secretary Waldemar Schreckenberger, a lawyer by education, with whom Kohl was familiar from the school's bench. It was one of the most loyal officials for Kohl. In November 1984, the executive office of the Federal Chancellor was headed by the forty-year-old Wolfgang Schäuble; he was younger than his predecessor and had legal education (Schreckenberger remained in the office of State Secretary). Simultaneously with his appointment, Schäuble became minister of state for special assignments, so his functions expanded considerably; and the situation in the political leadership significantly strengthened. Schäuble took part in the work of the CDU / CSU faction and was co-opted into the presidium of the CDU. Per Korte, this helped improve the coordination between the party's central leadership and its land organizations³³.

One of the most important structures in the Federal Chancellery was the “working staff of German politics”, kind of ‘think tank’, whose overall leadership under Kohl was initially undertaken by Jenniger, followed by Schäuble and Seiters. “The working staff of German politics” existed since 1977 and was created on the initiative of chancellor Schmidt, who wanted to have a separate structure responsible for the German policy in his department. This need was also dictated by the desire of the Western allies to obtain more information about the policy of the federal government, which would allow coordinating efforts in resolving the German problem. With the advent of Kohl, the functions and tasks of the ‘working staff’ were made more specific. Mainly, the members of the ‘staff’ carried out ‘production activities’: they prepared Germano-German negotiations, meetings of the head of Federal Chancellery

³¹ Korte K.-R. *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989*. Stuttgart, 1998, 31 p.

³² Langguth G. *Das Innenleben der Macht. Krise und Zukunft der CDU*. Berlin, 2001, s. 72–99.

³³ Korte K.-R. Op. cit, p. 36.

with the GDR representatives. Then came forward the ‘instrumental activity’: preparation of speeches, statements, treaties, agreements and so on. ‘Coordination activity’ followed: the coordination of the German policy through the foreign ministry with the three Western powers in the so-called ‘group of four’ (that is, the USSR was excluded at this stage); Bonn’s consultations with the three Western powers regarding the ‘integrity of Germany’ and the ‘Berlin question’; preparation for holding meetings on the German problem. The ‘administrative activity’ included: preparation of negotiations with the GDR representatives to outline administrative, organizational, technical issues and problems. ‘Ongoing activities’ included the following: problems of management and leadership, responses to inquiries received from the public, parties and parliament³⁴.

The immediate head of the ‘working staff’ under Jenniger and Schäuble was Hermann F. von Richthofen (in 1986 he was succeeded by Duisberg). He was also a landmark figure in the field of the German politics. Being non-partisan, he worked in the foreign ministry, then in the office of the Federal Chancellor G. Schmidt. In 1969–71, Richthofen took part in the four-party talks on West Berlin, representing the West German side. After the change of coalition in Bonn in 1982, Kohl, contrary to forecasts (Richthofen was nevertheless known as a ‘liberal socialist’), left him as head of the “working staff of the German politics”.

Per the chancellor, at that time, the financial priorities and the ‘double decision’ of NATO were the top priorities in the government’s activities, so he decided to “leave it as it is”, although there were people in the ‘working’ staff, who the chancellor did not trust³⁵. Most likely, in the chancellor’s entourage there was no other competent figure rather than Richthofen, who had considerable experience and knowledge in the field of the German politics. Korte notes that Richthofen followed a cautious course in the Germano-German relations, undoubtedly softened the criticism of the GDR in the planned speeches of the chancellor, crossed out everything that in his opinion could cause diplomatic complications between the FRG and the GDR³⁶.

Helmut Kohl’s closest adviser and trusted helper in solving the German problem, including the unification of Germany, was Horst Telchik – head of the ‘second department’ in the office of the Federal Chancellor. Until 1972, he worked in the apparatus of the CDU in Bonn and then became Kohl’s adviser in Mainz. His field of interest was foreign policy. Telchik not only knew how to obtain the necessary information, for which the apparatus was established, by bypassing the foreign ministry and contacting directly the political leadership of the Western powers, but he was also considered a figure who was thinking strategically. Back in Mainz, that is prior to

³⁴ Ibid, p. 41.

³⁵ Korte K.-R. Op. cit, p. 41.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 41–42.

Kohl's election as chancellor, Telchik organized a “creative brain trust”, where scientists, publicists and politicians were brought in to discuss informally the most important political problems³⁷.

Subsequently, this form was used by Kohl for evening meetings in the ‘chancellor's bungalow’. Genscher, while retaining the post of minister for foreign affairs in Kohl's government perceived as “the guarantor of the foreign policy stability of Germany”, did not trust Telchik's undertakings. There was a hidden struggle between them, although in his position Genscher was significantly higher than head of the department Telchik, but the latter's actions in carrying out the German policy, especially in its final phase, were quite weighty. It was important that the views of Telchik and Kohl on the content of prospects in the German policy coincided, despite the resistance of some members from the government as well as some politicians in the CDU / CSU.

Michael Mertes, who headed the sector of speechwriters (group 521: public participation of the Federal Chancellor), noted that in the Chancellery, as in any other institution, the internal life took place in the atmosphere of intrigue and rivalry. Moreover, in the Chancellery the situation was more tense due to special proximity to the authorities³⁸.

The careful nature and desire to voice certain provisions of the German politics can be seen in the preparation of the first government statement by Chancellor H. Kohl issued on 13 October 1982 at the 121st meeting of the Bundestag³⁹. The chancellor could not admit any sharp attacks in his speech, therefore ‘the German part’ in the statement was small. In general, the widely-known provisions of the CDU / CSU on the German question were covered in these statements. The appeal of the chancellor could be considered unusual: “Mr. President, my ladies and gentlemen, the consciousness of the German history is subject to renewal”. Then two central statements followed: “The national state of the Germans is destroyed. The German nation has remained, and it will continue to exist”⁴⁰. This brief thesis, which split into two parts, contradicted the established approach of the CDU / CSU on the “preservation of the German Reich” and the Federal Republic of Germany as its ‘successor’.

An important position in Kohl's statement of 13 October 1982 was his words about “the possibility of overcoming the split in the historical period”. It goes without saying that he did not specify the scope of this ‘period’, but the fact that the possibility of reunion in real time was not ruled out attached importance to the words of the

³⁷ Ibid, p. 38.

³⁸ Mertes M. *German Questions – European Answers*; Trans. From German. Moscow, 2001. 104 p.

³⁹ See: Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestags. ‘Koalition der Mitte’: Für eine Politik der Erneuerung. *Bulletin*. Bonn, no. 93, 14. X. 1982, s. 853–868.

⁴⁰ Kohl H. *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, s. 53–54.

chancellor. This goal, along with the others, became a priority in the work of H. Kohl's government. A special place in this part of Kohl's statement was devoted to his appeal to the history. It was about the jubilee dates in the German history dating back to 1983, as the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther (1983 was declared the year of Luther); the 50th anniversary of "the beginning of the dictatorship, and with it the way to the German catastrophe"; the 30th anniversary of the "workers' uprising in East Berlin against the communist domination"⁴¹.

Kohl, who was professional in history, understood perfectly well its significance and role in bringing the people divided by the circumstances closer. The GDR authorities, which expressed themselves clearer after 13 August 1961, were given the right to interpret the German history at their own discretion. All that was 'barbarian', 'dark' and 'ignorant' was associated with the FRG. The GDR was declared 'heir' to the finest and most beautiful aspects of the German history. "The historic task of the GDR," said W. Ulbricht, "is to bring the entire German people to socialism" ... because it "shapes the future for the whole of Germany"⁴².

As a forward-thinking politician, Kohl did not refuse meetings and contacts with the leaders of the GDR. Thus, they were given confirmation of Honecker's invitation to pay a return visit, which was arranged by Chancellor Schmidt before retiring⁴³. The chairman of CSU Strauss was dissatisfied with this approach, believing that Kohl should solve this issue himself and not renew the old invitation. In the telephone conversation, Kohl and Honecker said that on the Soviet side, the foreign minister A. A. Gromyko spoke positively about a possible meeting between the leaders of the FRG and the GDR. However, the subsequent events of all kinds postponed the visit of Erich Honecker to September 1987.

In addition to the political contacts with the leaders of the Socialist Unity Party, the FRG under Kohl became a financial 'sponsor' for the GDR. This was a 'billion loan' initiated by Strauss. But the 'brilliant chess move' in the Bavarian union was not supported by all. At the congress, during the re-election to the post of chairman of the CSU on 16 July 1983, Strauss received only 77.0 % of the vote, which was the lowest result, starting with the first election on 18 March 1961⁴⁴.

This loan did not allow to extinguish the Germano-German relations, which deteriorated with regards to the deployment of American missiles on the territory of Germany. It was understandable that Strauss was the intermediary in such a delicate mat-

⁴¹ Regierungserklärung... *Bulletin*. Bonn, no. 93, 14, X, 1982.

⁴² Motschmann K. Ein Volk – zwei Nation – drei Staaten? Zum kommunistischen Deutschlandbild der Gegenwart. *Wohin treibt Deutschland?* Hardenberg, 1973, s. 67–68.

⁴³ Part of the correspondence between Honecker and Kohl was disclosed in the publications of the foreign ministry of the GDR. See: *Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der DDR*. Bd. XXXIII. 1985, 1.-2. Halbbd. Berlin, 1988.

⁴⁴ HSS. ACSP: Franz Josef Strauß. Eine kurze Biographie.

ter. Despite his anti-communism, the links with Strauss had been supported by the GDR authorities since the 1950s, so he was not a ‘novice’ in such transactions⁴⁵. Crediting the GDR, as noted by the political scientist D. Grosser, allowed the republic to retain confidence in the eyes of the Western banks and to keep the social situation in the country under control. Strauss, who knew the true position of the GDR well, said the following at the talks on financial matters with the minister of state security of the SED committee, Schalk-Golodskovski: “I give you only ten years”⁴⁶. The government of chancellor Kohl continued the practice of providing loans to the GDR. In 1985, a loan was granted in the amount of 2.2 billion DM of the Federal Republic of Germany; in 1986 the amount was 600 million marks. These loans were not allocated for the salvation of socialism. There was gradual ‘embedding’ of the GDR into the financial and economic space of the FRG, thus bringing about an early denouement.

In this vein, Erich Honecker's official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, which took place on 7–11 September 1987, should be considered. For Honecker, this was undoubted success: he could visit his homeland – Saar⁴⁷. The leadership of the CDU / CSU could record this visit as an asset of their operative German policy (the preparation of the visit was undertaken by Wolfgang Schäuble⁴⁸). Despite the deterioration of the relations between the West and the East since the late 1970s, the connections between the two German states had not only not been interrupted, but also expanded. In 1986, as Kohl noted in his memoirs, about one million pensioners from the GDR visited Germany⁴⁹. In 1987, the number of those who visited increased to five million, of which one million were young people. This meant, in the opinion of the chancellor, that millions of Germans from the GDR could form their views based on their personal experience; they could see and feel that they belonged to one nation. The facts to which Kohl referred were quite convincing: two-thirds of eastern and

⁴⁵ Marcus Wolfe writes in his memoirs: “Since the 1950s, Strauss was not incognito for us ... When Strauss became minister for atomic energy, the initiative to establish contacts came from him. He froze them, becoming defense minister, and resumed after his resignation. Therefore, Strauss's ‘help’ was not some kind of accidental, spontaneous action”. Wolf M. *Playing on someone else's Field. 30 Years in Charge of Intelligence*. Moscow, 1998, p. 149.

⁴⁶ Grosser D. *Das Wagnis der Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion: politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln*. Stuttgart, 1998, s. 29.

⁴⁷ See: Petelin B.V., Stepanov G.V. Erich Honecker. *Questions of History*, 2013, no. 9, pp. 117–128.

⁴⁸ Potthoff H. Die Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesregierungen der CDU/CSU-FDP- Koalition (Kohl/Genscher), die Diskussion in den Parteien und in der Öffentlichkeit 1982–1989. *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’*. Bd. 5. F. am Main, 1995, s. 2079.

⁴⁹ Kohl G. ‘Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit’. S. 30; In his speech on 7 September 1987 Kohl cited such data from the visits of the FRG citizens in 1986: about one million pensioners as well as 550 thousand people of pre-retirement age visited the country. See: Bulletin. 10 September 1987, nr. 83.

one-third of western Germans had connections and contacts between each other. The interior door, Kohl concludes, opened so widely that Honecker's visit became possible⁵⁰.

The chancellor did not conceal (and he should have said it sincerely) that for him the ceremony of meeting the general secretary and the sounds of the GDR hymn, was a difficult test⁵¹. His biographer W. Maser writes: "He met the communist with an icy expression, and during all the television broadcasts he demonstratively stressed that this type of performance of official duties was deeply contrary to his internal mood"⁵².

Helmut Kohl, adhering to the official protocol, at the same time firmly and unequivocally made it clear that the visit did not change anything in the content of the German question. In his speeches, he not only disclosed the content of Germano-German relations at that moment, but also clearly outlined the range of tasks necessary in his opinion for the further intensification of the German policy. Let us quote the documents directly. Thus, already in his first speech at the opening of negotiations with Honecker on 7 September 1987 in Bonn, Kohl said: "The federal government firmly defends the unity of the German nation, and we are striving for the Germans to find each other in joint freedom. This position is substantiated in the Treaty on the fundamentals of relations and the letter on the German unity. We affirm the refusal to use any force, which has been and remains a central element of the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany since its inception. We respect the existing borders but want to overcome the split peacefully through agreements"⁵³.

In his speech on 7 September at the official dinner in honor of Secretary-General E. Honecker in Bad Godesberg, Chancellor Helmut Kohl tried to speak on behalf of all Germans who had conflicting feelings from the fact that there were two states. "Understanding the unity of the nation", said Kohl, "lives and the will to this is not broken, it is preserved. This unity is expressed in the language, in the single cultural heritage, in the long, uninterrupted common history". This meeting in Bonn, the chancellor continued, was "neither a final nor a new undertaking, it is a step on the road to a long-continued development". For Kohl, it was clear that mutual understanding would not be found on the principal issues of the German policy. He directly told Honecker about this. It was again stressed as follows: "The preamble of our Basic Law is not subject to any discussion, as it coincides with our beliefs. We want

⁵⁰ Kohl G. 'Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit', s. 31.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 31–32.

⁵² Maser W. Op. cit, p. 240.

⁵³ See: *Materialien zu Deutschlandfragen. Politiker und Wissenschaftler nehmen Stellung 1986–87*. Bonn, 1988, s. 147–148.

united Europe, and we call on the entire German people to achieve Germany's unity and freedom through free self-determination”⁵⁴.

The chancellor expressed his firm belief that his words corresponded to the wishes and aspirations of all the people in Germany. Two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kohl told Honecker: “The German question remains open, but its decision is not now on the agenda of the world history, and we also count on the mutual understanding of our neighbor”. The chancellor did not conceal his rejection of the political regime that reigned in the GDR, calling for the removal of all the obstacles that people shared, since they formed an organic whole⁵⁵.

The future of Germany was decided not in the conversations with Honecker⁵⁶. Europe closely watched the progress of perestroika in the USSR. The policy of Mikhail Gorbachev's ‘new political thinking’ was accepted by the West, as it did not disagree with their interests. Helmut Kohl entered the dialogue with the Soviet leader later than other politicians. The ‘unfortunate’ utterance of the chancellor about Gorbachev in the interview with Newsweek magazine was the cause of this⁵⁷, but Gorbachev himself was looking for early access to the chancellor, so the conflict after the apology of Kohl was settled. The subsequent meetings of Kohl and Gorbachev in 1988-89 presented in detail in various descriptions and published documents⁵⁸, led to the fact that both politicians agreed on the views regarding the German question and the ways to solve it. The Soviet side decided to ‘sacrifice’ the GDR, hoping apparently that the implementation of the ‘decision’ would take years. Everything turned out differently. Kohl's German policy was offensive, and the events themselves developed so rapidly that they overturned not only the Berlin Walls, but all the real socialism in Eastern Europe⁵⁹.

“The improvement of socialism” as promised by the leaders of the CPSU obviously did not succeed. The authority of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR fell, but in the West his popularity grew. Especially in Germany, where the Germans met ‘Gorby’ with genuine rejoicing. Gorbachev, who was not hiding, admitted it was more pleasant to communicate with the chancellor – Christian democrat Kohl than with the head of the GDR, communist Honecker. Early in July 1989, Honecker participated in the summit of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the War-

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 151.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 153–154.

⁵⁶ Kunze T. *Staatschef a. D. Die letzten Jahre des Erich Honecker*. Berlin, 2012.

⁵⁷ Kohl H. *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, s. 450.

⁵⁸ See: Gorbachev M. S. *How it was*. Moscow, 1999; *Mikhail Gorbachev and the German question. Coll. Documents. 1986–1991*. Moscow, 2006; Responding to the challenge of time. Foreign policy of perestroika: documentary evidence. Per the records of Gorbachev's conversations with foreign figures and other materials. *Gorbachev Foundation*. Moscow, 2010.

⁵⁹ See: *History of anti-communist revolutions of the late 20th century: Central and Southeastern Europe*. Moscow, 2007.

saw Pact in Bucharest (7–8 July). It was there that Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’ about the joint defense of socialism was dead. Firstly, this responded to the views of the opposition forces in Poland and Hungary, where the communist leaders could hope until then to help the USSR. After the first day of meetings, at night, Honecker had an exacerbation of kidney disease and accompanied by Krenz returned to Berlin⁶⁰.

The SED Politbüro was practically inactive during Honecker's illness (he returned to his duties on 25 September). With the approach of the 40th anniversary of the GDR, the polarization between the power that was losing support and the society was growing, the active part of which was consolidated in the new political entities. Honecker's fate was determined. In addition to the internal dissatisfaction with the SED (it was not possible to integrate the GDR under Honecker to perestroika, and therefore a variant of his replacement by someone from the ‘reformers’ was being considered), the personal dislike of the leader of the CPSU towards Honecker was also affected, as indicated by Gorbachev's biographers⁶¹. After the jubilee celebrations, on 17 October 1989 he was forced to resign. Subsequently, Honecker claimed that he had fallen ‘a victim of conspiracy’, where Gorbachev was involved⁶².

Honecker's leave sharply weakened the SED position, and the situation was clearly out of control. The fall of the Berlin Wall might not have happened if the authorities of the GDR had acted thoughtfully and clearly. And thus, the incident that happened at the press conference on the evening of 9 November, when the tired head of Berlin SED party organization Günter Schabowski, reading out the poorly prepared document on the new rules for transition to West Berlin, said that “the situation will immediately come into force”⁶³. The press conference was broadcast by the television of the GDR. But only after the television in West Germany announced this sensational message, the residents of East Berlin rushed to the border crossings to “spontaneously test the new rules for travel”⁶⁴. Only overnight West Berlin was visited by about 60 thousand citizens of the GDR. The Berlin Wall fell. This was a complete surprise for the new leadership of the GDR Egon Krenz and Hanns Modrova.

⁶⁰ See: *Revolution und Transformation in der DDR 1989–90*. Berlin, 1999, s. 503.

⁶¹ Here is how A. Grachev writes about it: “Erich Honecker also irritated him, who not only had no intention of introducing perestroika but also did not conceal his disapproval of the dangerous flood of democracy that overwhelmed the USSR and threatened to splash beyond its borders”. Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. Moscow, 2001, s. 295.

⁶² Kuzmin I.N. *The 41st year of the German Democratic Republic*. Moscow, 2004. 20 p.

⁶³ The progress of the press conference is shown in the report of Hertle at the hearings of the Bundestag Commission. See: Hertle H.-H. Der 9. November 1989 in Berlin. *Materialien der Enquete - Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’*. Bd. VII, Teil 1. Frankfurt am Main, 1995, s. 843–849.

⁶⁴ Jäger W. Op. cit, p. 42.

But Chancellor Kohl was unusually perspicacious. On 8 November 1989, he spoke at the Bundestag with the latest and, as it turned out, the last “message to state and nation in the divided Germany⁶⁵”. If, referring to the unprecedented flight of people in the center of Europe and thousands of demonstrations in Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and other GDR cities, he assured the participants and demonstrators and deputies of the Bundestag that their voice “We are the people!” would be heard. “These events unfolding in front of the whole world,” Kohl said, “showed that the division of our fatherland is unnatural, that the wall and the barbed wire do not have a longer life⁶⁶”.

Among the Russian authors, Igor Maksimychev wrote more often than others about the fall of the Berlin Wall, who found himself in the “center of the political hurricane”, which completely carried away the whole country. In his view, “the fall of the Wall was not planned, that happened spontaneously due to intertwining of several regular but unrelated episodes” and mostly “due to the oversight of several politicians who were unprepared to manage the complex East German state⁶⁷”. Indeed, to assert that the ‘Fall of the Wall’ was specifically timed to the memorable and fateful date in the German history – 9 November; would only be true for those who believe in magic numbers. This was how the history dealt with it. But one cannot agree with the fact that everything happened ‘spontaneously’ (K. Zontheimer believes that the border wall collapsed “more by chance⁶⁸”), without any internal connection (“...under the pressure of an avalanche of protests, the wall must open,” W. Jäger wrote⁶⁹).

Conclusion

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the destiny of the GDR was predetermined. Less than a year later, “the first state of workers and peasants on the German soil” ceased to exist. The Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl showed not only his tremendous activity in those months, but also determination, ensuring the German unity in the shortest possible time. At the same time, his actions did not lead to a new confrontation, although at that time armed groups of the USSR and the US were on the German soil. Yet, as the well-known German political scientist A. von Plato writes in his book, without the support of the world politicians, firstly, US President George Bush, the

⁶⁵ Bericht zur Lage 1989–1998. Der Kanzler und Parteivorsitzende im Bundesvorstand der CDU Deutschlands, s. 27–36. This ‘message’ of Kohl is included into many documentary collections, in view of its great historical importance. See, e.g.: *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994*. Köln, 1995, s. 605–616; *Materialien zu Deutschland-fragen Politiker und Wissenschaftler nehmen Stellung 1989–91*. Bonn, 1991. (Auszüge).

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ Maksimychev I.F. *The fall of the Berlin Wall. From the Notes of the Adviser-envoy of the Embassy of the USSR in Berlin*. Moscow, 2011. 140 p.

⁶⁸ Sontheimer K. *The Federal Republic of Germany today*, p. 81.

⁶⁹ Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit; Werner Weidenfeld; Karl-Rudolf Korte (Hrsg), s. 208.

unification of Germany would most likely ‘stall’. The American president sent a confidential letter to Kohl back in May 1989, which referred to the “opening historical chance” to change the relations between the West and the East⁷⁰. Kohl took advantage of this ‘chance’, despite the opposition of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher and the President of France F. Mitterrand. As for Mikhail Gorbachev, as A. von Plato notes, there was in fact no intelligible strategy, and all attempts to “stretch the process” of unification in time, as he said in January 1990, testified to the fact that “Gorbachev rushed from one extreme to the other⁷¹”.

It can be considered that Helmut Kohl was lucky that “happiness fell from the sky” as the journalist Oskar Fehrenbach put it⁷²; however, that happiness was possible because Helmut Kohl brought it closer to the Germans. The unification of Germany proved to be a difficult affair; a year later the chancellor was pelted with tomatoes in Dresden. But are there many today, who wish to live behind the Berlin Wall? Nostalgia for “socialism in the colors of the GDR” will probably outlive its former citizens. And yet, as Hagen Schulze stated, the historical search for the Germans in the 20th century came to an end⁷³. Germany no longer offers any alternative routes in the history.

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⁷⁰ Plato A. von. The unification of Germany is the Struggle for Europe. Moscow, 2007, p. 22; In Germany, A. von Plato's book came out earlier and under a different name. See: Plato A. v. *Die Vereinigung Deutschlands – ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel: Bush, Kohl, Gorbatschow und die geheimen Moskauer Protokolle*. Berlin, 2002.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 178.

⁷² *The collapse and rebirth of Germany. A Glance at European History of the 20th century*. Moscow, 2001, pp. 238–239.

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REVIEWS

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Review of the book: **The last decade of socialism: Transformational processes in the GDR and in the Soviet Union (1985–1989; 91): Collection of articles. Moscow: New chronograph, 2016. 463 p.**

The reviewed collection of articles was compiled by the editorial board of German and Russian authors based on the materials of the international scientific conference ‘The last decade of socialism: Transformational processes in the GDR and in the Soviet Union (1985–1989; 91)’ held on 27–28 July 2013 in Tutzing (Germany). In 2016, the publishing house ‘New Chronograph’ issued the compilation in Moscow. The publication was implemented with the financial support of the Academy for Political Education (Tutzing, Germany), the Representative Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Moscow, the Federal Foundation for the Study of the Dictatorship of the German Socialist Unity Party, the German Historical Institute Moscow and the German-Russian Museum Berlin-Karlshorst.

The collection consists of five thematic sections, including fourteen articles. The text of the articles in the collection is provided in two languages: Russian and German. At the end of the publication, the section ‘Results’ is presented in English. Thus, the results of the research of historians and political scientists became available to the broader scientific community.

The first section, ‘Late socialism: Recent analytical approaches and research in the latest state of the art’, is opened by an article of Professor of the South Ural State University, Olga Nikonova, ‘Sevryuzhina with horseradish’ instead of a ‘constitution’: from the dichotomous model to ‘understanding’ historiography of late socialism’. As the title of the article suggests, there are two stages in the historiography in question. The first stage includes presence of two dichotomies: a ‘small’ dichotomy, which comprises ‘stagnation’ and perestroika (milestone 1985), whereas the second dichotomy would imply socialism and capitalism [p. 21]. The second stage involves attempts to understand the late socialism and the final stage of existence of the Soviet society. The author rightly notes that “the use of a dichotomous model for the description of the Soviet society not only obscures but also distorts the picture of the late socialism”. The author agrees with the opinion of A. Yurchak about the inexpe-

diency of such ‘binary oppositions’ as ‘suppression – resistance’ and ‘culture – counterculture’ [p. 33].

Olga Nikonova concludes that the number of interdisciplinary works is increasing, the works on the everyday life history are fairly spread and the transition from ‘telling’ to ‘understanding’ historiography gradually takes place [p. 36].

In the next article ‘What is there, beyond the ‘rim of the plate’: the ‘constitutive contradictions’ of the GDR and the prospects for global contextualization of transformational processes’, the vice-rector for research at South Ural Institute of Management and Economics Oksana Nagornaia demonstrates her special interest in the history of the second German dictatorship. In the opinion of the author, the study of the East German society led to formation of numerous explanatory concepts, such as: the GDR – ‘welfare state’, ‘dictatorship of education’, ‘party and bureaucratic domination’, ‘Red Prussia’, ‘niche society’. Such diversity is explained by the ‘constitutive contradiction’ (defined by Detlef Pollack) and ‘irresistible multi-perspectives’ (Martin Sabrov's formulation). The turning point in the history of German discussions about the nature of the GDR was publication of the program article by Jürgen Kokki, in which he criticized the researchers of the GDR history for self-isolation and the need to “look beyond the rim of the plate”, for the desire to inscribe the history of East Germany in pan-European and global processes [p. 40].

The author points out that the last decade of socialism, which led to the collapse of the GDR, is viewed to this day through the prism of the interdisciplinary approach of transnational history, the (dis)continuity of global trends, the ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ civilization perspectives [p. 42].

The second section of the collection ‘Systemic transformation in the GDR and the USSR’ consists of three articles. In the work of the Center for Contemporary History (Potsdam, Germany), the representative of the ‘new political history’ Jan Claas Behrends under the title ‘The road leading away from violence, the road leading to violence. Gorbachev’s civilization from above in historical perspective’ gives an interesting interpretation of the essence of perestroika time from the point of view of activities of law enforcement agencies in the USSR. The relationship between violence and non-violence as a means of politics is of importance for understanding the era of reforms. In the author’s opinion, the Soviet government had always held on to military force. The apogee of this policy was the Brezhnev Doctrine, which led to the war in Afghanistan [p. 53]. Over the next ten years, the Soviet leadership was looking for ways out in the foreign policy crisis. The USSR could no longer be a fearsome superpower, whereby the development of ‘soft power’ was taking place [p. 55]. Liberalization at that time served only as an instrument of weakening the party [p. 61]. Behrends believes that the collapse of the Soviet empire in Europe and the end of the Soviet Union as a state represented two different events and should be treated separately [p. 65].

The author does not limit himself to analyzing the last days of the USSR. After the collapse of the union, Yeltsin was unable to dissolve the security forces: “The KGB changed into Russian uniforms”. It was not freedom and property but rather power and property that became the reality of new Russia. The force, as before, stood above the law, and the state could not protect its citizens [p. 72]. Moscow again relied on violence, which per Berends, is proved by the storming of the White House and the war in Chechnya.

Berends concludes that perestroika was a short period of Russia’s rapprochement with the West. The greatest achievement of Gorbachev was the refusal to use force in Eastern Europe in 1989. The policy of ‘civilizing from above’ ended in the early 1990s. This policy turned out to be the most successful on the Eastern European periphery of the Soviet empire, where thus democratic states were created. Inside the country, this civilized mission of perestroika collapsed [p. 76].

Margareta Mommsen, professor of the Munich School of Political Science, Germany, in her article ‘The collapse of the system in the GDR and in the Soviet Union after 1985’ emphasizes that Gorbachev called the restructuring the second revolution. The author does not quite agree with this interpretation. Perestroika collapsed because of the delay in reforms and their rejection by the nomenclature. In the USSR, there was not a ‘revolution from above’ and not a ‘revolution from below’, but the decisive factor for the changes was the refusal of the communist parties of the union republics and their leadership to rule solely and exclusively [p. 83]. In the GDR, on the contrary, the concept of an ‘explosion’ of the regime was prevailing. In other words, that was the concept of revolution. The reason for this would lie in absence of both a reformist wing in the ruling party and the will and desire of the political elite for changes [p. 85].

The research scientist of the Academy for Political Education (Tutzing, Germany) Michael Mayer in his article ‘Counteract the transformation? Gorbachev and the collapse of the GDR’ reflects on the recently declassified declarations of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the role of the USSR president in the collapse of the East Germany state. These documents open a previously unknown prospect for Gorbachev's actions at the turning point of 1989–90. Based on the declassified conversations of the French ambassador in Moscow, Jean-Marie Mérillon, with the representative of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikolai Portugalov, the author tries to understand how the French visualized the crisis in the USSR and the GDR. Mayer notes the important role of the FRG in the process of preserving the GDR on the political map of the world, arguing with Gorbachev's thoughts about the ‘triangle’ consisting of the USSR – the FRG – the GDR. The author's conclusion is that the collapse of the GDR gradually delayed the destruction processes of the USSR [p. 94].

The third section of the book ‘Economics in the epoch of transformation’ opens with the article ‘The shortage of the labor force and intensification of labor processes in the last decade of socialism’ by Heike Knorz, Professor of the Institute of Economics and its Didactics (Karlsruhe, Germany). 1980 was the time of an unprecedented failure of the Soviet economy. It was clear that the problem with labor resources would become acute no later than 1985. The author argues that soon the Soviet and East German economies would have found themselves in a crisis, which meant the biggest challenge for the national economy [p. 102]. The strategy of rationalization and liberation of labor resources in the GDR was called a ‘Swedish initiative’ after the name of the city of Schwedt, where ‘RSK Oil Refinery’ was located [p. 104]. In the goals of the five-year plan for 1981–85, there was a task of releasing the workforce based on the model of the Swedish initiative. This practice became mandatory for all GDR enterprises. In the Soviet Union, an example of Schwedt imagery was embedded into the construction of a chemical plant in Shchekino. The author concludes that all attempts to intensify the production undertaken in the USSR based on Shchekino experiment, as well as those in the GDR that followed the example of the Swedish initiative, did not bring the desired result. The extensive type of economic growth proved unable to respond adequately to the challenges of the time.

Roman Kirsanov, senior research scientist at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, in his article ‘The financial system of the GDR and the USSR’ examines the role of the commercial banking sector at the final stage of perestroika. The author concludes that the new banks did not have a tangible impact on the economies of the countries [p. 112]. Thus, the transfer of the Soviet economy to the market relations was accompanied by aggravation of complexities and contradictions of the financial system of the USSR: an increase in commodity-money imbalances and a budget deficit and a fall in the purchasing power of the ruble. If the reform of the banking system in the USSR was one of the factors that strengthened the separatist tendencies (haste and mistakes in reforming, the desire to create their own monetary system) and the collapse of the country, in the GDR on the contrary, the modernization of the banking system came as a consequence of unification with the FRG (introduction of principles and organizational forms in the commercial banking sector on the territory of the GDR) [p. 113].

The fourth section of the collection ‘Society and ideology in the last decade of socialism’ consists of four articles. The researcher of Leibniz Research Alliance ‘Disappointments in the 20th century. Loss of utopia’ from the Institute for Contemporary History of Munich-Berlin and the University of Munich Konrad Schidat in his article ‘It is worrying but is socialism on the threshold again? Debates of the West German Left in the USSR and the GDR in 1985–91’ notes that the debate around transformation of political systems in two countries mainly went to the pages of the West Germany magazine ‘Konkret’. Gradually, the magazine became the mouthpiece

of the so-called new leftists. The Maoists, the Trotskyites, the Greens, the social democrats and dissidents from the GDR published their works there.

Shidat notes that in 1987, historians and political scientists were at first optimistic that the reforms in the USSR were contributing to the new socialism but on a higher level. Several West Germany Marxists understood the new socialism in the traditions of the new left. The changes in the rhetoric of the authors were audible in 1988 when Gorbachev destroyed the “fortress of the world revolution ...” with his ‘new thinking’ [p. 122]. Analyzing the difference in approaches in assessing the events of the last decade related to socialism, Shidat concludes that “the 1980s was not the first decade of another socialism epoch, but rather the last decade of socialism that really existed”. The transition from expectations to disappointment was characteristic for all representatives of the left. In the end, this disappointment led to the crisis of the leftist movement in the West [p. 122].

The editor of the news department of the Russia Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (Prague, Czech Republic) Petr Cheremushkin in his article ‘The crisis and disintegration of the system of propaganda and information about the Eastern bloc countries in the USSR at the example of TASS’ considers the informational aspect in the process of disintegration on the territory of the Soviet state. In Soviet times, acute themes and conflicts related to the countries of the Eastern bloc were either hushed up, expressed in Aesopic language or rather ignored or tabooed at all (Katyn, insurrections in Berlin, Hungary, relations with Yugoslavia and Albania). The USSR did its best to block information about the ‘Solidarity’ movement in Poland [p. 135]. In the Soviet Union, there were some closed issues. Quite often, Soviet people received the world news from the Western sources. One of the events that broke the Soviet system in terms of isolation from the real-world information, was the epic disaster at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986. Cheremushkin notes that when the news about the technogenic catastrophe leaked and became known abroad, the Soviet media could no longer keep silent about the truth [p. 136].

The author's memories of his stay in Poland in 1988 brings a special emotional color to the article. “What was seen there did not correlate with what was written about Poland in the Soviet media”. The author was particularly impressed on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Poland's independence. “People came with portraits of Pilsudski – this politician in the Soviet Union was usually called a fascist. It was a Catholic, nationalistic, Anti-Soviet and bourgeois but definitely not a ‘socialist’ country” [p. 139–140]. The author's conclusion is as such: “TASS was still a ‘factory of illusions’. TASS served as a state communist ideology almost up to the end of the USSR”. But the revolutions in the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR led to the liquidation of the main TASS Editorial Department in the socialist countries [p. 145].

Volker Benkert – a lecturer at the University of Arizona (the USA) – in his article ‘Performative change or differentiation? The last generation of the USSR and the GDR and the end of state socialism’ considers socialization of the cohort born at the turn of the 1970s in the GDR as the last generation being socialized in the GDR. The researcher relies on the theory of Alexei Yurchak regarding the differentiation of the last generation of the GDR and the USSR, whilst singling out seven types of socialization. The author emphasizes the amazing variability of the types of East Germany socialization types and explains it not only through his creative reinterpretation of the socialist discourses but also by interweaving many specific factors.

Research assistant of Sigmund Freud University Vienna (Austria) Anna Shor-Chudnovskaia prepared the article ‘Strength and weakness of public critical reflection in the years of perestroika’. In the author’s opinion, perestroika is interesting for its weakness, although it cannot be called weak in scale: the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Communist bloc, disintegration of the Soviet Union [p. 159]. The author is interested in perestroika, first, on the level of public thinking and public reflection [p. 160]. The Soviet society had two notable features: 1) ignoring the reality; 2) presence of a ‘devious man’. Dreams, illusions, deception, utopia and lies were important political and cultural components of the Soviet society.

In the author's opinion, “perestroika was an opportunity to finally build or rather complete what was long-planned...” [p. 162]. Thus, many historians and political scientists concluded that “perestroika was an attempt to rebuild the unregulated and to reform the irreformable” [p. 165].

The three most important requirements (per Jaspers) are as follows: awareness of the need for a moral and political revolution, unlimited will to stop the continuity from the past, understanding of necessity and desire to create something new – were not implemented in perestroika. Per the author, perhaps this was its main weakness [p. 178].

The fifth section ‘Consumption and everyday life in the 1980s’ opens with an article by Andrea Prause, the doctoral student of the Institute of European Ethnology, Humboldt University (Berlin, Germany), ‘The parallel world of fashion. Multifaceted erosion processes in the late GDR at the example of alternative culture’. In her reflections, the author relies on the interviews with architects, artists and fashion designers of the GDR. Per A. Prause, the residents of the GDR and the USSR lived in the world of lack and shortages in fashion. Fabric saving, functionality, modesty of style and comfort were regarded characteristic of the clothing style, which corresponded to the needs of the working class. Since the early 1980s, an alternative fashion trend began to develop in the GDR. These people positioned themselves as part of the alternative environment of the GDR, as opposed to socialist morality and aesthetics. Fashionable clothes made of various materials were sewn and sold in their own apartments and

ateliers. The notion of ‘society of fashion deficit’ appeared [p. 183]. The next step since 1984 would be fashion shows and other presentations of various kinds.

The phenomenon of alternative fashion trends as a specific subculture in the GDR was in the minority, however its actors and fashion designers influenced the appearance of urban centers in East Germany, which excited and inspired the young citizens of the GDR with a similar perception of the world [p. 186]. The basis of the alternative fashion trend was made up of people born around 1960, per Berndt Linder, the generation of those who ‘distanced’ themselves [p. 187]. The postulates on ‘socialist style of life’ and ‘socialist personality’, in the author's opinion, had turned into ‘trash’ for such people, [p. 189]. The article abounds with a lot of photos of the members of the fashion group ‘Chic, Charming and Durable’ (‘Chic, Charmant, Dauerhaft’ (‘CCD’)) [p. 187, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195].

Such a subculture articulated itself as a bearer of protest and conflict potential, opposing the SED State. On the catwalk and on the ‘stage’ of major cities, certain non-verbal critical messages could be broadcast that could not be pronounced openly in the GDR; thus this phenomenon was part of the ‘artistic face of the opposition’ of the ‘distanced’ generation [p. 196].

Thus, in 1988 the GDR Fashion Institute registered around 300–400 independent fashion groups, the actions of which had no influence on the activities of the state. This fact points out to the collapse of the power of the GDR. The alternative fashion contributed to the collapse of the East Germany state. Per the author, fashion had become a distinctive tool thrown into the garbage box of lofty ideological goals, as well as the iron curtain, long before the peaceful revolution of 1989 [p. 198].

Associate Professor of the Department of Russian History at V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University Alexei Popov in his article ‘The ‘autumn’ (declining years) of ‘Intourist’: ideology, recreational stratification and ‘shadow’ economy in the last Soviet decade’ touches upon an unexplored issue in both domestic and foreign historiography – the exploration of Soviet life and Soviet people in the ‘mirror’ of the All-Union Joint Stock Company on Foreign Tourism in the USSR (‘Intourist’) shortly before the ‘Land of the Soviets’ went into oblivion [p. 200]. Many Soviet citizens in the 1980s also used the services of ‘Intourist’. The author describes the activities of spivs (black marketeers) and prostitutes on the territory of the hotel complex ‘Yalta’. Alexei Popov concludes that the case of ‘Intourist’ in the 1980s shows that the change in ideological, value and ethical attitudes of Soviet people in the last Soviet decade embraced different generations and strata of the population unevenly, however at the same time it was steadily ahead with regards to transformation of the institutional structures [p. 212].

Professor of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Igor Orlov in his article ‘From political vigilance to ‘reasonable sociability’: Soviet outbound tourism in the 1980s’ considers the historiography of inbound and outbound

Soviet tourism. He notes that a vast array of documents on this issue in the domestic archives is still classified. The author works with the materials of three archives: GARF, RGASPI, RGANI. Orlov provides interesting statistics: in the first half of the 1980s, the Soviet tourists travelled mainly to ten countries: Bulgaria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland, Romania, India and Cuba [p. 222]. During the 1960s and 1980s, no more than 0.4–0.9 % of Soviet citizens travelled abroad. Even in the second half of the 1980s, the outbound tourism did not exceed 1 % of the total world tourist flow [p. 223]. Commercial tourism had acquired great development among the Soviet people.

The historian concludes that both international and outbound tourism gradually acquired the form of a dialogue between the West and the East, destroying the ‘iron curtain’ in the minds of representatives of the two ‘camps’. In the 1980s, as the regulation of contacts with the local population weakened, the foreign tourism became a channel for penetration of the values from the Western world into the USSR. The westernization of the country had contributed to the destruction of the Soviet statehood and the collapse of the Soviet Union too [p. 227].

The results of the overall collection of articles clearly show how relevant the study of the last decade of socialism both in scientific and social environment is. The selection of articles and the structure of the collection meet the requirements of the conference organizers quite adequately. The first section demonstrates the state of modern historiographic landscape that has developed and is developing around the last decade of socialism. In the second section, the positions of such trends in German science as traditional and new political history are reflected. The third section is devoted to the economy in the transformational era. The articles in the fourth section represent a trilateral perspective of the social transformations in Europe. The fifth section of the collection is devoted to the history of consumption culture and everyday behavioral practices of various social groups. In general, the presented materials cover the most important areas of historical science – political, economic, cultural history and the history of ideas.

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Review on: **R.S. Kolokolchikova. History of Industrial Cities in Northern European Russia: Space, Society, Culture (second half of 1960s – first half of 1980s): Monograph. Cherepovets: ChSU, 2013. 337 p.**

History of Northern European Russia is an important part of the history of Russia as it reflects the main tendencies and contradictions in the development of our fatherland in the modern times. Nowadays, when some global civilizational shifts happen in our country and in the whole world; when under the conditions of exacerbated informational war, the system of traditional values of our people is fundamentally revised, the impersonal and deliberated scientific research of the topic is currently of great interest. A complicated problem of modernization of the technical and material base of the economy, as well as a simultaneous solution of a large range of social issues which the state is facing, require an active consideration of the historical experience. Within the next stage of the Soviet urbanization in Northern European Russia in the 1960–80s, the massive programs of industrial development of vast underpopulated territories were implemented, which qualitatively transformed the social-economic and cultural sphere in the region. Thus, monocities appeared and became the city-forming centers around the chemical, pulp and paper, mining industries, as well as non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy. Dramatic changes of the conditions in these cities and the adjacent areas in the present days (up to the crisis and depression) also need some special consideration.

The reviewed monograph is written around the problematic field of historical urbanistics, which determines the use of interdisciplinary methods, such as culturological, philosophical, social-economical methods, etc. along with the historical ones. It is worth noting that the author's supporting base is that of historical methodology. The integral character of the research is determined by the structure and contents of the study. The monograph consists of three logically connected sections, each of which deals with one of the aspects mentioned in the title. Thus, the first section analyzes the social space of industrial cities and their influence on the environment. The second section examines in detail the social problems and achievements of these types of cities. The third section is a detailed study of the cultural environment in the industrial cities of Northern European Russia.

In the introduction, the author justified the purpose and the tasks of the study in a conclusive way, characterized the basic theoretical and methodological approaches to

the studied topic, rightly noting that “urbanistics has collected a lot of material about the city and the processes, which take place in its individual subsystems; there are individual theoretical concepts of cities and urbanization within the framework of individual sciences. However, there is no general theory of studying the cities on the whole” [p. 5]. Therefore, the author’s attempt to prove the efficiency of using the methodology of a complex approach to the studies of cities per three parameters (space, society, culture) based on the model put forward in due time by N.P. Antsyferov, seems valuable and reasonable. The territorial framework of the study includes the area of four entities of the Russian Federation: Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vologda regions and Karelian Autonomous Republic. On the example of construction and development of city-forming enterprises in the industrial cities (such as Novodvinsk, Koryamzha, Cherepovets, Sokol, Kirovsk, Apatity, Monchegorsk, Olenegorsk, Kovdor, Segezha, Kondopoga, Kostomuksha), R.S. Kolokolchikova reveals the complicated dynamics of implementation of the Soviet strategy of “managed urbanization” with the final purpose of development of the territories rich in natural resources. On the base of a significant volume of empirical material, she conclusively demonstrated how the process of formation of a specific type of industrial cities with characteristic features relevant to the settings and values of ‘developed socialism’ era, was going on.

The author’s merit is the introduction of a large array of archival materials for scientific circulation, including departmental documents intended for official use. More than 1100 cases from 62 funds from 13 central and regional, as well as municipal and enterprise archives were used. The extensive bibliography of the study covering more than 700 titles of printed publications is an important source base not only for studying this period of the history, but also for the Soviet era in the context of the urbanistic approach. The theoretical value of the presented array of materials is determined by both quantitative parameters and thorough analysis of the degree of reliability of the published documents. Almost every statement and assumption put forward by the researcher is confirmed or illustrated by the references to printed or archival sources. The attachments with full bibliographical descriptions of the cited sources contain significant statistical material on the studied topic.

In the first section, whilst analyzing features of creating the spatial environment of industrial cities in Northern European Russia, R.S. Kolokolchikova notes that the new urban planning as well as the growth and development of historically formed cities were first conditioned by the official interests of the relevant ministries. “The rigid connection between urban planning on the one hand and creating and developing the industrial enterprises on the other hand, reduced the significance of the social component in the process of urbanization, which, in particular was reflected in the external parameters of the cities” [p. 12]. This fact determined, per the author, the specificity of the urban space, its functionality, the very appearance of these industri-

al cities, in many ways preserved to this day. Thus, “by the beginning of the 1980s, the spatial environment of the entire typological group of the studied cities was formed based on the general planning and use of their territories, which made it possible to improve the urban spatial environment, to overcome fragments of village development in the territory of industrial cities and to create more favorable conditions for human life in an industrial city” [p. 27]. The unquestionable achievement of those years was the successful solution of the housing problem. The pace and the results of implementation of the programs for demolition of dilapidated housing, the relocation of people from barracks and emergency buildings, the construction of closed micro-districts with the necessary transport and socio-cultural infrastructure, were truly impressive. The author gives considerable statistical material proving the effectiveness of the Soviet urban planning practice in those years [p. 28–44]. This historical experience of carrying out the construction works should be considered by modern municipal authorities when solving similar problems. At the same time, the researcher also reveals the serious shortcomings inherent in the town-planning policy of the mentioned period. We are talking about violations of the complexity of development, deviations from general plans, errors associated with the socio-demographic calculations, products of poor quality from the enterprises of the construction industry and works conducted directly on the construction site, etc. Such shortcomings and miscalculations led to unfavorable consequences affecting the present situation in these cities. For example, it is stated that the “customers were reluctant to invest in the design and construction of utility networks, sought to save on this ..., which on the one hand, made the cost of the construction cheaper; and on the other hand led to the overload of utility networks, exacerbated environmental problems, violated planning decisions of the spatial environment of the city” [p. 48]. Thus, the reasons of the current environmental problems and risk factors were laid just then. The raw specialization of resource-intensive industries, lack of sanitary protection zones between the enterprises and the residential areas, lack of effective technologies for cleaning industrial wastes and discharges, the residual principle of financing environmental protection activities – these as well as other factors led to the destruction of natural ecosystems, aggravated the situation of the ecological crisis.

The study convincingly shows that the main contradiction between the economic interests of the city-forming enterprises and the social and humanitarian needs of the population was finally decided in favor of the former. In the second section, the author examines in detail the main achievements and contradictions of the social development of the industrial cities of this region. It is noted that the combination of voluntary and coercive sources of labor force development exacerbated the social and demographic problems in the region. On the one hand, active industrial construction in Northern European Russia led to the fact that “in comparison with the cities of other typological groups, the industrial cities of the region had the highest rates of

population growth”; on the other hand, the formation of the urban population was “mainly because of intensive migration turnover” [p. 97]. Moreover, the peculiarity of the demographic processes was the large mobility of the population, where not only migration to these cities was observed, but also a reverse tendency. The causes of backward migration were “severe climatic zones, hard working conditions, dissatisfaction with the provision of housing, specialty, trade and consumer services, etc.” [p. 99]. The instability of the social structure of the urban population, the presence of a significant stratum of marginal elements in it, the unfavorable housing conditions and other negative factors led to the serious social problems. Using an extensive and reliable material, both local and central sources, the author reveals the causes and manifestations of such negative phenomena as crime [p. 126–134], alcoholism [p. 114–126], social illnesses [p. 134–148] etc. “In general, the social development of industrial cities fits into the mainstream of the laws of urbanization,” the researcher believes [p.149].

The content of the third section devoted to the description of the cultural environment of industrial cities, substantially corrects the impression of predominantly unfavorable trends in the development of urban space and society. On the contrary, a systematic analysis of the factors influencing the public mood, the socio-cultural infrastructure, the achievements of propaganda and counterpropaganda, the specifics of cultural and educational activities, success in education, art, sports and amateur activity naturally lead to the conclusion that “the cultural life of industrial cities is remarkable for great saturation, dynamism and diversity”[p. 272]. Even though in the opinion of the author, there was no special state program for the development of the culture of industrial cities considering their problems during the period under study, the enterprises of the city-forming complex, the city councils of deputies and their executive committees played a significant role in the socio-cultural formation of these settlements. The monograph contains extensive statistical material that visually shows that during the period under consideration, sufficiently full infrastructure of the urban cultural environment is formed in the said region, providing the spiritual needs of the population, creating conditions for involving the inhabitants in benefits of culture. During these two decades, many social and cultural facilities were built in the industrial cities of Northern European Russia: schools, hospitals, libraries, cinemas, palaces of culture, sports complexes, etc. And although there was a certain lag in the development of their socio-cultural infrastructure as compared to the growth rate of the population (provision of the townspeople with spaces in cultural-leisure and educational institutions was significantly lower than the all-Union norms), in general, “the socio-cultural environment of the industrial cities of the region not only favored the broad development of the amateur artistic creativity, amateur associations in these cities..., but also radically changed itself towards humanization of all its components” [p. 245]. One cannot but agree with the author's assertion that the

cultural environment of the industrial cities of Northern European Russia was formed by the unification of efforts of city authorities, management of city-forming enterprises and the creative part of the population. The dynamic development of this cultural environment increased the status and the role of the cities belonging to this group in the culture of the region.

It should be noted that the monograph of R.S. Kolokolchikova is remarkable for its novelty and the formulation of the problem and with regards to the used research model, the complexity of the diverse sources, the logic and reasoning of the conclusions. This study makes a significant contribution both to regional studies through history and to historical urban studies, allowing to learn the history of Russia through the history of its regions. However, one can make a few comments and suggestions to the work. The conclusion and assumptions in the sections seem superfluously laconic; thus, they do not fully and accurately reflect the content of the structural elements and the position of the author. The title of the first paragraph of the third section is not entirely correct. Instead of the concept of ‘public sentiment’, it would be more appropriate to use the term ‘public consciousness’. The semantic content and the scope of this category, in addition to the psychological and emotional component, also includes ideological, political, socio-economic and legal components, which are discussed in the paragraph. The photographic materials are not of a systemic nature; they are also distinguished by poor print quality. Not all industrial cities of Northern European Russia are covered in the study; it might become the subject of further scientific research conducted by the author. The above comments do not reduce the overall positive evaluation of R.S. Kolokolchikova's monograph, performed at a high theoretical and methodological level and deserving the attention of the professional scientific community.

CHRONICLE OF SCIENTIFIC LIFE


To the memory of A.I. Boroznyak: International scientific conference in Lipetsk

On 16–17 February, the Russian-German Conference ‘Coping with the past in Germany and Russia: Experience and lessons for the future’ devoted to Aleksandr Ivanovich Boroznyak, Doctor in History, professor, who passed away on 21 December 2015, was held in Lipetsk State Pedagogical University (LSPU) named after P.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shan.

Several Russian and German scholars, who had known A.I. Boroznyak for many years personally, professors and students of the University, who shared their memories about their cooperative work, communication and studies together with the well-known scientist and a talented teacher, took part in the conference.

N.V. Fedina, acting rector of LSPU, gave a welcome speech to the organizers and participants of the conference. She mentioned the merits of professor Boroznyak in the scientific and social life of the University. “The German-Russian contacts have been developing for many years with the direct involvement of this talented scholar”, Doctor N. Katzer, Director of German Historical Institute Moscow noted in his speech. As a researcher, he contributed considerably to the historical studies of German fascism as well as to understanding the problems of coping with totalitarianism in Germany and Russia. A.I. Boroznyak’s books, articles and publications found acknowledgment not only among the researchers but also among the ordinary readers and history lovers.

The plenary meeting was opened by Doctor in Historical Sciences, professor of LSPU N.E. Vashkau, who followed the traditions established by A.I. Boroznyak and became head of German Center of Historical Research. In her presentation ‘Historical memory of Russian Germans as a warning to modern times’ she spoke about the difficult fates of Soviet Germans who experienced injustice in the years of Stalinism but remained loyal to socialism. It was followed by ‘A word on a teacher and a colleague’ submitted as addressed to the conference from V.V. Ishchenko, Deputy Director of international communication of the Institute of World History of Russian Academy of Science and a presentation of the well-known German professor B. Bonwetch ‘Double coping with the past in Germany: in 1945 and 1990’. L.N. Kor-



neva, professor of Kemerovo State University, spoke about the activities of Western Siberia Center for German studies, where A. I. Boroznyak regularly participated in its scientific work. The participants of the conference listened with interest to the presentation of LSPU professor V.B. Tsarkova about Lev Kopelev's Wuppertal project which A. I. Boroznyak was directly involved in.

After the plenary meeting, a presentation of B.V. Petelin, Doctor in Historical Sciences, professor of Cherepovets State University, 'Vologda in the life and scientific activities of Aleksandr Ivanovich Boroznyak' was made. The chosen topic was not a mere coincidence (the presentation can be found on the web-site: www.vereinigung.ru). In the early 1970s, professor A.S. Blank established the association devoted to studying problems in German History in Vologda State Pedagogical Institute, where A.I. Boroznyak actively participated in its activities. "He had special relations with Vologda", B.V. Petelin maintained. "He liked coming there, meeting the scholars, professors and the students. He shared his encyclopedic knowledge with them. He supported Vologda historians V.B. Konasov and A.L. Kuzminykh in their studies of such a difficult problem as military captivity".

The presentation of Doctor J. Zaruski (Institute of Contemporary History Munich – Berlin) focused on changing memory in the German society related to comprehension of the war past, based on the analysis of watch count for viewing the exhibition 'Exterminatory war'. It is natural for people to forget. "But do we have 'a right to forget' in the contemporary culture of memory?", a rhetorical question was posed by the associate fellow of RAS L.P. Repina. "To cope with the past" does not mean to forget it. "We have to learn the lessons from the past, which is actually not that easy". One of Aleksandr Boroznyak's topics for scientific work related to the studies of German Resistance to Hitler, which he constantly covered in his publications. "Whereby his works became known and acknowledged in Germany", as B.L. Khavkin, Doctor in Historical Sciences, professor of RSHU, mentioned in his speech.

M.P. Lapteva, associate professor of Perm State National Research University, spoke about A.I. Boroznyak as an interesting and intellectual personality. She analyzed the epistolary legacy of the scholar. M.N. Orlova, a member of the Board 'Kopelev-Forum: Cologne' (Moscow) spoke about the correspondence with A.I. Boroznyak that was also important and interesting for the audience. The general German topics were mentioned in the presentations of S.I. Dankovtsev, PhD in Philosophy and of N.P. Timofeeva, a well-known researcher from Voronezh. The subject-matters from the history of the World War I that were reflected in the Russian satirical editions of 1917–18 were presented by T.V. Filippova, a leading researcher of IWH RAS.

The presentation of Doctor J. Morre, Director of German-Russian museum Berlin-Karlhorst, was very informative. "The changed conditions have definitely varied a lot in the work of the museum and its expositions", he said. "New exhibitions do

not neglect the importance of the victory over fascism, however the war is presented as a ‘crime’ on part of all its participants”. The topic of the war was announced in the presentations of E.V. Ogarkova, PhD in Historical Sciences, associate professor (Volgograd), E.V. Zagorodneva, PhD in Philology Sciences, associate professor (Lipetsk), E.V. Obraztsova (Voronezh).

V.G. Baev, Doctor of Law, professor of Tambov State Technical University devoted his presentation to the history of the Weimar Republic and its collaboration with the Soviet Russia in culture. N.Y. Vasilieva, PhD in Pedagogy Sciences, associate professor of LSPU, focused attention in her presentation on the literary images of Russia in the German literary read. V.L. Chernoperov, Doctor in Historical Sciences, professor (Ivanovo) and A.M. Kozhevnikova, PhD in Historical Sciences, assistant professor (Novorossiysk) shared their memories about A.I. Boroznyak regarding the significance of his research works.

The all-round activities of the professor A.I. Boroznyak were reflected in the presentations of L.N. Belenikina, PhD in Philology Sciences, associate professor of LSPU, A.A. Lyulyushin, PhD in Philology Sciences, associate professor of LSPU, L.A. Maslakova, a student of LSPU, who spoke on various trends in educational and cultural work of the University.

A round-table discussion was held for the teachers and professors of educational institutions of Lipetsk with the participation of B.L. Khavkin, Doctor in Historical Sciences and N.E. Vashkau, Doctor in Historical Sciences, where the Soviet-German interaction in the field of school education was discussed. B.L. Khavkin, who is a research worker of the journal ‘Recent and contemporary history’, commented on A.I. Boroznyak’s activities as a member of the editorial board of the journal and as the author of many publications in the said journal. All the participants of the conference had an opportunity to get acquainted with the exhibition of personal documents and professor’s academic papers. The conference attendees visited the city cemetery and laid flowers on the grave of the well-known Russian scientist Aleksandr Ivanovich Boroznyak.

Following the results of the conference, a book of conference presentations will be published.

B.V. Petelin

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

MANUSCRIPT STRUCTURE AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

1. General requirements to the contents of articles

1.1 Articles presenting results of original scientific research are accepted for publication in the journal, as well as reviews, scientific reports and bibliographical reviews on the latest Russian and international studies in history and political science.

1.2 The journal publishes only original research papers not previously published elsewhere and not containing any incorrect or excessive citation.

1.3 Submitted articles should correspond to the subject matter of the journal in the following key areas:

- History
- Political Science

1.4 Submitted materials should be characterized by academic novelty and integrity. This presupposes that an article contains a historiographical overview.

- Per international standards of publication, a reference list should include no less than 20 sources, where international editions amount to one third of the total number of publications.

- Most of the references should be from Scopus, Web of Science, with DOI and URL.

- Excessive self-citation should be avoided (references to the author's works should not exceed 10 % of overall number of references).

1.5 Manuscripts, which do not correspond to the subject matter of the journal or do not meet the style requirements, will not be considered for publication.

2. General style requirements

2.1 Manuscripts should be in the format of .doc (Word 1997-2002) or .docx.

2.2 The recommended volume of an article is one publication base sheet (40 000 characters with spaces).

2.3 Page parameters: 210 x 297 mm (A4 format), portrait orientation. Page margin: all 20 mm. Normal font, TimesNewRoman. Font size: 12 point in the main text, 10 point in footnotes. Line spacing: one and a half. The text should be without automatic hyphenation at the end of the line. The title of the article: bold font, center aligned. Page numeration: right bottom.

2.4 The text of the manuscript should be in a single file. Provisionally, the manuscript is divided into two parts: the first one contains UDC, information about the author, an abstract, key words, the text of the article and a list of references; the second one should be entirely in English and includes information about the author, an abstract (not mandatory), key words (not mandatory), a list of references.

3. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the Russian language

3.1. Information about the author of the article: last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author in full, degree/s (if any), title (if any), position, affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study (in full), city, country, author's contact details: telephone number and email address.

3.2. UDC and the title of the article.

3.3. An abstract of **400-600 characters**, which must be informative and informative (it should briefly reflect the content of the article as close as possible, as well as its structure and conclusions).

3.4. Key words (8–10).

3.5. The text of the article. The article should have the following structural elements:

- a) Introduction;
- b) Main text;
- c) Conclusion.

3.6. List of references.

4. Rules on graphic presentation data

4.1. Drawings, tables, diagrams, charts, etc. are to be numbered, the sources are to be provided and printed within the margins of the page.

4.2. All highlights in the text of the article must be only in italics (not in bold or underlined).

4.3. Depending on the complexity of graphic materials, the Editorial Board retains the right to remove them from the text.

5. References in the text and in footnotes

All footnotes are given per page in 10-point size. (*Author*. Title. Place of publication (without publisher's name), year of publication. Pages) at the bottom of each page.

When referring to an electronic resource, a full and accurate link to the Internet resource and the date of retrieval are to be added at the end of the footnote.

In case the source is an archive document, the name of an archive in full without abbreviation is to be given first followed by an abbreviation in brackets. Fund. Series. Record. Sheet. When referring to documents from the same archive, only abbreviation is used for its name.

Examples:

Glebov S. Evraziistvo mezhdru imperiei i modernom. Istoriia v dokumentakh [Eurasianism between Empire and Art Nouveau]. M., 2009. P. 27.

Starostina T. Posleblokadnyi tranzit. Dnevnik [Transit after the blockade. Diary] // Sever. 2005. No. 5–6. Pp. 127–133.

Lazarev G. Frantsuzy ukhodiut iz Mali [The French leave Mali] // *Gazeta.ru*. 06.02.2013. URL: http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/02/06_a_4954773.shtml (retrieved: 22.02.2014).

The State Archive of Vologda region (SAVR). F. 366. S. 1. R. 1188. L.3. (when referred for the first time)

SAVR. F. 3105. S. 1. R. 3. L. 1 verso. (when referred for the second time)

Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o gubernskikh i uezdnykh zemskikh uchrezhdeniakh ot 1 ianvaria 1864 g. [Statute on governorate and district institutions approved by the Imperial, dated 1 January 1864] // *PSZ*. S. 2. Dep. 1 V. XXXIX. St.-P., 1867. N 40457. Pp. 18–20.

Stocking M.K. (ed.) *The Journals of Claire Clairmont. 1814–1827.* Cambridge, 1968. P. 325.

Boisbouvier Ch. Mali : le retour de la Françafrique? // *RFI.fr*. 23.07.2013. URL: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130722-mali-presidentielle-francafrique-hollande-fabius-traore-tiebile-drame> (retrieved: 26.02.2014).

6. Rules for arranging the list of references

6.1. The list is to be numbered in alphabetical order.

6.2. The list is to include only scientific works.

6.3. **All references to sources should be given as footnotes and not included in the list of references at the end.**

6.4. **Monographs** should be presented as follows:

- *Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;*
- Title of the book;
- Information about the book in the following order: place of publication, publishing house, year of publication. Pages.

Examples:

Potemkina M.N. Evakuatsiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: liudi i sud'by [Evacuation in the years of the Great Patriotic War]. Magnitogorsk: MaGU, 2002. 264 p.

Cross A.G. 'By the banks of the Neva': chapters from the lives and careers of the British in 18th – century Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 474 p.

6.5. **Dissertations and published summaries of dissertations:**

Arslanova Ch.R. Evakuirovannoe i deportirovannoe v Bashkirskuiu ASSR nasele-nie v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945) [Population evacuated and deported to Bashkirskaya ASSR in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: published summary of dissertation. Ufa, 2006. 25 p.

Iskhakova G.R. Sotsial'naia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (na materialakh Bashkortostana) [Social policy of the Soviet State in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: PhD dissertation. Ufa, 2002. 147 p.

6.6. **Articles in journals / collections of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;
- Title of the article // Title of the collection of articles/journal;
- Publisher's imprint in the following order: Year of publication. Number. Pages. DOI index (if available)

Examples:

Kumanev G.A. Voina i evakuatsiia v SSSR. 1941–1942 gody [The war and evacuation in the USSR in 1941-1942] // *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*. 2006. No. 6. Pp. 7–27.

Solodyankina O.Y. European widows as governesses in the 18th – and 19th-century Russia // *Women's History Magazine*. 2010. Issue. 63. Pp. 19–26.

6.7. **References to electronic resources** are to be provided in a similar manner, as in the previous sections, but at the very end of the reference the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date are to be added.

Example:

Stansfield G. Iraqi Kurdistan: political development and emergent democracy. Taylor & Francis e-library, 2003. URL: https://www.academia.edu/3271178/Iraqi_Kurdistan_Political_development_and_emergent_democracy (retrieved: 04.10. 2014).

6.8. When reference is made to an electronic publication (articles or monographs), the full name of the site is to be provided.

7. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the English language

7.1. Information about the author of the article:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) in full, transliteration (for automatic transliteration we recommend using the site <http://translit.net/>; **it is essential to select LC standard** in the main menu of the site, in the 'Options...' section), degree (if applicable), title (if applicable), position, author's email address;
- Affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study in full (full official name of the organization in English, post code, country, city, street (in transliteration), building).

7.2. The title of the article – English translation.

7.3. Not mandatory: Abstract in English, **between 400-600 characters in volume** (must be written using commonly used terms and expressions in the field, must constitute an independent text, be informative and rich in contents, as far as possible reflecting the contents, structure and conclusions of the article).

7.4. Not mandatory: key words in English (8–10 words or word combinations).

7.5. References.

8. Presentation rules for 'References' section

8.1. The structure of references to publications is to be totally identical to the list of references in Russian.

8.2. In the 'References' section, as in the list of used literature, only scientific articles and monographs are to be included.

8.3. All references to sources are to be given as footnotes.

8.4. **Monographs** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for Russian authors), **LC standard**;

- *Title of the book in italics* – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the book is published in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title in square brackets;

- Year of publication;

- Information about the publication as follows: location of publishing house, name of the publishing house;

- Pages,

- if the book is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

Examples:

Ter-Minasova S.G. *Rossiia i Zapad: dialog kul'tur* [Russia and West countries: dialogue of cultures]. Moscow: Tsentr po izucheniiu vzaimodeistviia kul'tur, 2000. 320 p. (In Russian)

Bevir M., Rhodes R.A.W. *Interpreting British governance*. London: Routledge, 2003. 150 p.

8.5. Articles **in journals** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s – transliteration (for Russian authors) **LC standard**;

- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;

- Information about the publication as follows: *Name of the journal (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, year of publication, number, pages, DOI index (if available);

- if the article is in Russian, add '(In Russian)' at the end.

Examples:

Dunin A. *Guvernery v starinu v pomeschchich'ikh sem'iakh* [Tutors in landowner families in old times]. *Istoricheskii vestnik* [Historical Herald], 1909, vol. 117, July, pp. 185–194. (In Russian)

Cross A.G. An Anglo-Russian Medley: Semen Vorontsov's other son, Charles Cameron's daughter, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich's English playmate and not forgetting his English nurse. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 1992, vol. 70, no. 44, pp. 708–721.

Cross A. English – A Serious Challenge to French in the Reign of Alexander I? *The Russian Review*, 2015, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 57–68. DOI: 10.1111/russ.10756

8.6. Articles **in collection of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for authors whose name is in Cyrillic characters), **LC standard**;
- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;
- Information about the publication of the collection of articles as follows: In last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the editor – transliteration, **LC standard, (ed.)**. *Name of the collection of articles (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, followed by the English translation of the title (if written in Cyrillic characters), in square brackets; place of publishing: the name of the publishing house in transliteration, year of publication; pages, DOI index (if available);
- if the article is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

Examples:

Chudinov A.V. Frantsuzskie gubernery v Rossii kontsa XVIII v.: stereotipy i real'nost [The French tutors in Russia at the end of the 18th century: stereotypes and reality]. Karp S.Ia., Mezin S.A. (eds.) *Evropeiskoe prosveshchenie i tsvilizatsiia Rossii* [European Enlightenment and civilization of Russia]. Moscow: Nauka, 2004, pp. 330–334. (In Russian)

Solodyankina O.Yu. Personal transfer of the message and undesirable acquaintance to the addressee: reputation of the governess. Stogova A.V. (ed.) *Incidents and Failures in European epistolary culture*. Moscow: IVI RAN, 2016, pp. 125–154.

8.7. **Links to electronic resources** are to be provided similar to the previous sections, but at the very end of the entry the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date is to be added.

Examples:

Dabla-Norris E., Minoiu C., Zanna L.-F. 2010. *Business cycle fluctuations, large shocks, and development aid new evidence* [Washington D.C.], International Monetary Fund. Available at: <http://site.ebrari.com/id/10437418> (accessed: 20.06.2014).

Frot E. 2009 *Aid and the financial crisis: Shall we expect development aid to fall?* Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402788 (accessed: 28.05. 2013).

