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## EDITORIAL

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*Dear readers,*



We are pleased to present the fourth issue of ‘Historia provinciae – the journal of regional history’. It is devoted to the most important event not only in the Russian but also in the world history – the Great October Socialist Revolution, the centenary of which is being celebrated this year. It goes without saying that our journal could not take no notice of such a significant event, however it would be incorrect to consider this issue as a response to this anniversary only. The Russian Revolution of 1917 left such a deep trace in our history that its study

will always remain the most important trend and an area of activity for historians and other specialists in the humanities knowledge. The scientific interests of the authors in this issue are related to the revolutionary topic, and their articles were not only prepared because of the ‘anniversary’ date, but rather reflect the current trends of the research. Following the subject theme of our journal, we are publishing the materials of researchers from various regions of this country: Arkhangelsk, Yelets, Oryol, Cherepovets and Yaroslavl.

The article of A.N. Egorov is devoted to the analysis of mass public sentiments among the population in Vologda Governorate on the eve of the February Revolution. At its basis are the reports of gendarme and the constabulary to their headship, adequately reflecting the state of affairs at the local level. The timeliness of this subject matter is in the intention of several historians, politicians and public figures to fix the idea in the public perception that there were no objective reasons for czar’s demise, and the revolution took place because of destructive activity of masons, liberals and other opponents of the existing established order. Entering polemics regarding this point of view, A.N. Egorov shows at the example of one of the peaceful governorates of Russia, the naturally-determined nature of the February Revolution, in many aspects caused by the inability of the authorities to solve one of the most important problems in the country’s life.

In the article of S.V. Kholyaev, at the example of Yaroslavl, the mutual influence of events is shown with regards to the course of revolution, that were taking place both in the capital and in the provinces. The author shows that the major problem in 1917 became the disaccord of the central and the regional authorities, whereas the refusal of the Provisional Government to recognise the priority of committees for public security, influential at the local level, led to the crisis of the whole system of regional governance. The rise to power of the Bolsheviks prevented the disintegration

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of the country, once again securing support for the central government on part of most of the principal towns of the provinces.

The most important problem in 1917 became the issue of inter-ethnic relations, splitting apart the Russian Empire. In the article of A.N. Hajiyeu, the factors of social-economic and socio-political development of the Southwestern Caucasus are considered, which set the prerequisites for formation of democratic republics in Transcaucasia. The revolutionary upheavals of 1917 caused the natural growth of national movements in Transcaucasia, and the rise to power of the Bolsheviks and their withdrawal from World War I created the real conditions to change the state-territorial status of Caucasian regions and provinces. Under such conditions, as the author shows, the creation of independent republics in Transcaucasia was becoming inevitable.

Up to now, the debates go on with regards to responsibility for the revolution that various politicians and public figures would assume. A certain contribution to this discussion is made by the article of D.V. Shchukin devoted to consideration and reflection of the image of historical people and the revolutionary events of 1917 in diaries, memoirs and letters of political personalities of the considered epoch. The author emphasizes that those events left a strongly pronounced emotional colouring in their contemporaries' memory, and such colouring passed onto the historiography of the Russian Revolution from private sources.

Of polemical character is also the article of D.V. Aronov on the place and role of President in the liberal law-making in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Having analysed the texts of the liberal projects of the Constitution of Russia (Basic Law) in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and the law-making process of the Special Committee and the Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, the author made a conclusion about inappreciable influence of liberal ideas on the statutory law making in 1917. In the opinion of D.V. Aronov, the project of introducing the post of Acting (Provisional) President confirms the overall conclusion that the liberal, based on rule of law, 'recipes' for overcoming systemic crises do not work in the revolutionary time, when the choice of the society gravitates towards other ways of reforming the social reality and crisis recovery, offering simple and understandable solutions for the ordinary people.

The materials published in the journal are complemented by the review of V.I. Goldin for the collection of reports at the international scientific conference that took place in March 2017 in St Petersburg 'February Revolution of 1917: Problems of History and Historiography'. In the section 'Chronicle of Scientific Life', the information regarding All-Russia (with international participation) academic seminar 'State, capitalism and society in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries' arranged by Cherepovets State University with financial support from RFBR, is presented. At the seminar, among other things, the problems of the Great October Socialist Revolution were considered, where many authors of the articles participated in its work.

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The Editorial Board of the journal hope that the presented materials will be interesting and useful not only for historians but also for non-specialist audiences, whilst the suggested debatable points of view will become the impetus for new research.

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## **Public sentiments of the population in Vologda Governorate on the eve of the February Revolution**

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*Abstract.* The article is devoted to the analysis of public sentiments of the population in Vologda Governorate in the period since the beginning of World War I and until the February Revolution. Reports of gendarmes and police officials to their administration adequately reflect the state of affairs locally and serve as the main source of information. The article shows how the patriotic spirit in the first months of the war began to give way to psychological and physical fatigue due to the hardships of war and disruption of the routine way of economic life. The author notes that the anti-German and, to a lesser degree, the anti-Semitic views that appeared during the war could be dangerous signs of aggravation of the social tension. Rising prices and the ongoing shortage of food and essential goods, together with the inability of the central and the local authorities to solve this problem, pushed the population to self-assembly and struggle. Immediately prior to the February Revolution, many people felt that the Tsarist regime was the reason of all failures and misery. Anti-war statements became widely spread, the Tsar and the government often faced sharp criticism; there were cases of open non-fulfilment of orders issued by the authorities. All the materials in the article acknowledge the naturally-determined character of the February Revolution.

*Keywords:* World War I, public sentiments, Vologda Governorate, gendarmes, police, political parties, the February Revolution

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### **Introduction**

The February Revolution is one of those historical events that will cause discussions as long as historical studies exist. Most Russian and foreign historians see the February Revolution as a logical consequence of the fundamental contradictions in

Tsarist Russia<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, in recent years, supporters of the conservative approach formulated by G.M. Katkov<sup>2</sup>, also became influential. They believe that there were no objective reasons for overthrowing the monarchy, and that the Revolution took place because of a combination of several accidental causes due to temporary military difficulties and the destructive activity of masons, liberals and other opponents of the existing system. To understand the causes of the Revolution adequately, it is necessary to look at the public sentiments of the population in the Russian Empire during World War I. This is not a new topic; its various aspects have always attracted attention of both Russian and foreign historians<sup>3</sup>. In recent years, the following intrigues have been thoroughly studied: the image of the Russian imperial family in the people's consciousness, spy mania, sentiments in the army, attitudes to subjects of hostile nations, etc.<sup>4</sup>. International conferences and colloquiums devoted to World War I are regularly held, where the manifestation of public sentiments amongst the population of the Russian Empire is revealed<sup>5</sup>, followed by publication of the summary works<sup>6</sup>. The changing dynamics of the public sentiments in several regions of the country are studied as well<sup>7</sup>. However, in Vologda Governorate, such studies have not been undertaken yet, except for their several separate aspects<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Khasegava Ts. The February Revolution. *Critical Dictionary of the Russian Revolution*. St. Petersburg, 2014, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> See: Katkov G.M. *The February Revolution*. Moscow, 1997.

<sup>3</sup> See: Gatrell P. *Russia's First World War: A Social and Economic History*. Harlow, 2005; Gatrell P. *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I*. Bloomington, 2005; Gaudin C. *Ruling Peasants: Village and State in Late Imperial Russia*. DeKalb, 2007; Figes O. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924*. Leningrad, 1996; Haimson L. The problem of the social stability in urban Russia, 1905–1917. *Slavic review*, 1964, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 619–642; 1965, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1–22; Haimson L.H. 'The problem of political and social stability in urban Russia on the eve of war and revolution' Revisited. *Slavic review*, 2000, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 848–875.

<sup>4</sup> Kolonitskiy B.I. 'Tragic Erotic': *Images of the Imperial Family during World War I*. Moscow, 2010; Fuller U. *Internal Enemy: Spy Mania and the Decline of Imperial Russia*. Moscow, 2009; Astashov A.B. *Russian Front in 1914 – early 1917: War Experience and Modernity*. Moscow, 2014; Lor E. *Russian Nationalism and the Russian Empire: The Campaign against 'Enemy Nationals' during World War I*. Moscow, 2012.

<sup>5</sup> See: *Russia and World War I: Proceedings of the International Colloquium*. St. Petersburg, 1999; *The Era of War and Revolution: 1914–1922*. St Petersburg, 2017; *Russia during World War I, 1914–1918*. Moscow, 2014; *Great War of Russia: Social Order, Public Communication and Violence at the Turn of the Tsarist and Soviet Eras*. Moscow, 2014; etc.

<sup>6</sup> See: *Russia during World War I: Economic Situation, Social Processes, Political Crisis*. Moscow, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> See: Balyberdin Yu.A. The rise of the protest moods of the people during World War I in the Vyatka-Kama region. *Bulletin of Vyatka State University*, 2011, no. 1, pp. 39–46; Belov S.B. *Patriotism in World War I (1914 – 1916). A view from Nizhniy*. Nizhniy Novgorod, 2008; Belova I.B. *World War I and the Russian Province. 1914 – February 1917*. Moscow, 2011; 21. Shashkov V.I. *The Political Climate among the Siberian Peasantry during World War I (July 1914 – February*

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Vologda Governorate was an ordinary province with the mostly peasant population. On the territory of the region, there were no big cities, large factories or higher educational institutions. The revolution of 1905-07 grew out relatively quietly there. In terms of politics, this region was interesting only due to the amount of political exiles, which was the second largest in the Russian Empire after the East Siberian region (they called Vologda Governorate ‘pod Stolichnaya Siberia’, which is literally translated as ‘Siberia near the vicinity of the capital’). The well-preserved reports of gendarmes and police officers regarding the situation in the local areas, together with the materials in the local press, make it possible to understand the public sentiments of the population of Vologda Governorate on the eve of the February Revolution.

### Main body

The impact of World War I on the revolutionary crisis that broke out in Russia is so obvious that it would be useful to look at the reaction of the population in Vologda Governorate to the outbreak of the war. In fact, this reaction was no different from the one in the other regions of the country, where the profound patriotic spirit observed everywhere was reflected both in the press and in the reports of gendarmes and police officers. One non-commissioned officer of Vologda provincial gendarme department was sent to several subdivisions – volosts – in Vologda uyezd (administrative subdivision of the Russian Empire, a second-level of administrative division, close to a county – *translator’s note*) in November 1914 to check the ‘attitudes of the population’. He noted, “Despite difficult times and the financial hardships of the peasantry, the attitudes are patriotic and cannot be compared to those that existed in these volosts in 1905 and 1906<sup>9</sup>.” In a few reports, the police officers characterized the attitudes of the local population as ‘highly patriotic’. On 18 November 1914, the City Duma in Vologda considered the possibility of commemorating the names of citizens from Vologda Governorate who “had fallen for faith, the Tsar and the motherland”. The members of the City Duma – ‘glasnye’ (councilors) – decided to install several commemorative plaques with the names of the citizens from Vologda Governorate

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1917). Author’s Abstract ... Doctoral Dissertation. Novosibirsk, 2001; Shilovskii M.V. *World War I of 1914 – 1918 and Siberia*. Novosibirsk, 2015; etc.

<sup>8</sup> See: Golikova N.I. To the question about interaction of state institutions and public organizations during World War I (on materials of Vologda Governorate). *Historical Local Studies and Archives: Collection of Articles*. Vologda, 2003, vol. 9, pp. 133–140; Smirnov I.A. *Kirillov Uezd during the World War I*. Kirillov. Vologda, 2005, vol. 6, pp. 136–156; Troshina T.I. *The Great War and the Northern Region: North European Russia during World War I*. Arkhangel'sk, 2014; etc.

<sup>9</sup> *State Archives of the Vologda Region (SAVR)*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5745, Sheet 13, reverse side.

who died at the front, in all Vologda churches, and to arrange a special site for military graves on the territory of the Bogorodsky cemetery<sup>10</sup>.

Currently, researchers consider it artificial to make attempts to isolate the stages in the formation of protest moods. During the whole period of the wartime, there was manifestation of patriotism, as well as that of grumbling and discontent. Whilst we agree with this statement, we would nevertheless like to emphasize that certain dynamics of changes in the public attitudes can be seen in the reports of gendarmerie and police. Thus, in many documents in the autumn of 1915, such expressions as ‘patriotic attitude’ gave place to others, such as ‘the population made themselves easy towards the war’. The battle fatigue and the desire for a quick but victorious end of the war for Russia began to prevail. The police chief of Kadnikov Uyezd believed that, although the attitudes of peasants and workers towards the war over the past year “seemed to have not changed at all..., there is no turning to peace, but, apparently, the fast end of the war is desirable for all.”<sup>11</sup> Reports from Gryazovets assumed that the peasants referred to the war with ‘great attention’, were longing for peace, but only for the peace that would be accompanied by a complete defeat of the enemy<sup>12</sup>. Since the spring of 1916, gendarmes had been noting that the peasants and workers were looking forward to making peace being impatient, however, with the honorable peace.

At the beginning of the war, the mobilization in Vologda Governorate, as well as throughout the whole country, was successful. As one of gendarmes’ reports states, “there was nothing politically reprehensible noticed at recruiting station No.3 among approximately 350 people summoned there. The sentiments of the people are patriotic, they join the service willingly; many of them volunteered”<sup>13</sup>. In 1915, the attitudes towards mobilization began to change. The gendarmes note, “Peasants and the rest of the population are conscious of the need for frequent military recruitments and lend themselves to this process, although they complain that we should also take police officers and guards to war”<sup>14</sup>. In 1916, the discontent with frequent military recruitments became obvious. After the horse mobilization, some of the peasants said, “It is still tolerable, however now people and horses are taken away, summer will come shortly, there would be no one to cultivate the land, and there would be nothing to help us to do so”<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> *State Archives of the Vologda Region (SAVR)*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5745, Sheet 13, reverse side

<sup>11</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 24.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* Sheet 32.

<sup>13</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5745, Sheet 26, reverse side.

<sup>14</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 7, 79.

<sup>15</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5872, Sheet 79.

Since the spring of 1915, gendarmes had begun to note the anti-war attitudes. Thus, a peasant from one of the villages said, “the Germans are rich and they have a lot of gold, but our government does not have any money, the Germans have a lot of power, our troops can never defeat them, and it would be better for the Russian government to ask the Germans for peace in advance”. Another peasant “scolded the Emperor and said that the soldiers do not need to go to war”, yet another “condemned the instructions of the Emperor, and said that we should not fight”<sup>16</sup>. For every fact like that, gendarmes conducted an unofficial check, and, if there were any reasons, made an official inquiry. However, although the anti-war attitudes were not so widely spread in Vologda Governorate, since the beginning of 1916, there was an obvious increase in the number of such inquiries. Quite often, such demonstration of anti-war attitudes also meant negative statements about Nicholas II and the Empress, which had not been observed before. In January 1916, A. Abramovsky, a peasant, said, “it is not necessary to fight; there is no one to fight for and no one to protect; he allowed himself to offend the reigning Emperor of All Russia, calling him ‘Kol’ka’ to arouse disrespect and scolded him in the foul language”<sup>17</sup>. The anti-war sentiments have spread not only among the peasants. In October 1916, a servant of K. Popov “dared to say that soon soldiers would not go to war, and that they do not have to go”, and “that there will soon be pogroms, they will smash the authorities, whereas the servant expressed the desire to join these pogroms”<sup>18</sup>. In December 1916, K.I. Pilberg, a chemist in the local pharmacy, said, “Peasants are fools to give money to the government, buying war bonds”<sup>19</sup>.

We also have at our disposal the memoirs of D.M. Silinsky, a Vologda peasant, who as a young man in 1916–17 worked as a scribe in the volost government. Silinsky wrote these memoirs in 1965–66 for the local history museum, most likely, commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the October Revolution. They have certain clichés of the Soviet era but show peasants’ attitudes in considerable detail on the eve of the February Revolution. Per the memoirs of Silinsky, the open and blended discontent with the war had revealed itself more and more since 1916, especially among women. During the war, the wives of soldiers who were off to the front received benefits from the state for disabled members of the family. However, under the conditions of constantly rising prices, these benefits “completely lost their value”. There were frequent cases when “soldiers’ wives and old people who had lost their breadwinners came to a rural marshal with demands to take measures to return their husbands and sons from the front”. Moreover, crippled soldiers began to come to villages from the front, telling about the situation and moods in the hospitals and at the front

<sup>16</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5872, Sheet 72, 79.

<sup>17</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 6002, Sheet 62.

<sup>18</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5990, Sheet 187.

<sup>19</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5983, Sheet 138.

not in a “newspaper style”, as Silinsky recalled, “And soldiers’ wives were no longer afraid to speak openly that peasants did not need this war”. The anti-war talks spread around at village meetings and in conversations of peasants with each other. These talks “have already brought a lot of trouble to a police sergeant, who reported about the attitudes of peasants to the bailiff in Tarnoga every week. However, it was no longer possible to hush such conversations among the peasants”<sup>20</sup>.

The gendarmerie documents show the ambiguity of attitudes in the various groups of population towards the war. Thus, in October 1915, an assistant to head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported that part of the peasant population had jobs in the cities. There, “due to shortage of workers, peasants can assign wages at their will, and employers only agree to them; and because of these circumstances, many peasants made money savings... they, therefore, are aware that the reason for improvement in their welfare is the war, for the duration of which they do not grumble”. Other peasants understand that “the enemy is strong, and the war cannot end soon; although there were certain individuals who expressed their views against the war; peasants did not agree with them, and these individuals were brought to attention of the local authorities”<sup>21</sup>.

In October 1915, summing up the information from all the counties, the head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported to the Police Department, “The attitudes of peasants and workers are now calm and mostly patriotic; the population has a strong desire to bring the war to the final victory over the enemy”. He noted, “Therefore, despite the enormous hardships associated with mobilization, the population adequately tolerates the frequent military recruitments, understanding their necessity, and only the recruitment of soldiers 2<sup>nd</sup> rank (‘ratniks’) was a little distressing”<sup>22</sup>. Per his observations, the anti-war proclamations of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the agitation of political convicts among the workers of Vologda railway shops were not very successful.

Since December 1914, the documents of gendarmes and police officers also note cases of evading military service. By 1916, they became so widespread that began to influence the public sentiments. In October 1916, an assistant to head of Vologda provincial gendarme department wrote about the ‘strong displeasure’ of the population towards people “evading recruitment, both through self-mutilation and mainly by applying for positions exempt from forced military recruitment, in various ways; and there were usually reports from the population about such people”<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Silinsky D.M. *Through the Fog of Time. Memories of Distant Youth. At the Savior Churchyard. The History of the Northern Village*. Vologda, 2002, pp. 85–86.

<sup>21</sup> SAVR. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 6.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. Sheet 16.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Sheet 268.

In August 2014, Nicholas II ordered to stop selling vodka for the whole duration of the war. As researchers note, and as evidenced by the materials of Vologda Governorate, the overwhelming majority of Russians<sup>24</sup> supported the Prohibition at the beginning. One of gendarmes' reports say, "Since the cessation of the wine trade, all sorts of crimes have significantly decreased, and this, apparently, quite satisfies the whole population"<sup>25</sup>. However, over time, the Prohibition began to bring some negative effects, the main of which was the widespread distribution of brewing and moonshining, being noted by the police since November 1914. Subsequently, it led to other consequences dangerous for the authorities. The documents of 1916 repeatedly noted the cases of peasants' dissatisfaction with the appearance of drunken representatives of the authorities; and it was not because they drank too much but rather because "they drink when we cannot".

One of the characteristics of the wartime was the growth of anti-German and, to a lesser extent, anti-Austrian attitudes that appeared mostly in the sentiments towards prisoners of war and persons of German nationality. At the beginning of the war, the attitude towards them was not yet hostile. Thus, in November 1914, a non-commissioned officer of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported that the residents of Ustysysol uyezd "do not oppress and do not make acquaintance" with prisoners of war (22 persons) located there<sup>26</sup>. However, due to escalation in military activities, the anti-German attitudes also intensified. The main reason of these anti-German attitudes was the idea of German, and in general foreign economic dominance, foreign sabotage within the country, the government propaganda that formed the image of the enemy among the people and the stories about inhuman methods of warfare applied by the Germans in the news that had been coming from the front starting since the autumn of 1914. In the autumn of 1915, a district police officer in Solvychegodk uyezd wrote that the attitudes towards the Germans were hostile and "the hostility towards them was also growing", since "there are almost no such persons who did not have their relatives mobilized, and this bitterness aggravates upon arrival of wounded soldiers to the villages, especially those with wounds from shell bullets"<sup>27</sup>.

An assistant to head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported on hostile attitudes of the population towards persons of German origin who were in the civil service and those holding prominent posts<sup>28</sup>. They blamed them for all the fail-

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<sup>24</sup> Arthur M.K. Prohibition during World War I: causes, concept and consequences of the introduction of Prohibition in 1914–1917. *Russia and the First World War*. St Petersburg, 1999, p. 154.

<sup>25</sup> SAVR. Fond 108. Opis' 1, D. 5745, Sheet 25.

<sup>26</sup> SAVR. Fond 108. Opis' 1, D. 5745, Sheet 25.

<sup>27</sup> SAVR. Fond 108. Opis' 1, D. 5864, Sheet 22.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Sheet 6, reverse side.

ures at the front. Before the war, German citizens run several commercial and industrial enterprises in Vologda Governorate (such as the brewery in Veliky Ustyug, etc.). Since the beginning of the war, the owners of these establishments had begun to accept the Russian citizenship discreetly. The residents of Vologda were strongly against it and suggested confiscating these enterprises in favour of the treasury<sup>29</sup>. The requirements to dismiss persons with German nationality from their posts became a widespread phenomenon, as well as spreading rumours about them being potentially spies.

The anti-German attitudes related to the patriotic spirit and resulted from it. In the autumn of 1915, a leaflet was posted up in Vologda, “When will Vologda get rid of the German Fuchs (vice-governor. – *A.E.*)? Are the scandal and warnings in the theatre not enough for him when people shouted “down with Fuchs, down with the Germans”? Such a pity they let him get away alive; it is high time to strangle this German spy because we cannot entrust the government with this... Moreover, we have another German, the gendarme Miller, and everyone knows about this scoundrel, everyone knows he is a spy but everyone is afraid of him. Down with the German Fuchs! Down with the gendarme Miller! It’s time for us to start cleaning our Mother Russia!”<sup>30</sup> The gendarmes did not find the authors of this leaflet, but judging by the style of the text, those were the people close to the Union of the Russian people, who showed certain activity during the war<sup>31</sup>. In 1906–07, almost with the same expressions they demanded to clean ‘Mother Russia’ from revolutionaries, liberals and the Jews. However, one should not think that the anti-German attitudes came only from the right-wing circles; they were spread in most segments of the population. The local district police officer from Kadnikov wrote, “I often heard peasants’ arguments that if not for the dry law, they would have treated the Germans in such a way that only very few of them would be left in Russia”<sup>32</sup>.

The incident in Totma in January 1915 proves how easily the anti-German attitudes turned into interethnic conflicts. Per the report of a non-commissioned officer of Vologda provincial gendarme department, several mobilized warriors – the ‘ratniks’ – smashed a few captured Germans and Austrians, explaining this by saying that “the Germans were under poor supervision and had greater freedom”<sup>33</sup>. Together with other prisoners, they also assaulted a supervised mountaineer, whom they mistakenly took for one of the Germans. The next day, the supervised mountaineers

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<sup>29</sup> SAVR. Fond 108. Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 42.

<sup>30</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 18.

<sup>31</sup> For further information please refer to: Egorov A.N. The organization of right-wing parties in the cities of North European Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. *Bulletin of Cherepovets State University*, 2013, no. 1 (46), vol. 2, pp. 29–32.

<sup>32</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 24, reverse side.

<sup>33</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5872, Sheet 7.

made a ‘deal’ with the mobilized in response to beating their compatriot. Thus, there started a big fight, during which one mountaineer was killed, and two died later in the hospital. The police that came to rescue decided not to deal with the mobilized and simply arrested all the mountaineers without any special investigation.

In 1915, the retreat of the Russian army caused evacuation of a significant number of Jews from the governorates, from the boundary of a settled area to various regions of the country, which led to increase in anti-Semitism activity. Prior to the war, there were almost no anti-Semitic attitudes in Vologda Governorate, since there were very few Jews there, and in some areas (‘*uyezdy*’ – pl. *translator’s note*), there were none of them at all. Therefore, per various police reports, the public attitude towards Jews could be mostly described as ‘indifferent’. In 1915, Jewish refugees appeared in Vologda Governorate; in most cases, the population reacted to this fact with no prejudice. The head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported to the Police Department that the Jewish refugees were treated in the same way as the Christians<sup>34</sup>. At the same time, in the cities that were located down the railway, such as Vologda or Gryazovets, the number of Jews increased noticeably, which led to spreading the anti-Semitic attitudes. The local police chief of Gryazovets reported, “The general attitude of the population towards the Jews is not very favourable, and whilst collecting information on location of refugees in the uyezd, we had to listen to such requests as “just do not send the Jews to us”<sup>35</sup>. Gendarmes saw the causes of such anti-Semitic attitudes in mass evasion of the Jews from the military service, unfair prices for essential products set by Jewish traders and strengthening of Jewish influence in the provincial cities. As an example, per gendarmes’ reports, the residents of Vologda complained of “Jewish dominance in general, and in particular, recent frequent purchases of houses by the Jews”<sup>36</sup>. The point was about the policy of settling all accessible areas by the Jews pursued by the Petrograd Jewish Assistance Committee, the deputies of which repeatedly visited Vologda.

One of the main questions is how great the influence of political parties was on maturing the revolutionary crisis during the war. There is no point explaining that the activities of all political parties in pre-revolutionary Russia, especially the left-wing parties, were under constant control of gendarmes. During the wartime, this control only intensified. Per the report of head of Vologda provincial gendarme department to the Police Department, “all persons under suspicion are registered, and both external and internal surveillance is done”<sup>37</sup>. There were no organized branches of revolutionary parties in Vologda Governorate, but there were some representatives of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) and the Socialist Revolutionary

<sup>34</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 17.

<sup>35</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 32, reverse side.

<sup>36</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 130, Sheet 28.

<sup>37</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 17.

Party (the SRs), as well as people who sympathized them. The Social Democrats in Vologda rested upon the society called ‘Prosveshcheniye’ – a cultural and educational organization that brought together more than 200 people, mostly workers of various industries and professions. The society arranged lectures, literary readings, concerts and excursions for the workers. Per the invitations of its management, many scientists and cultural figures from the capital visited Vologda and delivered lectures. Supporters of the Socialists-Revolutionaries were also orientated at the Vologda Agricultural Society, which played a huge role in the development of the cooperative movement in Vologda Governorate. Per gendarmes’ reports, “agitators used legal meetings of these societies to put forward their beliefs; proclamations accidentally received from Petrograd were also delivered there”<sup>38</sup>. At the same time, in 1915, the local gendarmes did not see any great danger in the activities of the revolutionary parties and their representatives yet. They believed that workers “are not inclined to believe the agitation appeals, with few exceptions, saying that now was not the time to be engaged in politics; the disturbances amongst them occur only due to rising prices for food and insufficient remuneration of their work, in their opinion”<sup>39</sup>.

In 1916, the situation began to change. The secret agent named ‘Kamenny’, who was apparently a worker recruited for the service, regularly reported to Vologda provincial gendarme department on the Social Democrats spreading among the workers. In January 1916, the workers of Vologda railway shops and city printing house established a social-democratic group that maintained contact with the Social Democratic fraction of the State Duma and the working group of the Central War Industry Committee<sup>40</sup>. On 1 May 1916, the members of the group planned a mass meeting outside the city followed by a meeting of workers sympathizing with the ideas of the Social Democrats, however they did not dare to do so due to fear of arrests. The general public sentiments among the workers can be seen from the gendarmes’ reports, “The workers do not trust the central government and representatives of administrative authorities unconditionally, they are opposed to merchants for their looting and blame the government for the opposition against them, and in general, for the high cost of appropriate measures”<sup>41</sup>.

Various public organizations in Vologda Governorate (such as credit partnerships, consumer and cooperative unions, cultural, educational and agricultural societies) were the reason of serious anxiety on part of the authorities. Per head of Vologda provincial gendarme department, “These unions attract attention of the population not only as breeding ground for culture and material well-being, but also as insti-

<sup>38</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 17.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*. Sheet 17, reverse side.

<sup>40</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 131, Sheet 105.

<sup>41</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 130, Sheet 79, reverse side.

tutions that unite disparate forces”<sup>42</sup>. The historians have repeatedly emphasised the importance of legal organizations, including cooperatives, for the socialist parties in pre-revolutionary Russia<sup>43</sup>. A. Dickens believes that legitimate organizations created new political culture, “which shaped the organized socialism”<sup>44</sup>.

This statement is fully confirmed by the materials of Vologda Governorate. Thus, the Regional Cooperative Congress of eight northern provinces (‘guberniyas’) arranged by the Vologda Agricultural Society late in August 1915 became a highlight of the social life. The organizational bureau of the congress headed by the famous Socialist-Revolutionary S.S. Maslov, included people close to revolutionary parties, and most deputies, per gendarmes’ observations, referred to the left wing. A prominent liberal, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, Prince D.I. Shakhovskoy became chairman of the Congress. During the war, he played a huge role in the development of the cooperative movement and strengthening its role in the socio-political life of the country<sup>45</sup>. During the work of the Congress, the vice-governor repeatedly interrupted the speeches of the left-wing deputies and cautioned them for their attempts to raise political questions. At the end of the Congress, Prince Shakhovskoy read out the general political resolution that expressed the demands and wishes of the Congress. The text of this resolution is not preserved in the archive, but we know its content according to one of the members of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, A.S. Izgoyev, who states that the cooperative congress demanded “freedom of alliances, universal suffrage, responsibility of the ministry, etc.”<sup>46</sup> For a legal congress, this was too much, and when Shakhovskoy put the resolution to the vote, the vice-governor declared the Congress closed.

The local press noted that at the Congress many peasants saw and understood for the first time the importance of various organizations, “They realized, because they had to realize, that it is possible to fight for better future only being organized”. One newspaper quoted the words of one of peasants’ deputies, “Everything that I saw and heard at the Congress affected me so much that I feel terribly excited... Here I realized that we, small people, being united and organized, represent the force for which there is nothing impossible. This consciousness brought me into cheerfulness and forces me to strain my efforts in my work for the good of the Motherland and the

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<sup>42</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5864, Sheet 16, reverse side.

<sup>43</sup> See: Swain G. *Russian Social Democracy and the Legal Labour Movement, 1906–1914*. London, 1983.

<sup>44</sup> Dickens A. A legal path to revolution: Consumer cooperation and the overthrow of Tsarism (the case of Krasnoyarsk). *The Age of Wars and Revolutions: 1914–1922*. St Petersburg, 2017, p. 64.

<sup>45</sup> Kuz'mina I.V., Lubkov A.V. *Prince Shakhovskoy: The Path of a Russian Liberal*. Moscow, 2008, pp. 238–239.

<sup>46</sup> *Protocols of the Central Committee and foreign groups of the Constitutional Democratic Party: in 6 volumes*. Moscow, 1998, vol. 3, p. 168.

bright future, in which I believe now”<sup>47</sup>. Per gendarme’s report on A. Nikitin, a peasant, the idea of such co-operative congresses was beginning to become popular in the villages. At the meeting of the consumer society, A. Nikitin made a speech “on the benefits of cooperative societies, saying that currently, with the level of destruction of the state, this it is not possible to achieve any profit, because workers in our country have been in chains for more than one century and even though liberation from serfdom has taken place, people are still in slavery”<sup>48</sup>.

On 30 August 1915, the Vologda City Duma organised a banquet with 500 guests for members of the cooperative congress. Opposition speeches were made over a cup of tea, and at the end, a telegram was received from Moscow in support of the Moscow City Duma demanding “the need to regain the authority by means of engaging people who are trusted in the country and bear the responsibility for such power”<sup>49</sup>. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party on 5 September 1915, D.I. Shakhovskoy talked about the public sentiments in Vologda Governorate. He noted, “The absence of any manifestations of public life does not mean any powerlessness of the country, but simply the impossibility or inability to bring its negative attitude towards the reactionary course and arrange any legitimate forms of struggle”. Recalling his trip to Vologda, he mentioned “tremendous growth of everyone’s responsibility for the national affairs and understanding the need to invest in these affairs, but at the same time, extreme caution should be exercised in trying to get involved into any open struggle”. Therefore, local “serious riots and unrest” cannot be expected”<sup>50</sup>.

The military upheavals led to the much expected activities of the working class. In Vologda, workers of railway shops differed in their greater cohesion and organization. They came forward in May 1915, appealing to the City Duma with a demand to include their representatives in the city food commission. The workers wrote, “For many months, prices have been rising... our City Duma, one can say, did nothing... It satisfies traders’ interests rather than consumers’ needs... Earnings remain at the same level, when life got more expensive and the prices continue to rise. It is impossible to survive for the working population. Drastic measures should be taken immediately, straight away”<sup>51</sup>. 683 workers signed the petition. Both members of the City Duma and the authorities saw not only the economic requirements in this letter, however the political context as well. At the meeting of the City Duma on 2 June 1915, an intensive discussion arose, as some of the City Duma members feared possibly greater in-

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<sup>47</sup> *Vologodskiy listok (Vologda leaflet)*, 1915, September 1.

<sup>48</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 1, D. 5988, Sheet 10.

<sup>49</sup> *Vologodskiy listok (Vologda leaflet)*, 1915, September 1.

<sup>50</sup> *Protocols of the Central Committee and foreign groups of the Constitutional Democratic Party: in 6 volumes*. Moscow, 1998, vol. 3, p. 165.

<sup>51</sup> *Vologodskiy listok (Vologda leaflet)*, 1915, May 31.

fluence of the workers and, consequently, less influence of the ‘eligible to vote’ population. Thus, the City Duma agreed to include representatives of workers into the city food commission<sup>52</sup>.

In March 1916, the workers of Vologda railway shops elected a commission of seven persons to draft a petition and submit it to the Social-Democratic fraction of the State Duma referring to the failure of the city government and the administration of Vologda Governorate, in their opinion, to take appropriate measures to curtail the rising prices. At the same time, the workers from Vologda selected a delegation of five persons to the governor to deliver a statement “on the removal of Volkov, the mayor of Vologda, and inspection to be conducted by police officers, in presence of workers’ representatives, in the warehouses of local merchants and traders holding back the flour in their stores for the sake of their own profit”<sup>53</sup>. Thus, the first signs of self-organization could be seen among the workers, which in 1917 led to the creation of a system of workers’ councils, or soviets.

The military upheavals caused quite natural expectations for changes amongst the population, after the said war was over. According to the observations of Velsky uyezd police chief, in the autumn of 1915, peasants believed that they would “timely increase the size of their allotments per person to correspond to the standard in place, and that this would happen by the supreme order after the war’s end”<sup>54</sup>. In October 1916, an assistant to head of Vologda provincial gendarme department wrote, “in all social groups, there is a belief that since the war has become the people’s war, as soon as it ends, people will have the right to demand from the government the fulfilment of their desires”<sup>55</sup>. Were these the attitudes that led to euphoria from the fall of the monarchy that overtook Russia after the February Revolution?

The rising prices for all products and essential commodities had a huge influence on public attitudes on the eve of the February Revolution. The public discontent with the soaring prices was the key issue in all the reports of gendarmes and police officers to their leadership; the inability of the authorities to control the rising prices caused the naturally expected anti-government attitudes. In December 1915, an assistant to head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported, “Due to the high cost of living in terms of necessities, the population began to distrust any measures of the government aimed at high prices, whereas the merchants raising the prices for these products were met with bitterness”<sup>56</sup>. In October 1916, the same assistant reported, “The high cost of living makes no sense, sometimes it is caused by nothing more than greed of the traders, and the prices for some products are higher than those in the

<sup>52</sup> *Vologodskiy listok (Vologda leaflet)*, 1915, June 4.

<sup>53</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 130, Sheet 12.

<sup>54</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 5864, Sheet 35.

<sup>55</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 5864, Sheet 17, reverse side.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* Sheet 53.

capital. Among the poor, even the bureaucrats, and especially those who work at the post office and telegraph offices, you can hear the opinion that it is better to commit a crime than to see a starving family”<sup>57</sup>. The head of Vologda provincial gendarme department reported to the Police Department about the widespread “grumbling and discontent of the population with the government that does not take any measures against the high prices”<sup>58</sup>.

The public attitudes were reflected in sad couplets (‘chastushki’),  
“There’s no tea and sugar,  
No more beer left in store.  
This is when I start to know,  
We’re with Germany at war”<sup>59</sup>.

The discontent with the rising prices provoked hatred towards merchants and entrepreneurs. According to the words of a local police officer, peasants blamed for this dearness the “local merchants, who take advantage of the opportunity to raise prices for all goods”<sup>60</sup>. Summarizing the data on the governorate, the administrators of gendarmerie noted, “Among peasants, there are rumours that when the war ends, they will fight against the merchants, because they consider them one of the reasons for the high cost of living”<sup>61</sup>. There is probably no point in explaining how the Bolshevik propaganda used these attitudes in 1917, accusing the bourgeoisie, merchants and landlords of all the country’s troubles.

On the eve of the February Revolution, the problem of food provision became the major issue in Vologda Governorate. The members of the City Duma members reflected upon its importance in the report on the food provision issue dated 19 January 1917, “The situation gets worse every day and in the nearest future, as soon as the previous supplies are exhausted, it threatens us with famine and its terrible consequences. If not Vologda, then other less lucky areas already came close to this difficult situation”. The members of the City Duma no longer believed in the government’s ability to cope with this situation. They believed that “it was impossible to prevent an impending disaster in presence of the governmental regulation of the food matter, that was currently in effect”, and therefore “the local public institutions... must immediately raise their voice and point to the central authorities how threatening the situation with food currently is”<sup>62</sup>.

However, the local authorities could guess where the situation was leading to. It was already possible to spot some alarming issues in October 1916. In the review on

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<sup>57</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 5864, Sheet 17, reverse side.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. Sheet 7.

<sup>59</sup> *Vologda in the last Millennium: Essays on the history of the city*. Vologda, 2006, p. 135.

<sup>60</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 5864, Sheet 35, reverse side.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. Sheet 139.

<sup>62</sup> SAVR. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 594, Sheet 20.

the political situation in Vologda Governorate in the autumn of 1916, the head of Vologda provincial gendarme department noted that amongst the population “one can note a certain degree of fatigue, expressed grumbling and discontent of certain individuals regarding recruitment of the elderly workers, and regarding the cost of living, rising everyday”. Per this report, this discontent “transformed into hatred towards the merchants who shamelessly plundered their buyers”. A city inhabitant “gives up in despair for now, however their patience has limits”. Peasants thought that requisitioning of grain products was “uneven and did not correspond to one’s well-being, and due to shortage of bread in the harvest this year, it causes concern with regards to successful seeding of fields next spring”. Thus, “the failure to address the food issue, the injustice in food supply that is obvious to a common man and favouring merchants and landowners cannot strengthen the authorities’ credibility that became obvious at the beginning of the war; therefore, due to shameless criticism of newspapers and frequent changes of key figures in power, the population feels pessimistic towards the government, almost hostile towards those bearing German surnames, and indifferent towards the local executors of supreme orders, in view of their impotence”. The head of Vologda provincial gendarme department saw the main danger in destabilizing the situation in Vologda Governorate when military officials and individuals coming from the front spread rumours that the troops were unhappy with the government, and that after the war and defeating the enemy they would start a war ‘on the home front’. “The questions regarding land and food”, he concluded, “were so close to ordinary citizens that all the gossip about them were spread instantly, and the idea of a revolution was discussed as something inevitable unless emergency measures were to be taken to improve the food crisis”<sup>63</sup>.

An incident in Nikolsky uyezd demonstrates how close the ‘idea of revolution’ was to the population. On 21 December 1916, head of a volost in Utmanovo called a meeting to distribute the oats among the peasants, which was also necessary for the army. However, the peasants at the meeting said that “they had no oats and did not wish to give any verdict on this”. On 24 December, the meeting was held again, this time with the local authorities being present, among which were rural chief of police, the district agrotechnician and others. The representatives of authorities tried to elaborate on the decision of the minister for agriculture to pay the ‘grain duty’, explaining it to the peasants, however failed to do so. The speech of the rural chief of police was interrupted by the local peasant A.S. Okulovsky, “We do not have any oats, so if you wish, you can take the seeds; however in this case give us the money for the seeds”. The rural chief of police replied to this, “And you, the red man, shut up”, In response, Okulovsky, as stated in gendarme’s report, “shouted at the chief of police, “maybe you will order me to get out?”, to which the chief replied, “probably,

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<sup>63</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 5864, Sheet 272, reverse side.

yes, get out”. Then Okulovsky shouted again, “If you want us to get out, then we will get out. Guys, let’s go”, and then he turned around and went out, and the whole gathering followed him”<sup>64</sup>. Then the chief called the uyezd captain, however his intervention did not save the situation – the meeting was disrupted, and the peasants did not provide any oats.

A similar incident took place on 4 December 1916 in one of the villages of Yarensky Uyezd. The local authorities gathered the peasants in the building of a parish school for a meeting devoted to the military loan. The priest Popov urged the peasants to donate money for the needs of the army and said that whoever was against the loan was considered ‘a traitor’ and ‘unworthy to be called a son of their motherland’. The local scribe F.P. Chukichev replied, “I am a local peasant and I will not allow such rude treatment of the peasants”. The chairperson of the meeting, whilst referring to Chukichev, noted, “This is neither the place nor the time for making such remarks”. However, the troublemaker “continued to shout that he always had such a right”. Thus, the peasants began to leave the meeting – the subscription for the military loan was disrupted<sup>65</sup>. The investigation showed that in 1916, peasants often gathered in the volost government, read newspapers, discussed the situation at the front and in the country, and Chukichev played a significant role in this. He repeatedly expressed his support for the Labour Group, the Trudoviks, tried to refer the conversation to the political topics during private conversations, criticized the activities of the government, “pointed to deprivation of the peasants”, sympathized with the democratic government and was interested in newspapers of the left wing. Most of all, the authorities were alarmed by Chukichev’s great influence on the peasants<sup>66</sup>. The gendarmes did not have time to complete the inquiry as the revolution broke out. Such cases, although not numerous, testified to the increase in protest moods among the peasants.

### Conclusion

Thus, the public sentiments in Vologda Governorate during World War I underwent significant changes. The patriotic spirit of the first months of the war, already since the end of 1915 began to give way to psychological and physical fatigue due to hardships of the war and disruption in the normal routine of economic life. Significant anti-German and, to a lesser degree, anti-Semitic views became dangerous signs of aggravation in the social tension. Rising prices and food shortages, as well as high prices for essential goods, together with the inability of the central and local authorities to solve this problem, pushed the population to self-organization and struggle. In

<sup>64</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 6040, Sheet 29, reverse side.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* Sheet 13.

<sup>66</sup> *SAVR*. Fond 108, Opis’ 5, D. 6040, Sheet 14a, reverse side.

peasants' Vologda Governorate, this was particularly noticeable at the example of the cooperative movement, which became basis of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. On the threshold of the February Revolution, the masses at large felt that the Tsarist regime was to blame for all the failures and misery. The anti-war statements became widely spread, and the Tsar and the government often faced sharp criticism; there were cases of contempt and non-performance of orders issued by the authorities. Contrary to the claims of conservative historiography, the liberals, masons and German agents had nothing to do with that process. All the material provided in the article confirms the naturally expected character of the February Revolution, caused by the inability of the authorities to solve the most important problems in the country's life. One would find difficulty to quarrel with the statement of the head of Vologda provincial gendarme department, who wrote in October 1916, "The idea of revolution is being discussed as something inevitable".

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### The year of 1917 in Yaroslavl

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*Abstract.* The example of Yaroslavl shows the mutual influence of the events taking place at the capital level and in the provinces, on the course of the revolution. The main problem in the year 1917 was the split of the central and regional authorities. It is significant that it occurred in the first days of the revolution, when the power structures were headed by the representatives of one camp only – the liberal one. The failure of the Russian Provisional Government to recognize the primacy of the Committees for Public Security, which were influential at the local level, led to disobedience of the entire regional administration system to the government. The arrival of the Bolsheviks to power prevented the collapse of the country, once again providing support to the central government from the most provincial cities, including Yaroslavl.

*Keywords:* 1917, Yaroslavl, cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks, the Committees for Public Security

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### Introduction

The revolutionary events of 1917 cannot be reviewed without considering the deep contradiction of the revolution, which manifested itself in the split of the central and regional power. The Soviet historiography did not recognize this conflict, adding purely mechanically the governmental authorities formed at the provincial level in February 1917 to the local apparatus of the Provisional Government<sup>1</sup>. The first to question this approach was V.I. Startsev in his monograph 'Domestic Policy of the First Provisional Government' devoted to the analysis of two initial months of the Provisional Government. In his opinion, the provincial authorities in 1917 did not pass into the category of the local governmental authorities, and the Provisional Government in the regions did not have its own apparatus: the local government acted autonomously and independently from it. Even the provincial and district commissars,

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<sup>1</sup> *Mincz I.I.* The History of the Great October. In 3 vol. V. 1. P. 715.

the only official government representatives, were nominated from the local public and were more closely associated with it than with the centre<sup>2</sup>.

G.A. Gerasimenko provided more details regarding this conclusion at the turn of the 1980-90s in two monographs on the situation with zemstvos in 1917 and the policy of the main bodies of power in the pre-October revolution period – the Committees for Public Safety (KOB)<sup>3</sup>. The facts collected by him confirmed that very soon, i.e. in the spring – in March-April 1917, the Provisional Government lost control over the processes that took place in the regions, and an intensive process of its disintegration began in the country. The regional aspects of revolutionary shock of the year 1917 were reflected in a few generalizing works of foreign researchers<sup>4</sup>. In particular we note the famous specialist in Russian history D.J. Raleigh, studied in detail the political struggle in 1917 in Saratov and other Volga cities<sup>5</sup>.

The course of the revolution in Yaroslavl province was first studied by the local publishing houses of the Ispart Commission. These were the commissions created in the early 1920s in each province and consisted of the famous Bolsheviks who collected materials on the history of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party. The Ispart Commission published collections of articles not only about the Bolsheviks but also about the other parties. Such was the collection ‘Rybinsk in the Revolution of 1917–22’<sup>6</sup>. However, essays on the history of the CPSU left a much greater trace in the historiography of regional aspects of the revolution<sup>7</sup>. They undoubtedly played a positive role in the study of 1917 at the local level, as they summarized all the information known at the time.

Among the researchers involved in the studying of regional structures of the known political parties were the works of G.P. Annin and V.P. Fedyuk. G.P. Annin specialized in the research of the Bolshevik Party, whereas V.P. Fedyuk was interest-

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<sup>2</sup> *Starcev V.I. Domestic Policies of the Provisional Government of the First Election. Leningrad, 1980. P. 182.*

<sup>3</sup> *Gerasimenko G.A. Territorial Self-government in Russia. Moscow, 1990. 262 p. Idem. The First Act of Democracy in Russia. Moscow, 1992. 350 p.*

<sup>4</sup> *Fitzpatrick Sh. The Russian Revolution/ Oxford, 2008; Wade R.A. The Russian Revolution, 1917 Cambridge, 2000.*

<sup>5</sup> *Raleigh D.J. Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov. Cornell University Press, 1986. 375 p.; Raleigh D.J. Revolutionary Politics in Provincial Russia: The Tsaritsyn “Republic” in 1917. Slavic Review, 1981, vol. 40 no. 2, pp. 194–209; Raleigh D.J. The Revolution of 1917 and the Establishment of Soviet Power in Saratov. Politics and Society in Provincial Russia: Saratov, 1590–1917. Ohio State University Press, 1989, pp. 277–306.*

<sup>6</sup> *Rybinsk in the Revolution of 1917–1922. Rybinsk, 1922.*

<sup>7</sup> *Essays on the History of the Yaroslavl Organization of the Communist Party. 1883–1937. Yaroslavl, 1985.*

ed in the cadets. The main work of Annin ‘The Bolsheviks of the Upper Volga in 1917’<sup>8</sup> devoted to the analysis of the organizational condition of the party in the Upper Volga, the process of creating social-democratic organizations united with the Mensheviks with replacement of the latter from the region later, the struggle for centralization of the party. The PhD thesis of V.P. Fedyuk studied various aspects of cadet activities<sup>9</sup>. Its conclusions run as follows that in 1917, the Cadet Party turned into a purely urban one, and its party organizations were almost not preserved in the countryside. Most of the party members lived in provincial centres and several parish cities. In this situation, the cadets could not stand against the Socialists. This conclusion is confirmed by the foreign historiography<sup>10</sup>.

The book ‘The Struggle for the Power of the Soviets in Yaroslavl Province’ stands out from the similar works on the local history during the Soviet period<sup>11</sup>. Its main value is the underlying fact that it provides more details regarding the actions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the Upper Volga region.

In the post-Soviet period, there appeared plenty of works studying the activities of the individual parties on the territory of Yaroslavl province<sup>12</sup> or those of specific public authorities<sup>13</sup>. However, the topic that is of interest to us is confrontation of the leading Russian parties struggling for predominance, the dominance in the key public authorities (KOBs, zemstvos, city councils and the Soviets), which remains relevant and continues to arouse interest among the researchers.

### **Main body**

Yaroslavl occupied an important geopolitical position in the centre of the country, between the two capitals – St. Petersburg and Moscow – and the events that took place there had impact on the whole country. Thus, it was in 1917 that such an interaction occurred already in the first days of the revolution: The Provisional Government was in a state of conflict with the regional authorities, including Yaroslavl.

The new regional and provincial authorities that were formed in February-March during the days of the revolution initially expressed their unanimous and decisive support for the newly formed Provisional Government. These authorities, the public

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<sup>8</sup> *Annin G.P.* The Bolsheviks of the Upper Volga Region in 1917. Yaroslavl, 1983. 143 p.

<sup>9</sup> *Fedyuk V.P.* The Collapse of Cadet Policy in 1917 (on the Materials of Upper Volga Region): PhD dissertation in Historical Sciences. Yaroslavl, 1984. 191 p.

<sup>10</sup> *Rosenberg W.G.* Liberals in the Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921. Princeton, 1974.

<sup>11</sup> *Kozlov P.I., Rezvyiy N.I.* The Struggle for the Soviet Power in Yaroslavl Province. Yaroslavl, 1957. 259 p.

<sup>12</sup> *Tikhomirov N.V.* Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917–1918 (on the Materials of the Upper Volga Provinces): PhD dissertation in Historical Sciences. Yaroslavl, 2001. 231 p.

<sup>13</sup> *Burova A. Y.* The Executive Committee of Public Organizations and Development of Alternatives to the Revolution of 1917 (on the Materials of Vladimir, Kostroma and Yaroslavl Provinces): PhD dissertation in Historical Sciences. Ivanovo, 2006. 255 p.

security committees (KOBs), which at that time enjoyed great authority among the population, could significantly increase the influence of the Provisional Government on the general political processes taking place in Russia. They asked for only one thing from the central government to reward their loyalty: to make them an integral part of the new political system. They voluntarily expressed their desire to become government agencies in the region, thus the government could create an extensive network of its authorities. But it allowed a fatal miscalculation by not responding to the requests of the provincial committees, preferring to rely on the traditional structures of power – zemstvos and city dumas (town councils) situated closer to it. This was not surprising, as the chairman of the government – Prince G.E. Lvov – was a descendant from this environment; he headed the All-Russian Zemsky Union.

Chairmen of provincial zemstvo councils were appointed as new leaders of the provinces and provincial commissioners. The government did not only ignore the requests of the KOBs but also limited them as much as possible and cancelled all their rights. The liquidation of the KOBs did not take place, but they were not related to the official political system, and they never became its part. They were denied the main thing: financing their activities from the centre. The unjust command of the centre embittered the KOBs, and the large part of them refused to follow Petrograd's instructions. In Yaroslavl, the cadet K.K. Chernosvitov did not obey the government's decree, being elected as a provincial commissar exactly on the day of sending the government telegram to the regions, i. e. on 5<sup>th</sup> March. The KOB in Yaroslavl province adopted a resolution per which “the order of the central government ... means the first moment of anarchy, when the old provincial power had already collapsed, and the local public had not made any arrangements to accept this power yet. This order was somewhat belated for the Yaroslavl province. The Executive Committee has already elected its Commissioner”<sup>14</sup>.

The essence of the dispute was not in who would be the commissioner, but to whom he should obey: The Provisional Government or the relevant KOB? The Provisional Government assumed that the commissar was obligated to report entirely to the government. The KOBs now disagreed even “on the same responsibility of the Commissioner, both to the central government and to the local Executive Committee” (which was among other things the wording of Yaroslavl provincial committee)<sup>15</sup>.

The Provisional Government could not prevent the election of commissars by introducing a registration system in the relevant committees (autonomous, independent of the authorities' instructions) and on 20-23rd March officially authorized the election of commissioners from the persons “enjoying confidence of the local population”<sup>16</sup>. At the same time, having satisfied the insistent demands of the province for the election of commissioners in the regions, the government did not restore the con-

<sup>14</sup> Golos [The Voice] (Yaroslavl).1917. 8 March.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 16 March.

<sup>16</sup> *Gerasimenko G.A.* Territorial Self-government in Russia. Moscow, 1990. P.70.

trol over the entire country. The provincial committees became autonomous, independent of the government, since at that moment they were funded from the local funds, whereas the commissioners were regarded as mere executors of the local will.

The idea of making the commissioners responsible to the government was not justified: they were completely dependent on the KOBs. The very committees, the actual local authorities, were outside the control of the centre. The situation was complicated by the fact that all other local authorities (zemstvos, town councils and all kinds of the Soviets) were not even formally controlled by the government. It was believed that they expressed the interests of the local population. Thus, the centre could no longer influence the local life. From that moment on, in every province, including Yaroslavl, the authorities who did not even think about the regional separatism, i.e. leaving Russia, became independent of the government, and it had no longer any levers of influence over the local life. The process of provincialization of Russia began: the country was divided into separate provinces. The situation in each province henceforth depended solely on the arrangement of political forces developing there.

In such a difficult period for Yaroslavl province, the responsibility for preserving political stability fell on the cadets; where they took key posts in the executive system. The provincial commissioner was still K.K. Chernosvitov. D.G. Timrot was elected chairman of Yaroslavl provincial KOB; previously he was chairman of provincial zemstvo council. V.N. Krylov became the third comrade (deputy) chairman of the provincial KOB. The influence of the cadets at the city level in Yaroslavl was quite strong. V.S. Lopatin was the city head (mayor) of Yaroslavl, V.N. Shiryayev – chairman of the city council. N.G. Agafonov, M.P. Sakin and N.I. Sobolev were also members of Yaroslavl City Council<sup>17</sup>.

Nevertheless, it was difficult for the cadets to resist the every-day growing pressure from the people (peasants, workers and soldiers) and the more radically organized political forces-moderate and radical socialists. The pro-cadet provincial authorities in Yaroslavl were deprived of assistance not only from the central government on part of the Provisional Government, but also from the central structures of their own party.

This was quite naturally-determined for a constitutional-democratic party, the charter of which was regarded at the provincial level as a lower level of the party's authorities and specifically detailed the rights and duties only for the central and provincial committees. The provincial committees themselves were responsible for the Party's activities within the provinces. The smaller party units – those of parish (uyezd) and volost (rural) – were defined in the charter as auxiliary ones, and all the work on their development was assigned exclusively to the gubernia committees in

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<sup>17</sup> State Archive of the Yaroslavl Region (GAYAO) F.137. Op. 1. D. 5318. L. 28; Golos [The Voice]. 1917. 9, 12, 19 March.

the cadet milieu<sup>18</sup>. This approach to solving the most important organizational problems under the conditions of the revolutionary onset predetermined the future collapse of the Cadets, whose competitors, the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) and the Mensheviks, acquired a large share of influence in the provincial power since the first days of the revolution.

In the committees of public security, the SRs headed several influential peasant groups. In Yaroslavl Committee, the numbers of the peasant group grew up to 30 members in March 1917. The post of the secretary of Yaroslavl Committee was assigned to I.P. Rozov. The Mensheviks A.F. Popov and I.I. Musatov became deputies chairman of Yaroslavl Province KOB. The Socialist-Revolutionary I.V. Loshadkin headed Yaroslavl district zemstvo. A large group of the Mensheviks headed by A.V. Bykov, the first chairman of Yaroslavl Soviet of Workers' Deputies, became a member of Yaroslavl City Duma<sup>19</sup>.

At the initial stage of the revolution, when the power of the Cadets was still undeniable, the moderate socialists (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks) generally focused on the work in the Soviets. The Council of Peasants' Deputies was almost totally subordinated to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The executive committee of Yaroslavl provincial council was elected at the peasants' congress held on 19-21<sup>st</sup> March (chairman V.A. Nogtev)<sup>20</sup>. The Mensheviks prevailed in the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. A lot of the Socialist-Revolutionaries moved to the ranks of the Soviet of Military Deputies: among them there were officers I.D. Blokhintsev, I.N. Zhirkovych; soldiers Nikiforovsky, Nifontov and Sokolov. However, Menshevik B.V. Duchin – the future provincial commissioner – was elected as chairman of the Council<sup>21</sup>.

Nevertheless, the moderate socialists underestimated the importance of the Soviets themselves, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, who considered the work in the Soviets to be their main goal. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries saw in the Soviets only a means to control the activities of the main bodies of power and a kind of a springboard for getting there. Within the committees of public security, under the leadership of the Soviets, certain groups representing interests of the most popular layers of the population were formed (the Soviets of Workers' Deputies were headed by working groups, the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies were headed by peasants, and the military oversaw the Soviets of Military Deputies). Most of these

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<sup>18</sup> Dumova N.G. *The Cadet Party in World War I and February Revolution*. Moscow, 1988. P.165.

<sup>19</sup> GAYAO F.137. Op.1. D.5357. L.38; F. P.-180 Op.1. D.1. L.8; Golos [The Voice] 1917. 4, 24, 28, 29 March.

<sup>20</sup> Golos [The Voice]. 1917. 28 March.

<sup>21</sup> The establishment of the Soviet power in Yaroslavl province. *A Collection of Documents and Materials*. Yaroslavl, 1957. P.41. The News of the Council of Military Deputies of the Yaroslavl Garrison (Yaroslavl). 1917. 19 March.

groups were members of the relevant Soviets, although not always so. As an example, the above-mentioned peasant group consisted of ten deputies only representing Yaroslavl Council of Peasants' Deputies; the remaining 20 were chosen by the peasants directly in the volosts, at volost political meetings<sup>22</sup>.

Thus, the Soviets managed to increase their influence in the KOBs, which was not noticed by the liberals. This was easier because in the early days, the Soviets never went into direct conflicts with the cadet leadership of KOB. And it was not necessary – the representatives of the Soviets were the most active workers in the KOBs. The Cadets did not see any danger to themselves in strengthening of the influence of the Soviets, since they believed that the Cadets and moderate socialists were allies and had one common goal: to prevent the restoration of the old, royal power.

In the spring of 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks launched a broad campaign of democratization of city dumas and zemstvos in Yaroslavl province. These decisions were made by them through the KOBs, and they were put forward by those who represented the Soviets (most often workers or peasants). The meaning of 'democratization' of dumas and zemstvos referred to expulsion of right-wing parties and their representatives (those who were to the right of the Cadets) and admission of those supporting the socialist parties – especially the moderate socialists. The cutting edge of democratization on part of the local self-government authorities was not directed against the conservative circles but mainly against the Cadets. In the democratized governing authorities, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks came to power.

Intervention in the work of zemstvos and dumas became of mass proportions. In the mid-May, the Yaroslavl provincial zemstvo was awaiting its turn to being democratized as the last and main stronghold of the Cadets. At the meeting of the KOB, where the question of democratization of the provincial zemstvo was discussed, the leadership of the peasant group was invited to the said zemstvo meeting included representatives of the provincial Soviets of peasants' deputies, cooperative unions and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Council of Soldiers' Deputies appeared in Yaroslavl in April 1917 because of the transformation of the Council of Military Deputies. The meaning of reformatting this authority consisted in depriving officers of the right to join the Council. On 8 April, the Council of Soldiers' Deputies merged with the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Starting since that moment, the main meetings of the Soviets were held jointly, although both Councils retained their organizational independence.

The SRs demanded that six seats be allocated to the Provincial Council of Peasants' Deputies, 20 seats – to members of the district Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and four seats to cooperative unions. In addition, it was proposed that six members of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies be included in the zemstvo membership. And this even though the Yaroslavl provincial zemstvo already initially con-

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<sup>22</sup> Golos [The Voice]. 1917. 24 March.

sisted of delegates from democratized district zemstvos – there were no independent elections to the provincial zemstvo. Per the electoral procedure in effect in Russia, the provincial zemstvos consisted of representatives of district zemstvos who were delegated to district zemstvo meetings.

The Provincial Commissar Chernosvitov decided to include representatives of ‘specified organizations’ in the zemstvo assembly in the number required by them<sup>23</sup>. The Cadet Zemstvo government tried to challenge this decision unsuccessfully. Due to joint actions of peasant and working groups of the Yaroslavl Committee for Public Security, the pro-cadet gubernia zemstvo came under the direct control of moderate socialists.

In May-June, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks occupied the leading positions in the Yaroslavl Province with great confidence. It should be noted that this situation was typical for most of the Russian provinces. Moreover, in the neighbouring provinces of Yaroslavl-Vladimir and Kostroma provinces, the success of the socialists was even more impressive. There almost all senior posts, including provincial commissioners, belonged to the SRs and the Mensheviks by the end of April – early May. In Yaroslavl, the process was slower. Thus, in the said region, the Cadet K.K. Chernosvitov left the post of provincial commissioner only on 24 August (he was succeeded by the Menshevik Dushen)<sup>24</sup>. This slow process was explained by the fact that in Yaroslavl province the cadets enjoyed greater influence. But it was impossible to resist the all-Russian tendencies, unfavourable for the Cadets, even in that region.

The tough struggle of the moderate socialists with the liberals increased chances of the Bolsheviks, the main trump card of which was centralization of the party and willingness of the lower-level party structures to obey the higher ones. In April 1917, the Bolsheviks adopted a new political program set by V.I. Lenin, who had returned from emigration in his famous “April theses”. Lenin approaches has literally revolutionized the views of the Bolsheviks on the question of how the party should seize power. If before they followed the old, classical scheme, reducing itself to the fact that in order to seize power it was necessary to organize armed insurrection in the capital and then try and spread its influence over the rest of the country, the ‘April Theses’ worked in the opposite direction: first to seize power in the province, to strengthen positions throughout the country, and only afterwards to implement the seizure of power in the capital almost painlessly. This was precisely the profound meaning of Lenin’s theses – the Party obtaining the majority of seats in the provincial Soviets, then transfer of power to the Soviets on a national scale and announcement of the Soviets as the only state institution (the “republic of the Soviets ... throughout the country, from the bottom upwards”)<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> GAYAO F.1527. Op. 1. D. 19. L. 8–10.

<sup>24</sup> Golos [The Voice]. 1917. 25 August.

<sup>25</sup> Lenin V.I. Full Composition of Writings. V. 31, P. 115.

The Bolsheviks found the weakest link in the February political system – the county government, by understanding the isolation of the provincial government from the central and provincial power structures, as well as weaknesses of the provincial – uyezd ties. The Yaroslavl Bolsheviks also acted successfully on the county level. With their direct participation, the volost Soviets were organized in Uglich district, where the county Soviet of Peasants' Deputies was organized and later merged with the workers' council. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was established in Lyubim; in Danilov, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was united with the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. The re-election of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was held in Mologa<sup>26</sup>. All these measures increased the influence of the Bolsheviks significantly with regards to the overall situation in Yaroslavl province.

The actions of the Yaroslavl Bolsheviks are indicative in the fact that they had to act in a difficult situation. In the Yaroslavl Soviet, there was a very strong influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. It was not by chance that in the first Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks received only two seats out of ten (I.I. Korotkov, F. I. Dokukin), and G.I. Petrovichev was appointed secretary of the said Executive Committee<sup>27</sup>.

Even in October 1917, the Bolsheviks were in the minority in the Yaroslavl Soviet of Workers' Deputies. On 16<sup>th</sup> October, the first meeting of the re-elected Council of Workers' Deputies was held. The re-election of the Council was held in September, at the very time when the prestige of the Bolsheviks in the country had grown immeasurably. However, in Yaroslavl the results of the elections were quite modest: only 36 deputies out of 139 supported the Bolsheviks. The moderate socialists put through 67 of their supporters (40 Mensheviks and 27 Socialist-Revolutionaries). In the new team of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the Bolsheviks were also in numerical disadvantage: six out of 15. The remaining members were five Mensheviks and four Socialist-Revolutionaries; the Menshevik I.I. Schleifer became Chairman of the Soviet<sup>28</sup>.

Nevertheless, the re-elections of the Soviets held in September brought considerable benefits to the Bolsheviks, since they had a clear advantage in the elections to the soldiers' faction of the Council. The Council of Soldiers' Deputies included 75 representatives of the Bolshevik Party (in the soldiers' faction of the Council, the Socialist-Revolutionaries had only 15 dedicated followers). Since the main meetings of the Soviets were held jointly, the Bolsheviks took the overall work of the Council under their control<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> *Kozlov P.I., Rezvyi N.I.* The Struggle for the Soviet Power in Yaroslavl Province. Yaroslavl, 1957.

<sup>27</sup> GAYAO F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 1.

<sup>28</sup> GAYAO F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 149a. L. 249.

<sup>29</sup> *Kozlov P.I., Rezvyi N.I.* The Struggle for Soviet Power in Yaroslavl Province. Yaroslavl, 1957. P. 116, 117, 134.

In October 1917, the Bolsheviks' plan finally began to be implemented. Four Bolsheviks – D.S. Zackheim, N.F. Dobrokhotov, A.M. Dadukin and P.A. Safronov were sent from the united Yaroslavl Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, where the question of power was to be decided<sup>30</sup>.

The events taking place in Petrograd and the seizure of power in the capital are usually understood as the events of October 1917. However, this is fundamentally wrong; the most important part of the coup took place in the province. The main thing in the Bolsheviks' plan was that the Bolsheviks along with the capital took power in the largest provincial and uyezd centres. The regional party committees coordinated their actions to seize power in the provinces, holding an intermediate position between the Central Committee and the provincial committees. The regional committees were responsible to the Central Committee for the development of the situation in adjacent provinces. The activities aimed at seizing power in the Upper Volga region was led by the Moscow Regional Committee.

On 14 October, the bureau of the Moscow Regional Committee announced of their intention to begin an open struggle for power, whereby responsible party workers were sent to all provincial cities and major regional centres in the area (13 provinces referred to the Moscow Regional Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party of the Bolsheviks<sup>31</sup>). The couriers were given a conditional text of telegrams (individual for each city), upon receiving of which the local Bolsheviks would know that their party was taking power in Petrograd, and thus they had to start acting at their own level. The telegram intended for Yaroslavl read as follows: "The conference nobody will be"<sup>32</sup>. In Yaroslavl, M.P. Yanyshchikov was sent with this instruction<sup>33</sup>.

The telegram expected from Moscow came on 25<sup>th</sup> October at around 12 o'clock in the afternoon<sup>34</sup>. The power in Yaroslavl passed to the Bolsheviks on 27<sup>th</sup> October. On the morning of that day, the Bolshevik faction of both Soviets (of workers and soldiers) demanded that the moderate wing held a joint meeting of the Soviets, having mentioned that in the extreme case the meeting would be held without their participation. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries agreed, and in the evening the meeting was opened. Its outcome was obvious: the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks took place by 88 votes to the remaining 46. The Mensheviks and the So-

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<sup>30</sup> The Establishment of Soviet Power in Yaroslavl Province. A Collection of Documents and Materials. Yaroslavl, 1957. P. 255.

<sup>31</sup> *Serebryakova Z.L.* Regional Association of Councils of Russia. March 1917 – December 1918. Moscow, 1977. P. 21–23.

<sup>32</sup> Zhokhov M. The signal of the uprising. *Northern worker* (Yaroslavl). 1974. November, 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Annin G.P.* The Bolsheviks of the Upper Volga Region in 1917. Yaroslavl, 1983. P. 109–111.

<sup>34</sup> Zhokhov M. The signal of the uprising. *Northern worker* (Yaroslavl). 1974. November, 6.

cialist-Revolutionaries stepped down from their parliamentary powers, leaving the Soviet to full disposal of the Bolsheviks. Those who remained in the hall elected the new executive committee, consisting entirely of the Bolsheviks<sup>35</sup>.

During a quick analysis of the events that happened in the autumn of 1917, it may seem that the success of the Bolsheviks in October was predetermined. In fact, the situation was much more complicated. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had the opportunity to provide decent resistance to prevent the Bolsheviks from coming to power or at least to hamper their actions as much as possible. The moderate socialists in the autumn of 1917 still held strong positions. In Yaroslavl, the moderate socialists enjoyed the majority seats in the provincial KOB and the city дума. The Socialist-Revolutionaries had an overwhelming superiority in the provincial Council of Peasants' Deputies, and the influence of the Mensheviks was also strong in the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The situation was similar in the other provinces, almost in entire Russia, the local government belonged to the moderate socialists. Having such levers of influence, they could provide support to the government. However, nothing seemed to have been done. It goes without saying, there was struggle against the Bolsheviks on part of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, but the resistance was maintained exceedingly formally. Why? The ruling power in the country was not just a handful of ministers who had settled themselves in the government, but on the contrary, it was centred around the moderate socialists. The October coup was not directed against the weak government, which had little effect on them, but rather against the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

The point is that this handful of liberal ministers had become an insurmountable obstacle for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks on their way to the heights of power. The acting head of government A.F. Kerensky was considered a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party but did not have any relation to the organizational structures of the party. He believed that the Socialists were not ready to govern Russia without any aid from the liberals and sought to preserve the coalition with them. The policy of Kerensky evoked growing irritation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries; the opposition was growing in the ranks of the party, towards the head of the government. When the Bolsheviks began to seize power, the SRs decided to take advantage of the situation. They did not doubt that having overthrown Kerensky, the Bolsheviks could not resist in power alone and should have entered negotiations with other socialist parties. That is why in those October days, instead of arranging effective resistance to the Bolsheviks, the SRs put forward the idea of forming a homogeneous socialist government – from the Bolsheviks to the people's socialists, i.e. representatives of all socialist parties were included in that government. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were confident that they would as-

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<sup>35</sup> GAYAO F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 149a. L. 292, 293; Kozlov P.I., Rezvyi N.I. The Struggle for Soviet Power in Yaroslavl Province. Yaroslavl, 1957. P. 141, 142–143.

sume the leading role in the government, whereas the Bolsheviks would take auxiliary roles.

But the Bolsheviks seized power not with the view to give it immediately to the SRs. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were in the error, believing that the Bolsheviks could not hold out long in power – and, moreover, their position helped the Bolsheviks greatly. The Socialist-Revolutionaries realized that they were mistaken when it had already been too late. By the time of convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries had attributed their main hopes, the main levers of power in the Soviets belonged to the Bolsheviks. This allowed them to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.

### Conclusions

One of the main problem of the development of the revolution of 1917 was the split of the central and provincial authorities. It is characteristic that the split took place when the development of the country was determined by the representatives of one camp (both central and provincial authorities were ruled by the liberals). The subsequent confrontation between the moderate socialists and the liberals worsened the situation even more, and in the incomplete eight months the February regime brought Russia to the brink of a national catastrophe.

In October days of 1917, the Bolsheviks did what the Provisional Government could not do: once again they united the central and the provincial authorities. The simultaneous seizure of power in the capital, Petrograd, and most provincial centres, including Yaroslavl, allowed the Bolsheviks to provide their central government, Sovnarkom, with the support of all its actions on part of the new provincial authorities.

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### **Socio-economic and military-political status of the Southwestern Caucasus on the eve of collapse of the Russian empire**

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*Abstract.* The article considers the insufficiently studied factors of socio-economic and socio-political development of the Southwestern Caucasus during the revolutionary events of 1917 – early 1918, which served as prerequisites for the establishment of the democratic republics of the Caucasus. The indicators of socio-economic development of Kars Oblast on the eve of the Revolution were analyzed, which became a good foundation for its independence. The democratic ideals of the February Revolution contributed to raising certain hopes on part of the population of the areas in the Southwestern Caucasus to gain territorial and political autonomy. The revolutionary turmoil of 1917 caused the naturally expected growth of national movements in the Caucasus, and the Bolsheviks coming to power and then withdrawing from World War I created conditions to change the state-territorial status of the regions and provinces in the Caucasus. Under such circumstances, the creation of independent republics in the Caucasus was inevitable. The attitudes of the Provisional government, Soviet Russia, the Transcaucasian government and the Ottoman Empire to the territorial and political autonomy of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Kars Oblast are shown in the article, as well as the struggle of various political and nationalist forces of the southwestern Caucasus for dominance in the region.

*Keywords:* Southwestern Caucasus, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Kars Oblast, the Caucasian Frontline of the First World War, OZAKOM, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

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#### **Introduction**

The problem of nation building in the South Caucasus is traditionally one of the most urgent, which relates to open interethnic conflicts and territorial disputes. The first attempt of the peoples of Transcaucasia to gain independence was made during the most difficult period at the end of World War I, when, along with other nations, the South-Western Caucasian Democratic Republic was built. In Soviet historiography, the problems of socio-political development of the Southwestern Caucasus were considered in the context of general questions of revolutionary time,

with natural emphasis on the activity of Bolshevik organizations in Kars Oblast<sup>1</sup>. In modern historiography, both the socio-political situation in Transcaucasia as a whole<sup>2</sup> and the experience of building a nation in the republics of the Southwestern Caucasus<sup>3</sup> are studied. Abroad, there is also a certain historiographic tradition of studying the problems of socio-economic and political development of Transcaucasia during the turning points of the history of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>4</sup>. We will note the works of the American researchers Firuz Kazzadeh and Richard Hovhannisyan, who, based on the memoirs of British and American officers, touch upon important aspects of political and military history of the Southwestern Caucasus<sup>5</sup>. The focus of this article is the factors of socio-economic and socio-political development that served as prerequisites for the formation of democratic republics of the Southwestern Caucasus in 1918.

### Main body

The Russian czar's demise in February 1917 had an impact on the political and economic state of Kars Oblast, Nakhichevan and Sharur-Daralagez Uyezds of Erivan Governorate<sup>6</sup>, matching its scale and nature. The First World War continued, and

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<sup>1</sup> Zavriev D.S. *To the Recent History of the North-Eastern Vilayets of Turkey*. Tbilisi, 1947; Kadishev A.B. *Intervention and Civil War in Transcaucasia*. Moscow, 1960; Pogonian A.M. *Kars Oblast as part of Russia*. Yerevan, 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Mikhailov V.V. To the question of the political situation in Transcaucasia at the final stage of World War I. *Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University. Ser. 2: Historical Studies*. Issue. 4. St Petersburg, 2006, pp. 125–137; Idem. *The Ottoman Intervention of the First Half of 1918 and the Separation of Transcaucasia from Russia. 1918 in the Fate of Russia and the World: Triggering off a Large-scale Civil War and International Intervention*. Arkhangelsk, 2008, pp. 181–187; Idem. Features of the political and national situation in Transcaucasia after October 1917 and position of Muslim factions of the Transcaucasian governments. *Clio*, 2009, no. 3 (46), pp. 59–65; Idem. On the question of formation and tactical activities of Armenian volunteer units on the Turkish fronts during World War I. *The New Watch*, 2010, no. 19–20, pp. 77–85; Idem. 'The Muslim Question' and the Russian Revolution: Turkey, Russia and Transcaucasia in the period since February 1917 to March 1918. *Clio*, 2016, no. 9 (117), pp. 140–146; Oreshkova S.F., Ul'chenko N. Y. *Russia and Turkey: The problem of the Borders Delimitation*. Moscow, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Hajiev A.N. *Democratic Republics of Southwestern Caucasus (Kars and Republic of Aras)*. Baku, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Hovannisian R.G. *The Republic of Armenia*, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919 Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1996; Kappeler A. *Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*. Munchen, 1992; Reynolds M.A. *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918*. Cambridge, 2011; Smith M.G. Anatomy of a Rumour: Murder Scandal, the Musavat Party and Narratives of the Russian Revolution in Baku. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2001, vol. 36, no. 2, April, pp. 211–240; Swietochowski T. *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920*. Cambridge, 1985.

<sup>5</sup> Hovannisian R.G. *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, 1918. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1984; Kazemzadeh F. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921)*. New York, 1951.

<sup>6</sup> Mikhailov V.V. 'The Muslim Question' and the Russian Revolution: Turkey, Russia and Transcaucasia in the period since February 1917 to March 1918. *Clio*, 2016, no. 9 (117), pp. 140–146.

these areas remained front-line territories, the socio-economic status of which was influenced by the proximity of the vast theater of military operations. After February 1917, the Russian Caucasus Army began to desintegrate, and the acute need for food made the army's quartermaster services develop their activities in the front-line regions, including in Kars Oblast and Nakhichevan exclave.

The policy of the Provisional Government concerning the outlying areas of Russia differed little from the policy of the tsarist authorities. The Cadets, who supported the democratic demands for autonomy in the State Duma of all convocations, rose to the position of 'one and indivisible' Russia after the February Revolution. Very clearly, in this regard, the British diplomat George Buchanan noted in his memoirs: "... the government of Russia was not, strictly speaking, republican"<sup>7</sup>. On 2 March 1917, the press published a proclamation of the governor in the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich of Russia: "Due to various circulating rumors, it is reported that events took place in Petrograd that caused replacement of the highest government officials, and now peace arrived in the capital. The troops of the Caucasus Army are triumphantly advancing to join our gallant English allies. Holding peace among the population of the Caucasus is extremely important, same as ensuring victory of the army and the non-stop supply of food for the population"<sup>8</sup>.

Having come to power on 2 March 1917, the Provisional Government, in solidarity with the basic postulates of the tsarist foreign policy, proclaimed in its appeal on 6 March of the same year that it would cherish the bonds of alliance with other powers and steadfastly carry out the agreements signed with the allies<sup>9</sup>. On 9 March 1917, the Provisional Government decided to form a special committee consisting of members of the State Duma, including V.A. Kharlamov, M. Y. Dzhafarov, A.I. Chkhenkeli, P.A. Pereverzev and I.A. Abashidze. This committee was authorized to act "... on behalf of and with the rights of the Provisional Government with a view to establish the lasting order and arrangement of the Transcaucasian region on the basis publicly proclaimed by the Provisional Government on 6 March 1917, as well as to take measures to organize civil administration in the areas occupied by right of war, on the Caucasian front"<sup>10</sup>.

What problems did the new government face in the Southwestern Caucasus? By the beginning of 1917, Kars Oblast was an independent administrative-territorial unit of the Russian Empire and consisted of Ardahan Province, Kagyzmansky, Kars and Oltu regions. These, in turn, were divided into areas, and the latter – into rural districts. Thus, Kars Oblast was divisible into the Agbabinsky, Zardushatsky, Kars, Soganluk and Shuragel regions<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Buchanan G. *Memoirs of a Diplomat*. Moscow, 1991, p. 213.

<sup>8</sup> Piontkovsky S.A. *Reader on the History of the October Revolution*. Moscow, 1923, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>10</sup> *The struggle for the victory of Soviet power in Georgia. Documents and materials*. (1917–1921). Tbilisi, 1958, p. 8.

<sup>11</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics*. Tiflis, 1916, pp. 65–75.

On all these territories, the tsarist authorities carried out an active ethno-demographic policy for resettlement of the Armenians from Turkey and Persia to the Russian Empire, which led to the creation of a huge foreign enclave near the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus. In this regard, even the Armenian authors themselves are forced to admit that during the Russo-Turkish wars of 1853–56 and 1877–78, in 1894–96, and during World War I, the flow of Armenians into these areas of the Southwestern Caucasus continued<sup>12</sup>. According to the census of 1897, the number of Armenians living in the Caucasus reached 1.1 million people, and in 1914 there were already 2 million<sup>13</sup>. On 1 January 1916, the area of Kars Oblast was 16466 square verst<sup>14</sup>. According to the census of 1917, 394,000 people lived in Kars Oblast, of which there were: 205,000 Muslims, 48,000 Greeks, 31,000 Russians, 20,000 Armenians and 5,000 representatives of other nationalities<sup>15</sup>.

As for the Greeks, the culmination of their emigration to Kars Oblast for the entire 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries reached during the period after the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. As pre-revolutionary Russian administrators noted, “... the happily ended Turkish war of 1877–78 endowed us with a whole stream of Asian settlers: 40,000 Greeks were sent to Kars Oblast”<sup>16</sup>. In Kars itself, there were more than 30 thousand inhabitants<sup>17</sup> (see the table).

Table

**The number of inhabitants and the composition of population  
in Kars Oblast during the period of 1881-1916.**<sup>18</sup>

Population	According to administration's data and for 1881	According to the census of 1897	According to administration's data and for 1912	According to administration's data and for 1916
Total number	101 336	290 654	333 917	404 305
Of these, Muslims (Meskhetian Turks, Turks, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, etc.)	74 251	145 781	180 185	170 310
Percentage of Muslims population	74	50	54	42

<sup>12</sup> Grigorian Z.T. *Accession of Eastern Armenia to Russia at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century*. Moscow, 1959, pp. 160–161.

<sup>13</sup> Zavriev D.S. *To the Recent History of the North-Eastern Vilayets of Turkey*. Tbilisi, 1947, p. 16.

<sup>14</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics*. Tiflis, 1916, p. 198.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198–201.

<sup>16</sup> *Review of Kars Oblast for 1912*. Kars, 1914, pp. 10–11.

<sup>17</sup> *State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SARA)*, F. 28, Op. 1, D. 171, L. 1, 11, 14 – 15 on the topic; *SARA*, F. 894, Op. 1, D. 59, L. 14.

<sup>18</sup> The table was compiled based on: Zavriev D.S. *To the Recent History of the North-Eastern Vilayets of Turkey*. Tbilisi, 1947, p. 17; Esadze B.S. *Historical Note on the Management of the Caucasus*. Vol. 2. Tiflis, 1907. P. 308; *Review of Kars Oblast for 1912*. Kars, 1914, p. 3; *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics*. Tiflis, 1916, pp. 200–201.

Along with this, based on the archival data supplementing the data of ‘Caucasian Calendar’, about 137 thousand lived in Nakhchivan District in 1916, in Surmalin there lived approximately 105 thousand people, and in Sharur-Daralagez there were more than 90 thousand inhabitants<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, in the provinces of almost 332 thousand people, the Muslim population was 208.2 thousand (62.1 %). We will note that Kars Oblast was mainly occupied by Sunni Muslims. The data of ‘Caucasian Calendar’ show that only 6,000 people were related to Shia Muslim confession<sup>20</sup>.

The economy of Kars Oblast and Nakhichevan District was mainly of agrarian nature. According to the pre-revolutionary statistical data, in 1915 about 70 thousand dessiatins was used for grain growing in Kars Oblast, from which quarters of winter wheat were harvested – 198 thousand poods, spring wheat – 2636.3 thousand poods, maize – 457 poods, rye – 461 poods, other grains – 394.4 poods<sup>21</sup>. In Nakhichevan District, quarters of winter wheat were harvested from the area of 30.9 thousand dessiatins – 235.3 thousand poods, spring wheat – 76.8 thousand poods, barley – 61.0 thousand poods<sup>22</sup>.

In Kars Oblast, cattle breeding was developed particularly well, especially sheep breeding: of 544,700 heads of livestock in the whole region, Kars accounted for 211,400, in Ardahan there were 170,300 heads and Kagiz-Mansky accounted for 135,5 thousand heads<sup>23</sup>. And this even though the region during the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century repeatedly became the battle ground between Turkey and Russia. It is not by chance that, having subsequently formed an important northeastern agricultural sub-district of Turkey, this region remained largely cattle-breeding: meat-and-dairy cattle farming with a mixed system of pre-capitalist and capitalist forms of farm management. As of 1 January, 1916, 149.3 thousand heads of cattle were kept in the households of Nakhichevan District, and 122,300 heads of cattle in Sharur-Daralagez Uyezd; it was a region characterized by developed livestock farming<sup>24</sup>.

Speaking about the city economy, we would emphasize that the City-Fortress of Kars had a completely unique place in the military-political and economic plans of the Russian Empire. This was explained, first, by its strategically advantageous geographical position, which determined its inaccessibility. This strongly fortified fortress played a key role in the Caucasian theater of military operations in almost all Russo-Turkish wars. An interesting fact is that Kars, according to statistical data, occupied a rather high place by the number of educational institutions and enrollment

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<sup>19</sup> SARA, F. 28, Op. 1, D. 171, L. 11.

<sup>20</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics.* Tiflis, 1916, p. 205.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 198–201.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 267–268.

<sup>24</sup> Komakhidze N.V. The State of Production and the Agriculture of Eastern Turkey. *Turkey. History, Economics, Politics.* Moscow, 1984, p. 162.

of students. Thus, in the city there was a gymnasium for women (383 schoolgirls), the largest in the entire Caucasus Mariinsky women's college – the total number of students on 1 January 1916 was 312, while in Pushkin there were 257 in total; in the high primary school 43 students were enrolled, and in the lower industrial school there were 43 students as well<sup>25</sup>. In total, in Kars Oblast, as of January 1 1916, there were 11,133 students enrolled, including 8,360 males and 2,953 females<sup>26</sup>. Higher secondary schools were in the towns of Kagizman, Nakhichevan, Oltu, Ordubad. In Ozurgeti there was a spiritual school (173 pupils)<sup>27</sup>.

In industrial terms, Kars Oblast, although not an industrial center, had certain manufacturing potential. Asphalt mixing plant, sawmill, brickyard and 12 hulling mills, six lemonade shops, 19 creameries, six cheese factories, six blacksmith's, 14 potteries and 501 mechanical workshops, 30 butter making rooms and one soap plant were manufacturing their products on its territory. In total, there were 599 industrial enterprises of various types, producing goods for the total of 624.7 thousand rubles. The number of workers employed in the production sphere of the region was 905 people<sup>28</sup>.

In the said region, there was quite developed social and industrial infrastructure for the time. In 1889, the railway with the length of 72 versts from Alexandropol to Kars was put into operation. Later it was brought to Sarygamysh<sup>29</sup>. In Kars Oblast, there were 11 post-and-telegraph institutions (for comparison, there were only one in Batumi Region)<sup>30</sup>. In the region, there were 27 forest estates with the total area of 137 thousand dessiatins. Mostly, these were dachas of the governmental department, which were under the supervision of the forestry protection administration<sup>31</sup>.

In Kars Oblast, tobacco production was widespread. In 1916, 728 villages collected and supplied to the processing points 594.4 thousand poods of this raw material of superior quality and 18 thousand poods of mean tobacco. The similar indicator for Nakhichevan enclave accounted for 650 poods of mean tobacco from eight villages, whereas in Sharur-Daralagezsky Uyezd – 122 poods of mean tobacco were collected from 31 villages<sup>32</sup>. At the same time, Kars Oblast was at the bottom in the trade of spirit and alcoholic beverages, and it was 58 places lower in the rank, as compared for example, with Tiflis Governorate, which ranked first in the Caucasus in this indicator. A similar situation was observed in the wine distillery industry; in Kars

<sup>25</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics.* Tiflis, 1916, pp. 272–273.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 310.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304

<sup>28</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics.* Tiflis, 1916, pp. 312–313, 316–317, 320–321.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 349.

Oblast, only 16 dessiatins were allocated for vinelands<sup>33</sup>. A significant place in the fiscal policy of the Russian Empire was given to Julfa, Shakhtakhty and Ordubad custom houses located on the territory of the Southwestern Caucasus. By 1917, the first of these occupied the fourth place in the Caucasus in terms of number of duties received in the Russian treasury in the entire Caucasian region.

In terms of trade, Kars Oblast was divided into two regions that gravitated toward various shopping centers. Thus, part of Ardahan Province was in constant contact with Batumi and Kutaisi markets, where the great and small cattle were sent and sold. The southern part of Oltu and the southwestern part of Kagziman districts did not discontinue the trade with the cities and major trade centers of Turkey, selling cattle, leather, fruit, wool and other products there. The eastern parts of these districts had close relations with the markets of Tiflis and Erivan Governorates, where grain, cattle and various livestock products, timber, salt and different products of handicraft industry were exported. Efforts were made by the state officials to develop the salt springs in Nakhichevan Republic, Kagziman and Oltu districts of Kars Oblast. In 1915, 160.5 thousand poods of salt were extracted in the Nakhichevan field; 30.2 thousand poods were mined in Kagziman<sup>34</sup>.

In Kars, newspaper *Kars* was circulated, which highlighted the socio-political, economic and cultural life of the region<sup>35</sup>. It is curious that Kars Oblast was one of the most prosperous in the Caucasus in terms of criminal situation. The same was typical for Nakhichevan Republic. For the whole of 1915, there was not a single murder or act of violence, whilst in Erivan Governorate alone only that belonged to the same province, 71 crimes against the person were committed during that year<sup>36</sup>. Thus, the material reflecting economic position of the regions of the Southwestern Caucasus allows us to conclude that until 1917, Kars Oblast was a relatively developed region, especially in the pastoral sector, whilst Nakhichevan and Sharuro-Daralagez Uyezds can be attributed to territories with underdeveloped agriculture.

However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Kars Oblast, as shown by the comprehensive economic and statistical analysis of all statistical computations, not only because of availability of natural resources, but also due to its favorable geographical location, had considerable potential for more intensive development of agriculture, trade and industry. Nevertheless, concentrating efforts on extracting the maximum from the existing industrial and agrarian objects, the imperial center was not interested in investing funds and resources in the economic development of the region. Probably, this was due to geopolitical interests reflecting the permanent need to retain this territory by force of arms, as the Ottoman Empire craved revenge and

<sup>33</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics.* Tiflis, 1916, p. 351.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 207.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 242–243.

prepared intensively for it. Constant military strengthening of the Castle of Kars alone, based on its important strategic importance, demonstrated the concern of the Russian imperial rulers about the possibility of its retention in the event of a new war with the Turks, despite a number of serious defeats of the Sublime Porte in the military battles that were led on the eve of World War I: Balkan and Tripolitan Wars of 1912–13.

Thus, the economic state of Kars Oblast and Nakhichevansky Uyezd did not boast a high level of development due to the policy of keeping them artificially low, carried out by the tsarist authorities. Nevertheless, favorable climatic conditions, advantageous geographical location, diligence and unpretentiousness of the local population allowed these regions to develop slowly and surely, and in some cases be in advance of the other outskirts of the Russian Empire.

What was the governance system in the southwestern regions of the Caucasus in the Russian Empire like? Kars Oblast was controlled by the military governor, Major General Aleksandr Ilich Sushchinskii serving as a governor in the pre-war years and at the beginning of World War I. The structure of the governor's office included construction, medical and veterinary departments. In the region, there was a department for agronomy, a regional statistical committee and a regional office for compulsory military service (the chairman of the committee and the regional office for compulsory military service was the very same Sushchinskii), the central people's court being headed by an assistant to the military governor. At the same time, the *cadi* and the deputies of the court were Muslims<sup>37</sup>.

Locally, the power was represented by the district administrations. The police supervision was carried out by the office of a chief of police in Kars. In the city of Nakhchivan there were the Nakhichevan Uyezd Directorate, uyezd office for compulsory military service, province's police department, city public administration, county court, provincial treasury, quarantine-customs station etc.<sup>38</sup>. The main juridical base for the entire management control system of the provinces in the Southwestern Caucasus were the 'Constitution for administration of Transcaucasian territory' adopted on 10 April 1840, the order of the Caucasian governor dated 30 April 1870 regarding establishing special investigative and court divisions and the law 'On changes in financial management of the Caucasus region' passed in 1897. Thus, the administrative authorities at both regional and district levels in this region were arranged on the same principles as in the internal provinces of the Russian Empire.

<sup>37</sup> *The Caucasian Calendar for 1917. Department of Statistics.* Tiflis, 1916, pp. 218–219.

<sup>38</sup> *Handbook on the Funds of the Central State Archive of Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.* Baku, 1989, p. 9–15.

Comparing the organization of provincial areas in Transcaucasia and in Russia, the prominent researcher of the Russian administrative-and-managerial system of the time, V. Ivanenko, emphasized: “In both areas one can find a civil governor (head of oblast) ... a treasury chamber, the public property chamber, criminal and civil courts, provincial and district land surveyors. All these institutions operated based on the common laws of the Russian Empire, and all exceptions to the general laws provided to the Transcaucasian regions have been declared annulled ... Again, the arrangement of provinces’ administrations were the same as in Russia. In each city, there was a governor; in each province, there was a province governor with an assistant, a county court, a county solicitor, a doctor and a treasury”<sup>39</sup>.

By 1917, the conditions of military confrontation with Turkey dictated to Russia the necessity of creating the so-called ‘fifth column’ in the event of loss of the territories in the Southwestern Caucasus, the role of which, due to certain circumstances, was to be played by the Armenian population of these regions. Preventatively pursued for several decades, the policy of the tsarist authorities aimed at creation and economic strengthening of the Armenian enclave of the Southwestern Caucasus, contributed to breakdown of the economic structure that had developed over the centuries, and introduced an element of disorganization into it. Under the extreme conditions of military operations in the region, this factor significantly aggravated the difficult economic situation that already existed there.

A rather objective assessment of the state of economic affairs in the Russian Empire during World War I was given by the Soviet historian P.V. Volobuev. He regarded decentralization of economic life in the country as a ‘concentrated’ expression denoting collapse of the empire, “its disintegration into separate isolated areas in which ... there was the process of ‘naturalization’ of the economy and replacement of monetary trade with barter”<sup>40</sup>. The unrestrained currency issue and inflation undermined money supply. On the territory of the Southwestern Caucasus, as in the other regions of the disintegrating empire, the monetary circulation had hardly fulfilled its function as the ‘blood circulatory system’ of the economic entity.

Simultaneously with depletion of productive forces in the region, the achieved organization of social production was destroyed, and the relations with other industrial and agricultural regions deteriorated rapidly; the unity of exchange and consumption was weakened, private and state control, accounting and regulation were weakened too, etc. In general, the socio-economic development of the region was closely interwoven with the features of socio-political processes taking place on its territory. Undoubtedly, the relatively prosperous course of economic activity in the

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<sup>39</sup> Ivanenko V.N. *Civil Administration of Transcaucasia from the accession of Georgia to the viceroyalty of Grand Duke Michael Romanov*. Tiflis, 1901, pp. 304–305.

<sup>40</sup> Volobuev P.V. *The Economic Policy of the Provisional Government*. Moscow, 1962, p. 470.

Southwestern Caucasus prior to World War I established the economic prerequisites for the future, albeit short-lived, existence of independent governmental associations that sought to emerge from the disintegrating Russian Empire.

After the February Revolution, the socio-political situation in the Southwestern Caucasus formed under the influence of several determining factors. Firstly, the Provisional Government viewed Russia as the successor to the Russian Empire in its southwestern regions, ‘galvanized’ so much that it became fraught with revolutionary speeches dictated not as much by the class struggle as by the interests of national-state self-determination. For Kars Oblast, the return to the bosom of Turkey was topical in this situation, for Nakhichevan – getting rid of its colonial status meant the revival of self-government lost in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Secondly, because of remoteness of the Southwestern Caucasus from the center, in the atmosphere of revolutionary disarray and chaos, the actions of state repressive apparatus in this region were clearly weakened. At the same time, the contradictions between the old tsarist administration, which continued to occupy important positions in the regional and county administration, and the new authority of the Provisional Government, represented by the Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM), intensified. Thirdly, the democratic ideas of the February Revolution began to penetrate and actively spread to Nakhichevan, Sharuro-Daralagez Uyezds and Kars Oblast. This process gave rise to a serious ideological and political discord between the aspirations of certain progressive sections of the population and the local feudal nobility, brave with its retrograde. Fourthly, disintegration of the Russian Empire pushed the expansionist aspirations of several Armenian political forces towards these territories.

Subsequent military and political events in the region actively and comprehensively generated small governmental formations in the Southwestern Caucasus. As noted above, the February Revolution in Russia contributed to the rapid development of the national movement throughout the Caucasus. A new qualitative stage of this movement was distinguished by the change of its character. Whereas the earlier enlightening motives prevailed, under the conditions of the revolutionary upheavals of 1917, the political tasks began to dominate its actions and programs quite clearly. The Southwestern Caucasus was not an exception in this respect.

The Special Transcaucasian Committee created on 9 March 1917 in Tiflis, from among the members of the 4<sup>th</sup> State Duma, headed by the cadet V.A. Kharlamov, and was forced to share power locally with the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, as well as with various national committees and organizations that emerged immediately after the revolution. On 23 May 1917 in Kars Oblast, the Regional Executive Committee was created, and in June – there appeared Ardahan and Oltu

province peasant committees<sup>41</sup>. The first Soviets in Nakhichevan appeared in the spring of 1917 in the cities of Nakhichevan and Julfa. The Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies appeared at Shakhtakhty railway station, which included, partially, deputies of railway workers, and later by the end of the summer of 1917 – deputies from the peasants<sup>42</sup>.

The social-democratic ideas in Nakhichevan and Kars were spread rather poorly. It is known that until October 1917 in the city of Kars, a small organization RSDLP (B) operated, headed by Russian serviceman Y. Lavrov. In the summer of 1917, he left for Petrograd, and then, due to illness, lived in Baku until 27 September. After returning to Kars, his authorities were questioned, since the military unit in which he served was relocated. Lavrov did not co-opt into the executive committee, which resulted in the delegation of certain Marcaryan instead of him to the Congress of Soviets. In this connection, Lavrov sent a complaint to the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b). The center, as a certain compensation for this case, could only recommend appointing this like-minded person as one of the leaders of Kars Committee of RSDLP (B). The top figure in it was Baumgart<sup>43</sup>.

In Nakhichevan, the Social-Democratic organization did not actually exist during this period. Only in the autumn of 1917, the long and stubborn work of the Bolsheviks brought specific political dividends in the form of gaining certain influence in the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies of Nakhichevan and Shakhtakhty. By mid-October 1917, the Council of Shakhtakhty garrison represented not only the military units, but also workers of the railway station and neighboring villages<sup>44</sup>. Almost all power in this region was concentrated in their hands: The Council controlled the railway, supervised the public order in the villages and set prices for agricultural products. He had great influence on the local executive committee of public organizations.

In April 1917, OZAKOM began appointing its authorized commissars to Nakhichevan and Sharuro-Daralagez provinces, which since May started to establish their district and village executive committees. Thus, the position of authorized officer in Nakhichevan province was taken by the former tsarist Burkhan bek Maksudbekov, whereas and in Ordubad it was assigned to the former policeman Bendukidze<sup>45</sup>. By the summer of 1917, the imposition of OZAKOM authority was formally completed, and elections to executive rural and food committees were held.

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<sup>41</sup> *Central State Archives of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (CSA GR)*, F. 10, Op. 1, D. 3, L. 27.

<sup>42</sup> *Central State Archives of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic*, F. 8, Op. 1, D. 395, L. 6; *CSA NR*, F. 1432, Op. 1, D. 395, L. 6; *CSA NR*, F. 24, Op. 1, D. 43, L. 5–6.

<sup>43</sup> *The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet power in Armenia*. Yerevan, 1957, pp. 91–92.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>45</sup> *CSA NR*, F. 8, Op. 1, D. 395, L. 6.

It is noteworthy that representatives of the feudal-patriarchal strata of the population lost significantly in these elections. But, despite this, they managed to get ahead of the democratically-minded applicants in several localities. It is characteristic that persistence of tribal and clan relations also manifested itself during this seemingly purely democratic process. An example of the Safiev beks, who succeeded in appointing all their relatives in some villages of Sharur-Daralagez district, was not so odious<sup>46</sup>.

After the October Revolution in Petrograd, OZAKOM lost their powers due to refusal to cooperate with the Social Democratic parties that dominated the Transcaucasia. Instead, the Transcaucasian Commissariat was established in Tiflis as a coalition government led by the Menshevik E.P. Gegechkori<sup>47</sup>. On 23 (10) February 1918, the Transcaucasian Seim opened in Tiflis, which was the legislative body of the commissariat. In its structure, along with representatives of Armenia and Georgia, 44 deputies from the Azerbaijani population of Transcaucasia were represented<sup>48</sup>. In the event of problems related to the internal political situation in Kars and Nakhichevan, the members of Azerbaijani faction invariably acted as defenders of the interests of Muslim population of the Southwestern Caucasus.

Seizure of power by the Bolsheviks put Russian Caucasian army in a difficult position. Commander of the troops of the Caucasian Front, General M.A. Przheval'skii and Chief of Staff of the Front Major-General E.V. Lebedinskii were in confusion. The General Headquarters was abolished; the political forces represented by the Bolsheviks, left SRs and anarchists who came to power in Russia, radically changed the entire military policy of the state, which to a significant degree demoralized the Russian army. And this happened at the time when the euphoria from the brilliantly developed Erzurum operation by the former commander of the Caucasian army General N.N. Iudenich was not over yet<sup>49</sup>.

This situation has also made corrections to the military policy of Turkey. In November 1917, M.A. Przheval'skii received a letter from the commander of the Turkish army on the Caucasian front, Ferik Vekhib-pasha, proposing a truce. On 21 November, the letter was discussed at the meeting of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. Followed by difficult discussions, they decided to accept the Turkish

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<sup>46</sup> CSA NR, F. 1432, Op. 1, D. 395, L. 6.

<sup>47</sup> Mikhailov V.V. On the Political Situation in Transcaucasia at the Final Stage of World War I. *Bulletin of St Petersburg State University. Ser. 2: Historical Studies*. Issue. 4, 2006, pp. 131–133.

<sup>48</sup> Mikhailov V.V. Features of the political and national situation in Transcaucasia after October 1917 and position of Muslim factions of the Transcaucasian governments. *Clio*, 2009, no. 3 (46), p. 62.

<sup>49</sup> Mikhailov V.V. The defeat of the Turkish army and forcing of a first-class fortress. *Military-Historical Journal*, 2006, no. 8, pp. 49–53.

proposal<sup>50</sup>. The next day, the relevant document was sent to the commander of the Islamic Army of the Caucasus<sup>51</sup>.

On 5 December 1917, the text of the armistice was signed in Erzincan, and a telegram with the explanations was sent to the corps of the Caucasian army. It is noteworthy that all the names in the Russian text of the act of armistice were taken from the map published by the Turkish General Staff<sup>52</sup>. In fact, this meant that the command of the Russian troops on the Caucasian front was inclined to recognize all the areas at the operational theatre and the areas adjacent to them as the sphere of Turkey's interests and influence.

Due to political chaos and uncontrollability in Russia, the military command was negotiating with a representative of the 'independent Caucasian government'. This unexpected nuance for the Turks was immediately reported to Enver Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, who assessed it properly. Immediately followed the instruction of Wehib Pasha on "the soonest recovery of the just peace so much wished for"<sup>53</sup>. The unexpectedness of such a proposal locked the Transcaucasian Commissariat in a dead end. After taking a three-week time out, the leadership of the commissariat began frantically searching for advice from Lorenzo Valerie, the elder of the consular representation of foreign powers in the Caucasus, as well as sending telegrams to the Central Ukrainian Rada and the chairman of the "South East Union of Cossack Troops, Caucasus Mountaineers and Free Peoples of the Steppe" I. Makarenko<sup>54</sup>.

In this context, it must be emphasized that immediately after signing the armistice, spontaneous departure of the Russian units began. Based on the draft of the chairman of Caucasian Volunteer Army's Regional Council, socialist revolutionary D. Donsky, it was decided to replace them with Armenian and Georgian national units<sup>55</sup>. This fact caused far from adequate reaction of the Caucasian public. Even the Baku Bolshevik press organ, newspaper *the Baku Worker*, stressed that the formation of national Armenian military units and disarmament of the old army completely disorganized the front, created incredible anarchy in the internal life of the region, and "deprecated the existence of the Caucasian peoples"<sup>56</sup>.

Per the orders of the Commander of the Caucasian Front dated 26 December 1917, No. 136 the Armenian Corps consisting of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Armenian infantry divisions was formed. They consisted of the Armenian volunteer units (commander –

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<sup>50</sup> *Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia*. Tiflis, 1919, pp. 11–12.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36–40.

<sup>55</sup> Ludshuwait E.F. *Turkey during World War I*. Moscow, 1966, p. 61.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

General Andranik Ozanian), the Armenian cavalry brigade (commander – Colonel G. Korganov), four territorial regiments, five territorial battalions, a march brigade and small irregular units<sup>57</sup>. Colonel Chardigny, Chief of the French Military Mission in the Caucasus, took an active part in the formation of these units<sup>58</sup>. The numerical force of the three divisions was only 17,000 bayonets; and the artillery equipment totaled 16 batteries. The lieutenant-general of the tsarist army F.I. Nazarbekov was appointed the corps commander<sup>59</sup>.

During the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, the delegation of Soviet Russia agreed to surrender Ardahan, Kars and Batumi districts to Turkey. The fourth article of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concerning the Caucasian Front, declared: “Russia will do everything in its power to facilitate the early cleansing of the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their orderly return to Turkey”<sup>60</sup>. To avoid any friction with Turkey, Russia assumed the obligation to demobilize and disband the Armenian armed forces on its own territory and on the territory occupied by Armenian militia units. The RSFSR also undertook not to concentrate troops on the Soviet-Turkish border of more than one division. Along with this, the agreement envisaged creation of conditions for emigration of citizens who practice Islam, to Turkey.

On 7 February (2 March) 1918, the Transcaucasian government was notified of the essence of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Soon followed the radiogram from Wehib Pasha with a request for evacuation of all formations subordinate to the Transcaucasian Seim from the said territories. The protest of the Transcaucasian government had no effect. The further fate of the territories of the Southwestern Caucasus became object of discussion at the negotiations between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Seim during the Trebizond Peace Conference, which opened on 1 (14) March 1918. The delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim included A.I. Chkhenkeli (Chairman), G.B. Abashidze, M.G. Gadzhinsky, O.F. Heydarov, G.B. Gvazava, R.I. Kachaznuni, G.M. Lashishvili, H.B. Hasmamedov, A.I. Khatsov, A.A. Shaykhulislamov<sup>61</sup>. The Turkish delegation, demanding recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Seim, was headed by the Prime Minister Rauf Bey. On 7 (20) March, the Transcaucasian delegation announced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk non-binding and unacceptable for the Transcaucasia. Immediately after that, on the following day, they made a statement regarding conditions of the peace, in which they insisted on restoring the state Russian-Turkish borders that existed at the time of

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<sup>57</sup> Mikhailov V.V. To the question on creation and tactical activities of Armenian volunteer units on the Turkish fronts during World War I. *New Guard*, 2010, no. 19–20, pp. 82–84.

<sup>58</sup> Ludshuwait E.F. *Turkey during World War I*. Moscow, 1966, pp. 160–161.

<sup>59</sup> *National Archive of Armenia (NARA)*, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 41, L. 12–13.

<sup>60</sup> *Peace Negotiations in Brest-Litovsk*. Moscow, 1920, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> *Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia*. Tiflis, 1919, p. 107.

outbreak of the hostilities in 1914. In this statement, the delegation asserted that “it seeks the right of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Anatolia, in particular, autonomy within the framework of the Turkish statehood”<sup>62</sup>. As the documents show, the contradictions that arose around the problems of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, became both the most important reason for failure of the Trebizond Peace Conference, and the subsequent disintegration of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic<sup>63</sup>.

After proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918, its government was concerned about delimitation of its southern boundaries – Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki Municipality. This helped to distance Georgia from the problems of Kars and Nakhichevan, which, in fact, the Armenian representatives in the Transcaucasian Seim wanted. Moreover, in October 1918, an armed conflict broke out between the Georgian and Armenian republics, symbolizing collapse of the ideas of Georgian-Armenian consolidation aimed at securing the rights to Kars, Ardahan, Nakhichevan and other territories of the Southwestern Caucasus for Armenia. At the same time, the Turkish military campaign of May 1918 culminated in the establishment of military and political control throughout Kars Oblast, and because of the military presence of the Turks in Julfa, a bridgehead was created to establish control over Nakhichevan<sup>64</sup>. The proclamation of Independent Azerbaijan, ethnically and religiously close to the bulk of the population of the southwestern territories of the Caucasus, on 28 May 1918, a new geopolitical reality appeared, capable of significantly influencing the dynamics of socio-political events in this region.

### Conclusion

Thus, inference should be drawn on which factors influenced the main political prerequisites for the formation of democratic republics in the Southwestern Caucasus. Before the revolution, Kars Oblast, which became the basis for the South-Western Caucasian Democratic Republic, was characterized by rather high indicators of socio-economic development, which created a good foundation for gaining independence. During World War I, the Southwestern Caucasus became the main arena of military operations, the civilian population suffered enormous damage, which in many respects contributed to the growth of both revolutionary sentiments and national movements striving for independence.

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<sup>62</sup> Ludshuwait E.F. *Turkey during World War I*. Moscow, 1966, p. 186.

<sup>63</sup> *Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia*. Tiflis, 1919, p. 266.

<sup>64</sup> Mikhailov V.V. *The Ottoman intervention of the first half of 1918 and separation of Transcaucasia from Russia. 1918 in the Fate of Russia and the World: Triggering off a Large-scale Civil War and International Intervention*. Arkhangelsk, 2008, pp. 183–184.

The Provisional Government and its body in the Caucasus, OZAKOM, that was formed after the February Revolution, did not factually implement Nakhichevan's desire to revive the lost self-government, whilst Kars Oblast continued to remain within Russia. Nevertheless, the democratic demagogy of the Provisional Government and its promises of cardinal reforms contributed to raising certain hopes for the population of the regions in the Southwestern Caucasus to carry out the democratic process in the future. The revolutionary upheavals of 1917 caused the naturally expected growth of national movements throughout the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Transcaucasia. The Bolsheviks coming to power and their virtually capitulatory withdrawal from World War I created real conditions for changing the state-territorial status of the Caucasian regions and provinces. Under such conditions, the establishment of independent republics in Transcaucasia became inevitable. The emergence of the Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani republics stimulated the process of state self-determination in the regions of the Southwestern Caucasus. As a result, in December 1918, after the end of World War I and withdrawal of Turkish troops from the occupied territories in Transcaucasia, the South-Western Caucasian Republic (Kars Republic) was created.

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**The revolutionary year of 1917 in Russia – reaction to events  
and everyday life in the diaries and memoirs of political figures of the era:  
From the Kadets to monarchists**

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*Abstract.* The article is devoted to consideration and reflection upon the image of historical figures and revolutionary events of 1917 in diaries, memoirs and letters by political figures of that period: Members of the People's Freedom party, Union of October 17, monarchist and social democratic movements.

The focus of the author's attention is the reaction of the Russian society, representatives of the political space of Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, revolutionary events of 1917 and their perception of the image of 'revolutionary changes'. The article emphasizes that these events left strongly pronounced emotional coloring in the memory of contemporaries, which passed on to the historiography of the Russian Revolution from the private sources. The author notes that an important place in the memoirs and diaries of contemporaries of the revolutionary upheavals in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Russia is taken by the question regarding responsibility for these historical events; also, reflections on their results for Russia are provided.

*Keywords:* revolution of 1917, party of People's Freedom, the Russian Empire, diary, memoirs, history of Russia

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*From October 1917 in Russia ... everything turned out as in France:  
there was not only its own Bastille, its Directoire, but also its Marats and Robespierres.*  
A.V. Yeropkin

### **Introduction**

After a lapse of 100 years, the revolutionary events of February-October 1917 in Petrograd, which historically transformed the development of Russian statehood, still belong to the most controversial and politicized pages of Russian history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The interest of modernity in the events of the Russian Revolution of 1917 is dictated not only by the need for some 'consensus' in the assessments of this historical

phenomenon by modern Russian society, but also by the recent activation of studies of the everyday life of Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and its representation to the public.

A huge research work on archival materials and personal sources concerning the place, role and activities of Russia's political parties and movements in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in the context of the revolutionary events of 1917 occupies an important place today in the study of domestic political history of this period. The researchers' interest in the diary entries of politicians of the era and their contemporaries is aroused by the synchronous nature of fixation of the information as well as auto-communicativeness (identity of the author and the addressee), which allows them not only to reconstruct the facts of the revolutionary upheavals of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Russia, but also to penetrate the world of emotions and feelings of the participants and witnesses of the era that surrounded them<sup>1</sup>. In addition, the possibility of analyzing the reactions of contemporaries to the changes that took place in Russia in 1917 is even more valuable, since notes in the diaries were, as a rule, "freshly traced" and, consequently, unlike memories, are not distorted by later late-time recreations.

Thus, the search and introduction of not only diaries, but also memoirs, notes, letters of contemporaries of the revolutionary upheavals in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Russia is an important matter in the process of studying the revolutionary everyday life as well as social-psychological aspects of the revolution of 1917. Within the scope of this article, we will present the image of everyday life and reaction to the revolutionary events of 1917 in Russia reflected in the diaries and memoirs of various repre-

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<sup>1</sup> Aksenov V.B. *The Daily Life of Petrograd and Moscow in 1917*: Dissertation... PhD in Historical Sciences. Moscow, 2002. 231 p.; Andreev L.N. *SOS: The Diary (1914–1919). Letters (1917–1919). Articles and Interviews (1919). Memoirs of Contemporaries (1918–1919)*. Moscow, St Petersburg, 1994. 598 p.; Brutskus E.O. "Well, that's enough for me to guess the course of history..." (From "The diary of the mother-landlady during the Revolution in Russia"). *National History*, 1997, no. 3, pp. 76–95; Buldakov V.P. *Krasnaya Smuta (Red Times of Trouble). The Nature and Consequences of Revolutionary Violence*. Moscow, 1997. 376 p.; Krivolapova E.M. *Literary Diary of 'Russian Smuta' of 1917. Bulletin of Vyatka State Humanities University. Ser.: Philology and Art History*. Kirov, 2009, no. 4 (2), pp. 105–108; Mishnin V.A. "It's such a blessing, to remain alive in this gigantic war." The diary of a soldier, 1 October 1915 – 29 January 1918. *Zemstvo (Penza)*, 1995, no. 2, pp. 84–157; Prishvin M.M. *The Diaries. 1914–1917*. Moscow, 1991. 448 p.; Rostokovsky F. Y. *Diary for Writing (1917: Revolution through the Eyes of a Retired General)*. Moscow, 2001. 496 p.; Tyrkova A.V. The Petrograd diary. *Links. Historical almanac. Issue 2*. Moscow, 1992, pp. 319–339; Khin-Goldovskaya R.M. From the diaries: 1913–1917. *The Past. Issue 21*. Moscow; St Petersburg, 1997, pp. 521–596; Finogeeva N.A. "When I write in my diary everything that I have in my heart, I somehow calm down...". From the diary of a high-school girl, 22 February 1915 – 6 May 1921. *Zemstvo: Archives of Provincial History of Russia*. Penza, 1995, no. 3 (7), pp. 43–66; 'Black notebooks' of Zinaida Gippius. *Links. Issue 2*. Moscow; St Petersburg, 1992, pp. 1–173.

sentatives of the political space of Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (the Kadets, monarchists, socialists etc.), publicists and public figures of the epoch.

### Main body

The historical events of February-October 1917 in Russia left a strongly pronounced emotional coloring in the minds of contemporaries, which passed on to the historiography of the Russian Revolution from the private sources<sup>2</sup>. The public opinion in Russia in the period of 1917 divided into two camps: Some stood for the revolution and praised it in their works; others, on the contrary, despised and hated it. Thus, the professor of St Petersburg University, the Russian philosopher S.A. Askoldov writes the following about the events of 1917: “Russian public figures, whilst trying to rebuild Russia, never bothered to understand Russia as a country of great ideas and potentialities, both in good and evil. They also measured the soul of their homeland with their own model of souls neatly tailored to foreign universities. They always proceeded from a clear or not so clear conscious assumption that as soon as the old masters left, it was they who would take their place as the new masters, who, of course, would also set up a new order. And yet, not only did the experience of Revolutions in Western and Central Europe, but even the Russian revolutionary movement of 1905, taught absolutely the opposite, namely that Russian public figures who fought the old regime, if successful, would prove to be an insignificant group that had no real influence over the people, and that with the fall of the old order, new forces would arise that would sweep away experienced and wise with their own experience and in their own way and, at any rate, would be politically honest fighters for Russian freedom.”<sup>3</sup>

The everyday routine of the revolutionary events in February-March of 1917 in Russia is described by members of the Party of People's Freedom (the Kadets) in their diary entries and memoirs as follows: “I was met with a fantastic spectacle”, the

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<sup>2</sup> The death of Tsarist Petrograd: The February revolution through the eyes of the mayor of A.P. Bulk. *Russian past*, 1991, no. 1, pp. 7–72; Pipes R. The Russian Revolution. In 2 vol. Part 1. Moscow, 1994. 399 p.; Goldenweiser E.A. The Russian Duma. *Political Science Quarterly*, 1914, vol. 29, pp. 408–422; Riha T. Miliukov and the Progressive Bloc in 1915: A Study in Last-Chance Politics. *The Journal of Modern History*, 1960, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 16–24; Pearson R. Miljukov and the Sixth Kadet Congress. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. 53, no. 131 (Apr. 1975), pp. 210–229; Treadgold D.W. The constitutional democrats and the Russian liberal tradition. *American Slavic and East European Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1951), pp. 85–94; Tuck R.L. Paul Miljukov and negotiations for a Duma Ministry 1906. *American Slavic and East European Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1951), pp. 117–129; Rosenberg W.G. *Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917–1921*. Princeton, 1974; Figs O. *A people's tragedy: The Russian revolution 1891–1924*. Leningrad, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> *Manifestoes of Russian Idealism. Problems of Idealism. Milestones. From the Depth*. Moscow, 2009, p. 56.

deputy of the First State Duma A.R. Lednitsky writes about the events of 26 February 1917 in his diary, “Nevsky is totally filled with people. Cossacks are in the center of the avenue. The crowd was either scowling or threatening... Again, and again shouting “Long live the army!” Hats were being thrown up... Rumors were spread about shootings with cheval de frise, strikes and rallies; they told about the Minister of Interior Protopopov placing machine guns on the roofs of the houses...”<sup>4</sup>

In his turn, a member of the Kadet Party since 1905, deputy of the First State Duma V.A. Obolensky continues the description in his memoirs: “On 27 February (old style) 1917, I left home at 8 am .... It was a wonderful clear frosty day. The snow that had fallen on the previous day covered the streets and glistened brilliantly in the sun. The absence of tram noise and bells gave a feeling of strange silence, which together with the bright sun and invigorating frosty air somehow settled the nerves wrought-up by the events of the previous days ...

When I arrived at the office, I started doing usual things ... Suddenly at 11 o'clock the phone rang: the husband of one of our employees informed her that the State Duma had been dissolved, and that in the army barracks, the rebellious Volinsky Life-Guards Regiment was lining up opposite their house in the street. Having received this hard-hitting news, I kept it brief and went through the city to Tauride Palace.

...I turned to Liteynaya. There, a young officer on a beautiful bay horse approached each house and gave the order to the yard-keepers: “Shut the gate, shut the gate”. Some people rushed along the sidewalks, knocking at locked entrances and begging to let them in ...

I hastened steps among the set-up machine guns. They were aimed along Baskov Street, where at the back, the rebelling soldiers who had left the army barracks was seen to be lining up. Having passed beyond those machine guns, I crossed the geographical line that was separating the city that still lived in the old regime from the one that was overwhelmed with the revolution.”<sup>5</sup>

The ‘baton was handed over’ to the member of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party, A.V. Tyrkova-Williams, who wrote the following in her diary entries and memories about the first days of the revolutionary events of February-March 1917 in Russia: “We came up to Tauride Palace without any gunfire (that day the police machine guns still guarded the passers-by). In Tavricheskaya Street, near the palace there was a bunch of soldiers and passers-by, and a car with soldiers was circling around. Commander Yakubovich told them, “Go to the army barracks. The sooner you return, the more order there will be. We got liberty, now we must make order. And for this we need cars. You cannot drive them in vain.” The soldiers’ eyes shined

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<sup>4</sup> Zakharov A.M. The February Revolution of 1917 in ‘The Diary’ of A.R. Lednitsky. *Revolution of 1917 in Russia: New Approaches and Opinions*. St Petersburg, 2011, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Obolensky V.A. *My Life. My Contemporaries*. Paris, 1988, pp. 511–512.

joyfully, and they shouted, “That’s right, sir! That’s right!” But those who were in the car sat tight.”<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, A.V. Tyrkova-Williams says the following about further events: “The fifth day of the Russian Revolution. There is more order in the city. There was no shooting yesterday. There was no absurd car racing. We have been asked a pass several times. Street rallies are arranged throughout the city. You cannot understand what they say, because the speakers got hoarse. Soldiers and workers are carrying red slogans: ‘Land and Will’, ‘Democratic Republic’. Singing can be heard everywhere. The sun shines frosty. There is some kind of ease that you had never experienced before. I never thought that you can feel this way.”<sup>7</sup>

The revolutionary routine and the events that took place in Petrograd in Tauride Palace during the first days of the February Revolution of 1917 were not to be lost on A.V. Tyrkova-Williams: “The rallies in the Duma often get people angry and burdensome. Yesterday afternoon I ran to the Catherine Hall for a moment. The soldiers next to me chuckled indifferently. Behind them, in the middle, there was a small crowd of workers, among whom were female workers. A frenzied, screaming and frustrated female voice could be heard from there. A woman, elderly, ugly, with a square gray face, screamed: “Com-ra-aa-a-des... Land... Wi-ii-ill!” (They say it is Groman’s wife. In this case there is nothing surprising about her behavior). She threw back her straight cut hair with her hand and, evidently, she no longer understood what, how and where. Not in her words, but in her frenzy, there was something ridiculous and stupid, and for me it was disgusting.”<sup>8</sup>

The view of “Russian monarchists” on the events of 1917 in Russia is also quite interesting. A political and public figure, publicist, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Empire of the second, third and fourth convocations, a well-known figure in the monarchical movement of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, V.V. Shulgin wrote the following about them in his memoirs: “We were born and brought up to praise or blame it under the wing of power... As a last resort, we were able to move painlessly from deputy seats to the ministerial benches... However, before the possible fall of power, before the bottomless abyss of this collapse, our heads were going around and my heart got numb... From the first moment of this flood, my soul was poured with disgust... God, how disgusting! ... it was so disgusting that, clenching my teeth, I felt only miserable, powerless and therefore even more vicious rage inside. “Machine guns!” The machine guns – that’s what I wanted. I felt that only the language of the machine guns was understandable to the street crowd and that only

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<sup>6</sup> Tyrkova A.V. Available at: <http://staging.project1917.ru/persons/890> (access date: 15.06.2017).

<sup>7</sup> Tyrkova A.V. Available at: <http://staging.project1917.ru/persons/890> (access date: 20.06.2017).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

this – its lead – can bring to bay the terrible beast that had escaped to freedom, back to its lair... Alas, this beast was... Their Majesty the Russian people <...> Then, what we were afraid of, what was worth trying to avoid at all costs, became already a fact. The revolution had begun.”<sup>9</sup>

Proceeding from the entry of 2 March 1917 in the diary of the ideologist of “monarchical statehood” L.A. Tikhomirov, the news of the fall of the autocracy was received with joy: “...It is hoped that the Provisional Government will support the order and protection of the country. If this is so, then we must admit that the coup was made remarkably cleverly and gracefully... The dynasty, apparently, perished up to its roots...”<sup>10</sup>

In his turn, whilst lamenting his hopes crumbled to dust, which he attributed to the February Revolution, a prominent right-wing politician, leader of the Black-Hundred movement in Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, V.M. Purishkevich would write in late December 1917 in the plan for his speech before the Revolutionary Tribunal: “On 27 February, we could become citizens and could come alive again. Alas!”<sup>11</sup>

Equally remarkable are the words of the famous Russian religious philosopher, literary critic and publicist Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov regarding the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 in Russia. “...It held ground for a thousand years. And suddenly only “there are not enough buns in Petrograd”. From Rurik to Nicholas II it was the same development, the same course and same meaning, in fact: and suddenly “on the Vyborg side there was not enough bread” – and everything collapsed at once.”<sup>12</sup>

In the light of this, we shall quote the words of the outstanding politician of his time, a member of the Kadet Party, V.D. Nabokov, who noted the following: “...does not mean, of course, that during the first two months, when on the ruins of the autocracy – formally obsolete on 17 October 1905, but in fact for 11 whole years trying to maintain its importance – the new, free Russia, – that everything went well within this short period. On the contrary: an attentive and objective look could find the symptoms of future decomposition in the first days of the “bloodless revolution”.”<sup>13</sup>

Equally interesting is the image of the post-February revolutionary reality of 1917 in Russia. The idea of this can be obtained from the diary of B.V. Nikolsky, a promi-

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<sup>9</sup> Shulgin V.V. *Days*. 1920. Moscow, 1989, p. 445.

<sup>10</sup> Repnikov A.V. *Conservative Ideas about the Reorganization of Russia (late 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries)*. Moscow, 2006, pp. 308–309.

<sup>11</sup> Ivanov A.A. V.M. Purishkevich and the Provisional Government: From support to frustration. *Revolution of 1917 in Russia: New Approaches and Opinions*. St Petersburg, 2011, p. 70.

<sup>12</sup> Rozanov V.V. Available at: <http://staging.project1917.ru/persons/59> (access date: 20.06.2017).

<sup>13</sup> Nabokov V.D. *Before and after the Provisional Government: Selected works*. St Petersburg, 2015, p. 221.

ment participant in such right-wing organizations as the Russian Constituent Assembly and the Union of Russian People, to which he was a member of their main council for a long time. “They have run out of money, there's a terrible feeling about food; I have not drunk milk for a long time, I forgot its taste. You can see what time we are going through,” exclaimed B.V. Nikolsky on 19 August 1917.<sup>14</sup>

Noteworthy in the context of the history of everyday life is the situation of “work with the new power” after the February events of 1917 and the fall of the monarchy. Thus, on 7 March 1917, the Kadet newspaper *Rech'* wrote: “It seems that there was not a single person who declared that they could not remain in the service according to their beliefs after all that happened. On the contrary, everyone tries to assure that they almost dreamed about the revolution from the cradle and about the overthrow of the old system.”<sup>15</sup>

“They formally triumphed,” writes the member of the labor party V.B. Stankevich in his memoirs, “we praised the revolution, shouted “hurray” to the fighters for freedom, decorated themselves with red bows and walked under the red banners... The ladies prepared nutritious dishes for the soldiers. Everyone said ‘we’, ‘our’ revolution, ‘our’ victory and ‘our’ freedom. But in my heart, in private conversations, I was horrified, shuddered and felt captured by the hostile element that was going in some unknown way... I will never forget the figure of Rodzyanko, this burdensome gentleman and noble person, when with dignified merit but also with an expression of deep suffering and despair on his pale face, he passed through the crowd of ungirded soldiers along the corridors of Tauride Palace. Officially it was said that “the soldiers came to support the Duma in its struggle against the government,” but in fact the Duma was disbanded since the very first days. And the same expression was on the faces of all the members of the Provisional Duma Committee and of those in the circles close to them. They say the representatives of the Progressive Bloc were crying at home in hysterics from impotent despair.”<sup>16</sup>

An important place in the ego documents of contemporaries of the revolutionary upheavals of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Russia takes the question of responsibility for these historical events. “For the revolution in February 1917, the Russian people, not the lower classes, not the so-called masses, but the leaders, the intelligentsia, literate people of all ranks are held responsible: professors, lawyers, writers, artists, legal counsels and even generals. They all yearned for change and insisted that it was impossible to live like this any longer. But they did not understand the need, they could not immediately form a strong government capable of waging a war and governing the country, giving orders, forcing themselves to obey. They were obliged to prevent

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<sup>14</sup> *Russian State Historical Archive* (RGIA), F. 1006, Op. 1, D. 4a, L. 11a.

<sup>15</sup> *Rech'*. 1917, 7 March.

<sup>16</sup> Stankevich V.B. *Memoirs. 1914–1919*. Leningrad, 1926, p. 33.

that break in the continuity of authority. The Russian intelligentsia did not cope with this duty. And is it not for this that history turned it into dust as punishment?” the member of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party A.V. Tyrkova-Williams wrote in her diary.<sup>17</sup>

We shall note that in 1917 Tyrkova-Williams described the whole course of this revolution in some detail and once again stressed her favorite idea of a strong state: “The Kadet Party, even during the revolution, failed to nominate people for action; it is one of the reasons for failure of the Provisional Government. Long-standing opposition eroded the liberals... they were too scrupulous about the means. Therefore, they were so conscientious about their name – the Provisional Government. They considered themselves only trustees, to whom the people, temporarily, until convocation of the Constituent Assembly, entrusted the state affairs. All major events, all significant changes in the laws were postponed until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly... Lenin did not acknowledge any ‘yet’, and certainly did not apologize to anyone. He seized power, and immediately it became clear that he would not give it away to anyone without a fight. This military clarity was present neither in the Kadet speeches, nor in their actions or in their hearts.”<sup>18</sup>

This ‘position’ is also reflected to some extent by the representative of the camp of political opponents of the Kadet Party, L.D. Trotsky. In his work ‘The History of the Russian Revolution’, he wrote: “The history of the February Revolution is the history of how the October core was liberated from its conciliating covers. If vulgar democrats dared to describe the course of events objectively, they could hardly call on anyone to return to February, same as one cannot make a spike return to the grain that gave birth to it. That is why the inspirers of the bastard February regime are now forced to turn a blind eye to their own historical culmination, which has turned out to be the culmination of their insolvency.”<sup>19</sup>

In the light of this, the words of the leader of the Kadet Party P.N. Milyukov are also noteworthy, which he wrote on 20 October 1919 in a letter to the “patriarch of Russian liberalism” I.I. Petrunkevich: “The revolution of 27 February was carried out not by us and against our will.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> A lady against Lenin. *Russian Newspaper*, 2017, 20 April, no. 7252(86). Available at: <https://rg.ru/2017/04/20/k-stoletiiu-revoliucii-gosarhiv-opublikuet-vospominaniia-ariadny-tyrkovoj.html> (access date: 18.06.2017).

<sup>18</sup> A lady against Lenin. *Russian Newspaper*. 20 April 2017, no. 7252(86). Available at: <https://rg.ru/2017/04/20/k-stoletiiu-revoliucii-gosarhiv-opublikuet-vospominaniia-ariadny-tyrkovoj.html> (access date: 18.06.2017).

<sup>19</sup> Trotsky L.D. *The History of the Russian Revolution*: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: The February Revolution. Moscow, 1997, p. 101.

<sup>20</sup> Dumova N.G. *The Failure of Policy of the Kadet Party in the Race for the Bourgeoisie Power (February–October 1917)*: Dissertation ... PhD in Historical Sciences. Moscow, 1970,

In his turn, speaking of responsibility for what happened in Russia in 1917, the famous representative of the conservative forces of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Nikolai Yevgenyevich Markov wrote: “Yes, Russia collapsed on the threshold of already gained victory; it collapsed because it was eaten up alive by worms from the inside... These worms were deliberating and irresponsible agents of the dark Judeo-Masonic power, which most feared the victory of Russia and for which its defeat was the greatest achievement. This mean and disgusting role of worms eating the fleshy white body of Mother Russia was played by the figures of the ‘Progressive Bloc’.”<sup>21</sup>

The revolutionary events of October 1917 formed an entirely new ‘mood’ in Russia in the minds of the masses, which, on the one hand, would be maximally exploited by various political forces to achieve their own ‘Olympus’ at the time; however, on the other hand, subject to their achievements, they would also undergo its orderly and systematic ‘consolidation’ in the context of triumph of the victorious ideology.

Let us emphasize that the image of the October Revolution of 1917 and the interpretation of these events during the Soviet period was of great importance in the context of legitimization of the new Soviet power, turning into a “myth of foundation” and thus obtaining its colossal symbolic destiny. Moreover, proceeding from the theory of “two revolutions”, October 1917 was interpreted not only as the beginning of “triumphal procession of the Soviet power” and the logical completion of the revolutionary process in Russia, but also as the most important step of humanity towards the new fair society and the bright future of communism. In the Soviet period, the image of the October Revolution of 1917 acquired a universally inclusive character and underwent its sacralization, including both revolutionary heroes and various revolutionary symbols (the cruiser *Aurora*, the revolutionary Red Banner and the anthem). The most important part of the official policy of remembrance was the memorable dates related to the revolution and the associated festive rituals. As an example, 7 November, the anniversary of the October Revolution, was the most important date in the daily life of the Soviet era.

The image of everyday reality in Russia in the light of October events of 1917 was reported in the notes by a member of the State Duma of the Russian Empire of the first and third convocations, the Octobrist, Russian publicist and public figure A.V. Yeropkin. He wrote: “Since October 1917, landlord pogroms began in Russia: the social revolution has entered its own rights, and the history of the second Russian

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p. 34.

<sup>21</sup> Bogoyavlensky D., Ivanov A. ‘The Kursk Bison’. Nikolay Yevgenyevich Markov (1866–1945). *The Warrior Host of Saint George. Lives of Russian Monarchists in the Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. St Petersburg, 2006, pp. 133–134.

revolution will bring on its pages such cruelties, such barbarity of destruction of the cultural centers of the Russian rural areas, when valuable libraries were thrown to the four winds page by page: pianos and mirrors were divided per capita, a string per head; fruit gardens and age-old parks were cut down to the root; buildings were burned or sorted out by log and brick; the landowners, their clerks and managers were beaten with such incredible brutality that the apologists of the Russian revolution can calm down: everything turned out as in France: there was not only its own Bastille, its Directoire, but also its Marats and Robespierres.”<sup>22</sup>

In his works, an outstanding Russian sociologist, the globally renowned scientist, an active political figure who was in the very midst of the revolutionary events of 1917, member of the Constituent Assembly of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin noted that after the revolution “the political throats and demagogues” live best: “constant speeches at rallies, revolutionary speeches, slogans, appeals give them the reputation of irreconcilable fighters for a just cause. And this is a public career, and therefore means power, money and privileges. Here is another paradox, more precisely, the dead end of the revolution: it pushes not the most hard-working, but the most talkative, to the public arena. Tribunes and not specialists are the true heroes of the revolution.”<sup>23</sup>

Speaking about the factor of violence as a characteristic feature of the revolutionary transformations of 1917, P.A. Sorokin maintained: “The revolution proclaimed ‘peace’ in October – in fact, it turned out to be a brutal and merciless war, merciless and heartless that lasted for three years, after the other peoples stopped fighting.”<sup>24</sup>

In the light of the opened question on the “revolutionary violence”, the position regarding this phenomenon expressed by the leader (‘vozhd’) of October 1917, V.I. Lenin, is also interesting. Thus, in March 1919, whilst delivering a speech in memory of Y.M. Sverdlov at the extraordinary meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, he noted: “There is no doubt that without this trait – without revolutionary violence – the proletariat could not have won, but also there is no doubt that the revolutionary violence was a necessary and legitimate move of the revolution only at certain moments of its development, whereas organization of proletarian masses and the working people was and still remains a much deeper and permanent property of this revolution and the condition for its victory.”<sup>25</sup>

In his memoirs M.A. Gorky wrote: “I often had to talk with Lenin about the cruelty of revolutionary tactics and life.

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<sup>22</sup> Yeropkin A.V. *Notes of a Member of the State Duma: Memoirs. 1905–1928*. Moscow, 2016, p. 112.

<sup>23</sup> Sorokin P.A. *Sociology of the Revolution*. Moscow, 2005, p. 489.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 464.

<sup>25</sup> Lenin V.I. *Full Collection of Writings*. Vol. 22. Moscow, 1973, p. 221.

“What would you like?” He would ask indignantly. “Is humanity possible in such a fierce fight that no one saw before? Where would be the place for kindheartedness and generosity? We are blocked by Europe, we are deprived of potential assistance of the European proletariat, the counter-revolution is getting upon us, from all sides, like a bear, so what shall we do? Should not we, do not we have the right to fight and resist? Well, forgive me, we're not stupid. We know that no one can do what we want, except us. Do you really think that if I was convinced otherwise, I would be sitting here?”<sup>26</sup>

Considering the position of ‘vozhd’ of the October Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), in relation to one of the constituent elements of its everyday life, brings his image to consideration, in relation to those historical events. Controversial from the point of view of political sympathies or antipathies, but at the same time bright and ambiguous, symbolic and provocative, the personality of V.I. Lenin, with all its diversity, is undoubtedly one of the most iconic in the history of Russia of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Evaluation of V.I. Lenin in the ego documents of the epoch are ambiguous, as well as his personality itself. On the one hand, in the diaries and memoirs of contemporaries we find his “charm by the masses” in this figure, recognition of his historical role and significance, and on the other hand – direct and utter disregard.

Russian religious and political philosopher N.A. Berdyaev, who did not accept the events of 1917 in Russia and moved to France, described the personality of V.I. Lenin as follows: “...Lenin was a typical Russian person. In his specific, speaking face there was something Russian-Mongolian. In Lenin's character, there were typically Russian features and not specifically those of intelligentsia, but rather Russian people: simplicity, integrity, rudeness, dislike for embellishments and rhetoric, practicality of thought, propensity for nihilism on the moral basis.”<sup>27</sup>

Nobel laureate in literature, Russian writer and poet I.A. Bunin, speaking in Paris in 1924, said in his turn: “... A degenerate, a moral idiot from birth, Lenin showed to the world, just in the midst of his activity, something monstrous, terrific; he ruined the world's greatest country and killed several million people – and yet the world has already gone so mad that in broad daylight they argue, whether he is a benefactor of humanity or not?”<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, Maxim Gorky (Peshkov), a Russian writer, in his essay “Days with Lenin” in 1934 wrote: “Lenin was a man of enormous signific-

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<sup>26</sup> Gorky M.A. *About Lenin*, 1934. Available at: [http://maxim\\_gorkiy.narod.ru/lenin.htm](http://maxim_gorkiy.narod.ru/lenin.htm) (access date: 19.06.2017).

<sup>27</sup> Berdyaev N.A. *The Origins and the Meaning of Russian Communism*, 1937. Available at: <http://h.120-bal.ru/literatura/5254/index.html> (access date: 22.02.2014).

<sup>28</sup> Bunin I.A. Available at: <http://www.runivers.ru/philosophy/chronograph> (access date: 20.06.2017).

ance. Only history will have the opportunity to evaluate it. He was a great statesman and great man. I consider it honor to be his friend!”<sup>29</sup>

Moscow philistine N.P. Okunev, who kept his personal diary in 1917-20, left the following entry regarding the image of V.I. Lenin dated 17-30 April 1918: “Lenin always writes, always talks... The energy of this man is outstanding, and as a speaker he, like Trotsky, is truly remarkable. No longer only dull Bolsheviks go to their speeches, but also the “motley audience”. The performance halls literally burst with thirsty listeners. Neither the Kadets, nor Kerensky had such a prolonged and indisputable success.”<sup>30</sup>

In the context of this let us note the arguments of V.V. Rozanov, who in his article ‘To the Position of the Moment’ writes that “the Leninist revolts are not so despicable as one might have thought of them for a while; this sealed lord, thrown by Germany on our shore, at first seemed to many as kind of dangerous fire that indicates a particularly dangerous place, an underwater rock or a strand to a ship sailing in the darkness, from where it should keep as far as possible and in no case come close to it. Thus, almost the whole press and the inhabitants of the capital, conscious of their responsibility as being citizens, reacted to it. However, quite obviously that Lenin was not meant to be for them. He was tailored for the lowest classes, for the last philistine illiteracy. And he disturbed them and raised it to the surface.”<sup>31</sup>

Quite an interesting image of V.I. Lenin can be found in the memoirs of a member of the Central Committee of the People's Freedom Party A.V. Tyrkova-Williams. Her view of the leader of the Bolsheviks is interesting not only from the representative of the liberal ideology of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and their main political opponent – the Kadets, but also because she was a school mate of his wife N.K. Krupskaya.

In her memoirs, she describes the leader of the Bolsheviks as follows: “I had not met or read Lenin before. He primarily interested me as Nadya's husband. A short man, seems shorter than her, squat, has broad cheek-bones and deeply hidden little eyes. A nondescript person (prune face). Only his forehead is Socratic and protruding. <...> I immediately felt that there, behind the door, where one could hear the occasional rustling of paper, the owner was sitting, and that the life of both daughter and mother revolved around him. When he went out to dinner, Nadya's ugly face brightened and got prettier. Her small blue eyes were lit up by girlish, shy love. She was absorbed in him, drowned, and dissolved in him, although she herself had a very specific character, her own personality, dissimilar to him. Lenin did not suppress it,

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<sup>29</sup> Gorky M.A. *About Lenin*. 1934. Available at: <http://maxim.gorkiy.narod.ru/lenin.htm> (access date: 19.06.2017).

<sup>30</sup> Okunev N.P. *Diary of a Muscovite*. Vol. 1. 1917–1920. Moscow, 1997, p. 174.

<sup>31</sup> Rozanov V.V. *To the Position of the Moment*. Available at://staging.project1917.ru (access date: 20.06.2017).

he absorbed it. Nadya, with her soft loving heart, remained true to herself. But in her husband, she found the embodiment of her dreams. Was not she the first one to see a leader in him? She recognized this fact and had since become his indefatigable, devoted collaborator. She helped him to build the team of like-minded people, who in 1917 forged the Communist Party, the foundation of ruthless Soviet power.”<sup>32</sup>

Characterizing V.I. Lenin, Tyrkova-Williams writes: “In 1904, when I met Lenin in Geneva, who could foresee the future brutal dictator in him? It was one of the emigre journalists who succeeded, despite the Central Committee of their party, in seizing the *Iskra* party newspaper. Even then, in the revolutionary circles, they knew that Lenin was power-hungry and very unscrupulous regarding the means to achieve it.”<sup>33</sup>

The personal sketches by A.V. Tyrkova-Williams from direct communication with V.I. Lenin are also interesting. She writes: “After dinner, Nadia asked her husband to accompany me to the tram, since I did not know Geneva. He took off his shabby cap, like those worn only by the workers, and went with me. He began to tease me about my liberalism and my bourgeoisness. I paid back with his own coin and attacked Marxists <...> Lenin was a ‘toothy’ polemicist and got tough with me, especially as my words touched and angered him. His smile – he was smiling without opening his lips, only his Mongolian eyes squinted a little – it was becoming more and more sarcastic. A sharp and unkind expression flashed through his eyes.

I remembered how my brother, returning from Siberia, told me that in Minusinsk the exiled Lenin was behaving in a completely uncomfortable way. He rudely stressed that the former exiles, the members of ‘Narodnaya Volya’ (‘People’s Will’), were trash, that the future belonged to them, the Social-Democrats. His disdain for the old exiles, for their traditions, was especially clear when he had to account to the local police for the flight of one of the exiles. Usually the whole prison settlement helped the fugitive, but did it so that the police could not punish those who gave him money or footwear. Lenin ignored this and because of a pair of shoes he let down the exile, who was imprisoned for two months for his assistance in escaping, although unsuccessful. The exiles demanded Lenin to a comrades’ court. He appeared, only to say that he did not recognize their courts and did not give a damn about their opinion.

My brother, with his usual humor, described this storm in an exile ‘anthill’, but at the end he added seriously:

“This Lenin is an evil man. And his eyes are wolfish, evil”.

The memory of my brother's story egged me on, and I began to tease Nadia's husband even more boldly, not suspecting that he would be the future autocrat of all Russia. And he, when the tram had already arrived, suddenly jerked his head and, looking me straight in the eye, said with curl of his lips:

“Now wait, we'll hang people like you on the street lamps.”

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<sup>32</sup> Tyrkova-Williams A.V. *On the Way to Freedom*. Moscow, 2007, p. 180.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

I laughed. That time it sounded like a ridiculous joke.

“No. I will not let myself be caught.”

“We'll see about that.”

With this we parted”<sup>34</sup>

Reflecting on V.I. Lenin, A.V. Tyrkova-Williams continues: “Could it have occurred to me that this doctrinaire, the follower of a fictitious theory, possessed by a demon of leadership mania, and perhaps even many other demons, already carried in his cold heart the terrible schemes of indiscriminate destruction of dissidents. He planned a lot in advance. It is possible that he already nourished his main idea of support, the Cheka.”<sup>35</sup>

Within the context of this article, as an example of not only personal, but also political opposition (revolutionary and counter-revolutionary), we shall consider the mutual view of each other by the leader of the Kadet Party, P.N. Milyukov and the leader of the Bolsheviks V.I. Lenin on the basis of memoirs and diary entries. P.N. Milyukov was personally acquainted with V.I. Lenin and met him. Thus, at the meeting devoted to the political development of Russia, which was held in 1903, they discussed the possible options for cooperation. In his memoirs, P.N. Milyukov described this meeting as follows: “Even Lenin, “Lenin himself”, looked at me at that time as if we felt each other out, and considered me possibly a temporary (rather ‘brief’) fellow-traveler – on the way from the ‘bourgeois’ revolution to the socialist one. At his request, I saw him in 1903 in London in his squalid lodgings. Our conversation turned into a dispute about feasibility of the tempo of the forthcoming events, and the dispute proved useless. Lenin kept hammering his way, throwing weight over the arguments of the opponent.”<sup>36</sup>

The revolution of 1905-1907 has significantly changed the political situation in Russia. In 1906, under new political realities, V.I. Lenin called on the Bolsheviks to fight the Kadets. He saw an acute need for disengagement from the liberals, because he feared that people who sympathized with the socialist ideas could move to the camp of the Kadets. The leader of the Bolsheviks was especially worried by the positive reviews by the Kadets about Marxism and G.V. Plekhanov. “Yes, yes, it's not for nothing that the Kadets are now cherishing Plekhanov!” V.I. Lenin wrote. “The price of this cherish is obvious. Doudes, as the Latin proverb says: *Do ut facias* (I give that you may do; I give [you] that you may do or make [for me.] – *translator's note*) ....”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Tyrkova-Williams A.V. *On the Way to Freedom*. Moscow, 2007, p. 181.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Stepanov S.A. The Kadets (the Constitutional Democratic Party). *Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series Political Science*, 2006, no. 8, pp. 71–82.

<sup>37</sup> Lenin V.I. The victory of the Kadets and the tasks of the workers' party. *Full Collection of Writings*. Moscow, 1968, vol. 12, p. 232.

M.A. Gorky writes in the memoirs of his conversations with V.I. Lenin: “With astonishing ever-present liveliness and clarity, he spoke of the Duma, of the Kadets, who “are ashamed to be Octobrists”, that “there is the only way for them to turn right” ...”<sup>38</sup>

In 1912, V.I. Lenin on the pages of the newspaper *Pravda* broke out with criticism of P.N. Milyukov, reproaching him for departing from liberalism toward the monarchy. Analyzing the program of the Kadet Party, he wrote: “The leader of the Kadet Party lost his way in the broad daylight! Does Mr. Milyukov really ‘not understand’ this difference, which is known even from the history textbooks? Does he really ‘not realize’ that the program of the Kadets is already a program of not democrats, but of liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie; that only liberals (and bad liberals) could vote for the budget in the Third Duma, could declare themselves a loyal opposition? etc. Mr. Milyukov understands this perfectly well and ‘distracts with smooth talk’, pretending that he forgot the ABC of difference between the liberalism and the democracy. To consolidate this pathetic equivocation of the Kadets in the press, we shall note to Mr. Milyukov that in the entire official press of the Social-Democrats (not counting, of course, the liquidators, who we will gladly return to Mr. Milyukov), in all the resolutions of the leading authorities of the Social-Democrats, throughout the entire line of the Third Duma Social-Democrats we always and constantly, in thousands of forms, are faced with protection of the old tactics, which the Social-Democrats, according to Mr. Milyukov, allegedly gave up. This is an indisputable historical fact, Mr. Scholar Historian! We are to reinforce the idea in the press of how low the Kadets must have fallen if they try to deceive the public regarding the issues so elementary and well-established by the history of political parties in Russia.”<sup>39</sup>

In 1913, V.I. Lenin in his article ‘An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties in Russia’ describes a member of the Kadet Party as follows: “The Kadet is a typical bourgeois intellectual and, in some respect, even a liberal landowner. The deal with the monarchy, the cessation of the revolution is his main aspiration. Unable to fight at all, the Kadet is a real broker. His ideal is perpetuation of bourgeois exploitation in orderly, civilized and parliamentary forms. Their political force is unification of the vast mass of bourgeois intelligentsia necessary in every capitalist society, but, of course, they are absolutely incapable of seriously affecting the actual changes of order of things in this society.”<sup>40</sup>

In his turn, the leader of the Kadet Party P.N. Milyukov wrote the following in relation to V.I. Lenin: “The logic of events was undoubtedly on the side of Lenin.

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<sup>38</sup> Gorky M.A. *About Lenin*. 1934. Available at: <http://maxim.gorkiy.narod.ru/lenin.htm> (access date:19.06.2017).

<sup>39</sup> *Pravda*, 1912, 6 October, no. 136. Available at: <http://www.mysteriouscountry.ru> (access date:18.06.2017).

<sup>40</sup> Lenin V.I. *Full Collection of Writings*. Vol. 22. Moscow, 1973, p. 283.

“Clearly seeing, perceiving, feeling the existence of the situation of the civil war”, he gave a signal. Calling the newly formed coalition a “civil war government”, Trotsky evidently meant this: not that the coalition will start the civil war itself, but that with this coalition the “objective conditions of the moment” have developed in the sense of ‘inevitability’ of a civil war with incomparably greater chances for the victory of ‘proletariat’.” “...The judgments of Lenin,” P.N. Milyukov wrote, were “deeply realistic.” He is “centralist and a believer in a strong state” and mostly counts on the measures of direct state violence.”<sup>41</sup>

At the same time, from the standpoint of political opposition, the leader of the Kadets, P.N. Milyukov said: “I prefer to see my enemy in the best light, to better understand and, more accurately, crush him”<sup>42</sup> However, one cannot disagree with the following words of M.A. Gorky: “Vladimir Lenin was a man who prevented people from living their usual life so much, as no one before him could manage”<sup>43</sup>

### Conclusion

In one article, it is difficult to reflect the perception of Russia's space, that was changed in the light of the revolutionary events of 1917, by its contemporaries and participants of this ‘history’. Enlightened through ego documents, Russia in 1917 was not just a country at the parting of the ways or at the change of epochs. This routine of the tide of life, balancing between ‘no longer’ and ‘not yet’, the changed attitude of the Everyman of the epoch towards the time, expressed through separation from the normal calendar, new ‘before’ and ‘after’. The leader of the Kadet Party P.N. Milyukov wrote in emigration: “Let Russia be devastated, thrown out of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the 17<sup>th</sup> century; let the industry, trade, urban life, higher and lower culture be destroyed. When we compute and balance gain and loss of the massive coup that we are going through, we are very likely to see what the study of the Great French Revolution showed. The entire classes were destroyed, the tradition of the cultural layer ended up, but the people passed into the new life enriched with a stock of new experience...” We think that in 100 years, the reflection upon this experience will still be one of the main things in the persevering search for an answer to the question: “What is the Russian Revolution?”

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<sup>41</sup> Milyukov P.N. *Memoirs*. Moscow, 1991, p. 326.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 327.

<sup>43</sup> Gorky M.A. *About Lenin*, 1934. Available at: <http://maxim.gorkiy.narod.ru/lenin.htm> (access date: 19.06.2017).

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## **The post of President in the liberal projects of state structure in the Russian Democratic Republic in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century**

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*Abstract.* This article explores the place and role of the institution of President in the liberal lawmaking in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, examines the results of a comparative study of the texts of liberal drafts of Constitution of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century relating to this topic, as well as the law-making process of the Special Committee and the Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government. The author concludes that the liberal projects relating to the introduction and functioning of the institution of Acting (Provisional) President had a very insignificant effect on official lawmaking in 1917. Nevertheless, they are an exceptionally important source for characterizing the liberal lawmaking in the era of systemic social and political crisis. In author's opinion, the project of introducing the post of Provisional President in Russia confirms the general conclusion that the liberal recipes for overcoming systemic crises, based on supremacy of legal ways of transforming public life, do not work. In a revolutionary time, the choice of society tends toward other ways of reforming the social reality and seeks recipes for overcoming the social crises that offer simple solutions understandable to the broad masses.

*Keywords:* liberal lawmaking, liberal drafts of Russian Constitution, the post of president, lawmaking of the Provisional Government

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### **Introduction**

The Russian Revolution of 1917 caused radical changes in the social and political system of the former Russian Empire. The question of the type of state power, widely discussed in the liberal socio-political thought, passed from the field of theoretical search into the sphere of practical politics. This problem, unfortunately, does not apply to the popular stories of the historiography of Russian Revolution of 1917, and this is typical for both domestic and foreign research traditions. Russian historiography focused on the problems of formation of the state governed by the rule

of law<sup>1</sup>, models of public restructuring of Russia proposed by various political forces<sup>2</sup>, moving the legal topics to the background. Foreign historiography in general, is only slightly interested in the processes of constituting the new Russian statehood<sup>3</sup>. Consequently, the problem remains unexplored in the research field of modern history as well as historical-legal sciences.

### Main body

The idea of introducing the post of president in Russia much earlier than in 1917, when the liberal legal thought and political practice moved to the stage of embodiment of their theoretical constructs, including in the sphere of state building. Even in the period 1908–11, which historians traditionally attribute to the time of the actual failure of historical power to conduct the policy of reforms, the idea that the new democratic Russia could be headed by president had a certain spread in the liberal environment. Thus, upon returning to political activism, the chairman of the First State Duma, S.A. Muromtsev, whilst meeting colleagues during his deputy activities and party work, constantly touched upon the topic of a possibility of his going into politics again. F.A. Golovin left very interesting memories of those meetings. During one of his private conversations with S.A. Muromtsev, which took place shortly before his death, he invited him to support with his authority one of the political groups that were at the time at the stage of formation. According to him, S.A. Muromtsev replied that “he decided to evade direct participation in any political group”<sup>4</sup>. He further made it clear that this was due to his hopes “for a new revolutionary movement,

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<sup>1</sup> See: Medushevskii A.N. *Dialogue with Time: Russian Constitutionalists of the Late 19<sup>th</sup> and Early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries*. Moscow, 2010; Glushkova S.I. *The Problem of the Legal Ideal in Russian Liberalism*. Ekaterinburg, 2001; Zhukov V.N. *Russian Philosophy of Law: The Natural Law School of the First Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. Moscow, 2001; Kornev V.N. *The Liberal Concept of State and Law in Russia at the Beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (1905–1917)*. Belgorod, 2001 and others.

<sup>2</sup> See: *Models of Public Restructuring in Russia. The 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Resp. Ed. V.V. Shelokhaev*. Moscow, 2004; Shelokhaev V.V. *The Liberal Model of the Reorganization of Russia*. Moscow, 1996; Repnikov A.V. *Conservative Concepts of the Reorganization of Russia*. Moscow, 2007; Mamitova N.V. *Liberal Concepts of the Constitutional State in Russia (end of 19<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> centuries)*. Moscow, 2001 and others.

<sup>3</sup> See: *Power and Legitimacy – Challengers from Russia*. L.; N.Y., 2012; Butler W. *Russian Law*. London; Oxford, 2009; *Late Imperial Russia: Problems and Prospects*. N.Y., 2005; *The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State. 1917–1921. Documents. Selected and Edited by Mc Cauley*. L., 1975; *The Russian Provisional Government. 1917. Documents*. Selected and edited by R.P. Browder and A.F. Kerensky. Stanford Univ. Press. Stanford, California, 1961. Vol. I–III; *The Rise and Fall of Soviet Union. A Selected Bibliography of Sources in English*. L., 1992.

<sup>4</sup> *Russian State Historical Archive (RSHA)*, F. 1625, Op. 1, D. 3, L. 28.

for the possibility of creating a republic and for taking on the role of president of such a republic if this was the case”<sup>5</sup>.

In general, the term ‘president’ was widely used in the legal terminology of Russia in relation to those posts in the hierarchy of public administration, where its use showed their primacy in comparison to the others. Without entering into a detailed analysis of this problematics, let us limit our scope at the example of half-jokingly, half-serious constitutional studies of the very same S.A. Muromtsev, whilst he was still a student. In his student years, together with N.V. Muraviov, a play, which was called ‘In 30 years’ was written for the student theatre. Among its actors were N.V. Muraviov in the role of Russian president and S.A. Muromtsev as the president of the Russian parliament<sup>6</sup>. In real life, the positions they had occupied in the system of public administration in Russia were called differently, but that was a somewhat different, albeit quite curious, plot.

One can see the same very post of minister-president (in fact, that of prime minister) in the ‘liberation’ (‘Parisian’) liberal draft of Constitution of Russia<sup>7</sup>, prepared by the so-called ‘Liberation’ group of lawyers (N.F. Anenskii, I.V. and V.M. Gesseny, P.I. Novgorodtsev, S.A. Kotliarevskii, I.I. Petrunkevich, G.I. Shreider). The term ‘president’ was used in this project for officials who headed the parliament. Thus, in Article 50 it was said that each of the chambers of the bicameral parliament “elects its president, vice-president and secretaries by closed casting of votes”. Article 63, on the arrangement of the judiciary, provided that “if a minister is brought to justice by one or both chambers, he is tried by a special court chaired by the president of the supreme court, members of that court and representatives of the highest cassation court of the Empire.” Thus, in the ‘liberation’ project, the term ‘president’ is used to denote the prevalence of any position in the current hierarchy, but does not mean the supreme person of the state. Similar provisions include the draft Basic Law prepared by the Kharkov Law Society based on the text of the ‘liberation’ project.<sup>8</sup>

In other liberal projects of Constitution of Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, there is also no trace of the institute of presidency as the highest official, they do not contain this term even in relation to other power structures. The reasons here are, of course, different. Thus, ‘Muromtsev’s’ project was drafted with the calculation of possible incorporation into the imperial legislation and language, and in terms of terminology

<sup>5</sup> *RSHA*, F. 1625, Op. 1, D. 3, L. 28; Antsiferov N.P. *From the Thoughts of the Past: Memoirs*. Moscow, 1992, p. 182.

<sup>6</sup> *School and Life*. 8.11.1910.

<sup>7</sup> ‘*Law*’ is a weekly legal newspaper. St Peterburg, 1905, no. 21, 29th of May. St Peterburg, 1735–1746.

<sup>8</sup> For more details see: Aronov D.V., Sheparneva A.I., Leonova I.A., Kosheleva S.V. Draft Basic Law of the Russian Empire by Kharkov Law Society – a place and role in the liberal constitutional lawmaking of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. *History of State and Law*, 2017, no. 1, pp. 60–64.

was as close as possible to it, as S.A. Muromtsev himself said at one of the Zemsky congresses. Speaking in the debate on the Draft Basic Law at the All-Russian Zemsky Union of city officials in July 1904, he noted that his authors “tried to stick to the language of our legislation, of course, without resorting to exaggeration”<sup>9</sup>.

The Ekaterinoslav project is generally very fragmented, as is the ‘Guchkovsky’<sup>10</sup>. As for the ‘Herzenstein’ project (the Moscow City Duma project), the authors did not elaborate on the problem of organization of the executive branch, limiting itself to a very brief section on the legislative power. The main difference between that project and the others was the elaboration of economic issues and problems of local self-government<sup>11</sup>. There was also no institution of president in the program of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which, due to certain disagreements over the future state structure of Russia, contained the formulation that “the constitutional structure of the Russian state is determined by the Basic Law”. At the Second Congress of the Party, the paragraph on the state structure was formulated more clearly under the influence of the local party committees: “Russia must be a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy”. This provision remained unchanged until March 1917, when at the Seventh Congress of the Constitutional Democratic Party, the formulation regarding introduction of a democratic republic in Russia was adopted. A similar situation existed concerning women’s electoral rights and the structure of parliament. As a matter of fact, the institution of presidency already presupposed the rejection of monarchy, which, correspondingly, was not included into the program requirements of the Cadets at that time. Based on these circumstances, we can say that the position of S.A. Muromtsev as rendered by F.A. Golovin, looks far more than different than the general trends peculiar to the then liberal political and legal practice.

The year of 1917 was extremely difficult for all political forces in Russia, but the common thing was that they all acted within the framework of the emerging legal field, which was largely the result of their political creativity. The historical power was personified in the imperial family name, and the most important acts in this sphere were those that were associated with the rejection of the former Russian throne. The political forces that came to power in October 1917, for some time formally retained the institution of the Constituent Assembly, with the convocation and the election of deputies happening after the October events. Almost dramatically,

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<sup>9</sup> *Liberal movement in Russia. 1902–1905*. Moscow, 2001, p. 275.

<sup>10</sup> See: Aronov D.V. ‘Draft Constitution of the Russian Empire with sections: The state system, the rights of citizens, public education’ – from the political and legal heritage of Alexander Ivanovich Guchkov. *History of State and Law*, 2014, no. 24, pp. 49–53.

<sup>11</sup> See: Aronov D.V. Reform of local self-government in liberal projects of the basic law of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: The experience of comparative study. *History of State and Law*, 2014, no. 12, pp. 41–46.

the legal field of the country was nullified, the formation of a new regulatory system began, based on radically different legal ideas and principles.

If we are talking about the activities of the Provisional Government and political forces in this area, whose representatives were mainly recruited into its membership, played the role of experts, etc., they were to some extent limited by the basic liberal principles giving the priority first and foremost to statutory regulation. Significant influence on the practice of transforming the liberal ideas, expressed in party programmatics, was provided by the realities of the current political situation. As we noted above, the party formulations such as the state structure of Russia and the new political system were very seriously adjusted. It was not without the influence of personal political ambitions though. In the field of our interest, we can talk about the presidential ambitions of M.V. Rodzianko of the post-February period. Radical politicians' political positions changed mirror-like. In this respect, a very vivid example was the reorientation of the extreme right, who sometimes spoke with greetings and support of a democratic republic in Russia. Thus, V.M. Purishkevich called "the best Russian people" "to raise above the sacred banner of civil freedom, freedom of the western model"<sup>12</sup>.

In practice, the Provisional Government in that current situation believed it expedient to pursue a consistent policy in the development of constitutional legislation. In September-October 1917, the procedure for drafting the Basic Laws of Russia was formalized. A special commission was created within the framework of the active Legal Meeting. It included many famous public and political figures, as well as 'stars' of national jurisprudence: A.A. Bogolepov, N.I. Lazarevskii, V.F. Deriuzhinskii, V.M. Gessen, A.I. Ivanovskii, A.E. and B.E. Nol'de, E.E. Pontovich, who mainly belonged to the Constitutional Democratic Party.

For a very short period of its work, the commission developed several projects, among which were the following materials: "Theses on the question of Upper Chamber", "On the Organization of the Provisional Executive Power under the Constituent Assembly", "Articles of the Basic Laws on Autonomy"<sup>13</sup>. "On Organization of Provisional Executive Power under the Constituent Assembly" was fundamentally important for understanding the position of liberal political forces on the issue of future state-political structure of the country under the conditions of a systemic social and political crisis.

In accordance with the text of its first article, "the exercise of executive power should be entrusted to the Provisional President of the Russian Republic". In the

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<sup>12</sup> Purishkevich 'We made this coup'. 'Gravediggers of the Russian Empire' *The 100th anniversary of the revolution of 1917*. Available at: [http://ruskline.ru/history/2016/04/05/my\\_proizveli\\_etot\\_perevorot/](http://ruskline.ru/history/2016/04/05/my_proizveli_etot_perevorot/) (Access date: 12.09.2017)

<sup>13</sup> Bobrova G.S. *The Formation of Russian Constitutionalism*. (PhD) Dis. Moscow, 2017, p. 52.

future, the fate of this institute of state power was to be decided by the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to give the right for re-election for up to one year (Article 4).

These norms created a legal mechanism for transferring power to the Constituent Assembly from the Provisional Government. They also opened the possibility for re-election of Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, already present in the new structure of state power, where they could take the post of President of the Russian Republic, introduced into the Basic Law. This scheme, according to representatives of liberal jurisprudence in the Special Commission, provided continuity in the management of Russia, gave the necessary stability and strength of the executive power, guaranteed further development of systemic constitutional reforms.

The project detailed the powers and conditions for functioning of the institution of President. Specificity consisted in their performance as the Provisional President and, as was said in the text of the draft, “under the supervision of the Constituent Assembly and with the assistance of the Council of Ministers enjoying the confidence of the Assembly” (Article 2). The set of rights of the Provisional President of the Russian Republic was significant to analyze the position of liberal jurisprudence. The President was entitled to “the right of legislative initiative” (Article 5), the “bills are submitted for consideration by the Constituent Assembly by the Council of Ministers” (Article 5) on behalf of the President, whilst the President would observe “the execution of laws and made orders necessary for this” (Article 8). The President was entitled to issue decrees “on the structure, composition and procedure of actions of representative institutions, except for the judiciary, requesting necessary loans from the Constituent Assembly” (Article 9). The President was also permitted “all affairs of government” (Article 10), led foreign policy, oversaw the armed forces (as the supreme commander in chief they belonged to “the supreme command over all armed forces” (articles 11-12)).

The analysis of the text of the bill suggests that when drafting the status of the Provisional President, the liberal drafts of the Basic Law of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century country were taken as its basis. This tendency continues in the articles that gave the Provisional President the right to appoint and dismiss those who replaced the main posts in the structure of the state administration. First, we are referring to such positions as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and ministers. The list also includes those officials of “civil and military departments, who are appointed and dismissed by the supreme authority based on valid legal acts” (Article 13). The Provisional President was also delegated the right to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. In his absence, this function was performed by Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Article 17). Similarly, to the monarch in the liberal projects of

the Basic Law of Russia of the beginning of the last century<sup>14</sup>, the President of the Russian Republic was protected from external influence by several special legal institutions. The obligatory inquiries from active deputies of the Constituent Assembly could not be addressed to him, and the articles providing for his responsibility to the Constituent Assembly had a general character, devoid of any specificity and containing very inaccurate language. In fact, they were talking about the possibility of receiving oral or written explanations from the Provisional President by the Constituent Assembly (Article 6). The real responsibility for the results of managerial actions in the project was assigned to Chairman of the Council of Ministers and sectoral ministers (Article 19). They were also responsible to the Constituent Assembly “for the decrees and orders sealed by the President”<sup>15</sup>. In fact, this was the adaptation of the institution of counter-signature, which was repeatedly mentioned and elaborated in 1904-06 in the liberal constitutional projects<sup>16</sup>.

We believe that the options for the restoration of monarchy in Russia, considered by individual researchers, are rather speculative, since they are based on a known legalist tradition. Similarly, one can also talk about the opinion that this scenario fits into the vision of state’s typology suggested by the Cadets<sup>17</sup>, although one can also see the evolution from the opinion of expediency to preserve the constitutional monarchy in the first days of the revolution, transformed into the decision of the Seventh Congress on introducing into the program provisions for a democratic republic. However, that would be a typical course of events under the conditions of a revolutionary gradual breakdown, when there would be a constant search for removal of any kind of cognitive dissonance between the sense of justice (if one likes it, the eternal Russian “search for truth”) and the existing legal order. The presence of this dissonance and its threat to the social system, and even more so for the state system, had been repeatedly described by the representatives of national jurisprudence and, in particular, by S.A. Muromtsev in the work ‘Law and Justice’, which became for him the theoretical basis for the search for a model (mechanism) to eliminate this contradiction<sup>18</sup>.

After the collapse of the monarchical form of government in 1917, the question of typology of Russian statehood was submitted to the Seventh Congress of the Cadet

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<sup>14</sup> Aronov D.V. Imperial concept in liberal projects, the basic law of Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. *Imperial and Monarchic Component of Liberal Ideology. Muromtsev Readings*, Oryol, 2014, pp. 122–130.

<sup>15</sup> Levchuk S.V. Constitutional projects of the Provisional Government of Russia in the inter-revolutionary period of 1917. *Law and Life*, 1996, no. 10, pp. 155–156.

<sup>16</sup> See: Aronov D.V. Status of the monarch in the liberal projects of the Basic Law of Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. *History of State and Law*, 2013, no. 3, pp. 14–17.

<sup>17</sup> Bobrova G.S. Decree. op., p. 54.

<sup>18</sup> See: Aronov D.V. Law and justice in the creative heritage of Sergei Andreevich Muromtsev. Reform or revolution. *Bulletin of Higher Education Institutions*, 2012, no. 3, pp. 9–13.

Party. The ideologist of the Cadets was a well-known liberal lawyer F.F. Kokoshkin – he was an active supporter of the thesis on including a provision on a democratic republic as a form of government in the Cadets’ program. “The republic in our eyes cannot but be the most perfect form of government, for,” he said, speaking at the congress, “this is a form of government in which our democratic principle – the rule of the will of the people – is carried out in its fullest and purest form”<sup>19</sup>. To implement the provisions on the actual rule of democratic principles, F.F. Kokoshkin noticed, “in the republic there should be a separation of power,” the legislative power was to “belong wholly to the representative assembly”<sup>20</sup>. F.F. Kokoshkin’s arguments, relating to the perception of the general political situation in Russia gave a unanimous vote of 323 delegates on the issue of amending paragraph 13 (on the state structure of Russia) in the party program of the Cadets. The new version ran as follows: “Russia should be a democratic parliamentary republic”<sup>21</sup>. Accordingly, the thesis about the immanent adherence of the Cadets to the restoration of monarchy required serious argumentation at minimum. As a matter of fact, after the abdication of Nicholas II and Mikhail Alexandrovich, the theoretical possibility of restoration remained, but that variant, analyzed by liberal jurisprudence, depended on the position of the Constituent Assembly<sup>22</sup>. Restoration of monarchy in theory could be implemented by both inviting to the throne representatives of the Romanov dynasty or another dynasty. It was the restoration of the Romanov dynasty that was impossible for many legal reasons, such as absence of regency institute, etc.

### Conclusion

Thus, the liberal projects of introduction and operation of the institute of Provisional President that we considered in the article, influenced the official law-making of 1917 even less than the liberal projects of the Basic Law of 1904-06 influenced the imperial legislation of 1905-07, although at that time, the influence was, strictly speaking, negligibly small<sup>23</sup>. At the same time, they are an exceptionally important source for characterization of the liberal lawmaking in the era of systematic socio-political crisis. From this perspective, it can be said that the project of introducing the post of Provisional President in Russia confirms the general conclusion that liberal recipes for overcoming systemic crises, based on supremacy of legal ways of transforming public life, do not work. At such times, the choice of the

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<sup>19</sup> *Congresses and conferences of the Constitutional Democratic Party. 1905–1920 years.* Vol. 3. Book 1. Moscow, 2000, p. 373.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 377.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 400.

<sup>22</sup> See: Aronov D.V., Kosheleva S.V. Typology of state power in Russia in February-October 1917. *History of State and Law*, 2017, no. 19, pp. 13–17.

<sup>23</sup> Aronov D.V. *From Lazavka to the Tauride Palace. Sergei Andreevich Muromtsev – politician, scientist, teacher.* Oryol, 2010, pp. 158–161.

society tends to use other recipes to overcome the social crises, offering simple ways to reform the social reality, understandable for the broad masses.

A promising field of research in this case would be studies of comparative nature that will enable us to identify and trace the degree of interrelation and mutual influence of liberal lawmaking in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the model of liberal transformation of the country and the activities of the Provisional Government, as well as theoretical legacy of the liberal jurisprudence of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and, to a certain extent, the emigrant period, which the Russian liberalism left to us.

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# REVIEWS

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## **Rethinking on the eve of the century: Historians of the February Revolution**

**[Book Review: The February Revolution of 1917: Problems of History and Historiography: A Collection of Reports of the International Scientific Conference. SPb.: LETI, 2017. 380 p.]**

On 3 March 2017, an international scientific conference took place in St Petersburg dedicated to the February Revolution and timed to the centenary of the Great Russian Revolution, with the publication of a comprehensive collection of materials. It should be noted that this conference was the fifth in a series of annual conferences held in St Petersburg since 2012 under the general title ‘Russia in the era of revolutions and reforms: The problems of history and historiography’. The most interesting part of the published materials was the text with the replies of 25 historians from the world (11 foreign and 14 Russian historians), experts on the revolutionary process of 1917 in Russia, to the questions on key issues of history and historiography of the February Revolution set out on almost 140 pages of the collection. The idea of creating such a project was expressed at the international colloquium ‘The Age of Wars and Revolutions (1914–22)’ in St Petersburg in 2016, and it was implemented in 1917 by the centenary of the Great Russian Revolution.

Let us name at least a number of names among the participants of this project, representatives of five countries well-known to specialists: American historians - A. Rabinovich, P. Kenez, R.G. Suni, C. Hasegawa and others; Japanese researchers H. Wada and E. Ikeda; British specialist A. Dickins, a former Russian historian who has lived and worked in Canada for more than 20 years, G.Z. Ioffe; Russian researchers – B.I. Kolonitsky, V.V. Shelokhaev, A.V. Ganin, I.V. Lukojanov, A.B. Nikolaev and others. Professor A. Rabinovich (Indiana University, USA) was the curator of the project.

The project participants were asked nine questions on the problems and processes that took place in pre-revolutionary Russia, on the role of World War I in the creation

of the February Revolution, its culprits, historical significance and the ability to stay within the framework of the liberal revolution. Following the publication of the project participants' answers, the responsible editor of the collection, Professor V.V. Kalashnikov placed almost 40-page express analysis under the heading 'The Newest Historiography of the February Revolution', which would be of great interest for specialists and all those interested in this topic. We note at once that the participants' responses and reflections were essentially or even fundamentally different, which allows us consider a wide range of judgments by contemporary researchers about the revolutionary process of 1917 in Russia.

On the first question regarding the focus and direction of the processes in Russia's socioeconomic development on the eve of World War I, in interrelation with the growth of socio-political stability or instability, most the respondents chose the option that the development processes were inconsistent, and the dominant trend was difficult or impossible to determine, where they refused to provide their definition. Ten historians spoke in favor of increasing instability, and only one claimed that the process of stabilization was in progress. Thus, the majority were concerned with the prospects of development in pre-revolutionary Russia, without optimism, and a significant part definitely referred themselves to 'pessimists'.

Answering the question on the most acute and dangerous problem regarding political stability of the country in prewar Russia, ten historians called the policy of autocratic power and the relationship between the government and the society, the authorities and intellectuals and the split of the elites. Four researchers believed that this was a working-class matter, three believed that it related to peasants, and seven people refused to name any problem and, as a rule, pointed to the interconnectedness of all existing problems. None of the project participants indicated the nationalities question as the most acute and dangerous problem, although it was noted that its importance increased during the revolution itself.

The next question concerned the role of World War I as a factor of the Russian Revolution. Most historians believed that it made it very likely or inevitable.

In the fourth question, the historians were asked to name the main culprit of the February Revolution and explain what their fault was. It seems that this question was formulated sharply and was not entirely correct, because it could be perceived differently. However, Professor V.V. Kalashnikov, as the person who prepared the questions, explained that such wording was chosen deliberately, because there was a long-standing dispute in the Russian society over the question of who is to blame. Yet, in another issue, it was supposed to clarify the problem of the driving forces or 'actors' of the revolution. It seems that after all, the original wording of the question of who bears the main responsibility for the February events or who played the main role in this revolution happening, would be more accurate and correct.

Most of those who answered this question named the tsar and his entourage (the government), their policies as the main culprit of the revolution. Three researchers mainly blamed the Duma, one spoke about revolutionary parties of a socialist type. Eight participants of the project preferred to talk about a combination of factors and people responsible for the revolutionary development of the events. Several historians considered this question incorrect, especially since in this case the ‘guilt’ was often associated with merit, driving forces and participants of the revolution.

The next question was related to the dates and beginning of the February revolution. Here, almost half of the respondents indicated 23 February, seven people linked it to 27 February as the beginning of soldier uprising, and five indicated the same day, noting the decision of the State Duma to create a Provisional Committee.

The sixth question was to find out which of the political forces played the main role in the downfall of the autocracy. Of the proposed options, four historians chose the left parties, based on the spontaneous movement of workers and soldiers, six people named the liberal leaders and Duma leaders as such, and four people mentioned the generals. But most respondents believed that the main force could not be named, however there were joint actions of various forces, or they pointed out a combination of factors, the role of the insurgent masses that contributed to the radicalization of liberals.

The seventh issue related to the assessment of historical significance of the February Revolution (downfall of the autocracy). Eleven participants rated it as an event necessary in historical sense. In this case, V.V. Shelokhaev called, for example, the revolution “a completely natural and historically significant event”. A few historians, recognizing the revolution as the logical one, at the same time, refused to recognize it as necessary, which raised the question of correlation of these concepts, and V.V. Kalashnikov in the final content analysis pointed to the correlation of these concepts (regularity and necessity) as an actual historiographic problem.

Only one participant in the Project called the revolution historically unnecessary, while the rest speculated in their answers about the complexity of the answer to this question and the contradictory nature of the phenomenon of the February Revolution. Pointing out that it was not accidental, they also noted its grave consequences: economic, social, political, geopolitical, disintegration of statehood and beginning of tragedy that turned into the consequent revolution and the Russian Civil War.

The last two questions were related to the post-February period. When asked, what mistakes were made by the liberals and moderate socialists, seven participants recalled the question of peace, one mentioned the agrarian question, whereas the others chose another option, pointing to another or, as a rule, a set of other mistakes, although seeing them all differently (inability to create a stable political and legal system, relations of the Provisional Government with the State Duma, delay in convening the All-Russia Constituent Assembly etc.)

The final question was whether the February Revolution could stay within the limits of the liberal revolution. Four historians answered that the liberals had good chances to retain power, while the other four believed that the moderate socialists had good chances to retain power and ensure the liberal character of the revolution. Ten people provided a response that the liberals and moderate socialists had no chance to keep the revolution within the liberal framework, whilst giving their own and often differing explanations.

Most historians believed that such chances existed, however they were too small. They connected this with the fact that the Provisional Government and its supporters could and should have done it, however they did not do it, or explained it by the general situation in the country, the growing radicalism of the masses, the dominant Russian socialist political culture, which required deepening the revolution, etc. Thus or otherwise, most of the project participants denied the fatal inevitability of the defeat on part of the liberals and moderate socialists but saw their chances limited and insignificant without solving the main issues that were on the agenda of the revolution – first, those of peace and land.

In conjunction with the bonus question, the respondents expressed various considerations related to the definition of nature of the February Revolution, vision of it as part of the revolutionary process of 1917, which later included the October Revolution, studying the variety of factors in the revolution, its comparison with European revolutions of the 18<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> centuries etc.

There is a grounded appeal voiced by V.V. Shelokhaev and supported by V.V. Kalashnikov, regarding the need to get rid of those ideological clichés that in the last quarter of a century began to fill the public space: after abandoning all sorts of ‘isms’ in Marxist historiography, researchers should not fall into the next string of myths about ‘insidious liberals’, ‘about masons’, ‘foreign cash injections into implementation of the Russian revolution’, etc.

The author of the review fully agrees with this position, especially since in modern explanations of the February Revolution in the media, publicist and popular publications, the term ‘conspiracy’ (or ‘conspiracies’) often prevails and thus, objectively speaking, its value is underestimated with regards to the important role of workers, soldiers and other layers of the population.

Summing up this part of the text in the collection, we must admit that it contains many interesting and profound judgments and reflections, although their authors hold widely differing views on one or another problem of the February Revolution. Let me emphasize once again that getting acquainted with these sections of the book allows specialists and interested readers to get an idea of the wide range of opinions and judgments that exist regarding this revolution in the modern historiography. It would be interesting to formulate a special question about the historical lessons of the Feb-

ruary Revolution and get expert opinions on this issue, although it is to some extent affected by several answers received from the project participants.

Underlining the importance of the materials of the project described in this collection, it should be noted that the third section contains articles, among which many are interesting. Let us note, for example, the article of D.V. Bazhanov, dedicated to the Baltic Fleet in the February Revolution, which gives an overview of historiography in the study of this problem and discloses the process of transition of marine units to the side of the revolution. This article to a certain extent reechoes the published material of K.B. Nazarenko 'Sailors of the Russian Fleet and the February Revolution'.

We will add that two more articles are devoted to the role of the military forces in the February events in this peer-reviewed collection. The article of K.A. Tarasova is devoted to the officer corps of the Russian imperial army in the February Revolution during the uprising in Petrograd. A.V. Ganin in the most voluminous article in this edition revealed the role of the General Staff in the February Revolution. He concluded that the conspiracy (or conspiracies) of the group of generals and senior officers took place, which resulted in the Emperor Nicholas II being forced to abdicate from the throne. Whereby A.V. Ganin named the central role of the officers in the General Staff who contributed to this. Summing up the article, the author concluded that the generals who participated in the overthrow of the emperor miscalculated, believing that political changes would not affect the army, as well as the institution of the monarchy and, conversely, would have a beneficial effect on the situation on the front. "Politicians, as it often happens, outplayed the military," - A.V. Ganin concluded his article.

There are some interesting thoughts about the Russian Revolution of 1917, more precisely about the February Revolution, expressed by I.V. Lukoyanov, who, assessing the state of power, the liberal opposition, the revolutionary parties and the labor movement, came to the conclusion that it looked like collapse of autocratic power that occurred spontaneously, with a random combination of reasons leading to it, although each of them would be characterized as more or less long and deep processes. The author pointed out that a serious change in the political structure seemed inevitable to the contemporaries even in the event of the victorious end of wars, and the question was only in dimensions and mode of transformation.

The monarchists' attitude toward the February Revolution in the modern historiography became subject of the article by D.I. Stogov, whilst O.G. Nazarov dedicated his article to Bolsheviks on the eve and in the days of the revolution. A well-known specialist on national problems of the revolutionary era in Russia, R.G. Suni devoted his article to this topic in the collection. The topic of formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies is discussed in the article of V.A. Rachkovsky. The history of the pursuit of the tsar train by representatives of the new Revolutionary power

since 28 February until 1 March 1917 was examined in detail by the famous researcher of the role of the State Duma in the February Revolution A.B. Nikolayev.

In general, one should admit that the reviewed collection is interesting and informative. Upon reading the materials, specialists and all those interested in this problem, can familiarize themselves with a wide range of judgments and assessments of historians from different countries regarding the problems of the February Revolution and the whole revolutionary process of 1917 in Russia.

# CHRONICLE OF SCIENTIFIC LIFE

## The research of a scholar from Cherepovets printed by the British publisher ‘Routledge’


The prestigious British publisher ‘Routledge’ specializing in publication of academic literature in the Humanities and social sciences issued the monograph ‘Early Professional Women in Northern Europe, c. 1650–1850’ in London and New York.

The monograph is devoted to the study of women’s history in the northern Europe in the early modern period, when they appeared on the arena of economic and social life, gradually occupying even more niches in terms of their jobs. “To improve their positions or to find better business opportunities, the women discussed in this book, developed their professional skills, invested in developing their qualifications and professional skills, took economic or other kinds of risks, or moved to other countries. Socially, they range from elite women and low middle-class origin.

In terms of theory, the book brings fresh insights into issues that have been long discussed in the field of women’s history and are also debated today. However, despite its focus on women, the book is conceptually not so much focused on gender as it is on profession, business, career, qualifications, skills, and work. By applying such concepts to analysing women’s endeavours, the book aims at challenging the conventional ideas about them”, with regards to lack of ambitions and their second-grade position in the society throughout a significant period in the European history.

Three Finnish researchers initiated this publication and later became its editors: Johanna Ilmakunnas (University of Turku), Marjatta Rahikainen (University of Helsinki) and Kirsi Vainio-Korhonen (University of Turku).

The immediate work to prepare the book took three years. An international team was created that represented scientists from Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden. Russia was represented in the project by only two participants:



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Galina Nickolayevna Ulyanova, Doctor of Historical Sciences, leading research worker from the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN Moscow) and Olga Yuryevna Solodyankina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor at the Department of History and Philosophy at Cherepovets State University. Not all the members of the creative team withstood the tough working schedule with regards to the research, and the final composition of the authors' team turned out to be smaller than announced.

The mechanism of work with the book, after the consent in principle for its publication was received from the publishing group Taylor & Francis (where the publisher 'Routledge' belongs), was as follows: first, it was necessary to write a short project with the proposed text, provide a summary and a list of publications, based on which the publisher took the decision on inclusion of parts (and their authors) into the proposed book. After that, each researcher was writing their chapter (in English) with the total volume of 9 000 words. Then the texts were compiled, sent to all members of the authors' team to familiarize themselves with these texts, and then a short workshop was held in Helsinki, where the authors met in person, presented their texts to colleagues, answered the questions, participated in the discussion of important and fundamental parts of the book. Considering the received comments, new versions of the chapters were rewritten. These were carefully edited by all three editors, each paying attention to different aspects of the text. After working with the comments and considering the editors' suggestions, new versions of the chapters were submitted again, after they had been seen by the editors responsible for the separate 'blocs' or sections of the proposed monograph. At this stage, new comments arrived, which were not that principal, and the texts were given another brush. Then the authors started working with the appendices, tables and illustrations. After this, the editors compiled all the texts (the final polishing of the English language was a personal responsibility of each author), made up their book into pages in accordance with the requirements of the publisher and passed it on to the professionals from 'Routledge' for further work, who added their comments too (regarding the language structure, statistical data, appearance of quotations etc.). The authors were to respond to all those comments, specifying the data and providing the requested information. After thorough proofreading of the corrected text by the publisher's editor, the proof corrections of the book were ready, and the authors carefully looked through the words and even the letters in their texts. Finally, after preparing the indexes, the work was finished, and in July 2017 the publisher announced the issue of the book. However, since the arrangement in the Library of Congress in the USA takes a certain time, 2018 will appear in the publisher's imprint.

Separate chapters are devoted to women-midwives (Kirsi Vainio-Korhonen), waiting ladies (Britta Kägler, Johanna Ilmakunnas), painters (Anna-Lena Lindberg), actresses (Marie Steinrud), tailors and dressmakers (Deborah Simonton), industrial-

ists (Galina Ulyanova), teachers (Åsa Karlsson Sjögren, Marjatta Rahikainen), governesses (Olga Solodyankina).

The total volume of the book is 280 pages. It can be purchased through the publisher's web-site of [www.routledge.com/9781472471345](http://www.routledge.com/9781472471345). A 20 % discount can be made if code FLR40 is applied.

## All-Russia academic seminar ‘State, capitalism and society in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries’

On 19-21 October, Cherepovets State University held all-Russia (with international participation) academic seminar ‘State, capitalism and society in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries’ arranged by the Department of History and Philosophy, Humanities Institute with financial support from RFBR (project No. 17-01-14056), as well as within the framework of implementation of the development program for a flagship university ‘Sociopolis 35’. The seminar turned out to be quite impressive: more than 60 scholars took part in its work – employees of academic institutions, university lecturers and school teachers, post-graduate students and students in the master’s programmes – from different cities of Russia (Moscow, St Petersburg, Oryol, Severodvinsk, Kaluga, Yelets, Vologda and others), as well as from the neighbouring CIS and non-CIS countries (the Republic of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania).

At the opening of the seminar, the Pro-Rector (Development) of Cherepovets State University M.G. Belova greeted its participants, noting the importance of the hosted event not only for re-thinking of the historic past of Russia, but also for search of solutions for the problems that the Russian society is facing nowadays. The director of the development program for a flagship university ‘Sociopolis 35’, professor of the Department of History and Philosophy O.Y. Solodyankina was talking about importance of such meetings for the academics to develop the University-level science. The chairman of organizing committee of the seminar, head of the Department of History and Philosophy A.N. Egorov noted the importance of objective comprehension of the developmental problems in the Russian society on the eve and during the October Revolution of 1917, the centenary of which is being commemorated this year, pointed to the range of problems that were supposed to be considered during the seminar and spoke in detail about the procedures.



The plenary session was noted for its lively debates. Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.N. Egorov (Cherepovets) in his report considered the debatable issues in the development of capitalism in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. According to Andrey Nikolayevich, the development of Russia in the stated period did not differ fundamentally from that in the West. Its differences lied in the fact that “in Russia there was no ‘capitalism’ as a special type of society. In Russia, there were only separate elements of capitalism (bourgeois way of life)”. And, whilst ‘in the West the capitalism built up the state according to its needs’, then “in Russia the state was using capitalism for their own needs”. Associate Professor at Faculty of History (History of Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries) at Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow) F.A. Gaida presented a report devoted to the problem of inclusion of public members into the State Council of the Russian Empire during the Coup of June 1907, interesting not only from the point of view of understanding of certain realities in the public life of the Russian Empire in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but also within the context of considering the problem of correlation of community and professional principles in the activity of governmental authorities in general. The speech of the leading research worker at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), V.A. Dyomin provoked an enormous controversy, in which he touched upon the issue of participation of entrepreneurs in the work of the Third Imperial Duma, whose activities were rated ambiguously. The contribution of professor, head of the Department of the History of legal doctrines at Oryol State University (Oryol) D.V. Aronov was dedicated to a complex issue – the nature of state authority in Russia during the period of February-October 1917, from a legal viewpoint. According to Dmitry Vladimirovich, the Russian Provisional Government established at that time, did not possess “features of monarchical power – heredity and lifelong enjoyment of the privilege”, but was rather collegiate and embodied the principles of popular sovereignty. In the report of Doctor of Philology Sciences, Professor A.V. Chernov (Cherepovets), the content of the brochure “Whirlpool. Thoughts and topics. Regarding drama by Leo Tolstoy ‘The Power of Darkness’”, written by Cherepovets city head I.A. Milyutin and published in St Petersburg in 1888, in the wake of recently staged Tolstoy’s play in Paris. The speaker emphasized that the tragic fate of the characters in Tolstoy’s play, related to the development of the Russian country-side in the after-reform period, was perceived by I.A. Milyutin as an inevitable sacrifice offered up to the catching-up modernization of the country. The sacrifice, “which could be avoided, and from constant reoccurrence of which one should protect oneself with the true and not imaginary enlightenment, enlightenment which not only and not so much ‘showing them the ropes’ of reading and writing, but also aiding in the ‘self-identity’ of a person”. The report of professor of the Department of World History at Vologda State University (Vologda) I.N. Tyapin related to the reflection on the ‘Russian Idea’ as a set of philosophical-

historical concepts and its role in the development of Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In the contributor's opinion, 'the Russia Idea' did not develop into a comprehensive national-state ideology during that period, which was one of the reasons that triggered the crisis in Russia, which in the end led to the revolutionary upheavals of 1917.

Further, the work of the seminar was continued in sections. In total, there were six sections ('Power, business and society in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – early 20<sup>th</sup> century', 'Power and society in historiographic and social-philosophical reflection', 'Reflection of development processes of the capitalist society in the periodical publications and literary tradition', 'Power and social-revolutionary movements in Russia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries', 'Debatable problems of social-economic development in Czarist-era Russia' and 'The onset of civil society in the Russian Empire').

The conference papers summarizing the reports have been published in the digest book of the seminar, prepared for publication by the Department of History and Philosophy of Humanities Institute, Cherepovets State University prior to commencement of its work.

*A. Novikov*

# GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

## MANUSCRIPT STRUCTURE AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

### 1. General requirements to the contents of articles

**1.1** Articles presenting results of original scientific research are accepted for publication in the journal, as well as reviews, scientific reports and bibliographical reviews on the latest Russian and international studies in history and political science.

**1.2** The journal publishes only original research papers not previously published elsewhere and not containing any incorrect or excessive citation.

**1.3** Submitted articles should correspond to the subject matter of the journal in the following key areas:

- History
- Political Science

**1.4** Submitted materials should be characterized by academic novelty and integrity. This presupposes that an article contains a historiographical overview.

- Per international standards of publication, a reference list should include no less than 20 sources, where international editions amount to one third of the total number of publications.

- Most of the references should be from Scopus, Web of Science, with DOI and URL.

- Excessive self-citation should be avoided (references to the author's works should not exceed 10 % of overall number of references).

**1.5** Manuscripts, which do not correspond to the subject matter of the journal or do not meet the style requirements, will not be considered for publication.

### 2. General style requirements

**2.1** Manuscripts should be in the format of .doc (Word 1997-2002) or .docx.

**2.2** The recommended volume of an article is one publication base sheet (40 000 characters with spaces).

**2.3** Page parameters: 210 x 297 mm (A4 format), portrait orientation. Page margin: all 20 mm. Normal font, TimesNewRoman. Font size: 12 point in the main text, 10 point in footnotes. Line spacing: one and a half. The text should be without automatic hyphenation at the end of the line. The title of the article: bold font, center aligned. Page numeration: right bottom.

**2.4** The text of the manuscript should be in a single file. Provisionally, the manuscript is divided into two parts: the first one contains UDC, information about the author, an abstract, key words, the text of the article and a list of references; the second one should be entirely in English and includes information about the author, an abstract (not mandatory), key words (not mandatory), a list of references.

### 3. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the Russian language

**3.1.** Information about the author of the article: last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author in full, degree/s (if any), title (if any), position, affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study (in full), city, country, author's contact details: telephone number and email address.

**3.2.** UDC and the title of the article.

**3.3.** An abstract of **400-600 characters**, which must be informative and informative (it should briefly reflect the content of the article as close as possible, as well as its structure and conclusions).

**3.4.** Key words (8–10).

**3.5.** The text of the article. The article should have the following structural elements:

- a) Introduction;
- b) Main text;
- c) Conclusion.

**3.6.** List of references.

### 4. Rules on graphic presentation data

**4.1.** Drawings, tables, diagrams, charts, etc. are to be numbered, the sources are to be provided and printed within the margins of the page.

**4.2.** All highlights in the text of the article must be only in italics (not in bold or underlined).

**4.3.** Depending on the complexity of graphic materials, the Editorial Board retains the right to remove them from the text.

### 5. References in the text and in footnotes

All footnotes are given per page in 10-point size. (*Author*. Title. Place of publication (without publisher's name), year of publication. Pages) at the bottom of each page.

When referring to an electronic resource, a full and accurate link to the Internet resource and the date of retrieval are to be added at the end of the footnote.

In case the source is an archive document, the name of an archive in full without abbreviation is to be given first followed by an abbreviation in brackets. Fund. Series. Record. Sheet. When referring to documents from the same archive, only abbreviation is used for its name.

#### **Examples:**

*Glebov S.* Evraziistvo mezhdru imperiei i modernom. Istoriia v dokumentakh [Eurasianism between Empire and Art Nouveau]. M., 2009. P. 27.

*Starostina T.* Posleblokadnyi tranzit. Dnevnik [Transit after the blockade. Diary] // Sever. 2005. No. 5–6. Pp. 127–133.

*Lazarev G.* Frantsuzy ukhodiut iz Mali [The French leave Mali] // *Gazeta.ru*. 06.02.2013. URL: [http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/02/06\\_a\\_4954773.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/02/06_a_4954773.shtml) (retrieved: 22.02.2014).

The State Archive of Vologda region (SAVR). F. 366. S. 1. R. 1188. L.3. (when referred for the first time)

SAVR. F. 3105. S. 1. R. 3. L. 1 verso. (when referred for the second time)

*Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o gubernskikh i uezdnykh zemskikh uchrezhdeniakh ot 1 ianvaria 1864 g.* [Statute on governorate and district institutions approved by the Imperial, dated 1 January 1864] // *PSZ*. S. 2. Dep. 1 V. XXXIX. St.-P., 1867. N 40457. Pp. 18–20.

*Stocking M.K.* (ed.) *The Journals of Claire Clairmont. 1814–1827.* Cambridge, 1968. P. 325.

*Boisbouvier Ch.* Mali : le retour de la Françafrique? // *RFI.fr*. 23.07.2013. URL: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130722-mali-presidentielle-francafrique-hollande-fabius-traore-tiebile-drame> (retrieved: 26.02.2014).

## 6. Rules for arranging the list of references

6.1. The list is to be numbered in alphabetical order.

6.2. The list is to include only scientific works.

6.3. **All references to sources should be given as footnotes and not included in the list of references at the end.**

6.4. **Monographs** should be presented as follows:

- *Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;*
- Title of the book;
- Information about the book in the following order: place of publication, publishing house, year of publication. Pages.

### **Examples:**

*Potemkina M.N.* Evakuatsiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: liudi i sud'by [Evacuation in the years of the Great Patriotic War]. Magnitogorsk: MaGU, 2002. 264 p.

*Cross A.G.* 'By the banks of the Neva': chapters from the lives and careers of the British in 18<sup>th</sup> – century Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 474 p.

6.5. **Dissertations and published summaries of dissertations:**

*Arslanova Ch.R.* Evakuirovannoe i deportirovannoe v Bashkirskuiu ASSR nasele-nie v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945) [Population evacuated and deported to Bashkirskaya ASSR in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: published summary of dissertation. Ufa, 2006. 25 p.

*Iskhakova G.R.* Sotsial'naia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Ote-chestvennoi voiny (na materialakh Bashkortostana) [Social policy of the Soviet State in the years of the Great Patriotic War]: PhD dissertation. Ufa, 2002. 147 p.

6.6. **Articles in journals / collections of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s;
- Title of the article // Title of the collection of articles/journal;
- Publisher's imprint in the following order: Year of publication. Number. Pages. DOI index (if available)

**Examples:**

*Kumanev G.A.* Voina i evakuatsiia v SSSR. 1941–1942 gody [The war and evacuation in the USSR in 1941-1942] // *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*. 2006. No. 6. Pp. 7–27.

*Solodyankina O.Y.* European widows as governesses in the 18<sup>th</sup> – and 19th-century Russia // *Women's History Magazine*. 2010. Issue. 63. Pp. 19–26.

6.7. **References to electronic resources** are to be provided in a similar manner, as in the previous sections, but at the very end of the reference the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date are to be added.

**Example:**

*Stansfield G.* Iraqi Kurdistan: political development and emergent democracy. Taylor & Francis e-library, 2003. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/3271178/Iraqi\\_Kurdistan\\_Political\\_development\\_and\\_emergent\\_democracy](https://www.academia.edu/3271178/Iraqi_Kurdistan_Political_development_and_emergent_democracy) (retrieved: 04.10. 2014).

6.8. When reference is made to an electronic publication (articles or monographs), the full name of the site is to be provided.

## 7. Composition and presentation rules for the section in the English language

7.1. Information about the author of the article:

- Last name, first name and patronymic (if applicable) in full, transliteration (for automatic transliteration we recommend using the site <http://translit.net/>; **it is essential to select LC standard** in the main menu of the site, in the 'Options...' section), degree (if applicable), title (if applicable), position, author's email address;
- Affiliation (name of the organization, place of work/study in full (full official name of the organization in English, post code, country, city, street (in transliteration), building).

7.2. The title of the article – English translation.

7.3. Not mandatory: Abstract in English, **between 400-600 characters in volume** (must be written using commonly used terms and expressions in the field, must constitute an independent text, be informative and rich in contents, as far as possible reflecting the contents, structure and conclusions of the article).

7.4. Not mandatory: key words in English (8–10 words or word combinations).

7.5. References.

## 8. Presentation rules for 'References' section

8.1. The structure of references to publications is to be totally identical to the list of references in Russian.

8.2. In the 'References' section, as in the list of used literature, only scientific articles and monographs are to be included.

8.3. All references to sources are to be given as footnotes.

8.4. **Monographs** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for Russian authors), **LC standard**;

- *Title of the book in italics* – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the book is published in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title in square brackets;

- Year of publication;

- Information about the publication as follows: location of publishing house, name of the publishing house;

- Pages,

- if the book is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

### **Examples:**

Ter-Minasova S.G. *Rossiia i Zapad: dialog kul'tur* [Russia and West countries: dialogue of cultures]. Moscow: Tsentr po izucheniiu vzaimodeistviia kul'tur, 2000. 320 p. (In Russian)

Bevir M., Rhodes R.A.W. *Interpreting British governance*. London: Routledge, 2003. 150 p.

8.5. Articles **in journals** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the author/s – transliteration (for Russian authors) **LC standard**;

- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;

- Information about the publication as follows: *Name of the journal (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, year of publication, number, pages, DOI index (if available);

- if the article is in Russian, add '(In Russian)' at the end.

### **Examples:**

Dunin A. *Guvernery v starinu v pomeschchich'ikh sem'iakh* [Tutors in landowner families in old times]. *Istoricheskii vestnik* [Historical Herald], 1909, vol. 117, July, pp. 185–194. (In Russian)

Cross A.G. An Anglo-Russian Medley: Semen Vorontsov's other son, Charles Cameron's daughter, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich's English playmate and not forgetting his English nurse. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 1992, vol. 70, no. 44, pp. 708–721.

*Cross A. English – A Serious Challenge to French in the Reign of Alexander I? The Russian Review, 2015, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 57–68. DOI: 10.1111/russ.10756*

8.6. Articles **in collection of articles** are to be presented as follows:

- Last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) – transliteration (for authors whose name is in Cyrillic characters), **LC standard**;
- Title of the article – transliteration, **LC standard**, if the article is written in Cyrillic characters, followed by the English translation of the title, in square brackets;
- Information about the publication of the collection of articles as follows: In last name, first name, patronymic (if applicable) of the editor – transliteration, **LC standard, (ed.)**. *Name of the collection of articles (in italics)* – transliteration, **LC standard**, followed by the English translation of the title (if written in Cyrillic characters), in square brackets; place of publishing: the name of the publishing house in transliteration, year of publication; pages, DOI index (if available);
- if the article is in Russian, add (In Russian) at the end.

**Examples:**

Chudinov A.V. Frantsuzskie gubernery v Rossii kontsa XVIII v.: stereotipy i real'nost [The French tutors in Russia at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century: stereotypes and reality]. Karp S.Ia., Mezin S.A. (eds.) *Evropeiskoe prosveshchenie i tsvilizatsiia Rossii* [European Enlightenment and civilization of Russia]. Moscow: Nauka, 2004, pp. 330–334. (In Russian)

Solodyankina O.Yu. Personal transfer of the message and undesirable acquaintance to the addressee: reputation of the governess. Stogova A.V. (ed.) *Incidents and Failures in European epistolary culture*. Moscow: IVI RAN, 2016, pp. 125–154.

8.7. **Links to electronic resources** are to be provided similar to the previous sections, but at the very end of the entry the exact link to the internet resource and the retrieval date is to be added.

**Examples:**

Dabla-Norris E., Minoiu C., Zanna L.-F. 2010. *Business cycle fluctuations, large shocks, and development aid new evidence* [Washington D.C.], International Monetary Fund. Available at: <http://site.ebrari.com/id/10437418> (accessed: 20.06.2014).

Frot E. 2009 *Aid and the financial crisis: Shall we expect development aid to fall?* Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Available at: [http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1402788](http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402788) (accessed: 28.05. 2013).

