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Russia under the influence of external
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EDITORIAL

Dear colleagues and friends,



We are pleased to present our latest issue (No. 3) of the electronic scientific journal ‘Historia provinciae – the journal of regional history’.

The issue includes mostly political articles, although some readers upon having familiarized themselves with the material, will say that this is not entirely true, as some authors use both philosophical and historical methodologies. It is just as well, nowadays all research is carried out by scientists at the intersection of various scientific fields, which allows obtaining more effective results.

The issue includes five scientific articles and a review of the monograph. It might seem that all the contributions present completely different problems, but there is one thing that unites all the materials of the issue – complexity, variety and the dynamic nature of the political processes occurring in the world.

Russia is no exception in this respect, if not to say that it is one of the key players of the international community; this country like no other is affected by these processes, and it also initiates many events that create the system of international relations.

That is why, in our opinion, it was quite natural to open this issue with an article written by a philosopher from Vologda Igor Tyapin, in which the author examines the problem of formation and evolution of the Russian geopolitical school as a response to the global processes of foreign policies.

The election of President of Russia is to be held next year. The future of the country and its role in the system of international relations will depend on who will be elected to the highest political office. The Editorial Team of the journal considered it important to recall the ups and downs of presidential elections during various periods in the history.

The topic of elections is also continued in the article of a political scientist and a historian from Krasnodar Andrey Baranov, who considers specific aspects of the goals and lines of Russia’s electoral policy regarding young people as compared to the European Union.

It goes without saying that the researcher from Ivanovo Polina Gradusova touches upon a very timely problem as well. The author studies the political activity aimed at overcoming anti-Semitism in France during the presidency of François Hollande.

In the ‘Discussion platform’ section, another article is presented by a researcher from Donetsk, Boris Kondorsky. This material will definitely stir up controversy, as

not everyone can agree with the author's point of view, but the originality of the concept he proposed cannot be denied.

In the 'Reviews' section, there is a response to the recently published and rather voluminous monograph of Yaroslavl historian Denis Tumakov, which is devoted to the analysis of the events during the first Chechen military campaign of 1994–96.

The Editorial Team hopes that the presented materials will be interesting and useful not only for researchers, but for a wide audience as well.

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The reflection of foreign policy in Russian political thought: History and modernity

Abstract. The article examines the problem of formation and evolution of the Russian geopolitical school as a response to the global political processes, developments and postulates which, in turn, act as a reliable conceptual basis for the formulation of a modern geostrategy for the Russian Federation. The importance of geopolitical methodology derives from its association with the principles of the systemic approach, modern scientific rationality, the unity of theoretical and empirical thoughts. The historical evolution of Russian geopolitics is traced back in the context of the 19th - early 21st centuries, with its conceptual continuity and dynamics of ideas. It is proved that the fundamental principle of the Russian geopolitical ideal is the protection of its geopolitical space from the pressure of the Atlanticist civilization for the sake of achieving just social order, national revival and moral transformation of the mankind. The need for a new geopolitical recovery of Russia, with the effective confrontation of the subjects of globalization involves implementation of the Empire models and a new type of coherent solutions to the problems of integration of the post-Soviet space, formation of focal points for geopolitical control in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, and finally, the creation of a Eurasian continental bloc for the restoration of inter-civilizational balance.

Keywords: geopolitics, national state idea, geopolitical cycle, geopolitical consciousness, Eurasianism, monarchist traditionalism, social traditionalism, anti-globalization, fair state, geopolitical restoration

Introduction

The main features of modern international relations would be as follows: the tendency to tighten the conditions for the survival of the nation states, increasing the intensity of competition between the civilizations, approaching the 'point of bifurcation' of assertion as the dominant model of the social structure or liberal totalitarianism or modernized national authoritarianism. The political, socio-cultural and eco-

conomic changes taking place in the modern world involve practically all countries without exception into the global transformation of the existing world order. Under these conditions, the imperative principle of survival would be the preservation of civilizational identity. For Russia today, this is becoming one of the central problems that determine the vector of its development, its ultimate goals as well as its strategy and tactics for their achievement. Our country is in a situation of unprecedented political and economic pressure, the instrument of which is the theory and practice of repressive social projects and hybrid wars aimed at destroying or reformatting nations and states not shaped per the design of the United States and its satellites.

Theoretically, the achievement of the goal of preserving civilizational identity requires the use of a systematic approach, which includes, among other things, the methodological principle implying synthesis of scientific and extra scientific (including ideological) rationality. The ideology acts as an objective factor of statehood, as a *form of self-consciousness of the people at the stage of statehood*, called to be the basis of the national-state identity, to safeguard the continuity of the national historical existence¹. Today, as never, the consolidation of scientific, political, economic and other resources is urgently necessary to implement certain breakthrough in the sphere of not only the national economy and social relations but also with regards to the spiritual culture, on which the effectiveness of the entire mechanism for ensuring the national security will depend.

Geopolitics is an example of the most organic combination of strictly scientific knowledge and ideological constructs, theory and practice. Geopolitical doctrines are a direct expression of national ideas and national-state ideologies. Geopolitics is not only a scientific discipline but also part of the ideological doctrine that is available in an explicit or an implicit form in any state. This part can be also called *geostrategy* – a choice of foreign policy directions. The state's geostrategy depends on the leaders' understanding of the national interests and priorities, the nature and geographical distribution of threats to the country's security that originate from abroad. Where there is no life-affirming national-state idea, there is no geostrategy (nor vice versa). Per V.L. Tsymburskii, who justified the definition of geopolitics as a project political outlook and project political activity, "geopolitics begins where there is a volitional political act, let it be in the intention or in the mental model based on the intentions found in a particular space. And it is only interested in such spatial structures, which are thought of as substrata, tools and conductors of the political plans that it generates"².

¹ Molotkov A.E. *Mission of Russia. Orthodoxy and Socialism in the 21st Century*. St Petersburg, 2008, p. 23.

² Tsymburskii V.L. Geopolitics as a world view and occupation. *Polis*, 1999, no. 4, p. 14.

The geopolitical approach has had immense significance for determining the goals of Russia's foreign policy objectively in the past and the present. As A.I. Fursov notes, “space plays a special role in Russian history. In fact, it is the space (quantity and quality, i.e. as a type of landscape) which is one of the main, if not the most important, wealth (and weapons) of the Russians. And certainly, it is the main Russian substance, around which the power and social relations develop. From this point of view, the protection of the Russian space would automatically assume the protection of power and social organization – and vice versa”³. Indeed, the *continental Eurasian core* remained single whole, whatever the role attributed to it in the global geopolitical system. This testifies to the existence of some fundamental properties of its geopolitical position. Key features of such a region are centrality and inaccessibility to maritime communications. “In the world, as a whole,” wrote H. Mackinder, “Russia occupies a central strategic position... It can strike in all directions; it can receive strikes from all sides, except the north... Any possible social revolution will not change Russia’s attitude to the geographical conditions of its existence”⁴. This attitude derives from the eternal and organic desire to find outlets to the sea coasts, especially the nonfreezing seas: in the north – to the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea, in the south – to the Black Sea, in the east – to the Pacific Ocean. Among the most invariable geopolitical imperatives of Russia would be its position at the intersection of different cultural worlds: agricultural and nomadic, European and Asian, Christian and Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox.

Historically, geopolitics developed mainly in Anglo-Saxon (H. Mackinder, A. Macken N. Spikeman) and German (F. Ratzel, R. Chellen, K. Haushofer) scientific schools. The ‘classical’ discourse of Western schools, with their ideology of ‘domination over the world’, ‘expansion of the living space’, ‘global domination’, ‘anaconda strategy’, etc., it is an obvious expression of aggressive selfishness and the triumph of antivalues. All kinds of ‘plans’ for Russia emerging from them (E. House’s plan, A. Dalles’s plan, Harvard and Huston plans, S. Huntington’s ideas, Z. Brzezinski’s ideas, etc.) are identical in all key points, presupposing isolation of our country, falling away of its territory important in the economic and geopolitical relations of the regions, splitting of the remaining space into many local formations, *tenfold* reduction of population and reprogramming the consciousness of the workforce necessary for economic growth.

It is widely believed that the troubles of Russia in the last century have been caused by the ‘geopolitical ignorance’ and indifference, so that the governments that own such geopolitical methods beat us on the international arena. However, Russian

³ Fursov A. The Russian Ark. Famous historian on the future of Russia. *Zavtra* [Tomorrow], 2007, no. 5.

⁴ Mackinder H. The geographical pivot of history. *Geographical Journal*, 1904, vol. 23, p. 430.

thought has its own (albeit often ignored by the authorities) geopolitical tradition based on a deep moral and metaphysical position and at the same time on a sober analysis of the real long-term trends in the world politics, the challenges that Russia has had to take. The situation of systemic crisis and the need for adequate responses to global challenges stimulate not only comprehension of geopolitical history and the current state of Russia from the point of view of national security and strategic interests (works by I.F. Kefeli, M.V. Remizov, V.V. Denisov, N.S. Rozov, A.S. Vladytskii, L.G. Ivashov, N.V. Luk'ianovich and others) but also understanding of the importance to appeal to the heritage of the Russian geopolitical thought and its modern transformation that has become a hot topic of research for a number of domestic philosophers and political scientists⁵. The results of the work now imply the need to move to the next stage, namely, to holistic comprehension of attitudes and ideals of the Russian geopolitical consciousness in its dynamics and in the context of the history of Russia's international position and foreign policy.

With regards to these, the *purpose* of the work is to examine the history of formation and evolution of the Russian geopolitical school as a reaction to the global foreign policy processes, threats and challenges in the world, where the findings and postulates in their turn would become an adequate conceptual basis to formulate the modern geostrategy of the Russian Federation.

Main part

Before the formation of geopolitics in Russia in its current state, their predecessors were M.V. Lomonosov in the 18th century (a treatise 'A Brief Description of Various Voyages in Northern Seas and Indication of a Possible Passage through the Siberian Ocean to East India' and other works), and in the first half of the 19th century – the thinkers of Slavophilism and 'protection of the mir' schools, who laid the foundations of the so-called Russian idea. The categories of 'sobornost' (communal spirit) and 'peopleism' that they developed gave impetus to understanding of the role of the communal system as the ethnopsychological basis of Russia. Realizing the special nature of Russia in the world, the conservatives understood the inevitability of its opposition to the West and the fact that the contradictions between Russia and the West were insoluble at the level of civilizational principles; they proclaimed the the-

⁵ See, for example: K. Aksenov. Ideas of L.N. Gumilev and modern Russian geopolitics. *Ethnographic Review*, 2006, no. 3; Rabotiazhev N.V. Historiosophy and geopolitics of Russian conservatism: the experience of analysis. *Politiia: Analysis, Chronicle, Forecast*, 2007, no. 2; Iakunin V.I. *Russian School of Geopolitics*. St Petersburg, 2008; Gerdt Ia.V. Origins of Russian geopolitics. *The Eurasian Journal of Regional and Political Studies*, 2012, no. 12; Klimenko A.N. *Influence of the Idea 'Moscow – the Third Rome' on Russian geopolitics of the 19th – 20th centuries: thesis of candidate of Historical Sciences*. Moscow, 2014.

sis about the possibility (and duty) for Russia to become the spiritual and political leader of the mankind.

The founder of Russian geopolitics is D.A. Milyutin, the minister of war in the era of Alexander II, who designed military geography as an independent science in the 1840-50s. Milyutin defined the geopolitical priorities of Russia, considering the British Empire to be its main enemy. In his opinion, a military-political alliance between Russia and Germany was essential to maintain the equilibrium in Europe and the Middle East. In Central Asia, Milyutin did everything to subordinate the Turkestan region, which made it possible to threaten India – the basis of the might of the British Empire and at the same time its Achilles heel. The Turks, in his opinion, had to be expelled from Europe, and the Balkan Confederation had to be created under the common patronage of continental Europe, where the straits should have received a neutral status. Persia and China would receive the guarantees of the Russian Empire from all the vicissitudes of the British policy⁶. Thus, the calculated geopolitical move – the occupation of Turkestan – neutralized England. The military alliance with Germany gave the latter the opportunity to defeat France and thereby deprived it of the opportunity to intervene in the Balkan affairs. The situation with the Crimean War did not happen again. However, Russia was not able to enjoy the benefits from this victory. The concessions made at the Berlin Congress (instead of taking Istanbul and establishing controlled regimes in the Balkan states) became a criminal miscalculation, showing the Western blindness and lack of ideology of the supreme power. *The control over the predominantly Slavic, Orthodox Balkans would have made Russia the master of Rimland forever.* Instead, the Balkans turned into a region irreversibly controlled by the West.

The 1860-70s became the time when Pan-Orthodox was supplemented by Pan-Slavism in Russia's foreign policy. As a geopolitical doctrine, Pan-Slavism was reflected in the project of the pan-Slavic Orthodox federation, developed by N. Danilevsky, where Russia acts as the driving force, because it is the only one of all the Slavic peoples that “makes its great universal decisions, which become the law of the life of peoples for entire ages, without intermediaries, surrounded by thunder and lightning, like Sabaoth from the top of Mount Sinai”⁷. And the union must be created in such a way that “the Slavic streams do not merge in the Russian sea”, i.e. all Slavs must preserve their national identity, political and cultural independence. Danilevsky saw Tsargrad-Constantinople as the political centre of such a federation.

Within the framework of the morphological methodological principle, N. Danilevsky showed that the cultural-historical types do not fundamentally mix and

⁶ Morozov E.F. The last field-marshal. *Russian Geopolitical Collection*, 1997, no. 2, p. 36.

⁷ Danilevskii N.Ia. *Russia and Europe*. St Petersburg, 1995, p. 254.

change only on a historical scale, based on ethnic qualities, developed by the landscape and historical evolution (what Jung later referred to as the ‘archetype’). Analysing Russia’s relations with the European countries, the thinker noted that they were often unequal and unprofitable for Russia. History, he rightly argued, taught that the expansion from the West was a permanent phenomenon. For the security of Russia and the entire Slavic world, per Danilevsky, it is necessary to be able to achieve the disunity of goals of England, France, Germany, Austria – their unification is always dangerous for the Russians and all the Slavs.

General R.A. Fadeev put forward the hypothesis of a single center for the conceptual management of the world and for the first time proposed methods of geopolitical confrontation. The root of the eastern question is for him to subordinate and Germanize the Slavs in the original efforts of the German race; hence the need to unite the scattered Slavic tribes under Russia’s primacy and the inevitability of an energetic Russian policy directed mainly against Austria⁸. The idea of combating the coalition of the Western powers – Austria, Prussia and England – did not embarrass the general at all, who was also known as a geopolitical practitioner, organizer of the Pan-Slav movement, military adviser in the Egyptian and Montenegrin armies, commander of the Serbian army in 1876.

The radical conservative K.N. Leontyev shifted his emphasis to the analysis of Russia’s historical connection with Byzantine civilization and the Middle East aspects of its foreign policy, calling to shake off the ‘Romano-German ashes from our Asian soles’. Leontyev, in contrast to the founders of Slavophilism, concluded that most of the Slavs had already irreversibly gone into the degrading Western civilization, into the ranks of the enemies of Russia, the only civilizational subject potentially capable of (and obliged) to show the world a new, higher type of flowering culture. “Russia is not just a state; Russia, taken in full with all its Asian possessions, is a whole world of special life, a special state world that has not yet found its own style of cultural statehood,” he wrote, calling for the development of “our own, original, Slavic-Asian civilization” centred in Constantinople, completely different from the European civilization with its triumphant philistinism. “Tsargrad,” asserted Leontyev a century and a half ago, “is that natural centre to which all Christian nations should gravitate, sooner or later ... destined to form with Russia a *great Eastern Orthodox Union*”⁹. “Then there will be two Russias ...: *Russia the empire*, with a new administrative capital (in Kiev) and *Russia the head of the Great Eastern Union* with a new

⁸ Fadeev R.A. *Opinion on the Eastern Question*. URL: <http://litresp.ru/chitat/ru/Ф/fadeev-rostislav-andreevich/kavkazskaya-vojna/6>.

⁹ Leont’ev K.N. *Temple and Church*. Moscow, 2003, p. 146.

cultural capital on the Bosphorus”¹⁰, a conservative thinker dreamed of, seeing nothing utopian in the creation of a colossal kingdom in the manner of the Macedonian empire.

The foreign policy of Alexander III (Nicholas II tried unsuccessfully to act in line with it) was to renounce the conflicts with the European powers to firmly consolidate his positions in Central Asia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East. For this reason, Militin's direction of geopolitical thought became the main one at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, providing several notable names (V.F. Golovachev, A.I. Voeikov and others), among which special attention deserves the figure of V.P. Semenov-Tian-Shansky.

Tian-Shansky, Jr. explained the nature of world domination and expansion in the context of synthesis of the marine and continental parts of the globe. The former interpretation of the global power of states based only on the thesis of British geographers with regards to dichotomy and eternal confrontation of land and sea seemed simplistic and one-sided to him. Tian-Shansky identified three forms of “territorial systems of political power” that had existed in history: 1) a circumferential system (the Mediterranean under the rule of the Roman Empire, Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, etc.); 2) a parcelled system (scattered over the seas and oceans of individual islands and pieces of continents – the colonial empires of Spain, Portugal, Holland, partly – England), which led to fairly rapid depletion of the forces of the metropolis; 3) the system ‘from sea to sea’. The scientist paid his greatest attention to the system of domination ‘from sea to sea’, which, in his opinion, was first implemented by Alexander of Macedonia, and which Russia and the USA repeated in the modern times. The main disadvantage of this type of the system is stretching the territory and uneven settlement. In the situation with Russia, the threat to its existence as a territorial system is created by the weakened eastern end wedged between the climatically severe territories of the north of Asia and the “original lands of the vast state of multi-million-strong yellow race”.

V.P. Semenov-Tian-Shansky considered the increase in population and economic development of the geographical center of the territory as the ‘way out’ for Russia. Then the extreme eastern part would be approached by a few thousand ‘versts’ to the middle part of the state and would be able to withstand the struggle with the external enemy much more successfully. The integrity of the Russian state implied reorganization of the dualistic geographical representation, per which the state would be artificially divided by the Ural ridge into the European and Asian parts¹¹. According to Semenov-Tian-Shansky, it is necessary to single out Russian Eurasia as a cultural and eco-

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 210.

¹¹ Semenov-Tian-Shanskii V.P. About the powerful territorial possession regarding Russia. Essay on Political Geography. *Spatial Economics*, 2008, Issue 2, p. 145.

conomic unit equal in rights to European Russia on the space between the Volga and the Yenisei from the Arctic Ocean to the southernmost borders of the state. The cultural and economic centre could be moved to the true geographical centre in two ways: either by transferring the capital (for example, to Ekaterinburg) or by forming new colonization oases – cultural and economic centres (Baikal, Altai, etc.). At the same time, the scientist opposed the administrative and territorial federalization of Russia as, undoubtedly, the course that was disastrous if going for it.

A considerable contribution to the ‘treasury’ of geopolitical thought was made by I.A. Ilyin, whose ideas (stimulated by the confrontation of our country in the two World Wars) in this regard resonating with the theory of the ‘father’ of Western geopolitics, R. Chellen. Like the latter, Ilyin believed that the state, the country with its population, is a ‘living organism’. Russia has evolved over centuries, not as a ‘mechanical sum of territories’ and “accidental piling up of territories and tribes”, but as an organic unity that is not subject to arbitrary partition, in the formation of which the land and the geographic environment play a decisive role. On this occasion, he wrote: “From the very first centuries of their existence, the Russian people found themselves on a conventionally divisible and open plain, open from all sides. There were no fencing lines; since the ancient times, there was a great ‘pass-through yard’ through which the ‘migrating peoples’ were flooding in – from the east and southeast to the west. Therefore, Russia was an organism, eternally forced to self-defence”¹². Ilyin, who defined Russia as “the geographical organism of large rivers and remote seas”, considered the policy of Russian sovereigns quite normal, consisting in getting out to the seas and “making a firm foot at sea”, to master the lower reaches of the rivers. Noting that “Russia ... is a stronghold of the European-Asian and therefore universal peace and equilibrium”¹³, Ilyin emphasized that the attempts to dismember its body have always been the cause and symptom of the general crisis. In the newest time, in his opinion, the whole universe will be dragged into this process, *the strife and civil wars in Russia will constantly grow into world clashes*, the powers of the whole world will invest their money, interests, strategic calculations in newly emerged small states and compete, seeking the predominance of the ‘strongholds’.

The Eurasians (*N.S. Trubetskoi, P.N. Savitskii, N.N. Alekseev, G.V. Vernadskii, L.P. Karsavin etc.*) were the first to use the very notion of ‘geopolitics’ in Russian thought. Unlike previous generations of Russian philosophers, Eurasianism has made the images of space as the main angle of view that helps to understand Russia as an ‘organism of natural size’ better against the background of other civilizations. It is appropriate to quote P.N. Savitskii, who wrote: “The geography junction with histo-

¹² Il'in I.A. *Our tasks*. Coll. Op. T. 2. Book 1. Moscow, 1993, p. 297.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 326–327.

riosophy means imposition of the grids of *historical* signs that characterize Russia-Eurasia as a special historical world, onto the grid of geographic features”¹⁴.

The Eurasianists accepted the discovery of H. Mackinder about the central axis of history and redesigned his category ‘the Heart of the Earth’ into the concept of ‘Eurasia in a narrow sense’ (in modern terminology – ‘historical Eurasia’) in contrast to “Eurasia in the broadest sense of the word” (now ‘Eurasia geographic’). By “Eurasia in a narrow sense of the word”, the steppe zone stretching from the Great Khingan to the Middle Danube plain is meant, the events on which, per H. Mackinder, determine the destinies of the world (“The Steppe strip is the backbone of history”). This is the place of development (the Eurasian term) of the *Continental* civilization, in all its foundations as opposed to the *Oceanic* civilization (European, Romano-Germanic). The borders of the Eurasian developmental place coincide with the borders of the Russian Empire and the USSR, which is not accidental. These are the natural boundaries of a Eurasian cultural-historical type.

Given that the main stimulus for the development of Russia, as a rule, was an external threat, the Eurasian project assumed rejection of imitation in all spheres of life, the idea of doctrinal synthesis, i.e. a combination of openness and dynamism with tradition and conservatism, where economic forms and instruments (autarky, multi-structure, business initiative) should serve the development of science and art, strengthening the social solidarity and country’s defense capability.

Relating to the events of World War II, an upward wave of the geopolitical cycle led our country at the highest geopolitical *maximum* in its history by the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. There was gradual restoration of the positions of the Russian state in the form of the USSR and under the flag of communism. The Soviet Union, whilst rejecting geopolitics, was at the same time very geopolitical; in the Soviet period, the messianic, idealistic essence of the country’s foreign policy was preserved, however on a different ideological basis. The Communist ideology, on the one hand, allowed giant geopolitical breakthrough, but it also became a delayed-action mine, suppressing Russian national identity and justifying the creation of semi-state entities on different levels that could become sovereign. With I.V. Stalin, throughout the boundaries of the Heartland, the system of limitotropic states was created, serving as its ‘own’ sanitary cordon. The USSR was one of the two centers of a bipolar system. The Soviet superpower existed in its historical borders as an integrated and protected geopolitical space. Moreover, the USSR was active in the belt of the ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer Crescent’ (Egypt, Syria, Laos, Yemen, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan) in the 1960–70s. These actions did not bring any real effect for strengthening the geopolitical security, because they did not rely on economic pragmatism or a

¹⁴ *The world of Russia is Eurasia*. Moscow, 1995, p. 229.

strategy (unlike the American ‘anaconda loop’, when in the coastal zone of Eurasia (with the exception of India) NATO and SEATO military blocs created CENTO and numerous naval bases). This system embedded the most daring projects of Russian tsars and geopoliticians but soon lost its historical dynamics, as it united too diverse states socially, politically and politically-ideologically, whose mentality transformed the communist ideology. The USSR was *an empire built the other way around* (when the periphery in many ways lives at the expense of the metropolis), and it *could not exist for long*.

The narrowing of the Russian geopolitical space after the collapse of the USSR led to the emergence of qualitatively new nature and the state of interstate demarcation in the form of ‘near’ and ‘far’ abroad. Being pushed back to the northeastern part of Eurasia, the ‘independent’ Russian Federation lost some of its outlets into the world ocean as well as the most important communication routes connecting it with the West and the South. Its resource base, productive capacity and financial and economic potential diminished sharply. Russia found itself surrounded by the states that are under the influence of the United States and its NATO allies creating military bases on their territories. To dictate their conditions to Russia and to nullify its geopolitical influence, the West needs a weak and fragmented country that has been pushed to the “margins of history”. The former ‘anaconda strategy’ now assumes gradual tightening of the loop throughout the entire former Soviet Union. Already in the 2000s, the partition of Russia was expected by analogy with the USSR with the transformation of fragments of Russian statehood into the colonial economic space.

The ideological basis of this program included several main points, of which the most important were as follows: 1) the presumption of Russia’s guilt as an incorrigibly imperialist state that threatens the stability of Europe and the world (in contrast to the supposedly post-imperial West); 2) the thesis that the time of empires has ended (ignoring the undeniable fact that the US, the European Union, TNCs are all variants and models of the ‘new type of empire’); 3) the call for ‘objectively necessary’ rejection of all foreign policy ambitions and geopolitical claims, in connection with economic difficulties, in the name of concentration of forces and focusing exclusively on internal problems; 4) operation with the ‘objective’ law, consisting in the fact that the intensive expansion of the area of the people’s livelihood generates and preserves extensive forms of management and economic life in general, which also has a significant negative impact on the cultural and political development of the country¹⁵.

In the situation of conducting such a foreign policy, the activity on the revival of the national geopolitical school within the framework of the public Institute of Geo-

¹⁵ Makeev A.V. The geopolitical course of Russia in security coordinates. *Space and Time*, 2010, no. 2, p. 109.

politics begun in the 1990s by A.G. Dugin, A.M. Anisimov, S.A. Shatokhin, etc., was considered quite natural. The external name of the doctrine is neo-Eurasianism, and on its own it is called the continental ('civilizational') school. V.V. Kozhinov, V.V. Maliavin, A.S. Panarin, V.Ia. Pashchenko, etc. worked in the said direction. The neo-Eurasianism developed a geopolitical version of this concept in the context of the Russian idea, which claims to be a valid theoretical basis for the development of a geostrategy for modern Russia.

The need to overcome the crisis of the society and the state became the main reason for creative mastering of the patriotic thought by the neo-Eurasians by appealing to the ideas and concepts of H. Mackinder, K. Haushover, the German 'conservative revolutionaries' E. Jünger, K. Schmitt, etc., and the use of L.N. Gumilev's concepts of 'passionarity' and 'super ethnos'. The orientation towards the strategy of *national antiglobalism*, the desire to achieve 'demotic ideocracy', multipolarity, civilizational and historical contextualization of the economic activity as a whole can ensure the fullness of social life about which A.S. Panarin wrote as follows: "The civilizational process has two interconnected aspects: instrumental-pragmatic, infrastructural designed to provide a single economic, informational and legal space, as well as spiritual value aimed to give this space the highest sacral (value) meaning"¹⁶. The mission of Russia, as Panarin believed, is to implement the Eurasian civilizational project, in other words, the creation of Eurasian civilization on the post-Soviet space: "The Russian idea in Eurasia was associated with messianism, willingness to assume responsibility for the state of this part of oecumene, share the burden of existence with friendly peoples, jointly building the future"¹⁷. At the same time, he hoped that the Eurasian project could become a consolidating force for the entire non-Western world in its resistance to globalism.

The most thorough version of neo-Eurasianism geopolitics was the concept of a new Eurasian empire developed by A.G. Dugin.

Like M.N. Katkov, who transferred the Hegelian historiosophic conception to Russian reality, Dugin writes: "Hegel developed an interesting concept that the Absolute idea in an eschatological situation should manifest itself in the final, 'conscious' form as a Prussian state. However, on a planetary scale, Prussia, and even Germany, taken separately, are geopolitically inadequate ... Russia, the Third Rome, perfectly corresponds religiously, culturally, spatially and strategically to such a teleological view of the essence of history and clearly strives to fulfill precisely the mission to create a "continental Kingdom of Absolute Idea"¹⁸. The Eurasian empire, "the build-

¹⁶ Panarin A.S. *Russia in Cycles of World History*. Moscow, 1999, p. 239.

¹⁷ Panarin A.S. Challenge (Geopolitical pessimism against civilizational optimism). *Political Science in Russia: Intellectual Search and Reality*. Moscow, 2000, p. 88.

¹⁸ Dugin A.G. *Fundamentals of Geopolitics*. Moscow, 1997, pp. 197–198.

ing of which would correspond to the global, planetary civilizational mission of Russian people”, is conceived as a multilevel formation, the ‘empire of empires’, the “confederation of Major Spaces”, among which four are the most distinguished – the European empire in the West, the Pacific Empire in the East (around Japan), the Central Asian empire in the south (around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the center of Eurasia (around Russia). In addition, it is assumed that there are several other ‘Major Spaces’ – around India and China, based on the Arab world, as well as the Pan-African Union. The continental integration of Eurasia with a center in Russia can guarantee its people the real sovereignty. Russia’s civilizational choice in politics is the assertion of “a special isolated humanity”. *Russia should not merge with the world, until the world becomes Russia.*

The modern right (‘Orthodox-monarchical’, ‘white’) traditionalists gravitate towards organic understanding of the society and the nation (each nation for them is a build-up of historical organisms). Therefore, the disintegration of the USSR is often perceived by them in the spirit of I.A. Ilyin as unnatural dismemberment of the organic whole. Thus, per V.N. Osipov, geographically and territorially, the USSR and Russia are one and the same thing, and the “Belovezhsky conspiracy of December 1991 is a crime, not in the sense of liquidation of the illegal, illegitimate, Bolshevik-compiled Soviet Union but in the sense of dismembering the organically united and indivisible 1000-year-old state organism”¹⁹. The essential incompatibility of the Russian and Euro-Atlantic civilizations is postulated by the approach. For example, E.S. Kholmogorov connects the opposition of Western and Russian civilizations with the fact that in their foundation, different types of action are underlying – goal-orientated and value-rational one (in the terminology of M. Weber). The basis of Western capitalism, per Kholmogorov, is a goal-orientated action: the subject sets a clear goal and strives to achieve it; the outside world and other people are treated by him only as means for achievement. “The Russian civilization is built on a different type of action – the value-rational one, for which the unconditional value, the given high social ideal is of primary importance over the goal itself and sets the rational structure of certain semantic and not only the target content”²⁰.

Right-wing traditionalists emphasize the centuries-old deep Western rejection of Russia in two of its manifestations: “as an equal geopolitical force and a historical personality with its own search for the general meaning of the universe – an obstacle to the destruction of the diverse world transformed by today’s messianic project of

¹⁹ Osipov V.N. *Russian Field*. Moscow, 1998, p. 119.

²⁰ Kholmogorov E.S. *Russian Nationalist*. Moscow, 2006, p. 251.

liberal globalization into a cultural and economic province of Anglo-American world”²¹.

Geopolitical attitudes of modern social-traditionalism, the slogan of which is the unity of national power and social justice, are graphically represented in the works of S.N. Baburin, where the key geopolitical idea is the functioning of Russia as the creator of a new global order, which can be based on the principle of a multipolar dispersal of power²².

Baburin notes that Russia has almost never been a national state in its classical sense, immediately having formed itself as a union of different ethnic groups with two fastening rods: the Russian language and Orthodoxy. Hence, the self-awareness of the Russian (Eastern Christian) civilization (the content of the community) and the Russian empire (its form) grew. Like any civilization, Russian is not a closed system, it seeks through external affairs (politics, economics and, above all, culture and science) to carry out its attitude to those outside it²³. In the 20th century, historical Russia passed through the tragedy of destruction twice (1917 and 1991). After the first occasion, it managed to restore its natural boundaries; the Soviet system was a special civilization that in a relatively short time had passed all cycles of civilizational development: from the heroic period of nomination of a new social ideal through wars and a period of stability, to “fatigue, loss of faith and limp fading”. At the beginning of the 21st century, we have the Russian civilization, which is in dispersion.

The main geopolitical concept for Baburin is the ‘Russian world’ understood as a cultural and historical community that transcends national states and political systems, based on a different system of values and interests. From this perspective, the space of the Russian world includes almost the entire territory of the former USSR, as well as Serbia and Montenegro (despite the change in elites in these countries). The political core of the Russian world should be the union state of Russia and Belarus, turned from amorphous education into a capable political subject represented in the UN Security Council, a “great power based on the Russian culture and the Russian language” capable of repelling the expansion of the West and the East, rejecting the globalist unification. Per S.N. Baburin, the Russian imperial idea is characterized by a complex set of religious and ideological ideas about the eschatological meaning and purpose of Russian statehood. The imperial approach means not only a strong power, but also a fair power, under which every person is guaranteed all opportunities for

²¹ Narochnitskaia N.A. *Russia and the Russians in World History*. Moscow, 2003, p. 214.

²² Baburin S.N. The world order as a system of possession of territories. *Our Contemporary*, 2006, no. 7, p. 217.

²³ Baburin S.N. *The Return of Russian Conservatism*. Moscow, 2012, p. 14.

comprehensive development and a dignified life. Not at the expense of other people, but together with them²⁴.

Conclusion

Thus, the geopolitical ideal of Russian national thought has undergone some transformation as the historical situation and state evolution change. At the same time, its essential features for more than a century and a half have remained the same. A fundamental principle is the *protection of its geopolitical space from the pressure of the Atlantic civilization for the sake of implementing the model of a just social order, national liberation and moral transfiguration of the mankind*.

Contemporary national-orientated geopolitical thought is, in fact, imbued with the belief that in the confrontation with the global dictatorship, the traditional – despotic or oligarchic – regimes based on former shapes of statehood and practices of social management are doomed to be defeated in the information-ideological and technological war. Only a state that is large in space and population, orientated on the commandment of absolute morality that is nationally expressed, can effectively resist the Western hegemony, building on its basis the political and legal activity, that has independent ideology and development strategies based on a national idea, alien to corruption and oligarchy. Consequently, the existence of Russia in the future is possible only as a state with imperial features, which differs both from the medieval empires of the East and the European colonial powers of modern times, as well as from the ‘reverse empire’ – the USSR. After all, despite the geopolitical catastrophe that took place, Russia remains a continental force, an independent subject of the world politics, playing the role of a geopolitical balance in the expanses of Europe and Asia. “The destinies of a new century’s confrontation are being decided in Russia,” A.S. Panarin concludes. – “Not only because Russia is the owner of the world’s largest territory, whose resources do not allow global privatizers to sleep. Russia is the owner of the most spiritually exalted, noble and chaste cultural tradition, without breaking resistance of which the population of the Eurasian Heartland cannot be turned into a human mass devoid of real dignity”²⁵.

We can state the presence of geopolitical consciousness as a special *form* of the Russian theoretical public consciousness. The Russian geopolitical consciousness unites traditions and approaches both of classical geopolitics, and of the new (*geo-economics*) and the newest (*geophilosophy / geo-ideology*) geopolitics. The ‘core’ of this consciousness is the belief that the historical experience of the existence of the Russian civilization shows that its geopolitical achievements and victories were ac-

²⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁵ Panarin A.S. *Strategic Instability*. Moscow, 2003, p. 345.

completed in the presence of clearly defined, consistent tasks, in their turn based (directly or indirectly) on the national idea at the metaphysical level, shared by the authority and the people; in other words, Russian geopolitics has always been ideocratic. In such cases, Russia sometimes won even with a disadvantageous ratio of potentials (military, economic, demographic) compared to their geopolitical opponents. On the contrary, failures and defeats, military and diplomatic, accompanied Russia almost always in its absence or in the event of its discredit, even in the situation of advantage or equality of forces, because the “non-national non-ideological” led to total opposition of the values of the society and the authority, and (in the context of global struggle of the worldviews) of disorientation and the inevitable spiritual degradation of the latter.

Hence the vision of the geostrategy of modern Russia stems as a long-awaited civilizational format in the sense of “modernization returning to its origins”.

Politically and economically, this is a reform within the framework of the project of a *moral state of justice* – a new version of the ‘mobilization model’, considering the objective interests of the majority²⁶. The anti-Western political vector set by the reunification with the Crimea cannot last forever without implementing an adjusted strategic scheme of internal social and economic development.

Ideologically, the geopolitical reconstruction should be based on the thesis that the expansion of the Russian state objectively responded to the security interests of ethnic groups living in Eurasian spaces. Its territorial growth was due to the needs of arranging a system of stable and safe economic activity, inclusion into the world production and economic relations. Overall, it also responded to the needs of spiritual development of the peoples who entered the system, through their involvement with the world values through the great Russian culture.

The geopolitical **task of a minimum** is integration of the post-Soviet space. The likely initial (requiring only minimal political will) step may be the ‘*confederation of Rus*’ within the Russian Federation, Belarus and Novorossia (at least within the limits of today’s DNR (Donetsk People’s Republik) and LNR (Lugansk People’s Republic). Maintaining the basic elements of the state sovereignty of its constituent parts, the confederation could have coordinating bodies that are *publicly functioning*, original symbols, common currency and act as a single entity in such areas as culture and sport. It is necessary to use various forms of control over the space of the former USSR, the distinct diplomatic recognition of pro-Russian autonomies (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), the real support of Russian diasporas in the Baltic, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the discussion with the leaders of the member

²⁶ For more details see: Tiapin I.N. The moral state as the state of justice: strokes to the concept. *Philosophy of Law*, 2016, no. 6.

states of EAEU of their anti-Russian political rhetoric, regulation of migration from the neighboring countries and beyond.

The task of the middle level is the formation of centers of geopolitical control in the space of the Eastern and Western hemispheres (Latin America: Cuba, Venezuela, Middle East). It is very important here: a) to weaken as much as possible the unity of the organization of the geopolitical opponents (for example, the EU), taking advantage of their real problems and contradictions; b) strengthen the relations with those countries that do not allow to ‘close in’ – Iran, India, China, Syria, Vietnam, etc.

The task maximum (which cannot be solved without implementation of the first and second tasks) is the unification of the Eurasian, African, Islamic, Hindustan and Far Eastern civilizations into a single Eurasian continental block to restore the inter-civilization balance.

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**The use of media opportunities during the presidential elections
in Russia in 1996 and 2000**

Abstract. The study of the processes that took place during the elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996 and 2000 is relevant today, when our country is on the verge of new elections in 2018. With the election of the country's leader, not only the new political reality is determined, but also the trajectory and algorithm of socio-political and socio-economic development of the country are formed, considering the many challenges and threats that arise today and will arise in the world tomorrow. The author of this article analyzes the use of media opportunities as an important resource for influencing the public opinion during the presidential elections in 1996 and 2000. Comparing features of the elections, the author concludes that in 1996 the nature of the relationship between the authorities and the mass media was complicated, since the media at that time was largely an independent institution of the political system that influenced the formation of the public opinion. However, the representatives of the political and economic elite supported the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin in his decision to be re-elected for a second term and managed to attract the media resources to achieve this goal. By the time of the election in 2000, the Russian media were already under the control of the authorities as well as financial and industrial groups, and therefore the use of effective technologies allowed Vladimir Putin to construct the image of a determined politician and ensure his victory within a short time.

Keywords: Russian presidential election, electorate, political technologies, mass media, politics

Introduction

The presidential elections, which took place in 1996 and 2000 are described in a lot of analytical materials. These were crucial years for the country. The first presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1992–96) was filled with serious problems: a drop in the level of production in Russia, unpaid wages and pensions, storming of the White House, the plight in the army, an unpopular war in Chechnya. At the end of 1995, in the elections to the State Duma, most of the mandates were received by the Commun-

ist Party. And if in 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the hero of the August coup, did not have equal rivals; in 1996 the authority of the President reached a critical level of 5-6%. This meant that the decision to start the election campaign had to take place in the face of considerable uncertainty in achieving the desired result.

The rating of the young politician Vladimir Putin, whose candidacy was unexpectedly proposed by Yeltsin to the State Duma in August 1999 for approval as prime minister, also amounted to an insignificant 1 % in September 1999, which was even less than a statistical error. However afterwards it began to grow rapidly and by the middle of September amounted to 4 %. In November 1999, 54.3 % of citizens trusted him. Vladimir Putin won the approval of the citizens by his decisive action during the second Chechen war and the fight against the terrorists who carried out the destruction of apartment buildings in several Russian cities. In short, the starting positions of the candidates at the beginning of their election campaigns were almost the same, and therefore it is appropriate, in our opinion, to compare the features of holding the presidential elections in 1996 and 2000 and to identify the ways and methods for achieving the victorious results, in which a significant role was played by the traditional media.

Background and scope

It should be noted that in general, the degree of scientific research of the Russian presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 is quite profound. This is evidenced by the publication of several collective monographs, collections of scientific papers, as well as dissertations devoted to this topic. As an example, the most comprehensive scientific analysis of the presidential elections in 1996 was carried out by a group of authors representing academic scientific organizations, as they say, on fresh tracks¹. The authors of the publication argue that the first presidential election in the Russian Federation, per the plan, popular, free and democratic, in fact often took place with violations of genuinely democratic procedures. The opponents were under unequal conditions and, above all, in terms of access to the media. The confession of A. Oslon, head of the Public Opinion Foundation, who uncovered the mechanism of using sociological surveys as a way of influencing voters' opinions is quite interesting².

¹ From Yeltsin to ... Yeltsin: presidential election-96, comp., the author of the preface L.N. Dobrokhotov, Eds. M.K. Gorshkov, L.N. Dobrokhotov, V.V. Zhuravlev. Moscow, 1997.

²Oslon A. As in 1996, the analytical group made surveys a social fact. *Sociological reality. Journal of Sociological Observations and Communications*, 2006, no. 6. URL: <http://socreal.fom.ru/?link=ARTICLE&aid=182>

The components of Boris Yeltsin's success were assessed in the work of L.F. Shevtsova³, who named the main reason for the victory of the first President of Russia: the Russians who supported Yeltsin voted most likely against Zyuganov, rather than for Yeltsin, that is, 'for the lesser of two evils'. The publication of V.M. Yuryeva and D.G. Seltzer is devoted to the analysis of the results in the elections of 1996⁴. The opportunities for free expression of citizens' will in the elections of 1996 were assessed in the thesis of N. V. Kapranov⁵. The federal and regional aspects of conducting the elections in Russia are analyzed in the thesis for the academic degree of Doctor of Political Sciences by A.Kh. Khalitova⁶.

The range of publications and the doctoral thesis of L.N. Dobrokhotova⁷ are devoted to the analysis of historical experience and the relationship between the government and the society in Russia under the conditions of systemic transformation. E.A. Ordonskaya describes the political processes that took place during the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, using the methodology of comparative historical analysis⁸. A.A. Filinsky performed an analysis of the state of political discourse during the election campaigns of 1999 and 2000 in his thesis⁹. A.N. Nurutdinova devoted her dissertation to the study of the selective media discourse under the conditions of institutionalization of democratic elections in modern Russia¹⁰. A.V. Postrikanova examined the procedure for holding elections in terms of legitimizing the formation of government bodies in contemporary Russia¹¹.

A large body of scientific publications is devoted to the study of transformational processes in modern Russia, which formed the new political reality. Everything that

³ Shevtsova L.F. The regime of Boris Yeltsin. *The Carnegie Moscow Center*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. Listing – the main components of success of B.N. Yeltsin, she formulates the main thesis, per which – the Russians, who supported him in the election, voted, most likely, against Zyuganov, rather than for Yeltsin – 'the lesser of two evils'.

⁴ Yuryev V.M., Seltzer D.G. The presidential elections in Russia: Dynamics of general and private characteristics. *Bulletin of Tambov University*. Ser.: Humanities, 2008, Issue 4.

⁵ Kapranov N.V. *Choice as a factor in the democratization of the political process of modern Russia: Political analysis of the presidential elections of 1991 and 1996*: Doc. Dis. Moscow, 1998.

⁶ Khalitova A.Kh. *Elections as an Institution of Political Democracy in the Transforming of Russian Society: Federal and Regional Aspects*: Doc. Dis. Moscow, 2004.

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⁸ Ordonskaya E.A. *Presidential Elections in Russia in 1996 and 2000: A Comparative-historical Analysis*: Doc. Dis. Moscow, 2011. URL: <http://www.dissercat.com/content/>

⁹ Filinsky A.A. *A Critical Analysis of the Political Discourse of the Election Campaigns of 1999–2000*: Author's Abstract. Doc. Dis. Tver, 2002.

¹⁰ Nurutdinova A.N. *Electoral Media Discourse under Conditions of Institutionalization of Democratic Elections in Modern Russia*: Doc. Dis. Kazan, 2007.

¹¹ Postrikanova A.V. *Elections as a Mechanism for the Legitimization of State Power in Modern Russia*: Doc. Dis. Moscow, 2005.

related to the elections: the alignment of political forces, the technology of forming the public opinion, changing sentiments in the society, socio-economic processes – has become the subject for research by Russian scientists. One can cite the work of S.K. Pestsov and A.V. Smirnov¹², E. Popov¹³, R.F. Turovsky¹⁴, A. Shvidunova¹⁵, O.V. Popova¹⁶, V. Avchenko¹⁷ and O.N. Bykova¹⁸.

The processes of formation of the electoral system in the Russian Federation, its improvement and the results of influence on the transformation of the country are examined in the studies of well-known foreign political scientists and specialists such as: M. McFaul, D. Simon, E. Schneider¹⁹. The ways of discovering the ideological content of mass-media messages during the elections are considered in the work by the English sociologist J.B. Thompson²⁰. The observation of the voting process and the voters during the elections in 1996 in the capital of Tatarstan – Kazan by the American researcher John Lavenherdt²¹ is also worthwhile mentioning.

The periodical scientific publications did not ignore the elections held in Russia either, as well as the peculiarities associated with their conduct. In the media space, one can find a significant number of journalistic materials. Quite interesting are the confessions of the former head of the presidential guard service A. Korzhakov²².

¹² Pestsov S.K., Smirnov A.V. Russian elections – 2000: Characteristic features and procedures. *Vlast* [The Power], 2000, no. 9, pp. 17–23.

¹³ Popov E. Russian political elite at the turn of the 20th – 21st centuries. *The Construction of the Social Order with the Help of Communication Technologies*. Vladivostok, 2001.

¹⁴ Turovsky R.F. Regional features of the presidential elections of 2000. *Bulletin of the Moscow University*. Ser. 12: Political Science, 2000, no. 4, pp. 38–54.

¹⁵ Shvidunova A. *Mass media as a subject of political process and an instrument of political technologies. Russian media in the presidential campaign of 2000*. URL: http://society.polbu.ru/shvidunova_smi/ch05_all.html

¹⁶ Popova O.V. Models of identification of the main candidates for the post of the President. *Political image: The Secrets of Manipulation of Mass Consciousness*: Collection of scientific articles. St Petersburg, 2000, pp. 145–156.

¹⁷ Avchenko V. Theory and practice of political manipulation in modern Russia. *Theoretical and Applied Aspects of Speech Communication*. Issue. 1(8). Krasnoyarsk, 1999.

¹⁸ Bykova O.N. *Language manipulation. Theoretical and Applied Aspects of Speech Communication*. Issue. 1(8). Krasnoyarsk, 1999.

¹⁹ McFaul M. *Russia's 1996 presidential election: the end of polarized politics*. Stanford, 1997; Simon G. *Präsidentenschaftswahlen in Russland: Jelzin oder Sjunganow. Aktuelle Analysen des BIOst* (Köln), 1996, no. 39; Schneider E. *Die russische Präsidentenschaftswahl 1996. Bericht des BIOst*. Köln, 1996, no. 50.

²⁰ Thompson J.B. *Ideology and Modern Culture. Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Cambridge, 1992.

²¹ Lovenhardt J. Elections of the President of Russia in 1996. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 1997, no. 1, March, pp. 127–139.

²² Korzhakov A.V. *Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk*. Moscow, 1997, p. 319.

A.E. Lyubarev²³ shares his observations on the twenty-year experience of holding elections in Moscow with the readers. V.V. Sogrin²⁴ considers the political processes that took place in modern Russia for 15 years, including the conduct of elections.

A considerable number of scientific works relate to the study of the features of the presidential elections of 2000. The efficiency of the use of V.V. Putin's administrative resource is emphasized in the studies of such authors as R.F. Avramchenko, R. Brim, L.B. Kosova²⁵, A. Zudin and A. Ryabov²⁶.

And, nevertheless, in our opinion, the phenomenon of holding elections in 1996 and 2000 is not fully investigated. It seems to us that many domestic as well as foreign researchers will turn to this topic. Moreover, not all the active participants of the events studied and shared their observations and assessments with the readers. We must assume that such work will appear in the future. In the proposed article, we will try to address the aspect of the two electoral campaigns so poorly studied, related to the use and capabilities of the Russian mass media by the main participants in the said elections – the candidates (and their teams) that won.

Materials and methodology

Elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996

It was a difficult decision for Boris Yeltsin to participate in the election of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996, and he pondered for a long time about his prospects for victory. The reasons for such uncertainty were quite serious. Firstly, the state leader's health left much to be desired. Both Yeltsin himself and his entourage assumed that the campaign would be very difficult, it would require a lot of strength and vitality, and the incumbent President had serious health problems at the time. On the eve of the new year of 1996, Yeltsin had another heart attack, and for a long time he did not appear in public. Here is what the former close associate of Boris Yeltsin, Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the president's guard, said in his memoirs about this period, "Everyone was overcome with doubts: what to do with the elections, can Yeltsin be nominated having such a condition? After all, after his heart at-

²³ Lyubarev A.E. *Elections in Moscow: The experience of twelve years. 1989–2000*. URL: <http://lyubarev.narod.ru/elect/book/soderzh.html>

²⁴ Sogrin V.V. *Political History of Modern Russia. 1985–2001: From Gorbachev to Putin*. Moscow, 2001.

²⁵ Avramchenko R.F. *Putin's Way: To the President or Reformer? A new Concept of Russia's Development*. Moscow, 2000; Brim R., Kosova L.B. V. Putin's phenomenon: morphology and semantics of mass popularity. *Monitoring of Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes*, 2000, no. 3, pp. 18–22.

²⁶ Zudin A., Ryabov A. Campaign- 2000 features and their influence on the configuration of the ruling elite. *Russia in the Electoral Cycle of 1999–2000*. Moscow, 2000.

tack, the doctors recommended a complete rest, especially if the patient was far from being young. However, elections are anything but rest”²⁷.

In December 1995, when asked “Who would you vote for if elections were held today?” 5 % of respondents preferred the candidacy of Boris Yeltsin, while Gennady Zyuganov was voted for by 13 %, Alexander Lebed gained 10 %, Grigory Yavlinsky – 9 % and Viktor Chernomyrdin – 7 %. In January 1996, many were confident that under such conditions Boris Yeltsin would not run for a second term, and in February, when he nevertheless announced his participation in the future elections, his defeat seemed inevitable. Then, on the eve of the impending presidential election, 30% of the population expressed their complete agreement with the saying “under the Communists everything was better, I would like everything to become the same,” and another 33 % expressed their partial agreement with such a statement²⁸. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland held in February 1996, Zyuganov was greeted as an obvious favorite of the elections and the future President of Russia.

Only one serious argument prompted by the political technologists acted in favor of Boris Yeltsin: the fear of the population of the restoration of the communist ideology in case of victory of the leader of the Russian Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov, formed by the Yeltsin-backed media and constantly cultivated by them. Before the elections, incredible circulation of ten million copies were issued by the free weekly newspaper ‘God forbid!’, which printed mostly negative material about Zyuganov, the main rival of the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin. The main theses of the newspaper were as follows: the inevitability of the outbreak of a civil war in the event of Zyuganov's victory, start of mass arrests, executions and famine. Zyuganov was repeatedly compared with Hitler on the pages of the newspaper²⁹.

What happened next, would have been called a miracle by many Russian media. If in February in Ekaterinburg a sick man, located far from the people and surrounded by a crowd of officials, announced his decision to run for the highest position in the country again, then in May he was seen as an active, confident and victorious ‘people's’ politician³⁰.

²⁷ Korzhakov A.V. *Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk*. Moscow, 1997, p. 319.

²⁸ Oslon A. As in 1996, the analytical group made surveys a social fact. *Sociological reality. Journal of Sociological Observations and Communications*, 2006, no. 6. URL: <http://socreal.fom.ru/?link=ARTICLE&aid=182>

²⁹ Avchenko V. Theory and practice of political manipulation in modern Russia. *Theoretical and Applied Aspects of Speech Communication*. Issue. 1(8). Krasnoyarsk, 1999; Bykova O.N. Language manipulation. *Theoretical and Applied Aspects of Speech Communication*. Issue. 1(8). Krasnoyarsk, 1999.

³⁰ Markov E.A. Towards elections: we draw lessons from the past. *Quarterly Scientific and Methodical Journal*, no. 1. Cherepovets, 2011, pp. 54–59. URL: [http://chereng.ru/nauka/jurnal/files/ENMG_1\(1\).pdf](http://chereng.ru/nauka/jurnal/files/ENMG_1(1).pdf) (Call Date May 28, 2017).

The director of NTV television company Igor Malashenko was appointed an adviser to the election campaign of Boris Yeltsin. This decision allowed to achieve two different and simultaneously very important goals. First, one of the main creators of the image of Yeltsin was a young specialist who was familiar with the West, and above all with the American experience in conducting election campaigns, who could develop an effective strategy and build interaction between the diverse team of the incumbent President of the Russian Federation and the media. Secondly, although I. Malashenko for the time of the campaign departed from the leadership of NTV, it was obvious that the broadcaster was, at least, neutral in relation to B.N. Yeltsin, and by and large, set the tone of the campaign and indicated to the other TV channels the necessary reference point for building strategically important relationships with the authorities (and its most promising presidential candidate). The struggle for the voters was conducted by the team of B.N. Yeltsin thoughtfully and aggressively. Boris Yeltsin visited large cities, national republics, using his personal charm and the star image of artists and stars of the Russian show business related to the campaign under the slogan ‘Vote – or lose!’ Until now, on television, they sometimes show everyone the memorable plot when Yeltsin danced on the stage, copying the young artists, thus attracting to their side the sympathy of the representatives of the younger generation. He began and finished the pre-election tour in his small homeland, in Yekaterinburg, surrounded by relatives (which reminded of the American methods of conducting similar campaigns). All President’s actions were covered in the media in the most detailed way, especially in the three national TV channels: ORT (Channel One Russia), RTR and NTV. In addition, before the elections, in TV news it was reported on the constructive moments associated with the end of the war in the Chechen Republic (truce, the arrival of the Chechen leader Z. Yandarbiyev to Moscow to participate in the negotiations, and, as an apotheosis, Boris Yeltsin's visit to Mozdok – no candidate could afford such a pre-election action. Thus, the main problem (the war in Chechnya) connected with the re-election of the incumbent President was partly neutralized with the help of television³¹.

Boris Yeltsin managed to win this election by defeating his main rival, the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, only in the second round. The results of the first round were almost equal for both candidates. Boris Yeltsin received 35.38 % of the vote, whereas Gennady Zyuganov received 32.03 %. The results of the elections were determined during the second round, and then it turned out that B. Yeltsin

³¹ Ibid.

received 53.82 %, and Gennady Zyuganov – 40.31 %. The voters' turnout in both rounds was high and amounted to just under 70 %³².

The politicians of the incumbent President did everything possible and impossible to raise Yeltsin's rating that was so low before the start of the campaign. It is true though that his main rival, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov and his participation in the pre-election race greatly facilitated the task of 'team' B.N. Yeltsin. The media did not accidentally increase the sense of confrontation between the two candidates. "To be perceived as a political figure, you need a contrasting background. The following can serve as such a background: another political figure / community endowed with totally negative properties. We need a pair of antipodes: a hero and a villain. The struggle between the hero and the villain, the good and evil forces, the influence on the mass consciousness, disorganizing it in reality and some really important problems". The results of the 'team' of Yeltsin at the elections were summed up by 'Obshchaya Gazeta', which reported in those days: "The president, constantly attending the media, performing actively in the information space ... has created a kind of 'virtual reality'. Within its framework, the problems that were inherently insoluble seemed completely surmountable. He managed to convince the different layers of the population that it was possible to stop inflation and simultaneously carry out the large-scale social programs The immersion of millions of Russians in this 'reality' made them forget about their real problems for some time and thereby helped the President to avoid an unpleasant report on the situation. "The virtual reality, to which we refer hereby, is nothing more than 'false reality', in which there is no presence of manipulation, or barrage – distracting the viewer from the real problems"³³.

Today, the humankind lives in the information world, and if it is possible to manage the information flows and influence them with public consciousness, it would be possible to achieve the desired action." Such an opportunity for managing the information flows in the 1996 elections was possessed by the team of the incumbent President at the time. This possibility was called an administrative resource.

"The strongest administrative resource was working for Yeltsin, in addition, the hidden 'advertising' was present literally everywhere – it became possible due to the fact that truly incredible amounts and opportunities were in the hands of Yeltsin and his team. In his memoirs 'The Presidential Marathon', Yeltsin frankly wrote out how the most influential bankers came to him on the eve of the 1996 elections: Friedman,

³² Elections of the President of the Russian Federation of 1996 on June 16, 1996. Protocol of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on the results of the election of the President of the Russian Federation. URL: http://cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/president/1996/index.html

³³ Ibid

Khodorkovsky, Smolensky, Potanin and others: “Boris Nikolayevich, use all our resources, so long as the election ends with your victory! And then the Communists will come – they will hang us all on the lamp-posts ...”³⁴.

Boris Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 elections would have been impossible if all the major Russian media had not supported him. Some of them supported him ‘unselfishly’, since the President, by his actions, guaranteed the media freedom of any action and did not pay attention to their criticism. Others, like NTV channel, for example, received after the election success at their full disposal the television frequency broadcasted by the federal channel ‘Russian Universities’, whereby NTV broadcasts were held on it for six hours a day. In addition, as acting President, B. Yeltsin issued decrees, enacted laws and regulations that enabled him to win support in a wide variety of circles. Thus, the Federal Law ‘On introducing amendments and addenda to the law on taxes of the Russian Federation’, introduced on 1 January 1996, improved the financial situation of the media.

“The frank propaganda nature of the overwhelming majority of these decrees and decisions was successfully confirmed after the presidential elections, when Boris Yeltsin, reelected for a second term, signed the decree ‘On urgent measures to ensure the economy in the process of preparing the federal budget in the second half of 1996,” E. Popov writes. “This document suspended, and in some cases cancelled 47 presidential decrees and government decrees, as well as some laws issued and adopted during the election campaign-96”³⁵.

Elections of 2000

A few months before the election of the President of the Russian Federation in 2000, the elections to the State Duma were held on 19 December 1999. If we talk about the peculiarities of using the original political technologies during these elections, the results showed that with the help of instruments of manipulative influence on the voters it was quite possible to ‘construct’ not only the ‘virtual social movement’ (that was the unity movement formed literally on the eve of the elections) but also the new president. That is, the elections of 1999 have become a kind of testing ground for working out the technological tools that could bring victory to the 2000 presidential election.

These techniques were used with a high degree of efficiency in the election campaign which was conducted by the acting President of the Russian Federation V. Pu-

³⁴ Avchenko V. Election of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996. *‘Family’: Victory at any cost. Elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996*. URL: <http://psyfactor.org/polman3.htm> (Date of circulation 04/27/2017).

³⁵ Popov E. Russian political elite at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. *The Construction of the Social Order with the Help of Communication Technologies*. Vladivostok, 2001.

tin. The Kremlin achieved maximum success in the parliamentary elections, which allowed ‘preparing the ground’ for a successful speech during the presidential campaign. Therefore, the presidential election of Vladimir Putin, in effect carried out by the same individuals that carried out the promotion of Boris Yeltsin in 1996, were not an easier example. And this means that the political process in Russia has become manageable, comparatively easy to fit into the right direction for the ruling elite.

The director of the Federal Security Service and at the same time the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to the surprise of many, was elected by Boris Yeltsin as his successor and on 9 August 1999 he was first appointed as acting head of the government and later, on 19 August he was approved as prime minister by the deputies of the State Duma. On 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin, who experienced health problems, announced his voluntary resignation and the prime minister Vladimir Putin became acting president of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Constitution of Russia.

Early presidential elections were scheduled for 26 March 2000. Vladimir Putin had to compete with ten contenders – the candidates included in the ballots, however serving as acting officials. The president was by that time already unattainable leader for the other participants, although he had strong competitors too, who had huge political experience as well – such as the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the leader of the Yabloko (Apple) bloc Grigory Yavlinsky.

Based on the results, Vladimir Putin won in the first round, receiving 52.9 % of the votes. The second competitor was significantly behind the winner – Gennady Zyuganov who received 29.2 %. The third place was taken by Grigory Yavlinsky gaining 5.8 %.

What was the secret of the success in the election of Vladimir Putin?

The appearance of V. Putin as the prime minister of the government, and then the acting President of Russia, coincided, first, with the expectations of the population of the country about the need for reforms. The people had long been waiting for a new, younger, stronger and self-confident leader who will strengthen the power vertically, stop the disintegration processes in the country, ensure sustainable economic development and finally stop the rampage of political bacchanalia in the country, during which the oligarchs and officials shamelessly stole the national wealth. Because of this coincidence of expectations of the population and the emergence of a new ambitious leader, the support rating for V. Putin began to grow rapidly. In November 1999, 54.3 % of citizens trusted him, and in May 2000 (after the elections) 64.1 % of respondents expressed their positive opinions about Putin. Thus, the secret of success was in a successfully chosen strategy of public activity with an emphasis on patriotic

and social themes and a well-chosen image of an energetic, tough, practical ‘business policy’ as V. Putin saw it.

The second factor explaining the rapid growth of V. Putin's popularity was the value-emotional state of the public consciousness.

“The actions of V. Putin during the crisis successfully played up to the public expectations: the prime minister became the conductor and spokesman of what is called ‘the people's aspirations’”: he actually assumed the responsibility to protect the population from the tyranny of terrorists and, moreover, supporting a collective ‘sense of revenge’, he actually started a counterattack against terrorists and led a campaign to ‘destroy the crap in its lair’ in Chechnya, while washing away the disgrace of the disastrous Chechen campaign of the 1996 federal troops”³⁶.

And, finally, the third statement to consider. “The sharpened relations with the West and rather sharp (mainly populist) actions and statements of the authorities on international relations made it possible for the population (who have been feeling humiliated by the West for a number of years) to feel the restoration of Russia’s role in the world politics. From the point of view of the philistine, Putin was the one who returned this opportunity to Russia. Obviously, the trust of the philistine in politics, which gave him the opportunity to feel his own importance, will remain high enough”³⁷.

The direct increase in publications and materials in the media has also influenced Vladimir Putin’s rapid growth in popularity. It is known that the rapid growth of the popularity of one’s policy is directly related to the frequency of references to it in the media. Many positive publications on the activities of the prime minister and acting President of the Russian Federation provided him with such fame.

One cannot ignore the support extended to Vladimir Putin by Boris Yeltsin, who called him his successor, which already gave certain guarantees for the success of his further political career, as well as support for the ‘Unity’ movement, which named V. Putin as their leader.

Results and discussion

Evaluation of the activities of the Russian media during the 1996 and 2000 elections allows us to draw up the following conclusions.

Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 elections was the result of a powerful propaganda machine that managed to persuade the public opinion of Boris Yeltsin's team. Not the least role in the manipulative impact on public consciousness was played by the Rus-

³⁶ *Elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 2000. Archive of political advertising.* URL: <http://www.33333.ru/public/2000.php>

³⁷ Ibid

sian media. However, at the same time, having agreed to work on the side of one of the candidates (albeit the most influential one), the Russian media have predetermined their future destiny. By signing an unspoken agreement with the acting authorities, they, without being aware of it, have since lost the opportunity to fulfill at least several of their main functions: 1) to be an objective, reliable and effective source of information for the society; 2) to be the controller of the public on part of the authorities; 3) to be an arbitrator in the relationship between the power and the society. Henceforth Russian media began to act in alliance with the authorities, once again under its control and lost its independence, which was won in the early 1990s. Yet, in fact, there was virtually no other choice for the Russian media, after the victory of the Yeltsin team in the presidential election. After all, "... the election financed a clique of tycoons who took state assets for billions of dollars as a reward <...>. The Russians laid the blame for this on Chubais, which is entirely justified if we use it as evidence. "If I were once again in such a situation," he says, "I would have made absolutely the same decision." This was a 'fundamental historical decision'. The ensuing looting of assets was "the price we paid to prevent the Communists from returning to the country"³⁸.

Thus, the leaders of the Russian media exchanged the professional freedom of their work for a full, serene and prosperous life in the future. But such expectations for most of the mass media turned out to be a phantom, because the fate of a significant part of various media was not as cloudless as it was supposed to be to their owners and leaders.

The victory of Vladimir Putin in the first round of the presidential elections in 2000 was the result of using a powerful administrative resource, which already at that time was owned by the acting President of Russia.

Let us list the factors that provided V. Putin with victory in the elections.

First, the use of the image of a young, active, tough leader of the country, who declared a merciless war on terrorism, separatism and corruption. The appearance of a politician with such traits coincided with the value orientations of the society.

Secondly, Vladimir Putin announced an independent foreign policy aimed at restoring Russia's authority and influence in the international community, and in the domestic policy – ensuring the country's social and economic development and real growth in the well-being of its citizens. These actions coincided with the emotional mood of the population, tired of the long humiliation of their country by the most developed countries and cherishing the hope of restoring the former power and greatness of Russia.

³⁸ *Dinner of Anatoly Chubais with 'FT'* (Financial Times as of 18.02.02, translation by Inopressa.ru). URL: <http://psyfactor.org/polman3.htm>

Thirdly, thanks to his active statements and actions, Vladimir Putin won the attention of the media, became the most frequently mentioned media person, which was also promoted using administrative resources, since the activities of the country's leader are undoubtedly actively covered in the media. Media attention formed fame and strengthened the effect of using the personality of the new leader, which allowed him to gain sympathy of a significant part of the population and quickly increase his rating.

Fourthly, an impressive starting capital to his follower was passed by Boris Yeltsin, who elected his successor six months before his voluntary resignation from the post of President and provided Vladimir Putin with a fast and successful career.

Fifthly, one of the success factors was the political support of the promising policy from the 'Unity' movement, which provided him with the voices of their activists and supporters and declared V. Putin their leader.

Some general conclusions can be drawn by analyzing the technologies used during the two presidential elections. First, the results of the election campaigns we examined were highly dependent on manipulation of public consciousness initiated by the authorities and conducted through the media. Unfortunately, as we have already noted, the media had in this case the role of the government-controlled instrument in the process of manipulation, neglecting the fulfillment of their main function – providing the society with complete and reliable information.

Secondly, the Russian media (by the time of the elections to the State Duma in 1999 and presidential elections in 2000) were in an extremely dependent position from their owners (founders), be it government bodies or financial and industrial groups. During the conduct of these election campaigns, this dependence of the media was particularly clear. (A sad example was the story with the newspaper 'Izvestia', which changed its position in the elections in 1999 because the owner, Vladimir Potanin had business interests that could not be implemented without the support of the Kremlin).

Thus, the domestic media did not try to give the population of the country an accurate and complete picture of what was happening, reflecting the events in such a way that it lacked the most important fragments of the Russian reality. The Russian mass media neglected, and, most likely, already did not have the opportunity to disseminate the diverse opinions, assessments and judgments with which the best representatives of the Russian society, interested in successful social and economic transformations, could turn to their fellow citizens.

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**Comparative analysis of objectives and trends in the electoral policy
of the European Union and the Russian Federation in relation to youth**

Abstract. The article reveals peculiarities of goals and trends of the Russian electoral policy in relation to youth in comparison with that of the European Union. The Russian electoral policy is state-centered and conservative and also relies on the state-based principle to protect the youth. It emphasizes the forms of political participation which provide consultative and training functions instead of lobbying political interests. The interactive mechanisms of liaising between the young voters, candidates and electoral commissions are not sufficiently revealed.

Keywords: electoral policy, goals, trends, comparative analysis, youth, Russia, the European Union

Introduction

The relevance of the topic chosen for the article is manifested by the fact that young people having the right to vote constitute a significant segment of the citizens of the Russian Federation. By the beginning of 2015, the Russian youth at the age of 18 to 30 years made up a significant part of the electorate – 27.264.1 people (24.4 % of eligible citizens of the Russian Federation)¹. Young people are an important participant in the electoral politics in the Russian Federation, since the succession of gener-

¹ The population of the Russian Federation by gender and age as of 1 January 2015, *Federal Service of State Statistics*. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140095700094 (date of retrieval: June 23, 2016); Information on the total number of voters, participants in the referendum of the Russian Federation as of 1 January 2016. *Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation*. Available at: <http://www.cikrf.ru/izbiratel/quantity/20160101.html> (date of retrieval: 21.05.2016).

ations is one of the factors of political change. However, the potential resources of youth influencing the results of election campaigns are largely devalued by the poor knowledge of young men and women about Russian politics, low interest in the outcome of the vote and unstable attitudes of electoral behavior. The electoral activity of citizens under the conditions of democracy is both a process of self-organization of politically active individuals and their associations and an object of targeted regulation by influential subjects of politics. These circumstances increase the relevance of the study of the electoral policy of the Russian Federation in relation to youth, the development of recommendations to improve its effectiveness in the context of the world experience.

The purpose of the article is to determine the specifics of the goals and trends of Russia's electoral policy towards young people in comparison with the similar policy of the European Union.

The electoral policy is interpreted as a purposeful, predominantly state influence on the factors, norms and agenda of election campaigns (see the works of G.V. Golosov², N.V. Grishin³). The electoral policy is aimed at ensuring the legitimate functioning of the political system by replicating the institutions and practices of election, control and succession of power. Such a policy includes, among its goals, the formation of positive motivation of citizens with regards to conventional forms of participation in the political life of society. This goal implies several agreed tasks: to ensure a certain level of voters' knowledge of politics sufficient for conscious participation in the elections; to teach to have a positive attitude towards the political system of the country, its authorities and legislation; to create positive attitudes and skills for the citizens, to participate in the elections, as well as the ability to make an informed political choice of their orientation through voting.

Modern specialists (E. Campbell, F. Converse and others⁴, J. Colomer⁵) believe that the trend associated with regulating the norms of electoral activity is always a result of the correlation of forces of competing political subjects, expression of their political interests and strategies. These subjects include legislative authorities that determine the normative rules for the conduct of elections, courts, election commissions, as well as parties and public organizations, media participating in election campaigns and making demands for changing the rules of their conduct. It is possible

² Golosov G.V. Cracks in the wall. The regime and the opposition during the Russian electoral cycle 2011–12. *Pro et Contra*. Moscow, 2012, vol. 16, no. 1–2, pp. 94–115.

³ Grishin N.V. State electoral policy: The subject area of the new scientific field. *The Caspian Region: Politics, Economy, Culture*. Astrakhan, 2014, no. 3 (40), pp. 71–82.

⁴ Campbell A., Converse Ph.E., Miller W.E., Stokes D.E. *The American Voter*. N.Y., 1980. 574 p.

⁵ *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. N.Y., 2004. 592 p.

to determine the degree of influence of a ‘player’ of politics on the development and outcome of electoral competition through applied research (by means of questionnaires and expert surveys, observation, focus groups, interviews) and not based on the legislative norms. Particularly, the difference between political and legal approaches is important when studying the regulation of electoral processes in Russia, where constitutionalism has weak traditions, whereas the political and ideological orientations of citizens are unstable⁶.

Studies have been created that explain the specificity of youth electoral politics in the world political science. These include the works of D. Buckingham⁷, S. Coleman and C. Rowe⁸, P. Dahlgren⁹, R. Kimberlee¹⁰, B.D. Loader¹¹, Smith and others¹². They focus on the forms of political youth’s self-organization, virtualization of political participation in the information revolution, reasons for absenteeism among young people and methods of positive involvement of young people in civic engagement. K. De Backer and M. Jans introduced the term the “triangle of youth participation”¹³. In their view, young people will actively interact with the political system provided the following three conditions are met: they must see the goal of the changes; feel that they can change the situation and to communicate with other people to solve their problems effectively.

Main part

Young people are defined as the socio-demographic group of a society aged 15 to 30 years with social status, positions and functions in the structure of the society, with the resources of political influence that determine their political interests, orientations and attitudes. Young people are heterogeneous, including various social-status, professional, territorial-settlement, age and gender groups. In the political as-

⁶ *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, 2006, pp. 168–169, 199.

⁷ Buckingham D. *The Making of Citizens: Young People, News and Politics*. London; N.Y., 2003. 235 p.

⁸ Coleman S., Rowe C. *Remixing Citizenship: Democracy and Young People’s Use of the Internet*. London, 2005. 16 p.

⁹ Dahlgren P. (ed.). *Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation*. London; N.Y., 2007. 262 p.

¹⁰ Kimberlee R. Why Don’t British Young People Vote at General Elections? *Journal of Youth Studies*. Berlin, 2002, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 85–98.

¹¹ Loader B.D. (ed.). *Young Citizens in the Digital Age: Political Engagement, Young People and New Media*. London, 2007. 218 p.

¹² Smith N., Lister R., Middleton S., Cox L. Young People as Real Citizens: Towards an Inclusionary Understanding of Citizenship. *Journal of Youth Studies*. Berlin, 2005, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 425–443.

¹³ De Backer K., Jans M. *Youth (-work) and Social Participation: Elements for a Practical Theory*. Brussels, 2002, pp. 7–9.

pect, segmentation of young people is also important in terms of the level and nature of education and the degree of religiosity. As young people, who do not take high-status political positions due to their age and short professional experience, they have high expectations, which can lead to deprivation whilst confrontation with the political reality. The political socialization of youth is not complete yet. The agents of political socialization of young people are diverse depending on their social status, professional, territorial-settlement, age and gender characteristics.

A useful innovation is the use of the term ‘political generation’. Per A.V. Selezneva’s definition, it is “a community of people of a certain age who have similar ideas about politics and power formed in the process of primary political socialization under the influence of the historical, political and socio-cultural context of its course ... Political generations belong to a symbolic category and mean a community of contemporaries whose life coincided with a special period of history...”¹⁴. The interval for the elimination of political generations (per K. Mannheim) is around 17–25 years¹⁵. However, considering the growing dynamics of the political processes, it is useful to single out some political cohorts within a certain generation with a time lag of 4–6 years, which will clearly reveal the conditions for socialization, orientation and setting the age categories of young people. The key feature of the classification of individuals as a political cohort is their involvement in the political activities, the types of personal and group participation in politics, their prevailing orientations and attitudes.

The authors of the British sociological survey conducted in 2013 by the specialists of ‘LSE Enterprise Limited’ reasonably believe that political awareness and education is the core of the interested participation of young people in politics¹⁶. We apply the ‘ladder of participation’ algorithm, which includes stages according to the criterion of growth in activity and independence of youth participation: from manipulation (for adults) and imitation of activity through volunteer work and organization of youth projects to political self-organization, participation in political discussions and decision-making¹⁷. The main forms of such political participation can be called youth councils, media organized by young people, political actions dedicated to a specific issue and work in youth political organizations. A more detailed classification pre-

¹⁴ Selezneva A.V. Socially active youth in Russia: Political values and preferences. *Power and Politics: The Institutional Challenges of the 21st Century. Political Science. Yearbook 2012*. Moscow, 2012, pp. 381–382.

¹⁵ Mannheim K. The Problem of Generations. *Mannheim K. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London, 1972, pp. 276–322.

¹⁶ EACEA 2010/03: *Youth Participation in Democratic Life*. Final Report. February 2013. London, 2013, p. 8.

¹⁷ Goździk-Ormel Ž. *Have Your Say!: Manual on the Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life*. Strasbourg, 2014, pp. 103–106.

supposes dividing into the following forms of electoral participation: information retrieval and political education: participation in the modeling of political processes, trainings in educational institutions and youth organizations; participation in debates on youth issues; creation of public opinion of youth through publications of traditional press, radio and television, participation in discussions on online forums, blogs; participation of young people in representative democracy: support of candidates or political parties, voting for them in elections; participation of young people in legislative (representative) bodies; increase of mass participation of young people in these structures, participation in youth associations, involved non-governmental organizations, volunteer activities¹⁸.

However, in the post-socialist countries, the level of political participation of young people is lower as compared to the territorial range of consolidated democracy, the motives for their participation are specific and relate to the national historical heritage, per F.M. Robertson¹⁹. Her opinion is confirmed by the empirical data relating to the countries of the South Caucasus, as cited by T. Turashvili²⁰.

The Russian studies of the electoral activity of young people provide similar material. The questionnaire survey conducted by the ROMIR Center in May 2016 (a sampling of 1,500 people aged 18–60 years) revealed a low level of willingness of Russian young people to participate in politics. Among the 18–24-year-old respondents, freedom as an opportunity to participate in the political life was indicated only by 6 %²¹. If 23 % of respondents of all ages consider voting a formal event, among the respondents aged 18–24, 31 % adhere to this opinion. The proportion of interviewed young people, who voted in concert with their family members, is 32 %²².

Another mass survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in May 2016 (a sampling of 1,500 people aged 18–30 years, 53 constituent entities of the Federation, where the error did not exceed 3.6 %). 48 % of respondents found that Russia was developing in the right direction, whereas 21 % indicated that it was developing the wrong direction. The potential for protest for young people was low: only 14 % recognized the desire to participate in a rally or some other opposition event,

¹⁸ EACEA 2010/03: *Youth Participation in Democratic Life. Final Report. February 2013*. London, 2013, p. 8.

¹⁹ Robertson F.M. *A Study of Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania. Thesis to be submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science*. London, 2009, pp. 221–224.

²⁰ Turashvili T. Youth participation in the electoral processes and the role of political elites. *Georgian Institute of Politics Report*. Tbilisi: Georgian Institute of Politics, 2016. September, pp. 2–6.

²¹ Feeling of freedom. The ROMIR project Russia. ‘10 Years Later’. Research Holding ROMIR. Available at: http://romir.ru/studies/804_1467666000/ (date of retrieval: 17.08.2016).

²² Civic duty is less and less fulfilled. Research Holding ROMIR. Available at: http://romir.ru/studies/822_1472677200/ (date of retrieval: 07.09.2016).

and only 4 % had already participated in such actions²³. The relatively high desire to participate in the elections and positive assessments of the state course were shown by younger cohorts of respondents (18–24 years old), and with age, absenteeism and opposition were increasing. A significant heterogeneity of political attitudes among young people with a low level of awareness is marked by M.M. Shul’ga in the areas of the North-Caucasian Federal District²⁴, whereas O.A. Koriakovtseva and O.A. Klimov state the same for the Yaroslavl region²⁵ and A.V. Shumilov investigating Chuvashia²⁶. The political inhomogeneity of the Russian youth is being confirmed, which makes it necessary to differentiate the state policies with regards to various cohorts and strata of young people.

The specificity of electoral policy in relation to youth is connected to the peculiarities of young people participating in the elections. This is marked by the increased role of ‘virtual’ forms of participation through their activity in social networks, blogs, on Internet forums; preference for ‘direct’ forms of action at the local level; interactivity of communication, rejection of the dictate of the older generations.

These features are considered, for example, in the ‘Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life’ (2003) adopted by the Congress of the Council of Europe and the Advisory Council on Youth. One of the many directions of the youth policy was the “policy of access to rights and legislation”²⁷. It includes the following areas: legal education of youth, support of youth organizations and initiatives, support of youth promotion in their demands to participate in the work of the central government and the local governments. The target audience of this policy to be applied is as follows: youth in general, their internal informal groups, youth organizations and associations, educational institutions, public authorities and local administrations.

²³ Political views and protest potential of youth. How do Russians assess actions of the authorities? *Public Opinion Foundation*. Available at: <http://fom.ru/Politika/13045> (date of retrieval: 02.11.2016)

²⁴ Shul’ga M.M. Social and political literacy as the basis of civic position of the student community in the South of Russia. *Personality. Society. State. The Problems of Development and Interaction. Collection of Articles, All-Russia scientific technical conference with intern. participation, 7–11 October 2016, Krasnodar, 2016*, pp. 309–316.

²⁵ Koriakovtseva O.A., Klimov O.A. Regional view on the problems of civic youth formation. *Socio-Political Transformation in Modern Russia: The Search for a Model of Sustainable Development*. Moscow, 2015, pp. 425–437.

²⁶ Shumilov A.V. State youth policy and modern youth in Russia: Search for innovative development. *Russia in the New Political Environment: Strategy and Methods of Development. Materials All-Russia Scientific Conf. RAPN*. Moscow, pp. 318–319.

²⁷ Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life. The Council of Europe. Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/1680719974> (date of retrieval: 03.01.2017).

The methods and practices for regulating the electoral participation, according to the Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life, are as follows²⁸:

- training young people for participation in politics, including civic educational programs in schools and higher education institutions, training teachers for civic education, exchange of experts' experience;
- informing young people about the policy and their rights, including information and consultation centers to support young people, special measures to help those from deprived and rural areas, without access to the Internet, as well as young people without any qualifications; delivering guaranteed standards of information aimed at supporting young people;
- support for youth participation through access to information and communication technologies;
- promotion of youth participation in mass media through creation of youth-orientated mass media, training of young activists in information activity;
- encouraging youth volunteer movements, including support for creation and financing, as well as in formational support for volunteer centers;
- support for youth projects and initiatives;
- promotion of youth organizations, including application of co-management methods and collaborative decision-making, together with the authorities; participation of the public through consultations;
- encouraging youth participation in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties.

Certain measures are proposed to regulate the electoral participation of young people based on these priorities. As an example, the British Social Attitudes Survey of 2013 suggests institutional measures to overcome the low level of youth participation in the elections: reduction in the voting age from 18 to 16 years, spreading electronic voting, introduction of special representation of young people (quotas) in the European, national, regional and local elections; election of Youth Advisory Councils (YAC). It offers support, information and consultation resources for e-voting and social media campaigns during the elections (interaction of young voters with candidates in social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, etc.), encouraging political debates in the educational system, developing electronic voting technologies and independent public control over campaigning²⁹.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ *EACEA 2010/03: Youth Participation in Democratic Life. Final Report. February 2013.* London, 2013, pp. 65–84.

Let us compare the strategies for managing the electoral activity of young people in the European Union and the Russian Federation. The most recent normative act at the federal level is the ‘Youth Electoral Concept’ adopted by the Central Election Commission of Russian Federation in 2014³⁰. The authors of the concept set a goal - formation of citizenship and patriotism amongst the Russian youth. The main task is to raise interest among young Russians towards the electoral system and the electoral process. The objectives of the concept are as follows: to improve the juridical culture of young voters; to ensure active and informed participation of young people in the election campaigns and referendums; to increase the level of confidence of young citizens in the electoral system, the institution of elections and referendums; to overcome political apathy, taking an active civic position; to inform on the activities of election commissions aimed at the implementation of citizens’ rights to elect and to be elected to the government bodies and local administrations. Achieving the goal will contribute to the solution of such priority tasks as “legal education of youth, elimination of legal nihilism among young people; increasing the level of civil responsibility, conscious and responsible social behavior; increasing the level of electoral activity in the youth environment through raising the status of the concept ‘duty of a citizen’”³¹.

The main directions for the implementation of the ‘Youth Electoral Concept’ of the Russian Federation include the following: education and training of future voters in secondary schools in the form of teaching subjects ‘Social Studies’, ‘Civic Studies’, ‘The Electoral Law and Electoral Process in the Russian Federation’; arrangement of business role-playing games to test the knowledge of the electoral law and the electoral process; conducting business games, festivals, quizzes, meetings of round-table meetings, excursions and open days in the election commissions, election of chairmen in student councils, etc.; delivering open lectures and workshops, free legal consultations on the issues of electoral law and the relevant process; events during the Young Voter Day; activities in the clubs of young voters, youth councils at election commissions and youth election committees. The activity of youth parliamentary institutions (youth parliaments, youth public chambers) is widely supported. The election commissions assist parties in the preparation of their young candidates, staff

³⁰ Youth Electoral Concept. Approved by Resolution of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on 12 March 2014, no. 221 / 1429-6. *The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation*. Available at: www.cikrf.ru/law/decreed_of_cec/2014/03/12/pril.doc (date of retrieval: 20.06.2016).

³¹ Youth Electoral Concept. Approved by Resolution of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on 12 March 2014 No. 221 / 1429-6. *The Central Election Commission of Russian Federation*. Available at: www.cikrf.ru/law/decreed_of_cec/2014/03/12/pril.doc (date of retrieval: 20.06.2016).

of election headquarters, members of election commissions, proxies and authorized representatives. The training of young observers and journalists covering the course of election campaigns is also provided³². The introduction of Internet resources and technologies foremost serves its training and information purposes.

The commission of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for Youth Affairs and Tourism (established in May 2010) and the State Duma Committee for Youth Affairs, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation are responsible for the development of youth policy in the structure of the legislative branch. At the federal executive level, the Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy of the Russian Federation is responsible for implementing the Strategy. It includes the following departments: The Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) and the Department for Youth Affairs and Public Relations. Undoubtedly, a significant part of the tasks in the youth policy is implemented in practice by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. However, in its structure, there is no unit yet that would coordinate the implementation of the youth policy in terms of political and educational programs.

Due to the federal structure of Russia and the variety of conditions, the youth policy in the Russian Federation is implemented at interrelated levels: national (state), macro-regional (federal districts) and regional (constituent entities of the Russian Federation). At the regional level, this activity is carried out by the body authorized to work with youth in the relevant constituent entity of the Russian Federation (the names can vary). A comparative analysis of the websites of the regional authorities of 61 constituent entities of the Russian Federation (2011) showed that the practice of creating ministries dealing with youth policy prevails (31 regions, including 29 combined ministries and two specialized ones); with 22 committees (equally – combined and specialized); 14 departments (mostly combined), four agencies (three specialized in youth affairs)³³. The regulation of regional youth policy is most often (85.5 %) conducted in the form of laws of the relevant constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

One of the problems is a low level of participation of Russian voters in elections, including large numbers of young people. Therefore, the election commissions are required to work with the electorate itself. The Federal Law No. 67-FZ ‘On basic warranty of electoral rights and citizens’ right to participate in any referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation’ dated 12 June 2002 set the goal of informational support for the elections and referendums – to promote “informed choice and expression of will for the citizens, as well as publicity of elections and referendums” (Art.

³² Ibidem.

³³ Kibanov A.Ia., Lovcheva M.V., Luk’ianova T.V. *Implementation of Youth Policy in the Russian Federation*. Moscow, 2013, pp. 20–22.

44)³⁴. The Law entrusted the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian federation with the obligation to ensure the implementation of activities related to “legal education of voters, professional training of commission members and other organizers of elections, referendums; publication of necessary printed products” (paragraph 9, Article 21; 10, clause 23)³⁵.

The Russian Federation is now creating conditions for increasing the electoral activity, in which the main emphasis would be on youth. The election commissions play an important role in the implementation of this policy. Per the Resolution of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation dated 28 February 2006, a set of measures has been implemented to increase the activity of voters and to train the organizers of elections and referenda. To attract young people, the election commissions cooperate with the constituent entities subjects and on the local level³⁶. At the meeting of the State Council of the Russian Federation held on 17 July 2009, a recommendation was made to establish the same age of election to representative bodies of local self-government (18 years) in all constituent entities of the Russian Federation³⁷.

Consequently, the participants of the electoral policy face the challenge of finding effective forms and methods for youth participation in elections, overcoming both absenteeism and risks of radicalism and extremism. The following effective strategies for increasing the electoral activity of young people can be chosen:

- stimulating interest in political information and participation in politics (education in clubs of young voters, during school and university lectures, in the Internet space and the media, holding academic competitions (Olympiads) and quizzes devoted to the knowledge of the electoral process, business games);
- development of skills to participate in the electoral process through a practical activity (discussion clubs, signature collection, volunteer movement, participation in election commissions and youth ‘wings’ of the parties, youth election commissions and youth parliaments, student self-government, etc.);
- patriotic and civic education, formation of a positive Russian civil identity, supporting the historical continuity (‘historical politics’);

³⁴ *Federal Law No. 367-FZ ‘On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Citizens’ Right to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation’ dated 12 June 2002*. Moscow, 2002.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ Resolution of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation dated 28 February 2006, no. 172 / 1107-4. *The Russian Newspaper*, 2006, March 2, no. 4008, p. 15.

³⁷ Kas’ianov V.V. *State Youth Policy in Russia: Experience, Problems, Prospects*. Krasnodar, 2010, p. 94.

- development of know-how and skills for the project activities, teamwork, leadership skills of young people.

The problem of youth participation in the electoral process cannot be solved only by holding events during the election campaign. Increasing the electoral activity of young people implies adopting a systematic approach towards political education, starting with the school age. Young people are included in the electoral process, showing activity in the information space, participating in the activities of youth organizations, various parties, consultative structures in cooperation with the government authorities and local administrations.

The main direction of increasing the electoral activity of young people would be to link the electoral process to the solution of important social and world outlook problems. If elections become a way of expressing young people's interests, they will be transparent to the youth community, and an effective youth electoral policy will be created.

Conclusion

Thus, the Russian electoral policy with regards to youth is state-centric, in which conscientious and constructive participation in the electoral process is, first, regarded as a duty of a citizen. The Russian policy is conservative; it proceeds from the principle of state protection of youth. It details the forms of political participation for young people associated with advisory and training functions instead of lobbying certain political group interests. The European concept characterizes the application of information-communicative and interactive technologies of youth participation in politics more deeply.

The main areas of the Russian Federation's electoral policy with regards to youth include the following: raising youth's awareness of the electoral system and the electoral process; supporting various forms of self-organization (clubs of young voters, youth councils at election commissions and youth election commissions, youth parliaments, youth public chambers); cooperation of election commissions with the political parties and the media; usage of Internet resources to inform the young people. The interactive mechanisms of liaising between young voters, candidates and election commissions are not sufficiently revealed.

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The problem of anti-Semitism in France's domestic and foreign policy in the years of François Hollande's presidency and the ways to solve it

Abstract. The article is devoted to the policy of French President François Hollande (2012–17) aimed at combating anti-Semitism. The author describes the extent of its implementation both domestically (in cooperation with the Jewish diaspora) and internationally (development of relations with Israel). The activity of Hollande's government is demonstrated over various periods of time, which allows seeing the changes in the policy and the status of the diaspora. A conclusion is made on the predominant influence of the economic factors and the factor of political heterogeneity of the government throughout the President's policy. Possible solutions for the problem of anti-Semitism in France are proposed.

Keywords: François Hollande, Manuel Valls, the State of Israel, the State of Palestine, Germany, the Jewish diaspora, anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, Aliyah

Introduction

The Jewish diaspora in France is the second largest after the American one – by 2012 it was made up of 480,000 people, which is essentially less than 1 % of the country's population¹. Like other national diasporas, the Jewish community has its

¹ Weiner R. France Virtual Jewish History Tour. *The Virtual Jewish World*, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/france-virtual-jewish-history-tour> (date of the access – 22.05.2017)

representatives in the legislative and executive authorities. It is difficult to determine the impact of the diaspora in the economy – the state does not provide any statistical data of this kind, systematized by nationality. However, given the zeal with which the Israeli government invites European Jewish experts (especially French) to the country, we can assume that their contribution to the research development should not be underestimated. The solidarity of the diaspora promotes cooperation with the citizens and authorities at the level of private organizations pursuing various goals, including the goal of reducing the level of interethnic tension.

Nevertheless, the Jews cannot eliminate the intolerant attitude towards themselves to the end. There are still stereotypes and conspiracy theories in the society, which depict the Jews as sinister manipulators-puppeteers who have undermined all spheres of public life. These views, existing previously, took a more aggressive form in the recent years, marked by the rule of Francois Hollande.

The aim of this work is to examine the problem of anti-Semitism in France's domestic and foreign policies during the presidency of François Hollande and to identify such aspects as the causes of the problem as well as the solutions proposed by the representatives of the diaspora.

Main part

The March terrorist attack in Toulouse, which took the lives of three schoolchildren and a teacher of the Jewish school, could not but affect the mood within the Jewish diaspora and the electoral situation in 2012. President Nicolas Sarkozy, who initiated the antiterrorist operation, made numerous arrests of suspects and strengthened the protection of Jewish institutions, received support on part of many Jews. The previous measures of the candidate played their role to improve the Franco-Israeli relations. But this did not mean that the representatives of the diaspora completely turned away from the socialists. One of the country's largest Jewish organizations, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF) (current head Roger Coukerman), organized a meeting with the party's national secretary, Pierre Moscovici, who convinced the Jews of their friendship with the Socialist candidate, Francois Hollande².

However, as it turned out, he made major bets on the electorate of other candidates from the Left Front and the Greens, who had not won and who participated in the anti-Zionist actions in the past (for example, called for boycotting Israeli goods).

² Silberman Z. French voters moving on from Toulouse, but Jews can't let it go. *JTA*. 19.04.2012. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2012/04/19/news-opinion/world/french-voters-moving-on-from-toulouse-but-jews-cant-let-it-go> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

Both candidates agreed on the need to maintain friendly relations with Israel. However, Hollande went further by declaring his support for the international recognition of the State of Palestine. In his opinion, Jerusalem should become the common capital of the two states³. This situation attracted supporters of the leftist parties, as well as French Muslims, representing the majority among immigrants.

Perhaps that is why Hollande was supported not only by the leftists and the greens, but also by many Muslims: of two million followers of Islam who took part in the vote, 93 % (1.8 million) cast their vote to favor the leader of the Socialist Party⁴. The opposite picture was observed in the Jewish diaspora, where most of the votes appealed to Sarkozy⁵.

The victory of the socialist caused a mixed reaction among representatives of the diaspora. Some were seriously worried about the possibility of strengthening the leftist parties and movements hostile to Israel. Several researchers drew attention to the fact that Hollande preferred not to link the development of Franco-Israeli relations with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict⁶. Yet, most of the Jews agreed that the Diaspora had nothing against the Hollande as president. Everything depends on his environment: if leading members of the Socialist Party take a position hostile to Israel, this will negatively affect the public opinion.

As we see, the problems of Hollande's policy in the matter under consideration already became apparent at the time of the election campaign. The new president sought to combine the incompatible (multiculturalism and secularization) and delimit the interrelated (the attitude of Israel and France, Israel and Palestine). These problems did not fail to prove themselves in the next four years of his presidency.

Nevertheless, immediately after taking up the new post, Hollande noted that he was interested in deepening the Franco-Israeli relations. Same as after any other presidential campaign, the French drew attention to the composition of the team of the newly-minted head of state. As it turned out, among the left there were enough citizens somehow connected with the diaspora. Yet, few of them put it for show, espe-

³ France's Hollande calls for shared Jerusalem, halt to settlement building. *JTA*. 18.11.2013. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2013/11/18/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/hollande-calls-for-shared-jerusalem-halt-to-settlement-building> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁴ Kern S. Muslim Voters Change Europe. *Gatestone Institute*. 17.05.2012. Available at: <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3064/muslim-voters-europe> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁵ MacDonald K. Muslims decide the French election. *Occidental Observer*. 19.05.2012. Available at: <http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2012/05/19/muslims-decide-the-french-election/> (date of the visit – 22.05.2017)

⁶ Gerstenfield M. Hollande's presidency: France, Israel and the Jews. *Arutz Sheva*. 19.05.2016. Available at: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/18897> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

cially those fighting for the rights of the Jews for this reason. The appointment of Manuel Valls as Minister of the Interior (then – Prime Minister) and Arlem Desire as Minister for European Affairs became significant for the Jews in this respect. A woman from Tel-Aviv (Daphna Poznanski-Benhamou) was elected as a deputy of the National Assembly representing interests of French citizens of the Mediterranean region. Earlier, she opposed the anti-Semitic projects and upon entering the post promised to help solving such problems⁷.

None the less, positive actions towards the diaspora within the country were not reflected in the foreign policy. In the autumn of 2012, the European Jewish groups actively advocated that the EU declared the Lebanese organization Hezbollah as terrorist. But the initiative could not be promoted, partly because of the position of France that opposed this measure. It is assumed that the French authorities went against the initiative to maintain favorable relations with Lebanon, the policy of which policy was under the influence of Hezbollah⁸.

However, a year later, France's position changed: President Hollande spoke of adding Hezbollah to the list of terrorist organizations. None the less, as French Foreign Minister L. Fabius noted, the main reason for the authorities' actions was the support provided by the organization to B. Assad regime in Syria⁹. This event demonstrates to us the true degree of arranging priorities for the French authorities in relations with Israel and its inevitable consideration in conjunction with other more important foreign policy issues.

As already mentioned above, the presidential struggle was won by Hollande largely due to the mass support of the Muslims. At the same time, he remained faithful to the ideals of secularism and promised to fight extremism. Therefore, in 2013 Hollande continued Sarkozy's policy of limiting government funding to organizations considered religious. But the application of this law affected the Jewish organizations not related to religious activities: kindergartens and sports associations¹⁰ ... In some

⁷ Lipshiz C. French expats elect Israeli woman to France's National Assembly. *JTA*. 18.06.2012. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2012/06/18/news-opinion/world/french-expats-elect-israeli-woman-to-frances-national-assembly> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁸ Lipshiz C. Europe's Jewish and pro-Israel groups pushing EU to classify Hezbollah a terrorist group. *JTA*. 24.08.2012. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2012/08/24/news-opinion/politics/europes-jewish-and-pro-israel-groups-pushing-eu-to-classify-hezbollah-a-terrorist-group> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁹ France wants Hezbollah added to terror blacklist. *The Local*. 23.05.2013. Available at: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20130523/france-want-hezbollah-added-to-terror-blacklist> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹⁰ Lipshiz C. In southern France, Jews paying a price for the government's effort to curb extremism. *JTA*. 02.01.2013. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2013/01/02/news-opinion/world/in->

cases, the authorities promised to continue to pay subsidies provided the organizations change their names to 'non-Jew'. The ban mainly touched upon Jewish and Muslim organizations. Per the representatives of the diaspora, the Jews and the institutions founded by them were victims of the state's struggle against Islamic extremism. Let us add that this situation also proved lack of competence of the local authorities that did not consider each case separately but preferred to deprive of funding all organizations directly or indirectly related to any confession.

However, in 2013 the diaspora in its main part assessed the policy of the president positively, in relation to the community. Since his appointment, hundreds of criminal cases have been brought against the citizens convicted of committing anti-Semitic acts. The Diaspora reacted positively to France's decision to reject a compromise agreement on Iran's nuclear program concluded by the world powers¹¹. On this issue, the French authorities shared the position of Israel, the leadership of which believed that the agreement did not provide protection for their state from a nuclear threat¹².

In the very same 2013, President Hollande visited Israel. He was accompanied by French businessmen – a clear indication that economic cooperation would be the main topic of discussion¹³. Indeed, Hollande was determined to conclude new agreements with Israel that would promote the development of bilateral trade relations. This desire distinguished him from the previous leaders of France on a deeper scale, the leaders who restricted the economic cooperation to maintain good relations with the Arab countries.

However, the president's position on the Jewish issue was not the only factor determining the attitude of the representatives of the diaspora to his policies. Let us recall that by the end of 2013, Hollande became the least popular president of France in the history of the Fifth Republic¹⁴. At the time, his unpopularity was largely deter-

southern-france-jews-paying-a-price-for-the-governments-effort-to-curb-extremism (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹¹ Lipshiz C. Deeply unpopular at home, French president embraced on Israel trip. *JTA*. 18.11.2013. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2013/11/18/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/in-israel-frances-unpopular-president-gets-praises-sung> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹² Rettman A. France blocks Iran nuclear deal. *EUobserver*. 11.11.2013. Available at: <https://euobserver.com/foreign/122056> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹³ Lipshiz C. Deeply unpopular at home, French president embraced on Israel trip. *JTA*. 18.11.2013. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2013/11/18/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/in-israel-frances-unpopular-president-gets-praises-sung> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹⁴ Llana S. Hollande's popularity hits new lows after a year at France's helm. *The Christian Science Monitor*. 06.05.2013. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0506/Hollande-s-popularity-hits-new-lows-after-a-year-at-France-s-helm> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

mined by the plight of the French economy. The crisis affected most of the French citizens. We can say that representatives of the Jewish diaspora suffered from economic crisis directly and indirectly. The connection between the economic crisis and the flourishing of radicalism, however indirect it may be, could still be traced. The growth of unemployment rate under Hollande primarily affected workers of foreign origin: among them, there was increase in the share of the unemployed by 1.4 % (at the same time, the same figure for the native French increased by 0.3 %) ¹⁵. By 2015, the contribution factor of foreign citizens in France secured the penultimate place in the EU (Belgium was last in the list).

The indicators among citizens under 30 demonstrate great polarization: young people with immigrant roots are twice as likely to be unemployed as their peers – the native French ¹⁶. Namely, young people represent the most favorable environment for radical ideas. Per the researchers, not finding a worthy place in the labor market (and in the French society on a whole), young immigrants (especially their descendants) turn to radical ideas – hyperbolized ideals about the culture of their ancestors.

The relatively quiet 2013 was followed by 2014 marked by the growth of anti-Semitic outrages. Studies conducted in 2014 showed that the number of anti-Semitic acts in France doubled from 423 to 851 in the previous year. In 2013, about 3,000 Jews left the country, and in 2014 – 7,000 returned to Israel. Since the foundation of the State of Israel, it was considered a record number ¹⁷. We shall not forget that the figures that were given above are relevant to the Jews who moved to Israel. It is difficult to say how many representatives of the diaspora emigrated to other countries. As an example, representatives of the diasporas of various major North American cities (Montreal, Miami and others) noticed the quantitative growth of French Jews in their communities ¹⁸.

A specific feature of anti-Semitic statements was that they were held under the guise of demonstrations against domestic political transformations or foreign policy events. The so-called Day of Wrath, to protest Francois Hollande's policy remem-

¹⁵ *OECD Data – official site*. Available at: <https://data.oecd.org/> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹⁶ Ethnic minorities in France: An edgy inquiry. *The Economist*. 4.04.2015. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647638-taboo-studying-immigrant-families-performance-fraying-edgy-inquiry> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹⁷ Hollande appeals to Jews, “France is your homeland”. *Deutsche Welle*. 27.01.2015. Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/hollande-appeals-to-jews-france-is-your-homeland/a-18217796> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

¹⁸ Liphshiz C. 5774: For Europe's Jews, a year of upheaval and uncertainty. *JTA*. 16.09.2014. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2014/09/16/news-opinion/world/5774-for-europes-jews-a-year-of-upheaval-and-uncertainty> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

bered by anti-Semitic slogans (“Jews, get out of France!”, etc.) can be referred to the first such type.

Actions of the second type were not limited to verbal threats. Most of them happened in July – the time of active military actions of Israel in the Gaza Strip. In the light of these events, supporters of Palestine in France (most of whom are Muslims) held several anti-Israeli demonstrations, some of which resulted in attacks on the Jews and their religious institutions. The most large-scale attack was on the Parisian synagogue ‘Don Isaac Abravanel’, which turned into siege of the temple. The police forces were not enough to disperse the protesters, with the back-up arriving only ten minutes later. At that time, members of the Jewish security services, radical movements (the Jewish Defense League, etc.) supported the law enforcement officers. This event convinced representatives of the Diaspora that Jewish movements should continue to promote the work of the police officers.

To avoid the recurrence of such an incident, the French authorities temporarily banned demonstrations and protests the policy of Israel. Despite the obviously negative attitude of the government to such outrages, they continued their foreign policy, in fact, fueling the anti-Israeli sentiments. In November 2014, Fabius said that France would continue its activities to promote the international recognition of the State of Palestine within the UN. If the actions of the authorities fail, France would individually recognize Palestine in 2016¹⁹.

The Diaspora leaders could not but respond to the growing tensions. At the beginning of the year R. Kukerman met the President and invited him to declare fight against racism and anti-Semitism “a matter of state importance”²⁰. “The matter of national importance” was a problem defined by the Prime Minister, which was covered free of charge by the state media.

It seems that the French authorities listened to the requests of representatives of the diaspora. The appointment of Manuel Valls as Prime Minister could be considered an unexpected response of the leadership to the growing crisis in the society. It was him where many representatives of the diaspora saw the defender of their interests. He was one of the first to speak out about anti-Zionism admitting that it was as a hidden form of anti-Semitism. As the Minister of the Interior, he actively supported campaigns against the intolerant attitude towards the Jews in the media. Shortly after

¹⁹ French FM: Recognition of ‘Palestine’ in 2016 if talks fail. *JTA*. 28.11.2014. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2014/11/28/news-opinion/world/french-fm-recognition-of-palestine-in-2016-if-talks-fail> (date access – 22.05.2017)

²⁰ Anti-racism should be national cause, French Jewish leader tells Hollande. *JTA*. 05.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2014/03/05/news-opinion/world/anti-racism-should-be-national-cause-french-jewish-leader-tells-hollande> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

assuming office, Valls responded to the requests from the diaspora: he declared the struggle against racism and anti-Semitism a matter of state importance in 2015.

But the reshuffling in the government was somewhat belated: in March 2014, the ruling party showed unsatisfactory results in the municipal elections. The Right-wing parties, on the contrary, took more favorable positions. Whilst the ‘National Front’ gained 26 % and took the lead in comparison to the other parties, the Socialist Party had to be content with 14 % and the third place (after the ‘Union for a Popular Movement’)²¹. The held public opinion polls showed that at the time being, in 2014, the ‘National Front’ enjoyed the support of approximately 12 % of the Jews²². This is a significant figure taking into account the fact that the party has anti-Semitic roots (same as the views of the founder of the party, Jean Marie Le Pen – father of the current leader of the party Marin Le Pen). The explanation of such a surge in party’s popularity among the Jews should be sought in its promises. Marin Le Pen has recently worked to get rid of the reputation of the anti-Semitic party for ‘National Front’ – for this, she had to expel her father from the party. At the same time, she remained impartial with regards to ethno-confessional issues: thus, Le Pen proposed extending the ban on wearing religious symbols and to replace it with the ban of Catholic and Jewish symbols²³. It is known that the ‘National Front’ takes a tough stance towards Islam. Therefore, several of the Diaspora representatives are ready to make such sacrifices if they can guarantee exercising control over the activities of the Muslims and the organizations they create.

2015 brought new hardship to the Jewish diaspora. The January terrorist attacks in the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the kosher store Hyper Kasher in Paris claimed the lives of four Jews. The response of the authorities followed immediately: 10,000 servicemen were sent to provide security for the facilities (including synagogues). About 4,700 fighters were put up for protection of 717 Jewish schools²⁴.

²¹ The National Front's victory: France in shock. *The Economist*. 26.05.2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/05/national-fronts-victory> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

²² Liphshiz C. Why Jews in France might give right-wing populist Francois Fillon a chance. *JTA*. 29.11.2016. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2016/11/29/news-opinion/world/why-jews-in-france-might-give-a-right-wing-populist-a-chance> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

²³ Le Pen says as French president she would ban all religious symbols, including kippot. *JTA*. 18.10.2016. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2016/10/18/news-opinion/world/le-pen-says-as-french-president-she-would-ban-all-religious-symbols-including-kippot> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

²⁴ Sokol S. France sends security forces to protect Jewish schools. *The Jerusalem Post*. 12.01.2015. Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/France-deploys-5000-security-forces-to-protect-Jewish-schools-throughout-France-387465> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

However, as representatives of the diaspora noted, the state support for the security of the community did not find a response in the mind of the citizenry. At that time, the march of the Republic dedicated to the memory of the dead caricaturists, gathered millions of people from all over the world, about 2,000 people visited the funeral service for the victims among the Jews. To be honest, among the few present one could see the first persons of the state – Hollande and Valls.

In the following months, each of the politicians repeatedly commented on the terrorist attacks. Whilst both politicians recognized the dangerous situation into which the Jews of France were pushed, they could not agree on the identification of perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. Valls called what was happening using the term ‘Islamophobia’, unambiguously speaking of the source of anti-Semitism. However, in Hollande’s view, what was done was the work of ‘fanatics’ whose confessional or ethnic affiliation did not matter²⁵. As we see, in the desire to remain politically correct, part of France’s policy (including the head of state) chose not to highlight the possible source of the problem. Nevertheless, many Jews appreciated the provided government support. However, as one representative of the diaspora rightly observed, “Governments change every few years, anti-Semitism remains in place”.²⁶

Lack of due attention to the tragedy revealed an important problem that is disturbing the community: preservation of unfriendly atmosphere in the society that is difficult to define with the help of statistics or to rectify with the help of patrols and financial injections. In view of the growing number of social elements showing unfriendly attitude towards the Jews and supported by radical representatives of the leftist parties, the Jews began to be forced out of the French identity. In some reports prepared by the diaspora, this situation was called ‘loneliness’ of the community²⁷.

The sense of alienation prompted many Jews to leave the country. In 2015, there were about 8,000 people, that is, the ‘record’ of 2014 was broken²⁸. The growth of these indicators alarmed the authorities. We dare assume that their anxiety partly had an economic motive.

²⁵ El-Mouchan A. The Twilight of French Jewry, the Twilight of France. *Mosaic*. 07.10.2015. Available at: <https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2015/10/the-twilight-of-french-jewry-the-twilight-of-france/> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

²⁶ Liphshiz C. Among some Jews, little faith in French authorities. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*. 11.01.2015. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2015/01/11/news-opinion/world/supermarket-vigil-paris> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

²⁷ Schimmel N. The “Loneliness” Of French Jews: French Responses To Anti Jewish Racism, Bigotry, And Discrimination. *Shifting Paradigms*. New York, 2016, pp. 88–99.

²⁸ Liebermann O. Au revoir and shalom: Jews leave France in record numbers. *CNN*. 25.01.2016. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/22/middleeast/france-israel-jews-immigration/> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

The Jews of France are on a special account with the government of Israel: unlike representatives of diasporas from other countries, French Jews tend to maintain closer ties with Israel and have property there. That is, they are more fit to life in that state and upon their arrival to the ‘homeland’ adapt easier.

Moving to Israel (Aliya) is not a cheap business. Usually re-emigration is provided to wealthy citizens. As a rule, they have higher education (per some estimates, about half of those who arrived have a degree)²⁹. Even elderly citizens, traditionally considered an additional burden for the social security administration, will not find themselves in such a situation: per the agreement on economic association, France undertakes to pay pension to the citizens who have made Aliyah³⁰. Per some sources, in 2010 around 10,000 millionaires left France, 20–25 % of whom were the Jews who emigrated to Israel³¹.

Another reason for the growth in indicators is the prevailing opinion among Diaspora representatives that Israel is safer. As one of the olims (a newly arrived Jew to Israel) argued, France has a negative attitude towards tougher security measures: in the Republic, the right to privacy is valued higher than security considerations. Therefore, French citizens react so sharply to the introduction of the emergency regime whilst the citizens of Israel consider it to be a norm³².

Whatever the reasons for the actions of the authorities, they continued their active pro-Jewish policy. It was included in the program for a period of three years, for which 100 million euros were allocated. The program consisted of 40 items, including an informational campaign against anti-Semitism and racism, tougher penalties for acts of racism and incitement to hatred.

The unprecedented terrorist attacks motivated the government to pursue a strict security policy. A state of emergency was introduced. It continues to this day: in December 2016, it was renewed for the fifth time³³. The state of emergency allows

²⁹ Zeff M. Aliya from France great for economy, Bar-Ilan profs say. *The Jerusalem Post*. 19.12.2016. Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Aliya-from-France-great-for-economy-Bar-Ilan-profs-say-475785> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Lowe J. Millionaires Flee France amid Religious Tensions. *Newsweek*. 31.03.2016. Available at: <http://www.newsweek.com/france-paris-jewish-israel-millionaires-442684> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³² Sales B. Paris attacks leave French-Israelis reeling, relieved to be out. *JTA*. 17.11.2015. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2015/11/17/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/french-israelis-reeling-from-attacks-relieved-to-be-out> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³³ France votes to extend state of emergency for fifth time. *France 24*. 14.12.2016. Available at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20161214-france-votes-extend-state-emergency-fifth-time> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

searches and citizens to be subjected to house arrest without compulsory judicial supervision.

Thousands of servicemen and law enforcement officers guarding objects of special importance were involved. Police officers in large cities and municipalities will be granted extended rights to carry and use weapons. The number of policemen will be increased by about 5,000, which will bring their number closer to the level of 2007³⁴.

The terrorist attacks forced the establishment to think about the danger of radicalization. Since December 2015, the authorities have initiated closure of approximately 20 religious buildings (out of 120 suspected by the government) preaching the fundamentalist form of Islam – Salafism³⁵.

A question arose about the disputable financing of places of worship. Minister Valls offered to enter a ban on foreign material support for the construction of mosques in France. An alternative to foreign funds, per Valls, should be the support provided by the Muslim community in France³⁶. Whilst the idea of ban on funding was rejected because of its impracticality, part of the Muslim community supported the proposal to establish a French fund for the construction of mosques.

As we can see, the prevention of radicalization is not going as smooth as wished it to be. And indeed, in the case of detained terrorists and their accomplices, the use of preventive measures is inappropriate. To resolve such problems, it was decided to open the so-called centers for de-radicalization (officially – Centers for Prevention, Integration, Citizenship). In the autumn of 2016, the first such institution was opened, with the authorities planning to set up 12 such centers in total, where the young people who had traveled to the Middle East would be introduced to the values of the Republic³⁷.

³⁴ Brundsen J. Hollande outlines tough new laws in response to attacks. *Financial Times*. 16.11.2015. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a05a5178-8c8b-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³⁵ Serhan Y. France's Disappearing Mosques. *The Atlantic*. 01.08.2016. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/french-mosques-islam/493919/> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³⁶ Serhan Y. France's Disappearing Mosques. *The Atlantic*. 01.08.2016. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/french-mosques-islam/493919/> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³⁷ McAuley J. France to open first of 12 'deradicalization' centers for at-risk youths. *The Washington Post*. 14.09.2016. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/france-to-open-first-of-12-deradicalization-centers-for-at-risk-youths/2016/09/14/d596d7fe-7a78-11e6-8064-c1ddc8a724bb_story.html?utm_term=.c11db53164bd (date of access – 22.05.2017)

The authorities intend to fight radicalization in prisons: now, measures have been taken to isolate the radical prisoners. The government drew attention to the shortcomings of the intelligence system and began to rectify them. First, intelligence services will increase their numbers (2,680 people, as well as around 113 infiltrators in prisons³⁸). Secondly, funds will be allocated for the purchase of more sophisticated equipment. Thirdly, the governments of Belgium and France stated that they would continue working to improve the quality of information exchange on potential terrorists.

No matter how comprehensive the program is, it will only work if the local authorities assist it. It has hardly reached many small towns and settlements. Regularly the rabbis of Marseilles, the city with significant Jewish diaspora, call on Jews to temporarily give up wearing bale to avoid attacks. In some localities, mayors honored the Palestinians convicted for terrorist attacks. The history of granting honorary citizenship to the Palestinian terrorist Marvan Barghouti is known from Aubervilliers, a commune in the suburbs, Council of Paris³⁹. Although granting honorable citizenship, recognized as excess powers of the municipal authorities, was annulled by court, it is a good indicator of the moods prevailing at the local level.

It should be noted that such political measures were usually taken by representatives of the leftist parties, most often the Communists. However, representatives of the socialists were also 'noted' in carrying out a biased policy. Thus, in 2016, the authorities of Bondy, a commune in the north of Paris, run by the mayor-socialist, proposed to boycott Israeli products⁴⁰. Even though previous measures of this kind were banned in other settlements, the council of Bondy opposed them, pointing out that the acceptance of products depending on the country of manufacture is a matter of civil law.

It is difficult to promote the fight against anti-Semitism in the country, where the authorities take measures in the foreign policy that are considered hostile by the lea-

³⁸ McPartland B. What has France actually done to fight terrorism? *The Local*. 19.07.2016. Available at: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20160719/what-has-france-done-to-fight-terrorism> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

³⁹ Flatow S. Paris attacks show France's appeasement of Palestinians and Islamists failed. *JNS*. 07.01.2015. Available at: <http://www.jns.org/latest-articles/2015/1/7/paris-attack-shows-frances-appeasement-of-palestinians-and-islamists-failed#.WSL5q-vyiUk=> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁴⁰ Municipality near Paris declares boycott of Israeli settlement goods. *JTA*. 26.06.2016. available at: <http://www.jta.org/2016/06/27/news-opinion/world/municipality-near-paris-passes-motion-declaring-boycott-of-israeli-settlement-goods> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

dership of Israel and the Jews⁴¹. In April 2015, CRIF sent a letter to Fabius. In this, the leadership of the organization warned the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the foreign policy pursued by France was damaging the friendly relations between the state and Israel. These were the actions of the French representatives in the UN Security Council, where France advocated imposition of a time limit in the negotiations between Israel and Palestine. France's actions in UNESCO were admitted to be anti-Israel in the letter with regards to recognizing part of the historical monuments (for example, the Cave of the Patriarchs and Rachel's Tomb) to be predominantly Muslim and Palestinian cultural heritage, despite their significance for the Jews. The hostile attitude towards Israel, as it was put in the letter, leads to the growth of anti-Zionism, and along with it to anti-Semitism.

It can be assumed that the taken measures were designed for the 'domestic consumer'. The first years of the presidency were marked by certain measures in the economy, which (due to the strong degree of its integration into the European one) Hollande had to defend on the international arena. It can be assumed that the first steps of the head of state related to the interethnic relations were in concert with the requirements of the economic plan.

To convince other states of the 'correctness' of France's political course, the president had to 'play the audience', trying on the old image of 'political' leader of Europe. Hence – the activity with regards to foreign policy unusual for the 'normal' president Hollande and appeal to his (in fact insignificant) authority.

To demonstrate authority, Hollande chose the Middle East, in the past – the zone of French influence, a region that was once partially colonized by it. In addition to the desire of France to take advantage of the historical ties, the US factor acted as levers of influence to favor the Middle East. President Obama tried to influence the policy in the region personally, but he failed, and the president had to abandon this direction. Carrying out an active policy where it failed the States, France would undoubtedly raise its international authority.

In this desire to demonstrate importance on the international arena lies another reason why in 2015 there was a record number of Jewish immigrants. It was at this time that refugees from the Middle East began to approach the borders of Europe. Germany decided to take the first step and announced opening of its borders⁴².

⁴¹ French Jews call out FM on policies seen as endangering France-Israel ties. *JTA*. 02.06.2015. available at: <http://www.jta.org/2015/06/02/news-opinion/world/french-jews-warn-fm-on-policies-seen-as-endangering-france-israel-ties> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁴² Lichfield J. Germany opens its gates: Berlin says all Syrian asylum-seekers are welcome to remain, as Britain is urged to make a 'similar statement'. *Independent*. 24.08.2015. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

France, not wishing to stay away from the large-scale foreign policy projects, put forward a similar proposition. In these measures, one can discern the president's desire to satisfy the demands of supporters for the party and other representatives of the left movement, who lacked support to the head of the state.

However, the problem of the influx of refugees brought new conflicts to the already fragmented society. Coming from the Islamic countries of the Middle East, some refugees were hostile to the representatives of the diaspora. During the attacks, the refugees did not participate for the most part, however, their presence contributed to the hostile atmosphere prevailing in the society and strengthened the sense of alienation among the Jews. Therefore, by the end of 2015, the heads of the state have diminished their ardor. 2016 was characterized by further distancing of the tandem from the refugee problem.

As is known, politicians prepare ahead of the elections. Conducting such a policy towards Israel can also be the desire of Hollande and his team to win over other leftist parties and movements to take advantage of their support in the upcoming presidential elections. Flirting with the right forces headed by the main European partner – Germany led to the formation of a new team consisting of more moderate politicians, which was not liked by the representatives of some leftist parties and movements. The leftists have unequivocally assessed the tightening of the migration policy – the result of the radicalization of some citizens and the increase in the number of terrorist attacks in France. Now, on the eve of the election, Hollande chose the most numerous and influential from several groups of the electorate and began to take measures to attract it to his party's side.

The confirmation of this point of view can be seen in the 'Peace Conference' held in France in 2016. Representatives of world powers attended it, but Israel and Palestine refused to participate. The outcome of the conference was a statement in which the states called upon the parties concerned to start negotiations⁴³. Israel refused to participate in the conference due to the fact that the event did not involve direct negotiations between the parties. The Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry Dori Gold compared the peace conference with the Sykes-Picot agreement – an agreement concluded in 1916 between the world powers on the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East⁴⁴. This comparison clearly demonstrates the attitude of the Israeli authorities towards the excessive involvement of the world powers in this regional conflict.

⁴³ Paris peace summit issues statement less harsh than Israel feared. *JTA*. 03.06.2016. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2016/06/03/default/netanyahu-asked-kerry-to-soften-tone-of-paris-peace-summit-statement> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

No matter how difficult the situation inside or outside of France might be, 2016 was marked by decrease in the number of Jews who moved to Israel: whilst in 2015, about 8,000 Jews left France, in 2016 the figure was about 4,000⁴⁵. The calculations have been made, per which this number would drop to 2,000 in 2017⁴⁶. The researchers find few explanations to this phenomenon. First, many representatives of the diaspora were encouraged by the changes in the sphere of security control in France. Whether they were effective or not is another question; the main thing in this situation was that the government of Hollande symbolically moved to decisive measures and demonstrated readiness to pursue a tough policy. Secondly, the situation in Israel is not as favorable as the emigrants would like it, especially in the economic sphere. Researchers advise the Israeli government to pay attention to the sphere of employment. Many young olim trivially cannot find a job in the new place. Their friends and acquaintances who remained in France but continue to maintain close contact with them, see how hard it is for the newcomers to get a job, and this affects negatively their motivation to leave the country in search of a better life. Thirdly, by 2016, the Government of Hollande withdrew from the policy of ‘open doors’ adopted under the influence of Germany. Limiting the reception of refugees contributed to reducing the level of tension in the society.

In such cases, when the hands of the state do not reach all corners of France, the representatives of the diaspora take the initiative themselves. The Jewish societies can be conditionally divided into two types: those who work in the sphere of culture, and those whose aim is to ensure the security of representatives of the diaspora. As an example, the Society of Jewish-Muslim Friendship (AJMF), a private organization engaged in establishing understanding between the representatives of the two faiths, can be referred to the first type⁴⁷.

One of the organizations that can be attributed to the second group, the Jewish Community Security Service (SPCJ), collects information on anti-Semitic acts and prepares reports on their basis. Annual reports of the organization are considered by the Ministry of the Interior, which helps the state authorities plan measures to combat this form of discrimination⁴⁸. The French authorities also aid SPCJ: the government agencies and the organization’s management hold regular consultations through

⁴⁵ Zeff M. Op. cit.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *Amitié judéo-musulmane de France – official website*. Available at: http://www.ajmfparis1.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1348&Itemid=737 (date of access – 22.05.2017)

⁴⁸ Liphshiz C. Mali incursion raises risk to French Jews, community says. *JTA*. 18.01.2013. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2013/01/18/news-opinion/world/mali-incursion-raises-risk-to-french-jews-community-says> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

which SPCJ determines at what level it is necessary to support protection of the Jewish institutions. The organization does not share information about its structures and the budget. Per the president of CRIF, the organization has a “wide network of loyal volunteers”⁴⁹. It is known that SPCJ promotes protection of institutions that are related to the diaspora. The organization also works to alert the Jewish communities to the security rules after the terrorist attacks. SPCJ, like many other organizations, operates under the ‘umbrella’ of CRIF, which, as we already established, is used as a voice in communicating with the government.

Conclusion

Upon looking closer upon the events that took place during the years of Hollande’s presidency, we can understand that the socialist government and the Jewish community had a difficult relationship. The sprouting of problems that arose later could be noticed during the election campaign of 2012, when Hollande, in his desire to win the support of different political forces, simultaneously took a compromise position on many issues, instead of outlining a holistic strategy.

The first two years of the presidency were relatively safe. The first signs of incompatibility of some of Hollande’s election were revealed. Several Jewish institutions suffered as a result of the state’s offensive strategy with regards to subsidizing religious organizations. Improving relations with Israel went hand in hand with reluctance to spoil the relations with the Arab countries, pursuing an openly hostile policy towards the Jews and their state.

Since 2014, the French leadership has begun to experience difficulties in pursuing the chosen political course. The complications were experienced for several reasons. First, the relations between Israel and Palestine deteriorated. As is often the case, the conflict was ‘exported’ to the territory of France, which resulted in significant increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts. Secondly, the social and economic situation in France has reached the limit at which the authorities began to lose support of the population rapidly. To restore the lost popularity and at the same time to earn trust of the main European partner – Germany – France decided to step up in its foreign policy. One of the priorities was the Middle East. Increased attention to this region contributed to further growth of tension within the country. Thirdly, the gradual deterioration of the situation in the economy affected radicalization of part of the population. Add to this the negative impact of the crisis that brought back to life the centrifugal tendencies hidden in the French society.

⁴⁹ Liphshiz C. In Europe, big gaps among security precautions at Jewish institutions. *JTA*. 19.11.2012. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2012/11/19/news-opinion/world/in-europe-big-gaps-among-security-precautions-at-jewish-institutions> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

These negative factors migrated into 2015. Then, the intensification of the foreign policy resulted in increased support for Palestine and further strengthening the position of the duo Merkolland. The return to promise of support for international recognition of Palestine can be explained by the desire of Hollande to gather the support of representatives of the left movement, who were not satisfied with the economic policy of the president and the ‘correction’ of his government with the entry of Valls as prime minister. It can be assumed that following Merkel’s political course was a consequence of the ambition of Hollande’s team to improve the economic situation in the country by improving relations with the main partner in Europe. Thus, the president of France was trapped: once again the head of state had to win trust of the leftist parties and restore the economy of the country, but the latter could be done in close cooperation with Germany, which was not evaluated positively by the left.

In any event, both tendencies negatively affected the situation with the Jewish diaspora in the society. The government’s pro-Palestinian measures led to increased tensions both within the country (between the government and the Jewish diaspora) and abroad (between Israel and France). The result of Merkel’s course was opening the borders of the country for refugees, whose presence created an additional burden on the security and exacerbated tensions between the Muslim community and the Jewish diaspora in 2015. It was marked by major terrorist attacks, which, among other things, were an additional incentive for the Jews to leave France to move to more secure, from their point of view, Israel. The events of this year allowed Hollande to look at what was happening from a different perspective. The disappointment with Germany followed its policy of ‘open doors’. By the end of the year, the French president was seriously engaged in reforming the security system. In response to the unprecedented attacks, unprecedentedly harsh measures were taken. At the same time, the struggle against racism and anti-Semitism was intensified, and considerable funds were spent on it.

In 2016, the president was primarily concerned with security issues. If earlier for the reasons of political correctness, Hollande had to define the nature of the terrorist threat quite vaguely, now the president acknowledged that terrorism had Islamic roots. In 2016, the level of terrorist threat in France was somewhat reduced. By the same time, representatives of the Diaspora in the country realized that the economic situation in Israel was not as prosperous as they would like to think. Therefore, the number of the Jews leaving France has declined. However, the team of Hollande had to hold a peaceful conference on the Palestinian question – as it seems to us, by inertia: the authorities from 2014 promised to hold the said event. Moreover, as it turned

out, the statement prepared on the results of the conference was more lenient than was supposed by the Israeli authorities⁵⁰.

The problem is that we cannot say for sure how much the changes in the political course of Hollande were influenced by the Jewish diaspora. As we can see, by the end of his presidential term, politics acquired the forms and content that were most beneficial to its representatives.

The uncertainty of the political course of Hollande is not only restricted to the Jewish issue: it was noticed both in the security and in social spheres. We can identify several reasons for this. First, the personality of the president himself invites for this – since the very beginning he has established himself as a ‘normal’ president, a ‘technocrat’, who is called upon to deal with standard issues but lacks the political will to cope with force majeure situations. Hence – the indecisiveness and the desire to follow their prospective partners (Germany). Secondly, the electorate, who brought Hollande victory in the presidential election, was a shaky platform. The French Left lost its strength and unity at any hint of a crisis. Moreover, the loss of popular support caused discontent in the government ranks.

As we found out, the power in France is not so centralized to ensure implementation of the ‘top’ decisions: some of them were simply ‘extinguished’ by the local authorities. Therefore, to some extent it is possible to blame the French government in the growth of anti-Semitism, consisting of representatives from various left forces. It was never able to achieve unity in consideration of the Jewish question and cope with the most radical elements in its ranks. Hollande began to follow his supporters and not vice versa. However, the fruitful influence of the Jewish diaspora on the policy of Hollande is noticeable. First, it manifested itself in the ability of the diaspora to draw attention of the public and authorities to their problems. And in modern politics, the ability to attract attention of the authorities to the problems of any social group is an important factor.

The Jewish diaspora carries out activities along several lines. They actively cooperate with the authorities through various organizations, events organized by them, as well as through politicians who have direct or indirect relation to the diaspora. When the state control is not enough to settle the situation locally, or when the problem requires a milder, more private approach, representatives of the diaspora take the initiative themselves. In addition to cultural influence, they provide various kinds of services to ensure protection of Jews at the local level.

⁵⁰ aris peace summit issues statement less harsh than Israel feared. *JTA*. 03.06.2016. Available at: <http://www.jta.org/2016/06/03/default/netanyahu-asked-kerry-to-soften-tone-of-paris-peace-summit-statement> (date of access – 22.05.2017)

A possible way out of this situation presupposes a comprehensive approach to the problem under consideration. First, it is necessary to solve the socio-economic issues that often push citizens to the path of intolerance and radicalism. Second, the establishment needs to make efforts to maintain integrity in the power circles. Third, France should finally find its own voice in the foreign policy, and an independent, non-contradictory course. And fourth, the authorities, regardless of their political affiliation, should continue to maintain close ties with the Jewish organizations.

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An attempt to analyze the development of capitalism in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries from the perspective of the revolutionary period

Annotation. The problem of capitalism development in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is analyzed from the point of concept of the revolutionary period. Revolutions in one country constitute a revolutionary period (hereinafter referred to as RP), which is an integral system having its own laws. Specific revolutions should be treated as manifestation of revolutionary processes within RP. Depending on RP's timing and nature, there are three main groups of countries, with Russia being in the third group. Despite development of separate heavy industries and intensive railway construction, Russia was dramatically behind the leading Western countries in terms of quality. In Russia, capitalism existed not as a system, but as a way of life, and did not have any potential of development. This should be kept in mind whilst assessing the current state of the 'capitalist' system in Russia and the prospects for its further development.

Keywords: capitalism in Tsarist Russia, monopolies in Russia, the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, geopolitical space, peasant village community in Russia, Stolypin reforms

Introduction

Even though the study of the nature of capitalism in Tsarist Russia – or the Russian Empire – in the late 19th and early 20th century attracted enough attention among the Soviet historians in the 1950s and 1970s, this question is still problematic. Most importantly, the problem mentioned above and the assessment of the current state of 'capitalist' Russian economy and possible ways of its further development are closely related. Here, we keep in mind the systematic nature of the process of historical development. Each of its stages would be a system deployed in time. The same applies to the epoch of revolutions of early modern period.

Revolutions (and subsequent counter-revolutions) in one country constitute a revolutionary period (RP), which is an integral system having its own laws. Specific

revolutions should be treated as manifestation of revolutionary processes within RP. RP ends when the society creates conditions that exclude the possibility of any revolutionary events¹.

Depending on RP's timing and nature, there are three main groups of countries: countries of the first generation (CFG), countries of the second generation (CSG), and countries of the third generation (CTG). CFG include England, the USA, France, i.e. the countries where RP began first. In England, RP ended with the Glorious Revolution, also called the Revolution of 1688; in France – with the establishment of the French Third Republic; in the USA – with the end of the civil war. In CSG, which include most European countries and Japan, RP began in the middle of the 19th century and ended after World War II. For CTG, such as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, and Latin American countries, RP was limited to the framework of the 20th century. In Arab countries, RP began only after World War II and will end no earlier than the mid-21st century. The Arab Spring should be seen here as manifestation of revolutionary processes.

In RP, all political regimes to some extent have features of dictatorship. Any attempts to liberalize power during RP generally led to the emergence of classical dictatorships. The obviously democratic Weimar Republic, which was in a state of permanent crisis during the entire period of its existence, led to the National-Socialism dictatorship. A similar situation was in Russia after the February Revolution and in Spain in the 1930s.

In CFG, the industrial revolutions had independent nature. For CSG, they were mostly due to the enlargement of the European Economic Space, already established by the mid-20th century. In CTG, there were no industrial revolutions; there was industrialization under the direct leadership of the state. This was typical, to a greater or lesser extent, for all CTG.

In CTG, capitalism did not exist as a system, there was a capitalist way of life, which, compared to any system, does not have any potential of development. The absence of a capitalist system predetermined weakness of the bourgeoisie in CTG, not only in the economic but also in the political sphere. The bourgeoisie could not organize its dictatorship during the revolution and could not offer any slogans that would have attracted people.

CTG showed strong financial dependence on more developed CFG and CSG. Whereby, providing loans was usually filled with political content. Internal weakness

¹ Kondorsky B.M. Use of the concept of a revolutionary period for the analysis of the most important political phenomena and events. *Political Science for the Challenges of Modern Politics*. Moscow, 2015, pp. 289–290.

Kondorsky B.M. Revolutionary period in China. *Society and the State in China*. V. XLV. Part 1. Moscow, 2015, pp. 134–150.

leading to international weakness, tied the politics of CTG to other countries' interests.

Main part

The nature of the study of the development of capitalism in Tsarist Russia as conducted by Soviet historians in the 1950s and 1970s was very ambiguous. It goes without saying that all the publications, to some extent, were based on the works of Vladimir Lenin, especially considering the fact that starting since early 20th century and until 1917, he paid great attention to this issue. However, it should be noted that, being a brilliant politician², Lenin, in our opinion, turned out to be a mediocre economist. It is also important to remember that, per the views of Marx and Engels, the socialist revolution was possible only in countries with developed capitalism and existing working class. Therefore, Lenin, to substantiate the possibility of a socialist revolution in Russia, needed to consider capitalism in the country through the 'prism' of its sufficiently 'high level of development'.

Analyzing the development of capitalism, we usually assume that prior to the reforms of 1861, feudalism, or at least its vestiges, existed in Russia and had decisive influence on the development of the economy; but then capitalism began to develop rapidly. "Feudalism, which remained the dominant system in Russia for many centuries, has given way to capitalism³". The time after completion of all the reforms became a turning point in the process of consolidation of capitalism⁴. Russia was recognized as a country with "an average level of development of capitalism⁵".

Foreign specialists paid special attention to the high rates of industrial development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries⁶. However, Russia mostly remained an agrarian country. Industrialization was incomplete. Russian capitalism has just begun to rise⁷. Per the level of national income per capita, Russia remained one of the poorest countries in Europe⁸.

It was necessary to find the place of Russia among other countries in terms of the developmental level of capitalism. One can recall the idea of K.N. Tarnovsky regarding the countries of early and late capitalism, which brought Russia closer to semi-colonial and colonial countries, such as India, with no free competition in the latter

² Payne R. *The Life and Death of Lenin*. Moscow, 2002, p. 9.

³ Ryndziunskiy P.G. *The Establishment of Capitalism in Russia*. Moscow, 1978, p. 284.

⁴ Druzhinin N.M. *The Russian Village at the Turning Point*. Moscow, 1978. p. 188.

⁵ Mints I.I. *The History of the Great October*. V. 1. Moscow, 1967, p. 41.

⁶ Goldsmith R.W. The economic growth of tsarist Russia in 1860–1913. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1961, no. 3, p. 441–475.

⁷ Blackwell W.L. *The Beginning of Russian industrializations 1800–1860*. N.Y., 1968, p. 198.

⁸ Falkus M.E. *The industrialization of Russia, 1700–1914*. Leningrad, 1972, p. 12.

case⁹. I.F. Gindin identified three types of capitalist relations: Western European, Central European and Russian-Japanese¹⁰.

The concept of I.I. Dolutskiy regarding three echelons of countries, depending on the nature of the onset and development of capitalism, is also exceptionally interesting. It almost completely coincides with our concept of three main groups of countries (CFG, CSG and CTG). The only exception is that Russia belongs to the second echelon. Hence, the author formulates several conclusions concerning Russia that we do not quite agree with. This concerns the fact that I.I. Dolutskiy denied the concept of multistructurality of the Russian economy, weak development of capitalist relations in the agrarian sector and the dependent nature of Russian capitalism¹¹.

The situation in the agrarian sphere was paid the main attention to. The general nature of the agrarian formation was determined by capitalism prevailing in the country¹². Despite existence of feudal remnants, the landowner economy was believed to be in the state of irreversible capitalist evolution. In the internal system of landowner economy in European Russia, the capitalist industrial management was occupying a dominant position¹³.

It should be also noted that the emphasis has been put on the study of involvement of peasants in the commodity-money relations¹⁴. It was considered that the trend of formation of the single commodity market indicates the establishment of a capitalist way of production in the country back in the 1880s¹⁵. The growth of commodity production of grain in the 1880s–1890s meant restructuring of the agrarian sector according to the capitalist principles¹⁶.

⁹ Tarnovsky K.N. The problem of the interaction of socio-economic structures of imperialist Russia at the present stage of the Soviet historical science development. *Questions of the History of Capitalist Russia*. Sverdlovsk, 1972, p. 27.

¹⁰ Gindin I.F. The concept of capitalist industrialization in Theodor von Laue's works. *Questions of History*, 1971, no 4, pp. 204–232.

¹¹ Dolutskiy I.I. Russia in the early 20th century: Typical and distinctive. *Reforms of the Second Half of the 17th – 20th Century: Preparation, Conduct and Results*. Moscow, 1989, pp. 83–107.

¹² Anfimov A.M. *The Economic Situation and the Class Struggle of the Peasants in European Russia. 1881–1904*. Moscow, 1984, p. 3.

¹³ Koval'chenko I.D., Selunskaya N.B., Litvakov B.M. *Social and Economic System of the Landowner Economy of European Russia in the Era of Capitalism*. Moscow, 1982, pp. 223–224.

¹⁴ Koval'chenko I.D. On the bourgeois character of the peasant economy of European Russia in the late 19th – early 20th century. *History of the USSR*, 1983, no. 5, p. 73.

¹⁵ Koval'chenko I.D., Milov L.V. *The National Agricultural Market. The 18th – Early 20th century*. Moscow, 1974.

¹⁶ Nifontov A.S. *Grain Production in Russia in the Second Half of the 19th Century*. Moscow, 1974.

The role of the state in the development of capitalism in Russia is another important issue in this matter. Per I.F. Gindin, Russian industrial capitalism was largely imposed in the country within a short historical period without any restructuring of the lower chains in the economic structure, necessary for it¹⁷. Other researchers in their turn believed that the Tsarist bureaucracy restrained the development of capitalism¹⁸. However, one thing does not necessarily exclude the other.

Foreign historians also paid a lot of attention to the role of the state in the industrial development of Russia. They believed that the development of Russian industry was the result of industrialization, led by the Tsarist government and Sergei Witte. Moreover, per A. Gershenkron¹⁹, industrialization took place at the expense of funds ‘pumped out’ from the rural areas. Per A. Kahan, the state should have played a less active role and should have relied on private initiative and free market mechanisms²⁰. However, J. McKay believed that industrialization led by the state was mainly limited to the railway construction²¹.

The State Bank of the Russian Empire, which was completely under the government control, played an exceptional role in the financial sphere. Acting as a stabilizing factor, it saved banks that were on the verge of bankruptcy and supported the mostly patronized industrial enterprises. At the close of the 19th century, the State Bank of the Russian Empire increased the number of industrial credits, but this mainly concerned trade and especially grain commerce²². Commercial banks that began to appear at the time did the same²³.

The 1899–1903 crisis served as a starting point for the process of merging between the banks and the industry. Significant volumes of shares of the enterprises weakened by the crisis turned out to be in their joint portfolio²⁴. Monopolistic associations appeared in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, relying on the power of

¹⁷ Gindin I.F. V.I. Lenin on the socio-economic structure and political system of capitalist Russia *V.I. Lenin on the Social Structure and Political System of Capitalist Russia*. Moscow, 1970, p. 244.

¹⁸ Ryndziunskiy P.G. The Establishment of Capitalism in Russia: 1850s – 1880s. Moscow, 1978, p. 286; Shepelev L.E. *Tsarism and Bourgeoisie in the Second Half of the 19th Century*. Leningrad, 1981, p. 24.

¹⁹ Gershenkron A. *Economic Backwardness in historical perspective*. Cambridge, 1962, p. 132.

²⁰ Kahan A. Government policies and industrialization of Russia. *The Journal of Economic History*, 1967, vol. 37, pp. 460–477.

²¹ McKay J. *Pioneers for profit. Foreign entrepreneurship and Russian industrialization*. Chicago, Leningrad, 1970, p. 9.

²² Bovykin V. I. *Russia on the Eve of the Great Achievements*. Moscow, 1988, p. 82.

²³ Shepelev L.E. *Joint Stock Companies in Russia*. Leningrad, 1973.

²⁴ Bovykin V.I. *Russia on the Eve of the Great Achievements*. Moscow, 1988, p. 82.

banks. They established absolute dominance in the economy of the country, taking over the whole branches of Russian industry²⁵. Monopolies concentrated over 80 % of production of certain products in their hands (syndicates ‘Prodamet’, ‘Med’, ‘Prodvagon’)²⁶.

Another equally important subject of discussion was the question of multistructurality in the Russian economy²⁷. Normally, this ‘multistructure’ was viewed as the result of specificity and contradictory nature of Russian capitalism²⁸. This resulted in raising a question regarding the ‘Russian’ way of capitalist development, which is fundamentally different from what has happened in the Western countries²⁹. The problem of this ‘multistructure’ became a subject of discussions at the conference held in May 1969 in Sverdlovsk. Most of the speakers supported the concept of multistructure of the economy in Tsarist Russia, despite different approaches to this problem³⁰.

Since the mid-1980s, many specialists began to share their views on the nature of capitalist development in Russia with regards to the changing political situation in the country³¹. It was argued that capitalism in industry and agriculture had significant potential for its progressive development³². Abroad, there were optimistic (even too optimistic) views as well. P. Gregory believed that Russia entered the era of modern economy growth during the period from 1885 to 1913. This growth was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I³³. The emphasis was placed on how good life was in Tsarist Russia, as well as on industrial achievements of Russia at the time³⁴. A popu-

²⁵ Bovykin V.I. *Revolution of 1905–1914*. Moscow, 1965, p. 10.

²⁶ Khromov P.A. *Essays on the Russian Economy during the Period of Monopoly Capitalism*. Moscow, 1960, p. 14.

²⁷ Tarnovsky K.N. On the sociological study of the capitalist principle of production. *Questions of History*, 1970, no. 1, P. 226.

²⁸ Gindin I.F., Ivanov L.M. On the uneven development of Russian capitalism in the early 20th century. *Questions of History*, 1965, no. 9, p. 125.

²⁹ Gefter M.Ya. Pages from the history of Marxism in the early 20th century. *Historical Science and Some Contemporary Problems*. Moscow, 1969, p. 21.

³⁰ *Questions of the History of Capitalist Russia: The Problems of Multistructure*. Sverdlovsk, 1972.

³¹ Bovykin V.I. *Russia on the Eve of the Great Achievements*. Moscow, 1988, p. 82; Mints I.I. On Perestroika in the research of the Great October. *Questions of History*, 1987, no. 4, pp. 3–9.

³² Bovykin V.I. *Financial Capital in Russia before World War I*. Moscow, 2001, p. 20.

³³ Gregory P. *Economic Growth of the Russian Empire*. Moscow, 2003, pp. 20–21.

³⁴ Mironov B.N. *The Welfare of the Population and Revolution in Imperial Russia: the 18th – early 20th century*. Moscow, 2010, pp. 662–664.

lar idea was that before the revolution, Russia was an economically healthy, rich country with fast development³⁵.

For full understanding of specific features of capitalism in Russia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it is necessary to refer to the theory and history. In the 18th century, feudalism in Russia no longer existed as a formation, same as in France in the 16th century. Peasants as an economic class within the framework of feudal formation turned into enslaved communities of purely social nature. Corporate serfdom appeared. Certain peasants came under strong authority and custody of the village community (or ‘obshchina’) and could not take any important decisions without its sanction³⁶. This means that the subject of enslavement was not the landowner but rather the village community itself.

If in the feudal period, the peasant communities were integral part of the feudal state, during the estates hierarchy, there was a process of its autonomation and isolation from the external world (the state). A peasant community became self-sufficient, when peasants started satisfying the major part of their material and spiritual needs on their own³⁷. It transforms into a kind of a ‘black box’.

In France, as well as in England, the emergence of capitalism was a long process that lasted for several centuries with the following disintegration of the peasant class. ‘Enclosure’ led to the fact that the bankrupt peasants became partly paupers and partly hired workers. Thus, the process of initial accumulation of capital began. In the 16th-17th centuries, the appropriation of monastic lands, plundering of the state property and seizure of drained bogs made the situation even worse. The backslides were observed even in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, when based on the acts of the British Parliament, millions of acres of land were passed into the hands of landowners and the bourgeoisie³⁸.

In Russia, capitalism did not have its own roots, which was typical for CTG. It can be described as ‘Russian’ capitalism, which has several features that significantly distinguish it from the Western-style capitalism. In CTG, the factor of civilization played a much greater role than in the Western countries (CFG and CSG). Collectivism, communality, priority of spiritual values over material ones, as well as principles

³⁵ Kozhinov V.V. *Mysterious Pages of the History of the 20th Century*. Moscow, 1998, pp. 44–45.

³⁶ Mironov B.N. *Social History of Russia during the Period of the Empire*. Vol. 1. St Petersburg, 2000, p. 434.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 425.

³⁸ Druzhinin N.M. Features of the genesis of capitalism in Russia in comparison with the countries of Western Europe and the United States. *Modern and Contemporary History*, 1972, no. 4, p. 16.

of social justice, were typical for the Russian civilization³⁹. The social justice really mattered. In the West, justice was defined by laws of economic system and not by the social one. Civilizational differences repelled the bulk of the population from capitalist social relations. The community ethics rejected the protestant one.

Russia was special in terms of the exceptional role of the state in the industrial sphere and its capitalism implanted ‘from above’. The government, represented by S.Y. Witte, sought to control the sphere of private economic activity⁴⁰ as much as possible, which was typical to other CTG. Moreover, Witte banked mostly on attracting foreign capital, believing that Russia was not China, and foreign capital would never replace the national one⁴¹. The state orders that put the private owner in dependence on the state played an important role too⁴².

Capitalism in Russia (as well as in other CTG) existed as a way of life, not as a system. The market of capital and not the one of goods constituted the basis of capitalism. To establish the capitalist system, we need certain critical mass of capital, so that an independent ‘chain reaction’ would follow later. This did not happen in Russia. The capital of only one American corporation – ‘The United States Steel Corporation’ – equaled the aggregate capital of all industrial and trading companies in Russia⁴³. In Japan, which was close to Russia in terms of several parameters, the capitalist system formed based on total mobilization of internal reserves with the most active participation of the state⁴⁴. On this basis, we should include Japan into CSG. Russian landowners, who received about 10 billion redemption payments⁴⁵ after the reform of 1861, did not invest them into the development of the economy, as Japanese landowners did, but simply ‘squandered’ this money.

Railroad construction and the attention that the government paid to it led to the rapid development of individual industries in Russia in the late 19th century. This applied to metallurgy, machine building (production of locomotives and wagons) and coal mining. Such a situation took place in England in the first half of the 19th century and in France in the mid-19th century. Therefore, it turned out that Russia in terms of the level and quality of capitalist development at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries corresponded to the periods in Western countries mentioned above.

³⁹ Ol’shtinsky L.I. *Soviet Society*. Book. 1. Moscow, 2014, p. 29.

⁴⁰ *History of Russia in the 19th – early 20th century*. Moscow, 1998, p. 470.

⁴¹ Werth N. *History of the Soviet State*. Moscow, 2006, p. 19.

⁴² Ol’shtinsky L.I. *Ibid*, p. 26.

⁴³ Utkin A.I. *World War I*. Moscow, 2001, p.19.

⁴⁴ *History of the Economy*. Moscow, 2000, p. 209.

⁴⁵ Koval’chenko I.D. Stolypin reform. *History of the USSR*, 1991, no. 1, p. 57.

Foreigners saw import of capital into Russia as a form of financing for the national industry, which ultimately led to purchase of their goods⁴⁶. In the years 1881–1900 only, Russia paid 2.5 billion interest, which was 1.5 times higher than foreign capital inflow⁴⁷. One should also note that only fifth part of foreign investments went to the shares of domestic and foreign companies⁴⁸. The share of Russia in the global debt was 31 %⁴⁹.

Before the war, the structure of the existing branches of industry, in comparison to Germany, was essentially archaic. Such industries as electrical, chemical, pharmaceutical, optical and machine building were very weakly developed. The automobile industry and aircraft building had just appeared in Russia. The same applied to the structure of its exports. Half of the exports were cereals, followed by timber flax and various livestock products⁵⁰. The cardinal differences between Russia and Western countries concerned the level of added value. The cost of production per capita in the US exceeded that in Russia by almost 20 times⁵¹.

The government was sympathetic to the foreign capital, especially the French one. Before the outbreak of World War I, Russian securities at the Paris Bourse were worth 8.5 billion rubles. France accounted for up to 80 % of the total external debt of Tsarist Russia. The economic dependence inevitably led to the political one. The growing financial dependence of Tsarism led to the fact that, in the Franco-Russian Alliance, Russia turned from an equal partner into a dependent satellite⁵². Its dependence on the foreign capital also assumed some external liabilities. The Western powers sought to use Russia in their own interests, involving military alliances to fight their rivals on the world stage⁵³.

The Russian national trading market and capitalist market as the scope of relevant laws did not belong to the same category. And the former could not be the reason for the latter. Cardinal differences exist between the simple commodities market and the capitalist market⁵⁴. The former is established by the integration of regional markets

⁴⁶ *History of Russia in the 19th – early 20th century*. Moscow, 1998, p. 159.

⁴⁷ Gregory P.R. *Russian National Income. 1885–1913*. Leningrad; N.Y., 1982, pp. 97–98.

⁴⁸ Bovykin V.I. *Financial Capital in Russia before World War I*. Moscow, 2001, p. 34.

⁴⁹ Zaval'ko G.A. *The Concept of 'Revolution' in Philosophy and Social Sciences*. Moscow, 2005, p. 172.

⁵⁰ Bovykin V.I. *Financial Capital in Russia before World War I*. Moscow, 2001. P. 32.

⁵¹ Mendeleev D.I. *To the Cognition of Russia. Compositions*. Vol. 21. Moscow; Leningrad, 1952, p. 484.

⁵² Bovykin V.I. *From the History of the Outbreak of the First World War: The Relationship between Russia and France in 1912–1914*. Moscow, 1961, pp. 59–68.

⁵³ Ol'shtinsky L.I. *Soviet Society*. Book. 1. Moscow, 2014, p. 28.

⁵⁴ Koval'chenko I.D. Agrarian market and the nature of the agrarian system of European Russia in the late 19th – early 20th century. *History of the USSR*, 1973, no. 2, p. 43.

and is associated with the circulation of goods regardless of the production mode. The capitalist market should be treated as a kind of economic system having its own binding laws, as a political (economic) category, as a market of capital in the first place.

Herein, we should understand the differences between commercial or merchant capital and the capitalist (financial) one. We should also distinguish between simple trading profits and capitalist profits, which, under normal (traditional) capitalism, are of a very limited size. For the existence of commercial capital, “no other conditions are required than those necessary for simple commodity and monetary circulation”⁵⁵. Here again, we would like to draw attention to a very important point that simple commodity production and capitalist production are based on different principles. A developed commodity market does not mean developed capitalism yet.

The nature of social consciousness of the Russian bourgeoisie was specific and different from the Western countries. Here we can mostly speak about entrepreneurs rather than capitalists (which is not the same thing). As an example, merchants were still engaged in entrepreneurial activity in the pre-reform period. A ‘fully-featured’ capitalist appears only within the framework of a capitalist system, and not the way of life.

In Russia, there was no revolutionary bourgeoisie in the Western European sense of the word⁵⁶. The Russian bourgeoisie, which appeared due to the forced state construction, turned out to be completely counter-revolutionary in the revolution of 1905.

Whilst in the industrial sphere, we can refer to the emergence of capitalism in Russia (only as a way of life, not as a system), this would not be correct if we speak about the agricultural sphere and peasantry. Let us look at the definition of a ‘kulak’ (a richer peasant), which many researchers have tried to present almost as a farmer-capitalist. A ‘kulak’ should be considered as someone who was engaged in the entrepreneurial, capitalist economy, exploiting other peasants either as hired laborers (farm laborers) or through pawnbroker’s business⁵⁷.

Let us now consider these statements from the political (economic) point of view. A ‘kulak’ was an entrepreneur but not a capitalist or even a bourgeois. The nature of his consciousness was not much different from that of an ordinary peasant inside the village community. The exploitation of a farm laborer was more of a social nature than of an economic one. In capitalism, an agricultural worker, who had proletarian consciousness, entered into an agreement with an employer based on the laws of capitalist production arranged in the appropriate legal form. A farm servant (‘batrak’)

⁵⁵ Marx K., Engels F. *Compositions*. V. 25. Part 1. Moscow, 1961, p. 357.

⁵⁶ Tyutyukin S.V., Shelokhaev V.V. *Marxists and the Russian Revolution*. Moscow, 1996, p. 74–75.

⁵⁷ *History of Russia in the 19th – early 20th Century*. Moscow, 1998, p. 289.

(especially if this concerned a ‘kulak’ from his own village) entered an agreement based on the social and traditional laws. Often, in case of any misunderstanding, the village community itself acted as a judge.

A Russian peasant perceived land as something common to everybody, given by God⁵⁸. This led to complete rejection of private ownership of land, with the demand to cancel its sale. The bourgeois view of property as a source of wealth was alien to that of a peasant⁵⁹. Land was considered common property of all those who cultivated it.

The relations between a landowner and a peasant were that of enslavement nature. Landowners gave land for cultivation in exchange for villein-socage and sharecropping. It should be noted that since 1861 until the end of the 19th century, the rents tripled⁶⁰. In Russia, the vast majority of landowner estates was cultivated by peasants with their livestock and own tool. The hungry, bonded peasant rent predominated due to the need for land. Such a system was profitable to the landowners⁶¹. The landowner economies did not intend to accept the capitalist development and postponed this process in the peasant environment.

The monetary form of rent often meant the provided work given in exchange for this rent. With such payments for short-term rent, the landowners kept a huge share of the manufactured product to themselves. This share, if converted to bread, would reach one third of the harvest. With such amounts of rent, the monetary form of rent was also a way of sharecropping. Instead of capitalist profit dominating over rent and defining its boundaries, the rent occupied a dominant position and determined the limits of the profit⁶².

Stolypin’s attempt to destroy the peasant communities eventually ended in failure. This was mostly because people responsible for it did not know the Russian village at all. As a result, Stolypin’s policy – for many various reasons – could not really suit any group of people, neither liberals, nor right-wingers, nor leftists, nor the Tsar himself⁶³. Stolypin tried to solve the problem by destroying the peasant communities and by relocating the redundant population to the eastern regions of the country.

⁵⁸ Kabytov P.S. *Russian Peasantry in Early 20th Century*. Saratov, 1990, p. 60.

⁵⁹ Mironov B.N. *The Welfare of the Population in Imperial Russia*. Moscow, 2010, p. 670; Mironov B.N. *Social History of Russia during the Period of the Empire*. Vol. 1. St Petersburg, 2000, p. 328.

⁶⁰ Dubrovskiy S.M. *The Peasant Movement in the Revolution of 1905–1907*. Moscow, 1956, p. 18.

⁶¹ Anfimov A.N. *The Large Landowner Economy of European Russia*. Moscow, 1980, pp. 365–367.

⁶² Anfimov A.N. *Land Rent in Russia in the Early 20th Century*. Moscow, 1961, p. 191.

⁶³ Tyutyukin S.V., Shelokhaev V.V. *Marxists and the Russian Revolution*. Moscow, 1996, p. 135.

However, the peasant communities survived, and the farmer did not become the central figure of the Russian village.

As the result of Stolypin's reforms, it was not possible to create a class of wealthy peasants in the village close to Grossbauer, even because Germany also had landowners and peasants. First, the liberation of peasants in Germany began half a century earlier. However, most importantly, in Germany, capitalism existed as a system that obliged both landowners and Grossbauer to follow its laws in the process of management. Otherwise, they could simply go bankrupt.

In case of capitalist monopolies, any monopoly has two components: a corporate component, when the interests of its participants are of social nature and subordinate to consciousness; and a capitalist one, that exists within the economic system with objective laws, independent from consciousness. In Russia, there was clear domination of the former, corporate component of monopolies. The main purpose of emergence of such associations was keeping monopoly prices.

The economic policy of the Tsarist government during the period of imperialism was not transformed into a policy of monopoly capital⁶⁴. The government supported the first monopolies, because they related to the railway construction. In the 1890s, the government used the railway construction to accelerate the development of machine building and metallurgy in the south of the country. The government artificially supported the plants with incomplete capacity utilization. In the period of industrial upsurge, state orders served as means of pressure to reduce the prices. Therefore, in the 1890s, the government began to pursue its antimonopoly policy. During the crisis that followed, the support of large staggering and bankrupt enterprises, banks and their associations took place again. This means that the relationship of the government with monopolies was situational; the government either provided support or distanced itself from monopolies⁶⁵.

It is worthwhile to note that monopoly associations in Russia were mostly created by people who did not have the capitalist but rather traditional consciousness; this was different for the Western countries. Landowners-latifundists took an active part in creation of such syndicates as 'Krovlya' ('Roofing') and 'Med' ('Copper'). They owned hundreds of thousands of dessiatinas⁶⁶ of land and in monopolized production saw the only way to preserve the profitability of their enterprises without fundamen-

⁶⁴ Gindin I.F. Politics of the Tsarist government in relation to industrial monopolies. *On the peculiarities of imperialism in Russia*. Moscow, 1963, p. 88.

⁶⁵ Gindin I.F. Politics of the Tsarist government in relation to industrial monopolies. *On the Peculiarities of Imperialism in Russia*. Moscow, 1963, p. 100–101.

⁶⁶ A dessiatin (Russian: Десятина) is an archaic land measurement used in tsarist Russia that equals to 10,926.512 square metres.

tal modernization and reorganization, which required huge investments⁶⁷. Thus, the monopolistic union of sugar refiners, which appeared on the initiative of noble entrepreneurs, was headed by representatives of the titled nobility⁶⁸.

Conclusion

The emergence of monopolies marks the beginning of the imperialist period of capitalism development. From the point of RP concept, only those countries, where RP has already ended, could become subjects of the geopolitical space. In the early 20th century, those were the United States, Great Britain, and France. These countries became the real winners in World War I. Even in Germany (as a country in RP), the imperialism was external. France acquired colonies in Africa and South-East Asia as sources of raw materials and markets and was engaged in the export of capital. At the same time, Germany, mostly for prestige, took wherever possible the third-rate colonies and was engaged in the construction of huge surface fleet (trying to draw near Britain in this respect) that showed its complete uselessness during the World War I⁶⁹.

The lack of geopolitical subjectivity led to the situation where the countries in RP did not have a certain position in the geopolitical space, as they did not have anything to rely on. As a result – there was absence of a certain foreign policy, adventurism, blue-sky thinking. In Russia, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries a similar situation was typical for the Russian Far East. The lease of the Liaodong Peninsula and the construction of Port Arthur, given the enormous funds invested in its construction⁷⁰, had little to do with the objective interests of the country in this region. This ultimately led to the war with Japan, which cost Russia 2.5 billion rubles.

In terms of foreign policy, we cannot define Russia as a real imperialist country. Russia was not ready to face the world war that began in 1914. It is enough to say, that there were less military units with heavy artillery in Tsarist Russia than not only in the leading Western European countries, but for instance in Romania. Russia produced much fewer machine-guns than Britain or Germany. Due to insufficient devel-

⁶⁷ Vyatkin M.L. *Mining and Metallurgical Ural in 1900–1917*. Moscow, 1965.

⁶⁸ Kamenetskaya I.M. The emergence of monopolies in the sugar beet industry. *History of the USSR*, 1965, no. 6, pp. 110–121.

⁶⁹ Kondorsky B.M. The nature of military and socio-political conflicts within the framework of the revolutionary period. *Memory and Time: The Impact of Wars and Armed Conflicts of the 20th Century on the Russian Society*. Penza, 2016, pp. 244.

⁷⁰ Levitsky N.A. *The Russo-Japanese War*. Moscow, 1938, p. 14.

opment of the material base, Tsarist Russia could not live up to ‘imperialist’ goals without any outside assistance⁷¹.

Thus, according to the main parameters indicated above, Russia was a typical CTG, with capitalism formed by the beginning of the 20th century as a way of life, not as some kind of an economic system with its own laws. Herein, we should focus on the fundamental differences between the ‘social’ (society) and ‘economic’ (economic system) concepts. A bourgeois is a social concept; a capitalist is an economic category. The exact same person, as a bourgeois, should spend money to maintain their prestige and image in accordance with the situation in the society; whereas as a capitalist, they should invest their capital into business in accordance with the objective laws of the economic system.

In Russia, as well as in other CTG, the state actively intervened in the economy and kept the situation in industry under its full control even during the crisis of 1899-1903. The same applies to monopolies that were completely dependent on the policy of the government, in contrast to real imperialist countries. This was similar to Japan, where, at the first stage of development, the state played an exceptionally important role in the formation of all basic industries. The main difference was that Russia was not able to organize total mobilization of resources, being dependent on the landowner estates.

Despite the existence of feudal relations between the landowners and the peasants in both Germany and Russia, Russia was never able to follow the ‘Prussian path’ because of the patriarchy of peasant communities and traditional consciousness. The evolutionary way of transforming a German peasant into an agricultural proletarian was more an exception rather than a rule in Russia. A peasant community was a completely different ‘world’ with its own laws. The history showed that the destruction of traditional consciousness was an extremely painful and long process. The elements of capitalism in the village were exclusively external. The absence of a capitalist system with its binding laws led to the fact that Russian landowners chose the capitalist way of management on their own initiative and not due to the circumstances that had nothing to do with consciousness, as it was in Germany.

The constant shortage of capital forced the state to take regular loans abroad (mainly from France). However, in the sphere of economy, this did contribute to the emergence of capitalism as a system at all, and put Russia in a dependent position in the sphere of foreign policy, which led to Russia’s entering a war with Germany, despite absence of any serious contradictions with this country.

⁷¹ Maevskiy I.V. On the dependence of Russia in World War I. *Questions of History*, 1957, no. 1, pp. 71–72.

If in terms of quantitative parameters (only by individual sectors), Russia was close to leading industrial powers, by qualitative ones, such as production per capita, products costs, yields of main agricultural crops, it was far behind. Russian capitalism was completely dependent on both internal and external factors. So how can we possibly talk about its self-development based on the laws of the capitalist system?

In Russia, as well as in other CTG, RP ended in the 1990s. It fell mainly on the years of the Soviet power, which means the ‘Soviet’ basis of the political and economic system became the ‘foundation’ for the ‘new house’ that was being built at the time. The superstructure is to correspond to its basis. Moreover, we cannot change it at will, without destroying the country itself. In China, it became obvious back in the 1980s and 1990s and led to the successful development of the country. At the same time, in Ukraine, the disregard of the ‘Soviet’ basis led to a permanent crisis that has lasted for quarter of a century. This is enough to say that Ukraine’s share in the world’s industrial production decreased 50 times during this time⁷². The current attempts to change it at will might ultimately lead to complete collapse of the country.

As mentioned above, CTG, including Russia, have their own features within the framework of political and economic systems that are very different compared to those in CFG and CSG (Western countries). All those problems that Russia has been experiencing for the past 25 years mostly relate to the attempts to build the economy per the Western patterns. Here we should remember that, in Russia, it is impossible to build the Western-type capitalism, which is not ever possible in any CTG. Within the framework of the world system, CTG feel themselves ‘not in their element’. Therefore, these countries need to focus on creating their own space – political, economic, and financial – in foreign policy and international relations.

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⁷² Stavitsky A.V. ‘The end of history’ of Ukraine: Already close. Available at: <http://skeptimist.livejournal.com/215927.html>

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REVIEWS

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Review of: D.V. Tumakov. The hot spot of the new Russia: the Chechen crisis of 1991–1996 in the assessments of the Russian society. Yaroslavl: Avers Plus, 2017. 740 p.

A young researcher from Yaroslavl, Candidate of Historical Sciences Denis Vasilyevich Tumakov published in this July the second of his monographs dedicated to the events in the Chechen Republic in 1991–96. It should be immediately noted that the author has taken on a very difficult topic in the contemporary Russian history, since it is customary to assess the historical events when they become remote for a reasonable period of time. As per historical standards, the events in Chechnya occurred very recently, and the wounds inflicted during the two Chechen wars have not healed yet (I mean the wounds inflicted on the Russian nation, which also includes the population of the Chechen Republic being its part).

In the two Chechen campaigns, which all together lasted from 1994 to 2009, many people were involved, either voluntarily or otherwise: they were representatives of the two warring parties, the civilian population of the republic in the hardships of the war, journalists of various mass media who covered the tragic events in their materials, etc. One can say with certainty that during those years, the whole country literally monitored the events in Chechnya, since the war concerned everyone: some were fighting there, and that means that their relatives and friends watched anxiously what was happening in that republic; others had their relatives and acquaintances under fire and shells, lost everything in one moment and thanked God if they were still alive; still others, with a sinking heart, caught every message from Chechnya, because at that time the fate of the country was being decided there, since the situation was extreme and the local war could grow into a civil war, as the example of the rebellious republic could be contagious for the other national entities. Moreover, the attitude of the society largely expressed by the mass media and the most prominent members of the public was completely different and contradictory. Some supported the actions of the federal troops, which had a task to put things in order in the Chechen Republic and to destroy the militants for the sake of preserving the integrity of

the country. Others, on the contrary, expressed support for the leaders of the republic, who declared it independent and sovereign, and justified the actions of the separatists by severely criticizing the operations in which the federal troops took part. For the latter, it was even more uneasy, because the army itself was not in the best condition at the time, and its spirit was almost broken by the criticism that it was hailed on, from several mass media.

All of this shows that Denis Tumakov, who has taken on the investigation of these events, faced a very difficult task, because he had to prepare such an analysis of events, which would indicate all the twists of those tragic events: the origins, causes and factors that led to triggering off the wars in the North Caucasus, the reminiscences of their direct participants, the opinions and assessments of the representatives of the two opposing parties, the estimates of the public opinion in the Russian society and so on. And decidedly Denis Vasilyevich successfully coped with this most difficult task by using in his work the archival materials, memoirs of participants of the events, materials of domestic and foreign mass media, documents of authorities, parties and public organizations, etc. which allowed him to ensure the depth of analysis and objectivity in assessing the events that the researcher referred to.

The young author has had a long way towards writing his monograph. While still at school, he became interested in this topic and faithfully studied it in the years that followed. Whilst studying at the university, he prepared several term papers and a thesis devoted to the events in Chechnya in 1991–96. In the subsequent years, the author prepared several articles and a monograph¹. But the recently published work is the result of many years of his efforts in the search and synthesis of materials on this topic. And it can be noted that without exaggeration, the author perhaps became one of the most authoritative researchers of today, who devoted a lot of time to studying the Chechen events and turned over a huge array of materials that he was looking for and retrieved in different cities of Russia and as referred to various sources.

The published works of the young researcher D.V. Tumakov, in which he has invested a lot of efforts and energy, allows a more profound and serious assessment of the events that took place in this country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The monograph by D.V. Tumakov consists of an introduction, three chapters, conclusion and an extensive reference list.

In the first chapter, ‘The Separatist Regime in the Chechen Republic, 1991–94’, which includes three paragraphs, the author analyzes the reasons of separatists’ rise to power in Chechnya in the autumn of 1991, describes the conditions under which Ichkeria, then actually being an independent nation, existed in 1991-94; the internal

¹ Tumakov D.V. *Restless Region: Armed Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the First Half of the 1990s and Yaroslavl Region*. Yaroslavl, 2016.

Chechen confrontation of various political forces, the ups and downs of relations between the central Russian government and the governance of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

The second chapter ‘The First Chechen War, 1994–1996’ is central to the monograph. It consists of eight paragraphs and is dedicated directly to the analysis of the military operations, in which the federal troops participated on one side, whereas the Chechen militant groups being on the other.

The third chapter, ‘Assessments of the Chechen Crisis in the Russian Society’ consisting of three paragraphs, is very important and essential. It makes possible better understanding and comprehension of the events that took place in this region. The author gives his attention to the reaction of broad layers in the Russian society and the main political forces of the country and their response to the events of the first Chechen war.

In the conclusion, the author sums his work up, trying to convey to the audience something important that he wanted to say whilst working on his published works. D.V. Tumakov notes that despite almost bloodless collapse of the USSR in late 1991, the disappearance of the great power caused escalation of many longstanding ethnic conflicts and the emergence of new ones on the borders of the former superpower. Sumgait, Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria – the list is not exhaustive referring to the ‘hot spots’ of the former USSR. A great and powerful country did not allow these crises to leak out, investing enormous resources in the development of the bordering republics, developing their economy, pursuing a certain cultural policy, considering the national diversity of the country. The escalation of the national conflicts occurred after the ‘Center’ weakened economically and politically and was unable to keep in its orbit the representatives of the new elite that gradually gathered political strength, the elite that was ‘ripening’ in the republics of the former Soviet Union, whose political capital was based, as a rule, on separatist aspirations and the desire to gain independence. This was facilitated by mistakes and miscalculations of the country’s leaders². Some republics (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) refused to pay taxes to the federal center at all, whilst receiving subsidies from it.

It was hard to overcome the collapse of the great power. The wars that were waged in the post-Soviet states – and this was noted by D.V. Tumakov – claimed, per the estimates of various sources, up to 100 thousand people’s lives. But the conflict between the federal government and the rebellious Chechen Republic was the most

² In this regard, the famous expression of B.N. Yeltsin can be recalled, who appealed to the Russian regional leaders with the following words: “Take sovereignty as much as you can swallow!”

protracted and bloody; it demanded the use of a powerful military group consisting of regular military formations, units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, aviation and other military machinery that were used during the Chechen war.

The republic led by the former Major-General D. Dudayev, successfully used the fact that the government of the Russian Federation had no clear and consistent policy regarding the events in Chechnya. Representatives of different political forces offered contradictory solutions to the pacification of the Caucasian republic. Some were supporters of the forceful solution of the problem, others advised to negotiate with D. Dudayev and his entourage, playing on the contradictions that existed among the various Chechen clans. Still others advised to lead a long and laborious work by helping Chechnya economically and gradually eliminating the contradictions between the central government and the authorities of the self-proclaimed republic.

The public sentiments of the Russian society were also quite vague. The whole country watched the course of events in the Caucasus, as mass media covered them extensively. Moreover, not only the representatives of the national mass media, but also the journalists of provincial media visited the area of combat. The author of the monograph notes three most striking positions of public perception of the first Chechen war: official, liberal-antiwar and left-patriotic.

The official view was based on the fact that D. Dudayev's regime was illegitimate and negotiations with him were impossible, which gave an excuse to bring in the regular troops into the republic and to disarm the militant groups. The subsequent events showed that the Kremlin underestimated the capabilities of the governance of Chechnya, which managed in a short time to prepare for the warfare by guerrilla methods, by having accumulated huge stocks of weapons and military equipment and by recruiting and training a considerable number of militants. After the introduction of federal troops in December 1994 and after their subsequent debellation out in Grozny on New Year's Eve, it became fast evident that the war would be bloody and protracted, which within a short time made it unpopular in the public consciousness of the Russian society.

Representatives of the liberal-antiwar wing pointed to the miscalculations of Russia's political authorities, the errors of military leaders, unpreparedness of the troops to conduct such operations, lack of equipment, the use of poorly trained military conscripts in the military operations, the mass death of civilians, etc. This position was quite popular in the society and was supported by a large part of the population. The liberal press was annoyed by this war that occurred at the time when the country was under very difficult economic conditions, and the population was experiencing the consequences of a protracted economic crisis, barely making ends meet.

The left-wing and the national-patriotic forces did not have a well-defined position on the war in Chechnya. At the same time, they supported the actions of the nations' leadership and criticized it for its miscalculations.

The first Chechen campaign (1994–96) has left different evaluations in the public opinion. D. Tumakov gives very precise and presentative definitions of the outcome of the first Chechen campaign. As an example, the military doctor V. Fyodorov, whilst expressing the mood of the Russian military, responded about it in such a way: “The army has remained spat upon and with beaten face” (p. 717). And here is the evaluation of the war outcome given by one of the representatives of the separatist party: “We have made it clear for Russia that our soldiers need to be valued and respected” (P. 717). After these words, one should ask whether this result was worth those victims that the war brought; in fact, per official information only, the loss of the joint forces in Chechnya amounted to 5,552 military men killed, prisoned and missing, as well as 35,289 people ill, 16,098 wounded and shell-shocked (p. 713). The losses of the militants remain unknown to this day. As D.V. Tumakov notes regarding some sources, the Russian command estimated the losses of the militants as 17,391 people killed and prisoned, whereas the officials of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria confirmed the death of only about two-three thousand militants, and some independent sources believed that five-six thousand of the Chechen separatists were killed.

A huge number of victims among the civilians should be mentioned as well. The author, having studied various sources, names the following figures: according to the estimates of the Russian human rights activists and national security, defense and law enforcement agencies, approximately 30–35 thousand Chechen people died in Chechnya. At the same time, in the periodical press, journalism and research literature, alternative data on the number of civilians killed were often cited: 50, 70, 80, 100, and even 120 thousand people (p. 713).

In his monograph, Denis Vasilyevich Tumakov reflected on the events of the first Chechen military campaign that took place in 1994–96. This campaign ended with the Khasavyurt Accord, which provided only some breathing space for the two opposing sides. The second Chechen campaign was inevitable, as neither the federal authorities nor the Chechen militants were happy with the outcome of the accord. The former were not satisfied with the fact that the republic became almost independent and completely out of hand for the Center. The Kremlin hoped, after the conclusion of peace, to gradually regain control of the rebellious region, but the government of the country did not have a clear recipe how it could be achieved. In addition, Chechnya was putting the central government to more and more troubles every day, as it became a bulwark of crime and terrorism; moreover, the existence of such a forma-

tion could in the future trigger break-up of the Russian state, as it demonstrated its weakness.

The results of the first war did not sit well with the governance of the unrecognized republic as well; it wanted complete separation from Russia and even more so, it intended to gradually expand its territory at the expense of the other North Caucasian republics and to create a unified Islamic state.

In August 1999, two groups of Chechen militants led by Basayev and Khattab attacked the border villages of Dagestan. At the same time, violent terrorist acts were committed, apartment blocks were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk. The militants had reliance in weakness of the Russian government and in the fact that the population of Dagestan would support the invasion. The terror attacks in the Russian cities were also supposed, according to the plan of the terrorists, to provoke discontent among the population by the actions of authorities that were unable to ensure the safety of citizens.

However, the militants miscalculated. The second campaign ended with the complete destruction of the militias, peaceful life gradually began to develop in the Chechen Republic; many militants who had recently fought against the regular troops joined the new governance of the republic. Today, its leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, emphatically confesses his loyalty to Russia and its current President. The government of the country has invested and is investing huge amounts of money in restoring republic's economic potential and infrastructure. It is true that the activity of militants in the North Caucasus has decreased, but the coals of the conflict have not been completely cooled. They are embers, and therefore even today the situation in the North Caucasian republics remains complicated; militant attacks on churchmen, government officials, police officers and the most authoritative public figures continue to be committed. Financial feeding from foreign countries has decreased, but Russia's unfriendly regimes continue to finance the criminal underworld in the Caucasus, trying to complicate the relations between peoples of our multinational country. Thus, the publication of this monograph is relevant and useful even as a reminder and warning of what can happen if the government is weak.

The monograph by D.V. Tumakov is filled with information and is logically structured, reasoned by facts and evidence; and author's comments and conclusions are vouched by quotations from many analyzed sources. In our opinion, to some extent it fills the gaps that exist in the research literature focused on the study of events that occurred in the North Caucasus in 1990–2000.

It is impossible not to note the innovative approach of the author, who has tried to consider comprehensively not only the events that took place in the Caucasus but also the reasons of pressure and ethnic tension in this region, as well as the sociopolitical background that had formed in the country at that dramatically difficult time. In addi-

tion, in his monograph, the author cites testimonies of direct participants, who played different roles during the first Chechen war (from soldiers and officers to politicians of the highest level), as well as memories of innocent victims of the unleashed military tragedy. This method brings in actuality and realism in the work of D.V. Tumakov, which, in our view, is justified by the very nature of the events and their tragedy, and which could not be ignored.

With regards to the drawbacks, it can only be mentioned that the monograph does not have enough photographs and published archival documents, which would certainly give more credibility to the work. But this is not the author's fault but rather a problem that the researchers cannot solve on their own. Representatives of the scientific community are well aware of how difficult it is nowadays to find means to publish their works.

Apparently, Denis Tumakov will continue his studies, which will result in writing a new book dedicated to the events of the second Chechen war, which officially lasted until April 2009, when President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev officially quelled the regime of the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic. At any rate, we would like the author to prepare such a monograph, he has everything for it: energy, youth, scientific ambitions and interest in these events.

CHRONICLE OF SCIENTIFIC LIFE

On 19–21 October 2017 Cherepovets State University is holding All-Russia scientific seminar (with international participation)



‘State, capitalism and society in Russia in the latter half of the 19th-early 20th centuries’

The seminar is run by the Department of History and Philosophy, Humanities Institute of Cherepovets State University.

The All-Russia scientific seminar is aimed at discussing the problems of interaction of the state, business and society in the Russian Empire in the latter half of the 19th – early 20th centuries. The peculiarity of the seminar is in the attempt to consider the announced issues from the point of view of various branches of socio-humanistic knowledge: history, philosophy, philology, politology, sociology and culturology. New, non-traditional approaches and ‘provocative’ scientific hypotheses are particularly welcomed.

The organizers of the seminar are planning to focus the participants’ attention on the mostly debatable issues:

- questions of interrelation of the government, business and society in historiographical tradition;
- polemical questions of social-economic development of pre-revolutionary Russia (the role of the government in the development of capitalism, peculiarities of Russian capitalism etc.);
 - the problems of interaction of the bureaucracy and the private sector;
 - the problems of interrelation of the authorities and the society in Russia in the early 20th century;
 - power and society in the social thinking of Russia;
 - the origin of civil society in the Russian Empire;
 - response of the society to the bourgeois transformations in the country (including changes of the political culture, moral-ethical climate and everyday practices) etc.;
- reflection on the development of Russian capitalism in the literary and art tradition.

Among the confirmed participants are: The Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Oryol State University, Vologda Regional Universal Scientific Library, Brest State Technical University, National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Belarusian National Technical University, Yelets State Ivan Bunin University, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Pushkin Leningrad State University. Representatives of higher education institutions, scientific organisations, cultural institutions **are invited** to participate in the seminar.

Executive secretary of the seminar organizing committee – Novikov Alexey Yevgenyevich.

For more information please write to: Department of History and Philosophy, Humanities Institute of Cherepovets State University 8, Sovetsky prospect, office room 908 Cherepovets 162602.

Tel. 8 (8202) 55 28 30; 8921-058-18-43

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

MANUSCRIPT STRUCTURE AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

1. General requirements to the contents of articles

1.1 Articles presenting results of original scientific research are accepted for publication in the journal, as well as reviews, scientific reports and bibliographical reviews on the latest Russian and international studies in history and political science.

1.2 The journal publishes only original research papers not previously published elsewhere and not containing any incorrect or excessive citation.

1.3 Submitted articles should correspond to the subject matter of the journal in the following key areas:

- History
- Political Science

1.4 Submitted materials should be characterized by academic novelty and integrity. This presupposes that an article contains a historiographical overview.

- Per international standards of publication, a reference list should include no less than 20 sources, where international editions amount to one third of the total number of publications.

- Most of the references should be from Scopus, Web of Science, with DOI and URL.

- Excessive self-citation should be avoided (references to the author's works should not exceed 10 % of overall number of references).

1.5 Manuscripts, which do not correspond to the subject matter of the journal or do not meet the style requirements, will not be considered for publication.

2. General style requirements

2.1 Manuscripts should be in the format of .doc (Word 1997-2002) or .docx.

2.2 The recommended volume of an article is one publication base sheet (40 000 characters with spaces).

2.3 Page parameters: 210 x 297 mm (A4 format), portrait orientation. Page margin: all 20 mm. Normal font, TimesNewRoman. Font size: 12 point in the main text, 10 point in footnotes. Line spacing: one and a half. The text should be without automatic hyphenation at the end of the line. The title of the article: bold font, center aligned. Page numeration: right bottom.

2.4 The text of the manuscript should be in a single file. Provisionally, the manuscript is divided into two parts: the first one contains UDC, information about the author, an abstract, key words, the text of the article and a list of references; the second one should be entirely in English and includes information about the author, an abstract (not mandatory), key words (not mandatory), a list of references.

3. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the Russian language

3.1. Information about the author of the article: last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author in full, degree/s (if any), title (if any), position, affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study (in full), city, country, author's contact details: telephone number and email address.

3.2. UDC and the title of the article.

3.3. An abstract of **400-600 characters**, which must be informative and informative (it should briefly reflect the content of the article as close as possible, as well as its structure and conclusions).

3.4. Key words (8–10).

3.5. The text of the article. The article should have the following structural elements:

- a) Introduction;
- b) Main text;
- c) Conclusion.

3.6. List of references.

4. Rules on graphic presentation data

4.1. Drawings, tables, diagrams, charts, etc. are to be numbered, the sources are to be provided and printed within the margins of the page.

4.2. All highlights in the text of the article must be only in italics (not in bold or underlined).

4.3. Depending on the complexity of graphic materials, the Editorial Board retains the right to remove them from the text.

5. References in the text and in footnotes

All footnotes are given per page in 10-point size. (*Author*. Title. Place of publication (without publisher's name), year of publication. Pages) at the bottom of each page.

When referring to an electronic resource, a full and accurate link to the Internet resource and the date of retrieval are to be added at the end of the footnote.

In case the source is an archive document, the name of an archive in full without abbreviation is to be given first followed by an abbreviation in brackets. Fund. Series. Record. Sheet. When referring to documents from the same archive, only abbreviation is used for its name.

Examples:

Glebov S. Evraziistvo mezhdru imperiei i modernom. Istoriia v dokumentakh [Eurasianism between Empire and Art Nouveau]. M., 2009. P. 27.

Starostina T. Posleblokadnyi tranzit. Dnevnik [Transit after the blockade. Diary] // Sever. 2005. No. 5–6. Pp. 127–133.

Lazarev G. Frantsuzy ukhodiat iz Mali [The French leave Mali] // *Gazeta.ru*. 06.02.2013. URL: http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/02/06_a_4954773.shtml (retrieved: 22.02.2014).

The State Archive of Vologda region (SAVR). F. 366. S. 1. R. 1188. L.3. (when referred for the first time)

SAVR. F. 3105. S. 1. R. 3. L. 1 verso. (when referred for the second time)

Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o gubernskikh i uezdnykh zemskikh uchrezhdeniiakh ot 1 ianvaria 1864 g. [Statute on governorate and district institutions approved by the Imperial, dated 1 January 1864] // *PSZ*. S. 2. Dep. 1 V. XXXIX. St.-P., 1867. N 40457. Pp. 18–20.

Stocking M.K. (ed.) *The Journals of Claire Clairmont. 1814–1827.* Cambridge, 1968. P. 325.

Boisbouvier Ch. Mali : le retour de la Françafrique? // *RFI.fr*. 23.07.2013. URL: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130722-mali-presidentielle-francafrique-hollande-fabius-traore-tiebile-drame> (retrieved: 26.02.2014).

6. Rules for arranging the list of references

6.1. The list is to be numbered in alphabetical order.

6.2. The list is to include only scientific works.

6.3. **All references to sources should be given as footnotes and not included in the list of references at the end.**

6.4. **Monographs** should be presented as follows:

- *Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;*
- Title of the book;
- Information about the book in the following order: place of publication, publishing house, year of publication. Pages.

Examples:

Potemkina M.N. Evakuatsiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: liudi i sud'by [Evacuation in the years of the Great Patriotic War]. Magnitogorsk: MaGU, 2002. 264 p.

Cross A.G. 'By the banks of the Neva': chapters from the lives and careers of the British in 18th – century Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 474 p.

6.5. **Dissertations and published summaries of dissertations:**

Arslanova Ch.R. Evakuirovannoe i deportirovannoe v Bashkirskuiu ASSR naseleenie v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945) [Population evacuated and deported to Bashkirskaya ASSR in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: published summary of dissertation. Ufa, 2006. 25 p.

Iskhakova G.R. Sotsial'naia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (na materialakh Bashkortostana) [Social policy of the Soviet State in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: PhD dissertation. Ufa, 2002. 147 p.

6.6. **Articles in journals / collections of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;
- Title of the article // Title of the collection of articles/journal;
- Publisher's imprint in the following order: Year of publication. Number. Pages. DOI index (if available)

Examples:

Kumanev G.A. Voina i evakuatsiia v SSSR. 1941–1942 gody [The war and evacuation in the USSR in 1941-1942] // *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*. 2006. No. 6. Pp. 7–27.

Solodyankina O.Y. European widows as governesses in the 18th – and 19th-century Russia // *Women's History Magazine*. 2010. Issue. 63. Pp. 19–26.

6.7. **References to electronic resources** are to be provided in a similar manner, as in the previous sections, but at the very end of the reference the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date are to be added.

Example:

Stansfield G. Iraqi Kurdistan: political development and emergent democracy. Taylor & Francis e-library, 2003. URL: https://www.academia.edu/3271178/Iraqi_Kurdistan_Political_development_and_emergent_democracy (retrieved: 04.10. 2014).

6.8. When reference is made to an electronic publication (articles or monographs), the full name of the site is to be provided.

7. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the English language

7.1. Information about the author of the article:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) in full, transliteration (for automatic transliteration we recommend using the site <http://translit.net/>; **it is essential to select LC standard** in the main menu of the site, in the 'Options...' section), degree (if applicable), title (if applicable), position, author's email address;
- Affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study in full (full official name of the organization in English, post code, country, city, street (in transliteration), building).

7.2. The title of the article – English translation.

7.3. Not mandatory: Abstract in English, **between 400-600 characters in volume** (must be written using commonly used terms and expressions in the field, must constitute an independent text, be informative and rich in contents, as far as possible reflecting the contents, structure and conclusions of the article).

7.4. Not mandatory: key words in English (8–10 words or word combinations).

7.5. References.

8. Presentation rules for 'References' section

8.1. The structure of references to publications is to be totally identical to the list of references in Russian.

8.2. In the 'References' section, as in the list of used literature, only scientific articles and monographs are to be included.

8.3. All references to sources are to be given as footnotes.

8.4. **Monographs** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for Russian authors), **LC standard**;

- *Title of the book in italics* – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the book is published in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title in square brackets;

- Year of publication;

- Information about the publication as follows: location of publishing house, name of the publishing house;

- Pages,

- if the book is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

Examples:

Ter-Minasova S.G. *Rossiia i Zapad: dialog kul'tur* [Russia and West countries: dialogue of cultures]. Moscow: Tsentr po izucheniiu vzaimodeistviia kul'tur, 2000. 320 p. (In Russian)

Bevir M., Rhodes R.A.W. *Interpreting British governance*. London: Routledge, 2003. 150 p.

8.5. Articles **in journals** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s – transliteration (for Russian authors) **LC standard**;

- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;

- Information about the publication as follows: *Name of the journal (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, year of publication, number, pages, DOI index (if available);

- if the article is in Russian, add '(In Russian)' at the end.

Examples:

Dunin A. *Guvernery v starinu v pomeschchich'ikh sem'iakh* [Tutors in landowner families in old times]. *Istoricheskii vestnik* [Historical Herald], 1909, vol. 117, July, pp. 185–194. (In Russian)

Cross A.G. An Anglo-Russian Medley: Semen Vorontsov's other son, Charles Cameron's daughter, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich's English playmate and not forgetting his English nurse. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 1992, vol. 70, no. 44, pp. 708–721.

Cross A. English – A Serious Challenge to French in the Reign of Alexander I? The Russian Review, 2015, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 57–68. DOI: 10.1111/russ.10756

8.6. Articles **in collection of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for authors whose name is in Cyrillic characters), **LC standard**;
- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;
- Information about the publication of the collection of articles as follows: In last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the editor – transliteration, **LC standard, (ed.)**. *Name of the collection of articles (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, followed by the English translation of the title (if written in Cyrillic characters), in square brackets; place of publishing: the name of the publishing house in transliteration, year of publication; pages, DOI index (if available);
- if the article is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

Examples:

Chudinov A.V. Frantsuzskie gubernery v Rossii kontsa XVIII v.: stereotipy i real'nost [The French tutors in Russia at the end of the 18th century: stereotypes and reality]. Karp S.Ia., Mezin S.A. (eds.) *Evropeiskoe prosveshchenie i tsvilizatsiia Rossii* [European Enlightenment and civilization of Russia]. Moscow: Nauka, 2004, pp. 330–334. (In Russian)

Solodyankina O.Yu. Personal transfer of the message and undesirable acquaintance to the addressee: reputation of the governess. Stogova A.V. (ed.) *Incidents and Failures in European epistolary culture*. Moscow: IVI RAN, 2016, pp. 125–154.

8.7. **Links to electronic resources** are to be provided similar to the previous sections, but at the very end of the entry the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date is to be added.

Examples:

Dabla-Norris E., Minoiu C., Zanna L.-F. 2010. *Business cycle fluctuations, large shocks, and development aid new evidence* [Washington D.C.], International Monetary Fund. Available at: <http://site.ebrari.com/id/10437418> (accessed: 20.06.2014).

Frot E. 2009 *Aid and the financial crisis: Shall we expect development aid to fall?* Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402788 (accessed: 28.05.2013).

